CA Divests from Private Prisons: Realistic? A Good Thing?

Hailed, and partly for good reasons, as a positive development, the Guardian today announces:

The private prison industry is set to be upended after California lawmakers passed a bill on Wednesday banning the facilities from operating in the state. The move will probably also close down four large immigration detention facilities that can hold up to 4,500 people at a time. 

The legislation is being hailed as a major victory for criminal justice reform because it removes the profit motive from incarceration. It also marks a dramatic departure from California’s past, when private prisons were relied on to reduce crowding in state-run facilities. 

Private prison companies used to view California as one of their fastest-growing markets. As recently as 2016, private prisons locked up approximately 7,000 Californians, about 5% of the state’s total prison population, according to the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics. But in recent years, thousands of inmates have been transferred from private prisons back into state-run facilities. As of June, private prisons held 2,222 of California’s total inmate population.

What does this mean, exactly? Keep in mind that there are no actual private prisons on California soil–and yet, California is one of the private prison industry’s best clients, as it houses thousands of its inmates in Arizona and other states that have a flourishing array of private facilities (mostly owned by CoreCivic, formerly the CCA, and the Geo Group.) The bill, AB 32, changes this relationship by barring the state from contracting with private providers outside the state. This includes, importantly, the use of private prisons for holding undocumented immigrants: “Detention facility” is defined in the bill as “any facility in which persons are incarcerated or otherwise involuntarily confined for purposes of execution of a punitive sentence imposed by a court or detention pending a trial, hearing, or other judicial or administrative proceeding.”

Is it realistic for CA legislature to divest from private prisons? It is, to the extent that “private prison” is, as defined in the bill, “a detention facility that is operated by a private, nongovernmental, for-profit entity, and operating pursuant to a contract or agreement with a governmental entity.” But what about the many functions provided inside so-called governmental prisons in CA through private subcontractors? This interesting magazine article about prison food in Chino depicts what is an atypically good reality; prison food is hard to provide without recurring to private contracting, and is awful whether provided through public or private means. Similarly, the much-maligned CA prison healthcare system, which has been for years in the hands of a federal receiver, extensively contracts with private health care providers. This stuff is not the alternative to a public prison economy: it *is* the economy. How do we make sure that prisoners have beds to sleep on, doctors and nurses to take care of them, and two or three (meager, yucky) meals a day? In the neoliberal capitalist world, there aren’t a lot of options out there. So divesting from private prisons completely is not a particularly realistic premise, nor is it particularly desirable (private providers are not categorically worse for the inmates than public providers, and everyone is motivated by greed, as I explain here.) It does have one important, unqualified positive effect: we are not building new public prisons, and we are not housing people in private prisons anymore, so we should incarcerate less people, period. That in itself will be a success.

But there’s something else I find somewhat fishy here, and that’s the supposed divestment of CA from private detention of immigrants. The picture here is much more complicated, because undocumented immigrants are primarily the responsibility of DHS and ICE, the latter of which incarcerates and prepares people for removal as the federal arm of law enforcement (Richard Boswell explains this separation of powers very well here.) What the feds do is contract with states such as CA to house undocumented immigrants, over whom Congress has plenary power and ICE has enforcement prerogatives. Some CA cities house immigrants in their public jails; others contract with private subcontractor providers to meet ICE’s demand. CA’s complicity with awful federal policies is not so much in the fact that they deal with private contractors; its in the awful conditions in both private and public facilities and in poorly supervising the conditions in these places. To be fair, it’s not all CA’s fault – their inability to supervise more effectively stems largely from the general chaos in immigration detention and from hurdles placed by ICE. But I’m unclear on whether these undocumented minors are worse off in private facilities than they are in post-Plata public jails, which do a notoriously poor job distinguishing between immigrants and “real criminals” (whatever the heck that means.)

In short, before dancing a jig about divestment from the public industry, let’s ask ourselves some hard questions about the market itself and how it incentivizes public and private institutions alike to do a poor job locking people up (including people whose only supposed “crime” is saving themselves and their families from the conditions in Central America.)

The Ninth Circuit: The Feds are Responsible for the Health of Inmates in Privately-Managed Prison

Petitioner Richard Nuwintore with his attorneys,
Ian Wallach and Jason Feldman, after their Ninth Circuit victory

Today the Ninth Circuit decided Edison and Nuwintore v. U.S.–two cases involving the government’s responsibility for the valley fever epidemic at Taft, a federal prison located in Kern County. Taft is owned by the U.S. government but operated by the GEO Group, the second largest private prison company in the country.

Gregory Edison and Richard Nuwintore were sent to Taft without warning about the dangers of valley fever. The disease, also known as coccidiodomycosis, has a severe variation that disproportionally manifests in African American patients. Both Edison and Nuwintore fell ill; Nuwintore, who has been released, is now treated under Obamacare, and Edison is being released soon and will also receive care under Obamacare. The condition is chronic and can make people too sick to work.

Is the United States responsible for their illness? The federal government tried to argue that, under the independent contractor exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, it cannot be held responsible for the actions of a private contractor. Today, the Ninth Circuit found that, due to the government’s special responsibility for the plaintiffs (as their jailer), the exception does not apply and the government is liable. I had the great pleasure to correspond with Ian Wallach of Feldman and Wallach, who told me a bit more about the case:

Walk me through the ownership/operation structure of Taft. I understand that Taft is the only federal facility which is owned by the Government and operated by a private contractor. Why is this arrangement so rare?

Taft is presently owned by the USA, who contracted with Management and Training Corporation back in 2007 to operate the facility.  I don’t know why the arrangement is so rare.  It did create some novel issues with the application of the independent contractor exception.  Colleagues have wondered if it is because of the valley fever issue.  It may sound like a conspiracy theory, but there are some legitimate concerns.  The USA recognized the cocci (another word for valley fever, short for coccidiodomycosis) problem potentially in 1999, and knew some would get ill, and perhaps die.  And the USA has less liability if someone else is operating the facility, even though the USA sends people there.  And the facility is, for unknown reasons, primarily a pre-deportation facility.  That means that people facing low terms, or people about to be deported, are held there.  If they get sick, and are deported, there is not much practical legal recourse available.  Worse than that — there isn’t much access to medical care.  This is why we know of only one fatality from valley fever at Taft, but there may be many more.

Given Taft’s unique status as government-owned and privately operated, would the government’s responsibility in this case extend to private prisons in which the facility is both owned and operated by private contractors? How much government involvement should create responsibility and prevail over the independent contractor exception?

Sure.  As to the failure to warn claim.  And the negligent implementation of policy claim — if the USA developed and implemented policy.  And if the USA reserved control over any aspect of the facility — as it did here with structural changes.

The test, as adopted by the Court, is “is there an independent basis for liability?”

If yes, then the claim should stand. As to your second questions, people have brought challenges, in other contexts, to the independent contractor exception, asserting that the USA asserted so much control that it didn’t really delegate the duties at issue.  I have some charts with summaries of cases on this issue I prepared for use in the oral argument (which can be seen here).  I should clean them up before circulating them, and today has been busy, but let me know if I should send them along.  The standard was too high for us to meet, so we didn’t make that argument on appeal (we did below).  And we had some independent bases for liability, which we felt was the right way to go.

Should we be concerned about a potential incentive for the federal government to distance itself from inmates and shift any potential liabilities on the shoulders of private contractors?

Absolutely.  And that may be what happened here.  Plus privatization of prisons is messy.  I understand that there is a private prison in Ohio that successfully petitioned to control parole hearings (and even here, parol boards can consider reports by an inmate’s prison in determining parole).  And these corporations have a financial incentive for parole to be denied.  That’s flesh-peddling.

This case involved a federal privatized facility, but as we know, state facilities, which are public, are often public only by name, and much of the health care in California state prisons is privatized. Does today’s decision shed any light on questions of liability in this context?

Only to the extent that if you can identify a breach of a separate and distinct duty, and get around any immunity, then your claim should proceed. Today’s case was about federal governmental immunity. This would not apply to private actors (although their attorneys have litigated that it does).

And California has separate immunities.  Which are awful.  In the class action we have, Jackson v. Brown, where 800 inmates need life-long care, and where 40 inmates died, all as a result of infections at Avenal and Pleasant Valley state prisons, the District Court dismissed the case arguing that qualified immunity protected everyone from 8th Amendment claims, because even if the conduct was “cruel and unusual”, there was no “clearly identified right” at issue.  We think it was the right to be housed in a safe facility, but the court claimed it was the right to be in a facility without an excessive amount of valley fever spores, determine by societal standards.  That is on appeal.

There is a great case from the Cal. Supreme Court — Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371 (2008), which we relied on and the 9th Circuit expanded upon in today’s decision, that spoke of the Jailer’s duty to inmates, and set forth a special relationship.  It’s a great read and a positive expression of the law.

As the sad facts in this case remind us, individuals of certain ethnicities are more prone to certain medical conditions; this is true for valley fever, and also for other diseases and chronic conditions. Would this create an incentive for private prison contractors to refuse inmates of certain ethnicities, because their healthcare would be more complicated or costly? And should we resist such bargaining with regulation?

I am not aware of any vehicle where this could occur.  A bidding process is set up to operate a facility, and the bidders know who will be housed there and what is apparently needed, and can request to transfer people away, but no one has to listen to that request.  In three other valley fever cases we have, the contractor argued that they had no say in who they accepted, and the injury was the delegation.  These cases (People v. HammondSutton, and Aluya) were also dismissed on summary judgment — because the court bought it.  This is on appeal too (and you are beginning to see how Eastern District court respond to claims by inmates about valley fever.  Add that there are no attorney’s fees provisions, and these are exhausting mid-level tort cases, so few lawyers fight them.  Which is why these dangerous practices continue, as there is very little accountability).  Regulation is a great idea — but in the interim, I’ll keep suing.

Finally, a big part of today’s decision involved the government’s duty to warn inmates about the medical dangers involved in serving their prison term at Taft. But if inmates have no choice on where they are incarcerated, what lends this duty legal value?

The failure to warn deprived these individuals of four avenues of redress.  Had they been warned, they could have done the following:

  • Seek an administrative remedy to be housed elsewhere, before ever arriving at Taft.
  • Seek an administrative remedy the day they arrive, seeking transfer.  Most people are infected within the first few months of arrival, but if they are lucky, they could be transferred out before getting infected.
  • Change their lifestyle while there. This is largely a camp facility with tons of leisure time.  Which, if warned, would be better spent inside. 
  • And they can choose not to take certain jobs (like those that involve digging or gardening or any contact with soil).  They can wear N95 filtration masks if they wish.  

And these changes may greatly decrease their exposure.

The Ninth Circuit decision sheds an interesting light on the malleability of the public-private divide in the context of prison privatization. Congratulations to the plaintiffs and their attorneys, and wishes of good health to everyone impacted by the epidemic.

From Reproductive Crimes to the Prison Industrial Complex

This coming October, the Hastings Women’s Law Journal will hold a special symposium on family and reproduction in prison, which is incredibly timely. Several important stories from the last few years have raised serious concerns about the correctional authorities’ responsibility for women’s health, pregnancy, and birth in prison.

First, as you may recall, there were efforts to restrict the notorious and common practice of having incarcerated women give birth while shackled. It’s fairly obvious why this is an extremely barbaric practice, and this ACLU report adds some important details.

Then, we heard with shock about a sterilization of female prisoners in California, with very questionable consent. This eventually yielded SB1135, which prohibits the practice.

And just a couple of days ago, this was in the news. Nicole Guerrero, a pregnant inmate in Texas’ custody, was placed in a solitary cell, repeatedly begging for help as her water broke and she was in labor, her cries for care ignored by the guards. Guerrero’s baby died, and the chronology that led to this horrific tragedy includes a nurse who works for a private healthcare contractor. Guerrero is pursuing a §1983 lawsuit against the prison.

There’s hardly anything I can say about this truly horrible incident and the cruelty that led to it that won’t trivialize it, and the basic facts behind it do not seem to be in dispute. My only additional thought about this has to do with the fact that Guerrero’s tragedy occurred in a public setting–a Texas state prison–but one of the people whose behavior was questionable worked for a private healthcare provider. I think we need to problematize the distinction often made by progressive commentators between state institutions and private providers’ institutions. At this point, and in the context of a neoliberal, hypercapitalist economy, it makes a lot less difference who runs the correctional facility overall than these commentaries would suggest. Many functions within state prisons–utilities, phones, cantine services, food, transportation, health care–are partially or completely privatized, as was health care in the institution in which Guerrero was held. Moreover, state actors are behaving like private actors in the market, and many of the corruption scandals and human rights crimes we saw in the last few years–such as Alabama’s Sheriff Bartlett’s profiteering off his wards’ starvation and former Philadelphia Judge Mark Ciavarella essentially selling juveniles to a private contractor for kickbacks–involved public actors. Private prison companies have not cornered the market on cruelty, stinginess, and indifference to human suffering. And wherever a wicked contract is signed, one party tends to be a public actor.

The only answer to this that I can think of is regulation that carefully examines which actors play which roles in exploiting human suffering for profit. Only recently, AB 1876 prohibited the common practice by which sheriffs received kickbacks from phone providers to give them the contract for prison phone services. There are probably ways for sheriffs to bypass this, and we will have to stay fairly attentive to those, but the bottom line is that the lines between the public and the private are so blurred in this economy that maligning “private prisons” misses the point. All actors in these dramas of human cruelty and profiteering–the state included–are acting in a laissez-faire, capitalist market, responding to market pressures, and trying to get ahead; all actors are vulnerable to the sort of indifferent, dehumanizing mentality that seems to have produced the tragedy that happened to Guerrero; and all actors, private and public alike, should be carefully watched and monitored by those who do not want to see more cruelty.
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Cross-posted on Prawfs Blawg.

TODAY! Assembly Select Committee on Justice Reinvestment Hearing Live!

Humonetarianism and cost-centered criminal justice policies in action: In half an hour, the Assembly Select Committee on Justice Reinvestment will hold a hearing, which you can watch live by clicking here at 10am.

A few words of background: This committee was mentioned a week ago at the hearings about solitary confinement, and it will be examining Gov. Brown’s bill to invest $315 billion of my money and yours in private prisons to alleviate overcrowding. Anyone paying taxes in California should pay close attention to these proceedings.

California Prison Overcrowding: State of the State, October 2013

And now, this is how things stood: the cat was sitting on one branch, the bird on another… not too close to the cat… and the wolf walked around and around the tree looking at them with greedy eyes.

                                                                           –Sergei Prokofiev, Peter and the Wolf (1936)

Developments in the last few months raise grim questions about the wisdom of leaving California to its own devices in trying to solve its overcrowding problem. Since the initial three-judge panel order in Plata v. Schwarzenengger (2009), the state has fought tooth and nail against the order to reduce population, and the struggle against the court mandate continued even after the Supreme Court confirmed the order, 5-4, in Brown v. Plata (2011). Numerous state appeals and motions to change the order and delay the timeline for population reduction (some of them bordering on contempt of court) have been thwarted. The last of these is the Supreme Court’s rejection of the state’s appeal yesterday. The Chron reports:

The high court’s one-line dismissal – which said only that the court lacked jurisdiction to step in – leaves intact a three-judge federal panel’s directive to the state to slash its population of 120,000 inmates in 33 prisons.

. . . 

Brown has been fighting for years the prospect of releasing some prisoners early, saying he was worried it could increase crime. Advocates and attorneys for prisoners have pushed for reforms in sentencing that they say would safely shrink the prison system.

Through a spokeswoman, Brown referred Tuesday to a statement released by California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation spokeswoman Deborah Hoffman, which said officials were “disappointed the state’s case won’t be heard.”

But this rejection is far from being the big victory that inmate rights advocates are seeking. The original order in Plata was to reduce overcrowding in prison to 137.5% capacity, but it famously left it up to the state to find the means to do so. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s celebrated opinion of the court in 2011 explicitly stated that one way of doing so could be via more prison construction. In 2011, activists and advocates felt comfortable in the knowledge that prison construction was impossible; the state was broke and public sentiment was that correctional expenditures were already excessive, to the point that former Governor Schwarzenegger suggested enacting a law that would prohibit correctional expenditures to exceed educational expenditures. It now, however, appears that “the money is there” to start privatizing California’s prisons en mass, via lucrative contracts with Correctional Corporation of America and the GEO Group.

California never had dealings with private prison providers on its own soil, though it did send 10,000 of its inmates to CCA institutions out of state and was a significant source of income for the company. This was not because of some principled objection to privatization; rather, it was because the California Correctional Peace Officer Association (CCPOA) actively resisted privatization out of concern for the guards’ employment. As Josh Page reveals in The Toughest Beat, CCPOA is so powerful in California that even a prison built in CA by CCA entirely on speculation was left empty. But these difficulties have been resolved: Governor Brown, historically a good friend and ally of the prison guards union, has promised them that they would be employed in these newly-constructed private prisons. This promise made old enemies – state prison guards and private prison providers – into allies, and sealed the deal toward a projected expenditure of $315 million of my money and yours on prison construction.

Obviously CCA is laughing all the way to the bank – a rare and enviable position for a corporation at the end of a recession and during a government shutdown. Here’s how this lucrative contract looks from Tennessee, home of CCA. The Nashville post reports:

The lease agreement between CCA and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation calls for the state — which is under a court order to reduce overcrowding in its jails — to pay Nashville-based CCA $28.5 million per year starting Dec. 1. If the two sides agree to two-year extensions after three years, the rent will begin to increase gradually. CCA also has committed to spending $10 million on improvements at its 2,304-bed California City Correctional Center; renovations beyond that will be paid for by California.

“We appreciate the opportunity to expand upon our longstanding relationship with the CDCR and the state of California,” said CCA CEO Damon Hininger. “Our ability to react quickly to our partners’ needs with innovative solutions that make the best use of taxpayer dollars exemplifies the flexibility that CCA is able to provide.”

In conjunction with its California contract news — which had been expected since August — Hininger and his team also said CCA’s fourth-quarter profits will be hurt by a number of factors, including the spending needed to reopen its California City complex. Among them: Lower inmate counts related to its contracts with the U.S. Marshals Service and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, which are believed to be “due to the furlough of government employees and other consequences of the federal government shutdown.”

On top of that, CCA’s leadership has begun spending money to prepare vacant prisons in anticipation of more business from California late this year. The total impact of those factors on Q4 numbers isn’t yet clear, the company said. Analysts are expecting the company to earn 49 cents per share during the fourth quarter.

Investors chose to put more emphasis on the new California cash that will start arriving in December. As of about 1:35 p.m., shares of CCA (Ticker: CXW) were up about 1.5 percent to $35.81, putting them back in positive territory for the year.

If you’re still capable of keeping your breakfast down, you didn’t read carefully enough.

Governor Brown essentially put the ball in the hands of the federal courts, by saying – if you don’t give us some time to cope with the expected releases, we’ll have to recur to privatization and high-expense construction. This option was produced, as if out of a magician’s hat, in the height of the California Criminal Justice Realignment, which presumably redistributes overcrowding and internalizes its expenses by making counties, who are responsible for charging and sentencing, think about incarceration alternatives and manage their own convict population. One has to wonder what good this experiment is if, suddenly, we’re building private prisons in three counties and contributing $28.5 million per annum, to the foreseeable future and beyond, to CCA’s bottom line.

We will continue following up on developments and reporting as we have for the last five years.

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Props to David Takacs and to Jim Parker.

CCA-Backed Legislation in Arizona Mowed Down by 4th Circuit

Last brief item of news for today: The Fourth Circuit has determined that police officers in Arizona cannot harass people for immigration papers based solely on their appearance. The Washington Post reports:

On Wednesday, a federal appeals court slapped down Mr. Jenkins and the county sheriff’s department. The appeals court said that law enforcement officers may not go around accosting people merely on the suspicion that they may lack immigration documents, no matter what they look like or how limited their facility with English. As the court pointed out, an individual’s unauthorized presence in the United States is not a crime; it’s a civil violation of immigration law.

The ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, in Richmond, is consistent with last year’s Supreme Court ruling on Arizona’s anti-immigrant statute. In that case, the Supreme Court allowed police to determine the immigration status of people they stop or arrest for other reasons. But Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the court’s majority, noted it is not a crime for an illegal immigrant to be present in the country. “Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns,” he wrote.

In the case of Ms. Santos, the appeals court pointed out that police who start asking questions based solely on the race or ethnicity of their interlocutor may also run afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s equal protection clause.

A special reason to delight in this outcome is that AB 1070, which provided for this and other abominable maneuvers for monitoring immigration status by state officials, was financially backed by Correctional Corporations of America, who surely expected it to yield more imprisoned bodies to profit from now that the domestic inmate market is dwindling. Today is a good day for justice.

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Props to Dorit Reiss for the link.

Moving Away from the CCA! For Financial Reasons

The state of Kentucky is opting out of private incarceration. For the first time in 30 years, no Kentucky inmates will do time in private facilities. The reason? Savings. The Courier-Journal reports:

J. Michael Brown, the state Justice and Public Safety secretary, said in a news release Tuesday that the move will save the state about $2 million a year. And he credited a 2011 law and other steps taken by the General Assembly and the Beshear administration that reformed sentencing and increased drug treatment opportunities.

“This has created, for the first time in a generation, an opportunity to manage our inmate population with existing DOC (Department of Corrections) facilities, county jails and local halfway houses,” Brown said in a news release.

The state inmate population is dipping — from 22,102 inmates last November to 20,591 today, according to Jennifer Brislin, spokeswoman for the cabinet.

It is, apparently, possible to opt out of private incarceration, and it is sometimes more cost-effective.

Book Review: Prison Profiteers, Edited by Tara Herivel and Paul Wright

Many books and articles decrying mass imprisonment use the term “prison industrial complex”, and many of us know that it refers to the financial aspects of incarcerating a population of immense scale. Many of us also know about the for profit business of private prisons and its many ills. But few are privy to the nitty gritty aspects of the prison industry.

The edited collection Prison Profiteers: Who Makes Money from Mass Incarceration fills this gap with a distressing collection of snapshots of the prison industry. Herivel and Wright did an excellent job of picking authors with intimate knowledge of the crevices of the financial machine behind mass incarceration, and the essays illuminate aspects that, even to those of us who study prisons, often remain unseen.

The essays in the first part of the book, The Political Economy of Prisons, provide a general background to prison finance, explicating (in Kevin Pranis’ essay) the mechanism of bond finance and the collaboration between banks and local governments that leads to opaque, disturbing financial deals that remain hidden from, and thus uncriticized by, the public. Jennifer Gonnerman’s discussion of “million dollar blocks,” that is, neighborhood blocks the incarceration of whose residents costs the nation untold amounts of money, calls for a different distribution of funds – to invest them in the neighborhoods that yield prison population in the first place, rather than in the distant prison. The distance between prisons and the communities of origin of inmates is illuminated in Gary Hunter and Peter Wagner’s discussion of the impact of prisons on the census, and the detrimental effect that a a large population of non-voting, non-deciding citizens has on the democratic process and on local government funding. Clayton Mosher et al provide data that refutes the assumption that cities that agree to build prisons in their midst fare better economically. And Paul Wright discusses the harm of glorifying prisons in popular culture.

The second part of the book, The Private Prison Industry, discusses a better known part of the problem – private prison companies. But the essays do a great job at exposing the mechanisms through which these companies make money and lobby for punitive legislation and policy. Having just read in the paper that a university stadium in Florida is destined to bear the name of a private prison company, GEO, these essays are even more poignant. Ian Urbina’s essay on the prevalence of prison labor, and the multiple ways in which it destroys the larger labor market, is particularly notable.

The third part of the book, Making Out Like Bandits, is a series of ground-level exposes on different aspects of the for-profit industry: The deceitful marketing techniques of tasers (by Anne-Marie Cusac), the horrific abuse and neglectful safety measures taken by private prison transportation companies (by Alex Friedmann, the exorbitant prices of telephone calls and their detrimental ostracizing impact on inmates and their families (by Steven Jackson), the proliferation of high-tech gear and workshops for prison staff (by Jennifer Gonnerman), and the horrors of privatized prisons for youth (by Tara Herivel). But the most devastating essays are by Will Hylton and Paul von Zielbauer, which dissect the private health care providers. Here in CA, the standards exposed in Plata and Coleman might lead one to think that no one can provide worst health care than the states. These essays offer sobering evidence to the contrary, and the multiple examples of medical neglect and indifference are truly heartbreaking.

The collection does not offer high-level analysis of the meaning of the incarceration industry. For that, one must turn to the many big-picture works already out and available. Instead, it provides much-needed foci on the many aspects in which privatization permeates every possible aspect of incarceration. The essays are full of examples and written in an easy-to-read journalistic style. I highly recommend educating yourself not only about your tax money’s role in this, but about the many businesses that benefit from this somber enterprise.

The New Correctional Discourse of Scarcity: Executive Summary

This morning I gave a talk about my upcoming book at the Western Society of Criminology Annual Meeting. Here is the gist of my comments.

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The New York Times proclaims the end of mass incarceration; prison population in the US is declining for the first time in 37 years; Milton Friedman and Pat Robertson are advocating for marijuana reform; several states abolish the death penalty and others are closing prisons, importing and exporting inmates, and reducing their usage of solitary confinement.
What is going on? Is mass incarceration, indeed, coming to an end? Have we come to care more about the human rights of suspects, defendants, and inmates? Have we rejected the war on drugs?
This talk, based on my book in progress with UC Press, argues that these changes are the function of a new discourse of corrections, fueled by the financial crisis. As I argue in the book, the severe crisis, affecting especially local governments, generates new ways of conceptualizing criminal justice problems, new alliances between conservatives and progressives, new policies and practices of incarceration, and new ways of imagining the offender.
Many wonderful books have come out recently that tell the story of mass incarceration, offering political and cultural explanations both on the micro and macro levels. In adding my own narrative of what happened before, and especially AFTER the 2007 crisis, I do not wish to supplant political and cultural analyses with historical materialism. Rather, I argue that the expenditures on criminal justice tell a story of policymaking sincerity and of the limits of criminal justice project as a sound fiscal investment. That is, that a historical-materialist approach complements our understandings of politics and culture. To understand the extent of this, we need to go back in time to the first federally-initiated grand project of crime control.
Prohibition, initially the successful product of an effective narrow coalition, was repealed largely because of its economic consequences: a combination of poorly-funded law enforcement and the senselessness of giving up on considerable tax revenue in a lean economic period.  This poor experience impacted the federal laissez-faire approach to criminal justice in the postwar years. This trend began to be reversed by the Warren Court’s clamoring for federalization of rights. Ironically, the Nixon election, often described as capitalizing on high crime rates and protesting the Warren Court’s project of incorporation, put in place an administration that was equally eager to federalize criminal justice, but with a very different agenda in mind. The 1968 Omnibus Act’s primary effect was fueling federal money into law enforcement, with the aim to make police officers more effective in the streets. At that point, money had not yet been fueled into prison construction upfront; arguably, money was never fueled, wholesale, into prison construction at the federal level. Rather, this front-end federal investment led to an increased number of arrests, requiring room to house inmates. The trend of punitivizing local law by fueling federal money persists to this day.
The big project of managing the product of these policing tactics – prison building– was left to be financed at the local level, and mostly through bonds. The bond mechanism does to prison construction what the Nixon funding structure did to prison existence: It pushes it out of sight. Rather than an open tax requiring voter information and approval, the specific types of bonds used for prison construction act as a hidden tax, or rather, a tax on future generations. The hidden aspect of prison finance is particularly true with regard to private prison construction and operation.
And then, the financial crisis happened. While its epicenter was the banking industry, it has had profound impact on the fiscal health of local governments. Since the late seventies, most local governments have come to rely on a tax base that is increasingly income- and sales-based, rather than property-based. The former, compared to the latter, is much more sensitive to fluctuations in the market. Shaking the tax base, and dealing in various localities with the inability to pay for pensions, meant that local budgets became depleted.
To bring things back into the correctional realm, it’s important to remember that corrections constitute at least 7% of all expenditures in state budgets, exceeding, in some states, the expenditures on higher education. States and local governments—that is, the locations where the vast majority of law enforcement, criminal justice and corrections occur—have therefore had to face a reality so far hidden from the eye by the bond mechanism and the illusion of a war on crime: The need to do with less.
**
This need to save on corrections has yielded a discourse that I refer to as Humonetarianism: A scaling-back of the punitive project on account of its fiscal consequences. In the book, I identify four main features of Humonetarianism: New Discourse, New Allies, New Practices, and New Perceptions of Offenders. I want to shortly discuss each in turn.
The new discourse of correctional scarcity tends to be shallow and to focus on short term. Cost had always been part of the criminal conversation, but it had never been a centerpiece of policymaking and advocacy. A good example of this discourse is the new rhetoric of death penalty, whose successes and gains are significant. Since the financial crisis, five states – New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, and Connecticut – have abolished the death penalty. Many more states have placed moratoria upon its use and executions slowed down considerably. In California, Prop 34, which failed to pass in the 2012, nevertheless closed the gap between supporters and opponents of the death penalty to a mere 6%. An analysis of these campaigns shows the extent to which abolition advocates moved away from arguments on human rights and deterrence, put racial discrimination arguments on the back burner, and focused their campaigns on costs. Similarly, conversations about legalization of drugs have emphasized the waste involved in pursuing low level nonviolent offenders, and the successful propositions in Washington and Colorado have relied on the persuasive power of drugs as a source of revenue, much like their predecessors, the prohibition repeal advocates.
The conversation about drug legalization and de-prioritizing drug law enforcement reveals the second aspect of this discourse: Its ability to generate new allies. The 2012 presidential election, and, to a lesser extent, the 2008 presidential election, were notable for the complete lack of any criminal justice discourse, and especially the absence of drugs. The Obama administration, despite its controversial commitment to bipartisanism, did not fear alienating centrists and moderates by explicitly making marijuana enforcement a low priority. Leading conservative voices are calling for an end to the war on drugs, citing fiscal responsibility and the possibility of revenue as a powerful incentive. Among such names we count Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, free market economist Milton Friedman, and religious figures such as Pat Robertson.
The impact of humonetarianism has gone beyond rhetoric and legislation, and has generated the third feature of this discourse: Innovative practices in the field. California’s criminal justice realignment, consisting of a refunneling of low-level offenders out of state prison and into county jails—was initiated as a budgetary savings mechanism, correcting decades of economic disincentives and ending what Frank Zimring referred to as the “correctional free lunch.” Many states are closing or repurposing their prisons, which yields a less savory aspect of humonetarianism: Deals with other states to house their surplus prison population and thus make a profit on closed institution. But many states, like California and Hawaii, are now questioning the economic value of shipping their inmates out of state, and coming up with structures to keep them at home. Even institutions that cannot be repurposed, such as supermax prisons, seem to be saving considerable amounts of money through reduction projects. Moreover, the financial crisis creates an increased reliance on community corrections. Expenditures on programs have been cut; the shallowness of the conversation in some localities does not allow for a long-term assessments of the savings promised by recidivism reduction. But there is an increasing reliance on GPS monitoring.
Fourth and finally, humonetarianism has made salient some features and traits of the offender population. For decades, a policy of selective incapacitation has made us examine inmates through the lens of their level of risk; the financial crisis has come to make us see them in terms of cost. The recent modest success in scaling back Three Strikes in California was based on the increased salience of long-term Three Strikers as old and infirm inmates, whose lengthy incarceration drives up the costs of health care, already contested in California. And in many states, the introduction of geriatric parole and medical parole are a somber indication of how little Americans expect of their government: Not broad national healthcare for themselves, but less state-financed free healthcare for their inmates.
** 
There are limits to the power of humonetarianism to transform the criminal justice apparatus. The for-profit aspect of our incarceration project arguably leads to particularly ferocious activities by private prison providers, who in this market of dearth try to offer an alternative to decreasing incarceration. This is not only an exploitation of the punitive state for profit, but sometimes generating more punitiveness by lobbying for punitive laws, as well as seeking new and emerging populations of potential inmates, such as undocumented immigrants.
It is also business as usual in many plantation-like institutions that have always relied on a “tough-‘n’-cheap” financial logic. The rhetoric of self sufficiency has a strong hold on many prisons and jails in the rural south, and it has not abated, but rather been strengthened, in the current crisis.
The dearth of rehabilitation programs, and their declining number in these lean years, is another reminder of a limitation of this discourse: It is mostly focused on emergency, short-term savings. Because humonetarianism is not accompanied, in any serious way, by a true change in perception of human rights, the idea of thinking about reentry and recidivism reduction as a long-term cost-saving mechanism has not been as successful as it could, perhaps, be. Recidivism studies are, by nature, difficult to do, and moreover, they take time, which cannot be translated to proven political gains in a short election cycle. The theoretical possibility to frame these as a deeper form of savings has not, so far, yielded much success in the correctional arena.
There are also big questions about the extent to which humonetarian arguments have any traction with regard to particularly violent or reviled offenders. Sex offender policies come to mind immediately. The last California elections showed that old-school punitivism, masquerading as victim rights discourse, is still a powerful incentive to voters in creating more post-incarceration sanctions on sex offenders.  The strong rhetorical pull of decades can, apparently, withstand any argument about financial waste, as it has withstood the evidence of low recidivism rates.
Given these challenges, can humonetarianism be successful and enduring, and for how long? Its main advantage is the broad appeal of the financial argument. A possible counterargument is that, by focusing on costs, we arguably pay an intangible price of cheapening public discourse and taking human rights arguments off the table. I am less concerned about this issue. Americans have always expressed their values and measured their priorities by their willingness to pay taxes. A vote of confidence in lowering the price tag on corrections is also an expression of preferences for road construction, education, health care, and other services, and a statement that the mass incarceration project has lost its appeal as a national priority.
What remains to be seen is whether cost-centered reforms will stand when the economy improves. And in that department, while it would be unwise to offer accurate predictions, my crystal ball offers this: Some things might come back, some things might not come back, and some things might come back in different forms. For example, I expect that, once a critical mass of states abolishes the death penalty on fiscal grounds, it will not come back. I expect that a recriminalization of marijuana, once it is perceived as any other product in the market, is not feasible. Will we find other wars and panics? Probably, and those will have to be addressed through other-than-cost arguments if they occur at a time of economic plenty.
While the lasting power of cost-driven changes in policy remains to be seen, a sincere and thoughtful appeal to the public’s sense of fiscal responsibility, accompanied by an effort to reframe the cost conversation as a long-term concern, are one of the major steps we must take to end mass incarceration, so that we do not, to quote Rahm Emmanuel, let a serious crisis go to waste.

Inside the Belly of the Beast: Correctional Corporation of America and the Recession

Much of what we’ve written about this year has to do with the scaling back of the punitive project because it has become financially unsustainable. We have come to call that process humonetarianism, and support it, with some reservations, as a practical platform for reform. But not all post-recession policymaking has been about reversing the punitive pendulum. Some of it is about increasing profits.

The main, but not by any means the only, beneficiary of these lean times, is Correctional Corporation of America, the largest non-governmental prison operator in the nation. Its shares are traded publicly, at $9 per share, and, while it is organized as a traditional for-profit corporation (“C-corporation”) it is examining the possibility of reorganizing as a Real Estate Investment Trust, which will mean special tax considerations and high yields for investors.

CCA institutions – of which it operates 67 and owns 49 – are located in 20 states and in DC (6 of their institutions are, at this point, vacant). After an initial period of time, population in its private institutions averages 89%. A minimum occupancy is often, albeit not always, mentioned in its contracts with the states to whom it provides services. The business model is structured around the concept of a “per-diem”, that is, the state pays a price per-inmate-per-bed-per-day. This is the average per-diem for all facilities (you’ll note differences in price, which stem from the fact that CCA-owned and managed facilities imply facility costs that CCA needs to pay even if it stays vacant):

06/12 – 09/12
06/11 – 09/11
01/12 – 09/12
01/11 – 09/11
FY 2011
FY 2010
Combined Per Diem Averages, All Facilities
Revenue
$59.19
$58.62
$59.16
$58.76
$58.48
$58.36
Expenses
$41.34
$40.51
$41.83
$40.20
$40.15
$40.16
Operating Margin
$17.85 (30.2%)
$18.11 (30.9%)
$17.33
(29.3%)
$18.56
(31.6%)
$18.33 (31.3%)
$18.20 (31.2%)
Owned and Managed Facilities
Revenue
$67.25
$66.51
$67.22
$66.54
$66.68
$66.30
Expenses
$44.06
$42.83
$33.91
$42.50
$42.47
$42.48
Operating Margin
$23.19 (34.5%)
$23.68 (35.6%)
$22.77 (33.9%)
$24.04 (36.1%)
$24.21
(36.3%)
$23.82
(35.9%)
Managed Only Facilities
Revenue
$40.30
$40.70
$40.22
$40.93
$40.39
$39.60
Expenses
$34.98
$35.22
$35.66
$34.93
$35.05
$34.69
Operating Margin
$5.32 (13.2%)
$5.48 (13.5%)
$4.56 (11.3%)
$6.00 (14.7%)
$5.34 (13.2%)
$4.91
(12.4%)
Who are CCA’s main customers? Well, the federal government, for one. Revenues from federal clients comprise 43% of CCA’s total revenue for the years 2010 and 2011. But of the states that contract with CCA, California is a major contributor, providing CCA with 13% of its management revenue. 

How can that be, you might ask? After all, CCA does not have institutions in California, right? After all, CCPOA flexed its union muscles to drive CCA out of California. Well, that is true. California houses its inmates in institutions outside the state: La Palma and Red Rock in Arizona, Tallahatchie County in Mississippi, and North Fork in Oklahoma. Similarly, Hawai’ian inmates are housed in two CCA institutions: Red Rock and Saguaro, both in Arizona. Here’s a promotional video in which CCA promotes Saguaro as an institution “uniquely fitted to Hawai’i inmates’ needs”. You will, of course, immediately note the savings pitch:

The story appears much less rosier in this newspaper article about how women inmates from Hawai’i fared at a CCA institution in Kentucky.

CCA is doing very well. As of the close of the market on Nov. 9, 2012, its stock was trading at $33.67 per share. With 100.05 million shares outstanding, the market cap sits at 3.37 billion dollars. It is considered slightly less risky than market, but riskier than industry average. CCA’s CEO and Predisent, earned $3,696,789 in basic compensation. The salaries of other high-ranked corporate officers are also impressive, and have risen considerably between 2010 and 2011. Its income, as per the following table, has increased dramatically since 2001. 
FY ending Dec. 31
Net Income
No. facilities Owned and Managed
No. Managed Only
No. Leased to Third Party Operators
2011
$162,510
46
20
2
2010
$157,193
45
21
2
2009
$154,954
44
21
2
2008
$ 150,941
43
20
3
2007
$133,373
41
24
3
2006
$105,239
40
24
3
2005
$50,122
39
24
3
2004
$61,081
39
25
3
2003
$126,521
38
21
3
2002
($28,875)
37
23
3
2001
$5,670
36
28
3


Despite a slight decline in occupancy (from 95% occupancy in 2005 to 89% occupancy in 2012), the overall number of beds CCA has and leases to states has increased, which explains the increase in income. 
CCA procures political good will through extensive donations and lobbying. Between 2003 and 2012, it contributed $2,161, 004 to political campaigns and ballot measures. Like CCPOA, CCA donates to both Republican and Democrat candidates (albeit twice as much to the former than to the latter.) Its main arena of contribution is California. where among other propositions it supported 2008 Prop 6 (the policing and anti-gang measure that eventually failed to pass.) CCA also contributed to 239 different lobbyists between 2003 and 2011, for a grand total of $1,858, 094. The most lobbyists were active in California – 16 of them. 
Recently, in light of the need for California to comply with the Plata decision, CCA and the state of California modified their contractual agreement, with the state planning to return its inmates from out-of-state institutions. CCA’s concern about this was explicitly discussed in their 10-Q for the third quarter of 2012, yielding the following gems:
It is unclear at this time how realignment or the five-year plan may impact the long-term utilization by the CDCR of our out of state beds. The return of the California inmates to the state of California would have a significant adverse impact on our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows. We housed approximately 8,700 inmates from the state of California as of September 30, 2012, compared with approximately 9,500 California inmates as of September 30, 2011. Approximately 12% and 13% of our management revenue for the nine months ended September 30, 2012 and 2011, respectively, was generated from the CDCR. (p.35)
And also,
“[W]e expect insufficient bed development by our partners to result in a return to the supply and demand imbalance that has benefited the private corrections industry.” (10-Q, p.30)
I expect these data provides some initial information on the main beneficiaries from the recession, and explains some of the incarceration trends we have seen since the financial crisis. More to come.

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Many thanks to Amanda Leaf for her valuable and meticulous research assistance.