What’s Up With the Pandemic Rise in Homicide Rates? Or, Beware the Lazy “Mass Releases” Take

There’s a really interesting op-ed by Jeff Asher and Ben Horwitz of AP Analytics in yesterday’s USA Today about the 2020 rise in homicide rates. Here’s an excerpt:

The FBI reported in September that murder was up almost 15% in agencies that reported three to six months of comparable data for both 2019 and 2020. But the antiquated national crime data collection and reporting system makes it hard to confidently say what is causing the spike or what can be done about it.

The FBI has used the Uniform Crime Reporting Summary Reporting System, which was created in 1929, for the past nine decades. There are about 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States. Only a bit more than 16,000 of them reported monthly crime figures last year in eight relatively broad categories that the FBI aggregated and published. This annual collection system is shoddy. Some agencies don’t report data every year and others report incomplete data.

There have been changes over the decades, but crime data reporting is mostly the same today as it was 90 years ago. And the most glaring issues remain: Agencies aren’t required to report data, and those that do report are often not asked to provide data in a way that’s useful. For example, agencies aren’t required to separate assaults during which individuals are shot from other attempted aggravated assaults by firearm. In general, assault-by-firearm cases are massively underreported, severely reducing insight into national gun violence trends.

Efforts have been made to improve collection, but there is still no timely national crime data. The FBI’s report in September was the first time the bureau produced a quarterly summary report.

The FBI also built a website that improves access to raw crime data, and in January the agency will drop the summary reporting system and transition solely to a National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which will provide a more nuanced look at trends.

The incident-based reporting system categorizes crime into more than 52 offense types, which provide more insight into the types of crimes recorded. But that system, while better, won’t solve all crime data reporting problems. Shootings, for example, will still not be specifically categorized under NIBRS.

It is also unclear how many agencies will participate in NIBRS next year. Just 51% of the participating agencies reported under NIBRS as of 2019. The switch to NIBRS-only doesn’t appear to solve the problem of lengthy delays in reporting crime data to the public.

The 2019 stats, for example, weren’t released until the end of this year.

Even though the FBI data is shoddy (for which, to be sure, there’s no excuse), there are a few things we can learn from this. On Twitter this morning, Asher provided the graph at the top of this post to show that the upward trend is consistent in lots of different towns, and he also has numbers to show that it’s not a Democratic/Republican issue (cities run by both R and D administrations are seeing a rise in crime.) He also showed that the rise in homicides is accelerating over the first three quarters of 2020, refuting one-factor explanations (“this is all about Defund the Police!”).

Image

I’m still (STILL!) grading exams, so I don’t have the bandwidth to do a full analysis on the data (you can download the entire dataset here and be your own hero) but I do have three quick observations to make:

  1. The data provides a breakdown by serious offense, but has a monolithic category of “murder,” preventing us from analyzing different types of murder. Even though it looks like a uniform rise as 2020 progressed, it is not implausible to suggest that the type of homicides that increased during the pandemic lockdown might be different. My money’s on a higher percentage of domestic homicides, and this might be something that can be confirmed by correlating with rapes and assaults. The reasons are obvious–all the risk factors for domestic violence are heightened because of the pandemic and the ensuing financial crisis: stress, proximity to assailant (especially the availability of children and working spouses during the day), unemployment, financial difficulties. It’s also possible that a higher consumption of drugs, more mental instability, and more people in the streets leads to more street shootings. None of this is rocket science.
  2. Articles about the rise in homicides in SF and Oakland highlighted that the incidents involve an overrepresentation of victims of color (the articles say nothing about perpetrators, but homicide tends to be intraracial.) If my theory that Q2 and Q3 largely represent a rise in domestic homicides, it should come as no particular surprise that you’d see higher rates of homicide among the populations that were disproportionately impacted by the pandemic and the prevention regimes (more stress, more unemployment, more financial difficulties, more homelessness, more mental health anguish visited on poor people of color.)
  3. I’m already seeing some lazy takes on Twitter about whether “this could have been caused my mass releases,” to which the easy answer is: What mass releases? The rise in homicides far precedes any releases that were taking place–even to the extent that some places (not CA!) released people, no one was heeding warnings from experts back in March, when the rate of homicides was already accelerating. Moreover, the acceleration is linear, suggesting that if releases in, say, July and August changed things in Q3, they didn’t do so to a particularly pronounced degree that was not predictable by the general trend. Nor is there anything to suggest that the people who were released–in CA, basically folks who would be released anyway due to attrition rates who got a wee push out the door a couple months early–can trigger a trend like this, and for places who did do their due diligence in releasing aging and infirm folks, those are the least likely people to commit crime, let alone homicide.

I’m harping on (3) for a reason. My suspicion is that we are not seeing mass releases precisely because of the fear that the inevitable rise in crime rates as a consequence of pandemic-related criminogenic factors will be linked by lazy journalists and hobbyist twitterers to releases (even though it likely has nothing to do with releases) and backfire in terms of political advancement. This is disappointing, but it is how democracy works, and the first people to suffer are the folks already behind bars–solely for the sake of optics.

BREAKING NEWS: Important Legal Developments in Quentin, Plata Cases

The last few days have seen key developments in all three major COVID-19 lawsuits against CDCR. On the San Quentin front, the California Supreme Court granted CDCR’s petition for review… but this is not necessarily bad news, just complicated. I’ll start by providing the decision in Von Staich and the order in the Marin cases, and follow up with commentary. Here’s the grant of petition for review:

The Attorney General seeks review of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, which found that prison officials have been deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of prisoners at San Quentin State Prison during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court ordered officials to remedy the constitutional violation by designing a plan to reduce the population of the prison to 50 percent of its June 2020 population, through either additional releases from custody or transfers to other institutions.

The questions raised by the petition are undoubtedly substantial. The health and welfare of individuals in the state’s custody during the pandemic, and the appropriate measures for their protection, are matters of clear statewide importance. As the Court of Appeal explained, “[t]he Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution both require correctional officials to provide inmates adequate medical care” and prohibit prison officials from being ” ‘deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious communicable disease’ [citation].” (In re Von Staich, filed opn. at p. 18.) 

The Court of Appeal ruled on the basis of the documents submitted and oral argument, without holding an evidentiary hearing. As the case now comes to this court, it appears that there are significant disputes about the efficacy of the measures officials have already taken to abate the risk of serious harm to petitioner and other prisoners, as well as the appropriate health and safety measures they should take in light of present conditions. For this reason, we return the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to consider whether to order an evidentiary hearing to investigate these matters before judgment is pronounced. (See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 482-483, 485.) As we have repeatedly advised in other cases raising similar issues, the matter should be resolved as expeditiously as is consistent with sound adjudication, given the exigent and evolving circumstances concerning COVID-19.

The request for judicial notice is granted. 

The petition for review is granted. The cause is transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 482-483 and 485, the Attorney General’s Return to the Order to Show Cause at pages 13-19, and the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at pages 32-38. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) 

The request for depublication is denied.

Votes: Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., Corrigan, Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, Groban and Jenkins, JJ.

And here’s the order in the 311 Marin County cases:

122420 Order Staying Further Proceedings & Vacating Individual Orders by hadaraviram on Scribd

Here’s what’s going on. Von Staich was decided on the basis of a case called People v. Duvall, which clarified how habeas corpus cases should be heard in court. Under Duvall, when someone petitions for habeas corpus and claims that the government is holding them under unconstitutional conditions, the government must provide a return that “allege[s] facts tending to establish the legality of petitioner’s detention. . . The factual allegations of a return must also respond to the allegations of the petition that form the basis of the petitioner’s claim that the confinement is unlawful. . . In addition to stating facts, the return should also, “where appropriate, … provide such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.”

The Court of Appeal in Von Staich relied on a fairly straightforward application of Duvall. Because the AG representatives of the San Quentin warden did not actually present evidence showing that the prison authorities’ behavior was appropriate, all the Court was left with was the AMEND report, which stated that no appropriate social distancing could take place unless the prison population were to be reduced to 50% of design capacity. The return did not provide any contrary medical opinion. The Supreme Court seems to disagree with the Court of Appeal, finding that the “significant disputes about the efficacy of the measures officials have already taken” to ameliorate the Quentin catastrophe, an evidentiary hearing might be warranted. As a consequence, the actions taken by the Marin court toward relief for the hundreds of San Quentin petitioners have been frozen until the Court of Appeal determines whether to hold an evidentiary hearing to examine whether the steps taken by the prison authorities can undermine the findings of “deliberate indifference.”

This is not necessarily a bad development, for several reasons. First of all, it is dubious that CDCR, and the AG, could put on any convincing evidence to show that the measures they took, short of releasing people, adequately put them out of “deliberate indifference” territory. Their own doctors are horrified by what they are doing and have said on the record that they want nothing to do with the transfers. Their claims about other precautions, such as screening and wearing PPE, have now been refuted by two Inspector General reports, and they have been excoriated by the legislature for not rising to that level. Only this week did they show any signs of enforcing proper protection on their own staff (so, even the ameliorating steps they claimed to have taken, which the Court of Appeal found “commendable”, turn out to be fictional.)

In addition, consider the dire developments for our friends behind bars before the Supreme Court’s grant. Recall that the Von Staich decision offered CDCR the choice between releases and transfers, urging them to consider releases of aging, infirm people. CDCR proceeded to abuse the discretion it was given to cook up a “remedy” that turned out worse than no remedy at all: as of a week ago, CDCR was still taking active steps to move people out of San Quentin, where the outbreak has abated (for now), to places like RJD and VSP, which experienced horrific outbreaks to the tune of hundreds of cases. Even in the face of realities on the ground–an outbreak in every single prison, a third of the entire prison population infected, a ninth of the entire prison population experiencing an active case, 104 deaths–they were going to shortsightedly confine their energies toward begrudging formal compliance that actually endangered people even more (in addition to the obvious contagion risks, I’ve received emails from folks inside expressing real fears of retaliation from people in the prisons to which they were to be transferred.) Meanwhile, flying in the face of the obvious public health priorities, the folks who should have been first in line to be released were at the very end of the line. This new development buys us more time to push for releases.

The last point is crucial, because the big legal case involving the entire CDCR apparatus, Plata v. Newsom, took a drastic turn in our favor yesterday. At the oral argument, Judge Tigar was exceedingly critical of CDCR’s handling of this crisis. He mentioned a conversation he had with Dr. Elizabeth Linos of the Berkeley Goldman School regarding a much-needed cultural change inside CDCR–a shift in approach from making demands (which Tigar referred to as a “sledgehammer” approach) toward emulation and leading by example, going as far as expressing doubt that the new CDCR policy to ensure testing compliance–and any measures taken by CCPOA, the prison guards union–went far enough, given the existence of significant “pockets” of noncompliance among the staff. Judge Tigar became visibly emotional as he discussed his visits at CMF, mentioning that Gov. Newsom called him and expressed a desire to tour CMF as well. Judge Tigar discussed in detail several people he had met behind bars, including a man in his 90s and a man who became eligible for parole in 1993. He displayed pictures of several people who had died of COVID-19 behind bars, speaking at length and in detail about Eric Warner, 57, an amputee, reformed Christian, and volunteer, and about Sergeant Gilbert Polanco, 55. When speaking of Mr. Warner’s passing, Judge Tigar had to stop to wipe his tears.

Judge Tigar then made a lengthy and forceful plea with Katheleen Allison to consider releases, stating that the time had come for that remedy and giving Gov. Newsom is support in this effort. Judge Tigar used the term of art “deliberate indifference”–a term indicating a finding of Eight Amendment violation–several times–even though he said that it had not been technically met, but explicitly said that CDCR’s behavior will fuel further lawsuits. The upshot of the hearing was the following order:

gov.uscourts.cand.76.3523.0 (1) by hadaraviram on Scribd

The order requires the parties to brief Judge Tigar on the physical possibilities to create quarantine and social distancing (including, for example, the existence of solid doors), as well as on the extent to which pandemic prevention guidelines might have changed during the course of the litigation. The situation on the ground makes it plainly obvious that what is needed here is an all-encompassing solution for the entire prison system; while state courts should be the vanguard of safeguarding Eighth Amendment rights in prisons, their jurisdiction is limited to their counties, and we are simply no longer in a situation in which this makes geographical sense. The thing to do now is push aggressively for releases and for early, effective, and broad vaccination behind bars, and to bring Plata to a successful and effective conclusion.

BREAKING NEWS: Vaccine Available for Staff AND Incarcerated People This Month

Today, CDCR Secretary Kathleen Allison communicated excellent news. The letter above reads:

To All Loved Ones of Incarcerated Individuals and Valued External Stakeholders,

We have an important update in our response efforts against the COVID-19 pandemic. As most of you know, the vaccine has arrived in California, and it is safe and effective. The vaccine is being made available on a phased basis, and as a state, we are committed to a fair and equitable allocation and distribution process.

To that end, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS) will receive our first vaccines allocation as soon as this month, and we are currently working with our public health partners on a distribution plan. The initial focus will be on people at high risk of becoming infected or severely ill from COVID-19, as well as frontline workers.

We will have information on our website, and will update it regularly to ensure we are keeping everyone informed on these efforts.

CDCR and CCHCS have also sent out a similar communication to the incarcerated population and staff. We encourage everyone to accept the vaccine once they are eligible to receive it, and in accordance with the phased distribution approach. These collective efforts will set us on the path to recovery, and will allow us to reduce the risk of COVID-19 in our institutions, and safely reopen to in-person visiting, group programming, volunteering, and other opportunities.

If you have questions please email COVID19@cdcr.ca.gov. We are unable to address questions about specific individuals with this correspondence; however, we value your feedback and welcome your questions about the vaccine program and our COVID-19 response efforts.

In the meantime, we are continuing to ensure everyone is taking every precaution to ensure the safety and wellness of everyone who lives and works in our institutions. We are thankful to the families, friends and loved ones of our incarcerated population, as well as our stakeholders. Your hard work, dedication, and sacrifice this year has not been lost on us, and we are appreciative of all your efforts.

For more information on these response efforts, please visit the CDCR/CCHCS COVID response page. For more information about this project and the COVID-19 vaccine, visit this web page.

Take care of yourselves and take care of each other.

Kathleen Allison Clark Kelso

Secretary Receiver

I received the above in a format that did not have clickable links, but I assume the links take you here and here. I have many questions, which I will email to the above address tomorrow morning, including whether the vaccine is mandatory for staff, whether readiness/buy in questionnaires have been administered, and whether choice to vaccinate will be linked to incarceration conditions. I hope to provide updates soon.

There. Is. Nowhere. To. Transfer.

Today we are hearing more rumblings about CDCR’s plans (irrespective of the Von Staich decision, they claim) to transfer elderly, infirm people between prisons.

Where are they going to transfer people to? The graph above, compiled by Chad Goerzen from CDCR data, depicts the rise in new cases just in the last few days. A third of the prison population has been infected so far; a tenth is currently infected; 97 people have died. As of today, twenty-three prisons have major outbreaks (more than 50 cases):

  • CCI (156 new cases)
  • CIW (64 new cases)
  • CMC (180 new cases)
  • LAC (795 new cases)
  • SAC (115 new cases)
  • SOL (129 new cases)
  • CAC (367 new cases)
  • CAL (154 new cases)
  • CEN (419 new cases)
  • CTF (799 new cases)
  • HDSP (722 new cases)
  • ISP (120 new cases)
  • KVSP (505 new cases)
  • MCSP (733 new cases)
  • NKSP (208 new cases)
  • PBSP (76 new cases) 
  • PVSP (1,213 new cases)
  • RJD (400 new cases)
  • SVSP (83 new cases)
  • SCC (248 new cases)
  • SATF (593 new cases)
  • VSP (368 new cases)

A change in strategy is long past due. But it looks like CDCR is taking a page out of Trump’s pandemic prevention playbook, flailing about, transferring people to and fro, hoping that this will go away and arguing in court that “there is no need to act hastily.”

What worries me about this is not just the immediate danger to people. The profound and understandable breakdown in trust between CDCR and the people in its care is going to be the Achilles’ heel of any vaccination strategy. It is essential to understand that releases and vaccinations must go hand in hand. I say this not only to CDCR officials, who might be thinking that the vaccine will obviate the need to release people, but also to activists who obstinately oppose the vaccines because they worry it will weaken the struggle for releases. Without the good will that only releases can create, not only will any vaccine intervention be ineffective, but the problems that fester in the system will increase its susceptibility to the next pandemic.

New Death Penalty Abolition Bill

There’s a new bill, introduced by Assemblymembers Levine and Chiu and coauthored by Assemblymembers Friedman, Gipson, and Stone and Senator Weiner to abolish the death penalty. The bill does not include a retroactive provision to commute current death sentences to LWOP.

The bill will likely pass in the legislature, but because it requires a constitutional amendment it will be on the ballot. This does not have a history of success, as Austin Sarat explains in this book. But since 2016, when we tried this last, six big things have changed, which may improve the odds:

  1. Twenty-two states have abolished the death penalty and three have moratoria on its use. A critical mass of states can now be said to have given it up.
  2. Since the beginning of this pandemic, more people have died of COVID-19 on death row alone than we’ve executed since the death penalty was reintroduced in 1978.
  3. Because of the death penalty moratorium, we won’t be executing anyone else anytime soon – but we’re still footing the bill of death penalty litigation.
  4. The Golden State Killer got life without parole. If not him, then who?
  5. One of California’s major killer counties, L.A. County, will cease to seek death sentences under new D.A. George Gascón.
  6. The recent Trump/Barr killing spree at the federal level has disgusted and reviled millions of people.

I think these developments have altered the landscape considerably enough to merit another try at abolition.

BREAKING NEWS: OC Superior Court Orders OC Jail Population Reduction to 50%

Incredible day: the Orange County Superior Court held today that the Orange County Sheriff, whose COVID-19 prevention incompetence was featured in Barnes v. Ahlman, violated the Eighth Amendment, and ordered the jail to reduce its population by 50%!

Here’s the decision in its entirety; summary follows.

20.12.11 Campbell Order by hadaraviram on Scribd

First, the bottom line: The specific petitioners in Campbell receive immediate relief, in the form of release or transfer. For everyone else, the court orders reductions of at least 50% in all dormitories–and if this is insufficient to achieve proper distancing, even further reductions.

The facts paint a horrible picture of the COVID experience at the jail. Not only is it impossible, given the conditions there, for people to socially distance, staff behavior is not monitored when they are away from the facility. Amazingly, staff are not tested unless they request it, even if they display symptoms. The staff is provided PPE but are not required to wear it. Housing decisions do not take medical vulnerability into account. None of these facts, which were backed by statements from medical experts and staff members, were contradicted by respondents with any evidence.

The decision is a pretty straightforward application of Von Staich, which in itself is a pretty straightforward application of Duvall. In other words: Petitioners showed evidence of incompetence accompanied by awareness of the danger to their lives + the Sheriff neglected to challenge the evidence => petitioners win.

I really hope this signals the beginning of the collapse of CDCR’s deceit machine about transfers; I want there to be court decisions in every single CDCR facility and county jail ordering 50% reductions. What we need is a more holistic understanding of the fact that there truly is nowhere to escape to–the entire COVID-19 prevention situation is broken beyond repair, and shifting people around won’t help.

There’s another way in which this matters for carceral permeability: so far, the meager releases from CDCR prisons have not been offset by transfers from jail because CDCR temporarily halted the transfers. The folly of having to obtain these decisions facility by facility is that, from CDCR’s standpoint, the population glut and resulting outbreaks in jails are invisible. This isn’t helped by the poor job BSCC is doing and the low credibility of their data (to the point that upstanding citizens like Berkeley law student Darby Aono have had to step up and collect data on their own.) But it should be obvious to CDCR that, sooner rather than later, the party will have to end, and the outbreaks in jails will require an exit door on that end. Shuffling folks around is not enough: something’s gotta give.

Full Steam Ahead in the Wrong Direction

You may recall that the Court of Appeal’s population reduction order in Von Staich did not specify the method by which CDCR should go about population reduction (though it did strongly recommend focusing on people aged 60 and over with 25 years of incarceration behind them.) The order specified that CDCR could choose to comply via releases or transfers. As far as releases, the recent Chron exposé shows that they delivered more or less on what was promised back in July: far too few people, 99% of whom were getting out in a few months anyway, and only 0.8% of whom were COVID-19 risks.

What this indicates–and what the AG’s petition for review to the California Supreme Court indicates–is that CDCR intends to address this crisis almost exclusively via transfers. This is also becoming clearer and clearer in the Marin Superior Court, where Judge Howard, who is presiding over hundreds of habeas corpus petitions from San Quentin, issued the following order:

SQ Case Management Order No. 12 by hadaraviram on Scribd

The gist of the decision is this: Judge Howard is proceeding with fashioning the remedies, as he considers Von Staich “persuasive authority” and despite declarations from the AG that they do not intend to comply until they hear back from the Supreme Court. At the same time, he seems unsympathetic to the arguments against transfers, because the Von Staich decision “provided clear guidance that transfer was a viable remedy.” The AG representatives did state that, independently of the Von Staich decision, they are starting their own transfer initiative, which targets people aged 65 and older. Judge Howard has ordered them to provide a list of the people they are transferring, and the petitioners’ lawyers to compile a list of people who are aged 60 and over and/or have COVID-19 risk factors.

How is this playing out on the ground? You can get a sense from the image at the top of this post. In the last week, per the San Francisco Bay View, people inside–both at San Quentin and at other institutions–have been pressured to accept a transfer out of their own volition, and when they refuse–they are asked to sign the form above, in which they waive any future claims about the risk they face. The form requires them to initial the following statements:

I understand that due to my age, I am at high risk for developing serious complications if I get infected with COVID-19.

I understand that I have one or more medical conditions that makes me high risk for developing serious complications if I get infected with COVID-19.

I understand that COVID-19 could lead to serious complications such as lengthy hospitalizations or even death.

I understand that living in places where individuals are in close contact and physical distancing is difficult to follow, such as prison dormitory [sic], will increases [sic] my risk of being infected by COVID-19.

I understand that COVID-19 could lead to serious implications such as lengthy hospitalization or even death.

I understand that if I change my mind and decided [sic] to be housed in celled housing, I will submit a 7362 or talk to a health staff to request for [sic] celled housing.

I’m hearing from family members and friends of incarcerated people that CDCR is gearing up toward involuntary transfers at Quentin and elsewhere, which are (and always have been) their prerogative, and so, these so-called informed consent forms are actually obsolete. Therefore, it is now more obvious to me than ever that CDCR is worried about a monetary damages lawsuit, and with good reason–I expect we’ll see one in the not-too-far future. If so, I doubt that these waivers, given the circumstances in which they are being procured, will even come close to providing the kind of defense that CDCR, or the AG, think it will provide.

More importantly, the virus doesn’t attend the status hearings at the different courts, and follows its own agenda, which is–as it always has been–to invade cells and replicate itself, which makes this transfer agenda even more inappropriate. As of three days ago, every single CDCR facility has a COVID-19 outbreak, which raises the question–how do CDCR officials purport to improve the situation via transfers, and where are they going to shuffle people to? The information I got from Solano, and a conversation with a relative of someone at SATF, have convinced me that the same pathologies that led to the spread of the virus in San Quentin are now in evidence in other prisons.

Which brings me again to the point of carceral permeability. The logic of lawsuits and court rules doesn’t conform to the realities of geography. By their very nature, they deal with “cases and controversies”, not with proactive solutions to rapidly evolving situations. Order a remedy in one prison, and by the time it’s fashioned, the outbreak will quell there and spike in other places. Exhibit judicial caution and give prison officials the choice between transfers and releases (which is, after all, what courts are supposed to do–express restraint) and they will make the wrong choices. Thinking about this remedy regarding San Quentin alone is part of the brief, but in terms of the actual problem, it makes no sense to implement the remedy in isolation from what is happening in other prisons.

Pandemic Food Problems

One of the often overlooked aspects of mass incarceration is that, as Erika Camplin puts it, “we as a nation are effectively feeding around 2 million mouths at least three times over each and every day.” Prison food has always been a problem; we even had a conference about it nine years ago. What I remember from the conference is that the CDCR nutritionist spoke on one of the panels and showed slides of prison meals that looked decent enough; under pressure from audience questions, however, she admitted that the slides were doctored, and then lashed out, “these people are monsters.” The rest of the panelists, most of whom were prison and jail doctors, immediately said, incensed, “that’s a lie.”

The pandemic has let things drop far beneath even that already low baseline. During the big outbreak in San Quentin, kitchen workers became infected and fell ill, which led, for several weeks, to serving the men an extra lunch in lieu of a hot dinner (to make up the missing calories.) We now learn from reports of people inside that the same, and worse, is happening at other institutions.

The email chain in the image above is making the rounds on Twitter; I don’t know who sent it around, but here is the text, reproduced. The printout is stamped as “Pelican Bay State Prison, Security Housing C-8.” The first email in the chain is from a Bryan Price to a Chad Parry, CC’ing a David Barneburg. I looked Barneburg up, and it looks like he’s Associate Warden at Pelican Bay. Price writes:

Hey Chad how’s your night going.

Well as for here, it’s not going to good. The inmate are starting to act out over the food and I don’t blame them. I thought when we cut one of their hot meals like dinner. In the past we have given them two lunches for dinner to make up for the calorie lost. Right now they got six crackers, two cookies, a small bag of pretzels, block of cheese and a drink mix. They also got 1 peanut butter, banana and a jalapeno. It is hard to believe that two of these lunches and the breakfast meal has the calories that is due to them. I the memo it states they will be getting box lunches with fruit, milk and juice.

So my question is, is this right because it does not seem right. The same lunch they saw this morning is the one they got for dinner. Hope there is something we can do. I think it’s going to get really bad really fast around here.

Any help in this matter would be greatly appreciated.

Out of the obvious awfulness of the whole thing, for some reason I find myself stuck on the mystery of the jalapeño. What is someone who can’t cook, and who has no access to vegetables, supposed to do with a single jalapeño? Is it cooked? Canned? Pickled? Frankly, I’m not sure the problem is only or even primarily the calories (snacks, peanut butter, and the “drink mix” probably pack a punch of calories)–the serious problem is the nutritional content, which seems sorely lacking.

Chad’s response:

Hey Bryan, that’s the correct meal. They were supposed to get the extra stuff you mentioned… not sure what is planned for tomorrow.

Kim, anything we can do to improve upon this meal? The fellas aren’t enjoying it much…

Thank you

Several family members and friends chimed in the relevant twitter thread. One person reported that she received a letter from someone at VSP who reported that “they are receiving 8 tablespoons of food per meal.”

I’m unsure whether this is garden variety incompetence or pandemic-related; the dinner shortage mentioned in the first email suggests the latter. This is pure conjecture, but the numbers of infected staff have shot up, which could explain kitchen worker shortage. I’m also unsure who leaked this printout; it features pretty feeble efforts to mask people’s names, but not their emails, so the names were easily readable.

It’s Official: Nowhere in CDCR Is Safe from COVID-19

Today feels like we’ve crossed a new threshold of horror: As of this morning’s update of the official CDCR ticker, every single CDCR facility has a COVID-19 outbreak. Every single facility has new cases from the last 14 days. There are currently 4,763 active cases in custody. So far, 24,716 people–more than a quarter of the current prison population–have contracted COVID-19 behind bars, and 93 people have died in 17 facilities.

Numerous prisons are seeing major outbreaks (more than 50 new cases in past 14 days): CCI (92 new cases), LAC (198 new cases), SAC (103 new cases), CAC (174 new cases), CEN (319 mew cases), CTF (393 new cases), HDSP (464 new cases), KVSP (92 new cases), MCSP ( 469 new cases), NKSP (77 new cases), PBSP (51 new cases), PVSP (699 new cases), SATF (937 new cases), and VSP (339 new cases). There are new outbreaks at CIW (37 new cases–a third recurrence!), CMC (38 new cases), SOL (34 new cases), CCWF (3 new cases), DVI (11 new cases), ISP (12 new cases), RJD (3 new cases–the last prison to see an outbreak), SVSP (27 new cases), SCC (16 new cases), and WSP (22 new cases–a recurrence.)

All facilities have staff cases. So far, 7366 prison staff members have contracted COVID-19 behind bars; 1722 of these are new cases and 2121 are still deemed “active cases.” Ten staff members have died.

Big facilities have cases. Small facilities have cases. Overcrowded facilities (20 prisons are still over 100% capacity!) have cases. Facilities under, but close to, 100% capacity have cases.

I look at this and think of the Attorney General’s stance in the Plata, Von Staich, and Hall et al. cases. “We can safely transfer people; your suggestion that we cannot is not well taken.” Transfer them where?

Nor is testing a silver bullet; it merely helps the analysis after the fact. Mule Creek, which features 469 new cases, has tested 95% of its population. Testing itself, without decisive action, is a diagnostic, not a prevention mechanism.

An acquaintance at Solano prison managed to send me a missive through a common friend. I’ve removed his identifying information, and this is what is happening there:

Current conditions at CSP-SOL

Complaints: 1. Buses have arriving with inmates from prisons where known positive coronavirus cases have been documented.

2. CDCR are not quarantining these inmates as they arrive, exposing the entire housing units to potentially dangerous viruses.

3. CSP-SOL is currently experiencing an outbreak

4. C/O’s are working double shifts some of them, going from an infected building to a non-infected bldg exposing inmate population to higher levels of probable infection.

5. C/O admitted that a staff member was covid positive a d thus potentially started the spread/outbreak.

6. Inmates have been forced to move from one to another to facilitate work assignments or receive a CDCR RVR115, for refusal or asking for a job change.

These issues and there are more, are some of the things the guys want the public to know.

We are given the proper PPE’s (only received them 2 days ago, before that we only had inmate-made masks), it’s just a mess.

And in the face of this, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, who has been presiding over the state’s outrageous, self-righteous responses to this plight, is rewarded with a cabinet seat–the health seat, in the name of all that is holy?