As some regular readers know, I used to be a rather avid true-crime podcast listener. I followed several dozen podcasts and am still interested in the long-form ones that cover a particular crime in depth, and at one time even did some fieldwork for a book about true crime podcasts I was planning to write. I had long BART rides and bicycle rides during which I listened to these things nonstop. Then, personal calamity and world events took over and life changed course somewhat, but I kept the materials even though my horror of real-world stuff put me off the genre. This is not a complaint–many people who produce true crime shows are solid, ethical journalists who want not only to report the truth, but also to bring about closure or correct miscarriages of justice. I just can’t stomach tragedy nearly as much as I used to. But once in a while I do get captivated by legal proceedings in a high-profile case.
Such is my interest in Bryan Kohberger’s trial for the murder of four University of Idaho students. As I think I’ve posted before, much of the pretrial action is under seal, which frustrates the journalists and podcasters to no end, but once in a while the judge releases a nugget or two. Anyway, today we learned of a judicial decision on the defense’s motion to suppress the DNA found on a knife sheath at the crime scene. For those who are not following the case, this is the only piece of forensic evidence that links Kohberger directly to the crime, and it was obtained through familial DNA analysis and a genealogy website. I didn’t think the motion had a chance, and was therefore not surprised that the court denied the motion. Here is the reasoning:
[A]pplying well-settled principles of Fourth Amendment, the Court finds no constitutional violation. First, Defendant abandoned any privacy interest in his DNA by disclaiming knowledge or ownership of the sheath from which the DNA was extracted. Second, even if no such abandonment occurred, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in DNA found at a crime scene which is subsequently analyzed to identify an unknown suspect.
This makes sense to me, except for one possible wrinkle. There’s a 1968 case called Simmons v. CALinks to an external site., where a defendant sought to suppress a suitcase on Fourth Amendment grounds. For the motion to suppress, the defendant claimed standing in the suitcase, and this later came back to bite him at trial when he disavowed the suitcase. The court said: “[W]e find it intolerable that one constitutional right [the 5th Amendment privilege against self incrimination] should have to be surrendered in order to assert another [the 4th Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures]. We therefore hold that, when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.”
In other words, had Kohberger made a valid 4th Amendment argument against the admission of the sheath DNA, it shouldn’t have mattered if he said, for the purpose of the motion, “this is my knife sheath” or “this is my DNA.” He would still be allowed to disavow both the sheath and the DNA at trial. But the second rationale of the motion denial still stands: anything discarded at a crime scene is fair game.
This motion, and others in the case, redeem to some extent my interest in these high-profile cases. Because the attorneys on both sides in these cases tend to be very thorough, and know that the eyes of millions of people are on them, they put in a lot of effort to file motions, argue, and mine evidence and logic that remains invisible in other cases. Often one hears of new forensic technologies through these cases that have not yet been employed in a lot of other scenarios. If it weren’t for the Golden State Killer and Bryan Kohberger, I wouldn’t know that the use of genetic genealogy had entered the mainstream of policing (or maybe it’s still cutting edge), nor would I think that the standing issue would find so little purchase with the court. I plan to keep following this case, as I think it’ll be interesting from both a criminal procedure and an evidence angle.
While out of the country, I got to while away the copious leisure time I didn’t have watching a fascinating international production: a Netflix series called Criminal. Four countries – the UK, Germany, Spain, and France – participated, each producing three episodes. The setting is very bare-bones: all four series utilize the same interrogation room with a one-way mirror in it. We see the interrogation of one witness or suspect, privy to what happens in the interrogation room as well as to what occurs behind the scenes. Some differences in procedure and legal culture are evident, but for the most part, it is a psychological drama.
In one of the Season 2 UK episodes, we see an interview with a woman named Julia, the ex-wife of a convicted murderer. Her ex-husband, who was a tutor for international students, apparently was involved with a young man from a foreign country and killed him. It now turns out that a second young international student is missing, and the team wants to figure out whether this young man met the same fate as the murder victim.
Julia has come to the interview on her own accord and appears very eager to help the interrogation: she is horrified by her husband’s deeds. It is a Sunday, and the team on the ground is sparse – just the interviewer and one more detective behind the mirror. But suddenly, the detective’s ears perk up: Julia has mentioned a few details about the peculiar method of the killings that were never released to the public; they were only included in the pathologist’s report, which she hasn’t seen. So how does she know?
The detective who is conducting the interview is, as of yet, unaware of this momentous fact. But the people behind the scenes are checking to make sure. The detective calls up the rest of the unit and, one by one, they arrive. They all seem to agree that, as long as the interviewer is unaware that Julia is incriminating herself, there’s no need to formally warn or charge her with a crime. It is only after the amicable interview is over and Julia exits the room that the commanding officer of the team approaches her, warns her, and places her under arrest. The following morning, she is interrogated under caution, and eventually provides more incriminating statements.
What if this had happened in the U.S.? That depends on whether the detectives were required to provide Julia with her Miranda warnings. It’s pretty easy to determine that, at the outset of the first interview, Julia is not in custody; she has come of her own free will to the station, she is collaborating, etc. As we know, Miranda warnings must only be provided to people under custodial interrogation; no custody, no Miranda requirement.
The more complicated question is whether the interrogating team’s awareness of the incriminating questions changes the nature of the interview into a custodial interrogation. By the time the team behind the mirror ascertains that only the killer could know the information Julia provided, it should be reasonably clear to them that she’s not going anywhere; she is the killer and, to top that, has framed her husband for the first murder. Does this change the constitutional status of the interrogation? Is Julia, at that point, in custody?
The definition of custody is: an arrest or its functional equivalent–a situation in which a reasonable person would feel that their freedom is considerably limited. Custody case law uses the suspect’s point of view: in at least one case, the suspect’s age is a relevant consideration as to whether they were in custody or not. Given that the actual interrogator in the room gives no indication that anything has changed (and is unaware of that herself), Julia doesn’t have any reasonable grounds to assume that her situation has changed. According to this view (and I suspect this is how many U.S. lawyers and legal scholars would see this), the warnings were unnecessary–which also means that the statements given during the second interrogation, in which she is given the warnings, are also admissible.
This does, however, raise the problem. If we say that Julia was not in custody during the first interview, we signal to detectives that there is an incentive for inviting people in as friendly witnesses and refraining from alerting them that their situation has changed. This is a fair argument in support of the idea that, once the interrogating team has become aware of the fact that the person is a suspect, rather than a neutral witness, they must give the person the warnings.
But that’s not the end of the story, because even according to this second view, while the first set of statements might not come in, the second one might. If the passage of time, the new warnings, and perhaps the added comment that the prior statements are inadmissible, count as curative methods, it’s quite possible that the statements from the second round will be admissible even if the first ones are not.
You’re probably familiar with the image at the top. Created by Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin, the face/vase illusion tests the modularity of perception: you can see the vase, or you can see the two faces, but you can’t see both.
I thought about this when I read Jonathan Ireland’s hard-hitting critique of the nonprofit industry. I recommend that you read it in its entirety – it heavily features San Francisco, and exposes some deep ugliness in the management of nonprofits presumably designed to help the homeless, which actually do anything but. Ireland’s examples illuminate his key point, which is that the reliance of progressives and socialists on dysfunctional, corrupt nonprofits is the exact opposite of being “progressive” or “socialist”:
Contrary to the conservative assumption that high taxes are an inherent evil, people are often fine with higher taxes provided that the taxes are utilized to improve local living standards. What is taking place in America’s most performatively socialist urban areas is that taxes are constantly raised in order to fund public services, resulting in some of the most heavily taxed populations in the country. But this tax revenue is then squandered on private contracts to unaccountable nonprofit organizations whose activities do little to rectify the problems they are nominally being funded to address.
In other words: instead of increasing state capacity to improve quality of life (e.g., pick up trash), ensure public safety in downtown areas, and solve large-scale social problems–after all, we want government spending in these areas–progressive cities have been delegating these areas to nonprofits, which are plagued by financial malfeasance, cynical posturing that often goes against the interest of the populations they are supposed to benefit, and just plain old incompetence. Ireland’s leading example is TODCO, whose corruption is truly breathtaking. I’ve been around do-gooder organizations for the last 25 years, and some of the ones with the noblest goals and most sanctimonious agendas are the shittiest in terms of administration, financial management and responsibility, and actual accomplishments in the field (not to mention all the horrendous infighting that makes hardworking, solid people flee them in horror and swear they’ll never work for one again).
But I’m not sure I’m buying wholesale Ireland’s critique of nonprofits employing people with criminal histories. Titling this section of his review “Crime, Inc.,” he addresses several cities that employ formerly incarcerated folks as “violence interrupters” or mentors. Notably, he does not mention Urban Alchemy, but rather similar programs in Seattle and Chicago. Here is Ireland’s critique:
[N]one of these people could draw a government paycheck unless it was laundered through a nonprofit. A police department could never hire a convicted felon with long-term ties to street gangs, but a private nonprofit has looser standards regarding who is allowed access to public funds. This not only squanders money on people who are not capable of performing the roles they’re assigned, but is an active threat to public safety in circumstances where the state uses convict-staffed nonprofits for duties that ought to be reserved for the police.
I think Ireland confounds two issues that are best kept distinct. Insofar as his critique is that the municipality would not directly hire people who have served a long prison sentence, the obvious answer is, yes, that’s exactly the point! One of Ireland’s concerns is that nonprofits employ people lack the skills for doing the work they are hired to do, and I suspect he is seeing only one aspect of the face/vase illusion. The material question is, what are useful skills for crime prevention work? You see, the logic of programs like Urban Alchemy is that, living lives saturated with danger and violence, people acquire special skills that help them sniff trouble before it begins and prevent it through subtle, nonviolent means, such as positioning themselves between a young woman crossing the street and a man about to mug or assault her. If the state or municipality cannot bring themselves to value these skills in the job market, of course private providers have to step in and employ them. Whether or not the proof’s in the pudding is another matter, and this is where, again, we’re dealing with two incompatible views of reality. One view measures public safety in arrests and busts for things that have already happened. Another measures public safety in terms of the intangible sense of safety that people experience walking down the street and having nothing bad happen to them. I’m not a neutral commenter here; my sympathy for Urban Alchemy comes from my, ahem, <groan> lived experience </groan> working in the Tenderloin. I can’t quantify this, put a number on it, or twist it into a nice graphic that would fit in a quarterly performance review, but I can tell you that the entire energy around my workplace shifted when the practitioners started opening doors for us, cleaning areas that used to be repellent, and watching out for folks. The difference between street corners with and without practitioners is palpable. Maybe at some point we hit a saturation effect and the impact of seeing someone with a green vest in the corner will dissipate. I worry that the proliferation of these companies could get us there, but my subjective assessment is that we’re not there yet.
(Also, there’s the underlying assumption that the scrutiny of the public sector helps prevent scandalous mismanagement of the kind that nonprofits are notorious for. But if the private-versus-public-prisons debate is anything to go by, the private sector has not cornered the market on scandalous mismanagement. The entire COVID-19 disaster in CA prisons was 100% brought to you courtesy of the public sector, and funded by $10 billion of your tax money per annum. And the few people who tried to do something were federal employees working for the Receivership and upstanding citizens volunteering or working in nonprofits, not state employees running the prisons.)
The second issue Ireland brings up is considerably thornier: the not-at-all-unreasonable concern that putting folks with criminal ties in charge of other people (crowd handling) and funds is a risk. He does provide some hair-raising examples of folks who continued their criminal activity, be it financial malfeasance or actual gang violence, under the sheltering umbrella of the nonprofit where they worked. Because I am well read on criminological literature (including quant stuff, not just jargon-heavy political propaganda), and because I live in the real world, I know that recidivism is always a risk, particularly in the first few months after one gets out of prison (with all the usual caveats about the concept of recidivism). A BJS study looking at state prisoners released in 2005 and following up on their records until 2014 found the following:
The 401,288 state prisoners released in 2005 had 1,994,000 arrests during the 9-year period, an average of 5 arrests per released prisoner. Sixty percent of these arrests occurred during years 4 through 9.
An estimated 68% of released prisoners were arrested within 3 years, 79% within 6 years, and 83% within 9 years.
Eighty-two percent of prisoners arrested during the 9-year period were arrested within the first 3 years.
Almost half (47%) of prisoners who did not have an arrest within 3 years of release were arrested during years 4 through 9.
Forty-four percent of released prisoners were arrested during the first year following release, while 24% were arrested during year-9.
There is plenty that we don’t know and can argue about, of course, such as whether the arrests reflect actual renewed criminal activity or bogus outcomes of escalated stop-and-frisk stuff that ended up being nothing, and whether the arrests reflect the lives of people who were housed and employed after they came out, or people who drifted back to crime out of necessity. But I think you’d be pretty silly, misguided, or deceptive, to argue that there are no risks of reoffending when employing people straight out of the joint. My argument, in both Yesterday’s Monsters and Fester, is that you can considerably mitigate this risk by providing early releases and employment opportunities to aging and infirm people who have already spent a long time behind bars. At least initially, this was Urban Alchemy’s employment strategy, and I would not be surprised if nonprofits employing people with an incarceration history find that they have significantly more reoffending challenges with young people. As I explained in both books (in different contexts), hooking up aging former lifers with opportunities requires a stomach for bad optics, because doing so tends to produce headlines about murderers-at-large, even though from a well-researched, robust criminological standpoint, the recidivism rate among people in their fifties who served decades in prison is remarkably low, and they constitute a very low employment risk. It’s also fair to say, I think, that any organization employing people who face temptations to reoffend on their daily beat must provide them hands-on support–decent pay, decent benefits, access to therapy, reasonable colleagues to talk to–otherwise, it’s not doing its due diligence.
Once the population of employees with criminal records increases and includes younger people with recidivism risks, the question becomes: at what point do we have enough information to argue that the nonprofit is dysfuctional, or even countereffective? I submit that Ireland falls into a trap that many of us fall into: failing to acknowledge that the world is full of both Type I and Type II errors. Briefly, a type I error, also known as a false positive, is the rejection of the null hypothesis when it is actually true. A type II error, or a false negative, is the failure to reject a null hypothesis that is actually false.
The errors that Ireland flags in his article–admittedly, horrible ones–happen when you employ a formerly incarcerated person in some crime prevention capacity, making the assumption that the person will not reoffend. The person then reoffends, garnering terrible headlines and raising the expected critique: Why are you employing criminals in your organization? The error no one observes is the one we (perhaps) make time and time again: we assume people will reoffend, and therefore do not release them or employ them or offer them opportunities, when they would actually be competent and helpful and not pose a recidivism risk. Because errors of the second type are invisible (you can’t guess whether someone would have reoffended on the job if you didn’t give them the job) you’re left with just the errors from the first kind.
The invisibility of the second type of errors stands in our way when we try to figure out whether a program like Urban Alchemy or Ceasefire or Community Passageways is effective or not. The temptation is to point at the situations in which the employees commit crime–say, assault people in the street, embezzle funds, pimp sex workers in their violence-prevention areas, etc.–and say, this program gives people a license to commit crime. Of course we should not ignore these critiques. But alongside them, we should see other things: Has the overall crime rate for the area supervised by the practitioners decreased? Do before-and-after surveys of the people who live and work in those areas show an improvement in their sense of safety walking the streets? Can we compare crime and safety in the streets when (1) neglected, (2) traditionally policed, (3) patrolled by nonprofit employees, or (4) combination of policing and nonprofit practitioners? That is the sort of essential literature that can actually answer the question whether the solutions offset the problems or vice-versa. We would all be better off if more people did this careful evaluation work, instead of writing alarmist “criminals on the loose” pieces or ignorant “dismantle the carceral whatever” pieces.
I don’t think Ireland’s piece falls neatly into one category or another, and I do think that his willingness to shine a light on the pervasive dysfunction of do-gooder organizations is important. I remember following, with some interest, the ugly feud between Shaun King and DeRay Mckesson, just to see how much rubbish, dysfunction, and malfeasance was at the heart of all the mudslinging. This is not the exception; it’s not uncommon. But I think that malfeasance and incompetence do not perfectly overlap with criminal history, and that’s where we should be more careful.
Friend, are you heading to a birthday or baby shower? If you like bringing books as gifts, and want the books to be meaningful, I’d steer away from tiresome sloganeering a-la-A-is-for-Activist and offer some actual content instead. I especially recommend two books I read with my son in recent years: The Gardener of Alcatraz and Milo Imagines the World. In case one wonders, why would I want to expose my kid to prison? it’s worth remembering that many kids are exposed to prison through the incarceration of family members and friends; that prison is constantly on the news, and so you’d be better off exercising some judgment over the narrative; and that, given that about 1 in 150 Americans is incarcerated, your child will come across prison or imprisonment at some point.
The Gardener of Alcatraz, written by Emma Bland Smith and beautifully illustrated by Jenn Ely (see cover image above), is a story that humanizes people in prison and offers hope without slipping into cheesy melodrama. It tells the true story of Elliot Michener, sentenced for counterfeiting in 1941 and put on a boat to Alcatraz after participating in a foiled escape plan from Leavenworth.
To Smith’s credit, she does not embellish or glorify Michener. The narrative follows his arrival in the gloomy prison and his plans to escape, and very subtly and intelligently shows (without telling) his internal transformation through his garden work. Michener’s labor of love, planting and cultivating flowers throughout the island, and his friendship with the warden’s wife, are gently and delicately handled. Smith also doesn’t gloss over the fact that Michener was transferred out of Alcatraz toward the end of his sentence, which was a true blow to him and his work. The book contains an appendix full of interesting information about Alcatraz and about the gardens. It offers a very special slice of history without hitting readers over the head with “mass incarceration is wrong,” but even young readers will get a sense of the complexity of having done something wrong and at the same time being harshly punished.
Milo Imagines the World, written by Matt de la Peña and illustrated by Christian Robinson, takes us into the present, with Milo and his sister riding the Subway. Again, no sloganeering or hitting you over the head with moralizing messages; instead, you get to learn about Milo’s world implicitly, through the way he imagines the lives of the people around him. In a particularly moving sequence, he sees a troupe of street performers on the train, and later his imagination takes a dark turn, implying that if these girls go to an electronics store, they might be stopped by the police for suspected shoplifting. The meaning of the story fully unfolds toward the end, when the reader realizes that Milo and his sister are on their way to visit their mother, who is incarcerated. To his surprise, Milo sees that another boy who was riding with them is also in line to see his own mother. Which is where Robinson’s illustrations complete what de la Peña only delicately intimates: the other boy seems white and well dressed. Realizing that things are not what they seem, Milo opens his mind to imagine other things beyond his assumptions (for example, the street performing girls living together in a big, lovely house; the bride on the train marrying another bride, rather than a groom; the gloomy man eating his dinner with a loving family, rather than just with cats), including a future where he, his sister, and his mom, now free, all sit in front of their building and eat ice cream together. I’ve been a fan of de la Peña’s work since I read the wonderful Last Stop on Market Street, which humanizes street people and shelter workers without being condescending or too explicit.
The more I see of my son’s educational journey at Red Bridge School, the more I realize that children are very smart and perceptive; teaching them stupid things and hitting them over the head with things they can discern from better crafted materials is a waste of their intellect and sensitivity. Gardener and Milo are two examples of how to thoughtfully introduce children to the painful topic of incarceration in a way that engenders empathy and complex reasoning.
Houston, we have a bit of a problem. Having just finished writing my term papers at the GTU, I’ve turned to grading exams (will be done soon! I promise!) and to some writing obligations in my areas of expertise, only to find out that I seem to have outgrown things I promised to finish and send out. It’s not exactly writer’s block: the challenge is not dishing out words, but rather the specific words that I’m supposed to be dishing. I committed to write something about the anticarceral literature of the last few years, its contributions and the ways in which it falls into the same traps it identifies (basically, a scholarly version of this thing), except I can’t shake a sense of “what’s the use?” It’s simply no longer clear to me how “contributing to the debate” makes the world a better place.
I’ve now spent more than 25 years in criminology and penology and have come to realize that there is nothing new under the sun. Maybe this is true of all social sciences, maybe humanities, too, maybe all disciplines; I can only speak about my own area of expertise. New terms and jargons are banded about often enough, but very little of the substance changes. Do the conference and publication thing, year in and year out, and you’ll risk catching whatever new viral tic is going around, infecting the crop-de-jour of publications and talks: the X industrial complex, postcolonialism, decolonialism, neoliberalism, extractionism, or whatever is in vogue this year (I’m sure there’s something, but I’ve been out of the loop for a few months, mourning my father and shellshocked from the massacre and the war and bereft of appetite for mundane job stuff.) If you scrape the jargon off, you find that the basics have changed very little in more than a century, and when articulated simply and without flourishes, they pretty much reflect what we know: what counts as “crime” varies, and although some things (e.g., serious violence) tend to generate consensus, others (e.g., white collar crime and environmental crime) are treated more nebulously; what is treated more seriously sometimes, but not always, correlates with what causes the most social harm. Disadvantage and deprivation can bring about pathological behavior both on the part of the people experiencing it and on the part of the people policing it. Militarized and aggressive policing is a low-yield, high-alienation strategy that makes communities bitter and mistrustful and harms efforts to actually solve crime. Locking people up can create conditions for cruelty and neglect and can bring about change (due to deterrence or rehabilitation) only under very specific conditions that, more often than not, do not materialize. Generally, the folks on the receiving end of the uglier aspects of criminal justice–whether too much or too little–tend to have less money and darker skins.
Contributions of value to this situation come, basically, in two packages: either a truly groundbreaking understanding of how the world works, or someone willing to put in the work to make things better. Publications and talks of the former variety are rare, which makes sense–we stand on the shoulders of giants, even if we no longer recognize the giants or remember to cite them. As to the latter variety, practical effort to improve things is hard to do, and also thankless, because even fairly mediocre folks know how to write the sort of gloomy diatribe that gets an applause: People did A, which was bad. Or people did B and meant to do a good thing, but it turned out bad because of systemic problems. Or people did C and pretended to do a good thing, when they were doing a bad thing all along. It matters very little which tack you take, as long as your conclusion is that things turned out worse than they were before. Writing this sort of thing gets a lot more respect in the social science spaces where I spent two and a half decades of my life than actually working in policy or government, where you are branded either as an idiot or as complicit with the bad guys, and it’s not nearly as much work, so even grad students realize fairly quickly where the incentives lie.
Because saying what other people have said for decades is not innovation, and because true innovation is not on the menu, we have simply found new ways to say old things. Which is why I find myself asked, at a book talk, how FESTER relates to “doing crip theory,” because apparently saying, “people with disabilities and chronic conditions were horrifically neglected and their conditions deteriorated” is less hip than calling it “crip theory,” which is exactly the same thing, except without the fancy name. Same goes for saying “the neglect and mismanagement of COVID-19 in prison caused horrific outbreaks and alarming rates of mortality, which affected people on the outside as well” without dressing it up as “eugenic logics.” When I say that overtheorizing is not a virtue, it’s an ego-driven intellectual game (and not a particularly impressive one), and that the facts are horrifying enough without calling them all sorts of things that don’t actually do any explanatory work, I get blank stares.
Ask any American criminologist or penologist about radical realism, and nine times out of ten you’ll get a blank stare. Punishment theory tends to be fairly parochial, and had I not been lucky to study with people trained in Europe and Canada, odds are I wouldn’t be familiar with Jock Young’s important work. A towering figure in criminology in the 1970s, Young was part of the pioneers of The New Criminology, then a groundbreaking work that responded to the challenges of British working class neighborhoods with a systemic analysis of deprivation and inequality, and challenged the mainstream assumptions of classicists and positivists by asking questions about the provenance of criminal categories and criminalization and positing that power played a role in crafting them.
Along with John Lea, Young offered a multifaceted understanding of the causes of crime, tying it to three factors: relative deprivation, subcultures, and marginalization. Poverty alone could not explain rising crime rates; standards of living had risen since the 1950s, and so had crime rates. But in an increasingly wealthy society, everyone’s material expectations rise: we are wealthier, but we feel poorer, and thus there is more pressure to get more stuff to keep up with everyone else, which generates historically high crime rates.
Relatedly, Lea and Young built on some of the proto-conflict criminologists of the 1950s (Merton, Albert Cohen, and others) to combine the problem of relative deprivation with systemic neglect (which they refer to as “marginalization) and the rise of criminal subcultures. Recall that Merton flagged the basic problem with the American dream: the mismatch between the goal (to get ahead materially) and the means (blocked opportunities due to structural inequalities, lack of representation, and being pushed out of fully participating in society.) People who adhere to the conventional goals but lack legitimate opportunities to accomplish them, said Albert Cohen, experience “status frustration,” which can lead to cynicism and bitterness and fuel criminal subcultures.
What produces crime, therefore, is a combination of factors, which Young captures in the “square of crime.” This framework can accommodate multiple criminological questions: why people commit crime, what makes crime victims vulnerable, what factors affect public attitudes toward crime, and what impacts the state’s formal response to crime. Any criminological theory that is a one-trick pony can ridicule any corner of the square of crime: knee-jerk left idealists can complain about the offender corner, arguing that crime is a capitalist, white supremacist invention, while knee-jerk conservatives (and, say, some carceral feminists) can complain about blaming the victim. But grownups understand that complex phenomena have complex etiologies.
Complex problems call for complex solutions, and left realism focuses on two types of practical, high-yield strategies: prevention through early intervention (tearly-age education and high quality programming for youth) and community-based approaches that focused on raising living standards, creating jobs, and improving quality of life. Because crime prevention is at its best when initiated by the community, the police must invest in building the community’s trust, opting for proactive problem-solving, rather than low-yield, high-antagonism tactics like militarized raids and stop-and-frisk activities.
You can probably see where i’m going with this. Left realism is an approach that sees social inequalities as fueling two sides of the same coin: criminality and criminalization. They are cognizant of the fact that the world can be very unfair toward those of us with less resources, and they also know that both perpetrators and victims tend to belong to the less fortunate sectors of society. There’s no preemptive assumption that victims and offenders must develop class solidarity and hold hands in peace circles, because crime is a serious thing and not everyone feels forgiving. There’s also no preemptive assumption that people who commit crime are uniformly innocuous and, without exception, lovely to be around, even as the source of their suffering can be very complicated. And, there is a basic trust in the common sense and power of community, because even though many people are poor and disadvantaged, most poor and disadvantaged people do not commit crime, nor do they like being around criminal activity. All of this makes as much sense to me in 2024 as it did to Young between the 1970s and the 1990s.
Why am I thinking about this now? In trying to discern my current opinions about carceral-this and anticarceral-that, I came across a crisp, clear analysis of our current political moment by the one and only Nate Silver. You can (and should) read the whole thing here, but here are a few handy paragraphs:
SJLs and liberals have some interests in common. Both are “culturally liberal” on questions like abortion and gay marriage. And both disdain Donald Trump and the modern, MAGA-fied version of the Republican Party. But I’d suggest we’ve reached a point where they disagree in at least as many ways as they agree. Here are a few dimensions of conflict:
SJL’s focus on group identity contrasts sharply with liberalism’s individualism.
SJL, like other critical theories that emerged from the Marxist tradition, tends to be totalizing. The whole idea of systemic racism, for instance, is that the entire system is rigged to oppress nonwhite people. Liberalism is less totalizing. This is in part because it is the entrenched status quo and so often is well-served by incremental changes. But it’s also because liberalism’s focus on democracy makes it intrinsically pluralistic.
SJL, with its academic roots, often makes appeals to authority and expertise as opposed to entrusting individuals to make their own decisions and take their own risks. This is a complicated axis of conflict because there are certainly technocratic strains of liberalism, whereas like Hayek I tend to see experts and central planners as error-prone and instead prefer more decentralized mechanisms (e.g. markets, votes, revealed preferences) for making decisions.
Silver goes on to explain why these differences have become even more stark in the aftermath of October 7:
I suspect that an increasing number of liberals will a) more clearly recognize that they belong to a different political tribe than the SJLs and even b) will see SJLs as being just as bad as conservatives. And this will cut both ways; some SJLs will regard liberals as just as bad as conservatives — enough so that they might even be willing to deny a vote to Biden. All of this is quite bad for the progressive coalition between liberals and the left that’s won the popular vote for president four times in a row.
The liberal-vs-SJL distinction Silver makes is echoed, in the criminological area, in the perennial distinction between left realists and left idealists, which then became the distinction between reformers and revolutionaries, which then became the distinction between, say, not-quite-abolitionist and abolitionist folks. Left realists are not the perfect equivalent of traditional liberals, but in terms of how the field is organized, they might as well be, because for the hardcore abolition/anticarceralism folks, anyone who is willing to treat crime as a phenomenon with ontological reality, regard incarceration as an institution that has some public safety payoff (if only to incapacitate people who are truly dangerous to their immediate environment), and ask hard questions about racial disparities in violent crime rates (and not only in criminalization), might as well be a rabid Trumper. I see this again and again at conferences. I hear incessant chatter about how prison “should not exist in its current form” but no practical proposals for what form it should take. I hear conversations about disenfranchised people being harmed by crime, but nothing about the fact that there are actual people, also disenfranchised who are doing the harming, and about the possibility that restorative justice circles might not be the only solution for this situation. Thing is, as a staunch left realist, I have serious axes to grind with fatuous analyses and suggestions from both these-people-are-monsters fearmongerers and psychopaths and crime-is-nothing-but-white-supremacist-scapegoating idiots and fantasists. And I also know that there’s a silent majority of reasonable people hovering around those two points that doesn’t quite accept those positions in their caricatured forms, but are afraid to write nuanced things that can contribute to practical improvements in the real world out of fear that no one in their respective milieus will treat them seriously or want to have coffee with them. And I don’t really have a solid plan for how to make this slouch toward unseriousness and hyperbole any better, beyond saying again and again: Jock Young was right, there are no easy answers, and left realism matters now more than ever in criminology.
Like many other campuses around the United States, mine is papered with despicable flyers espousing an ignorant perspective on the Israel-Hamas war. My Jewish students are understandably upset and infuriated, and so am I. Every day brings fresh, unbearable details about the massacre. The contrast between that and my outside surroundings is a dissonance that fractures me to the core. In the coming days, many campuses, including ours, will see abominable displays of hatred, antisemitism, and a breathtaking level of illiteracy regarding international affairs. We’ll see laughable, imaginary coalitions between, say, Hamas and the fight for trans rights. This will be ugly and it will be emotionally difficult to stomach. It already has been a difficult struggle to function at work and it’s likely to endure for some time.
At such times, supporting a legal regime that has absolute free speech is deeply distressing and challenging. I finally found out who first wrote, “I detest what you write, but I would give my life to make it possible for you to continue to write”–it was Voltaire biographer Evelyn Beatrice Hall, in 1906. For First Amendment enthusiasts, this era epitomizes that sentiment–the price of freedom is walking around with a broken heart, even if the open goal of the speakers is to break it.
The image above depicts the Illinois Holocaust Museum in Skokie, IL; in the 1970s, Skokie was the setting for a free speech debate culminating in a Supreme Court decision that in many ways reminds me of the situation on the ground today. David Goldberger, at the time the legal director of the ACLU of Illinois (and later an Ohio State law professor specializing in free speech) has written a fascinating account, complete with images, of his representation of the Nazis in this case–not only what it was like to have them for clients, but also the public response. I really recommend that you read it verbatim. Among many things I didn’t know was the fact that Meir Kahane, in many ways the ideological granddaddy of murderous Jewish nationalists like Ben Gvir et al., started his activity in the US with the Jewish Defense League, who appeared at the ACLU offices with baseball bats! Another thing I didn’t know was that the ACLU’s choice to represent the Nazis in the Skokie trial led to tens of thousands of resignations, but also to some support letters from holocaust survivors who said that “they wanted to be able to see their enemies in plain sight so they would know who they were.” The ACLU is taking the same approach regarding the protests we are experiencing now.
I really recommend reading Goldberger’s entire account, and it’s even more interesting to ponder it through a comparative lens. Not all countries have absolute free speech; many place limitations on hate speech and incitement to racism or violence. That approach ushers its own host of problems: what is and is not “hate speech” or “incitement” is a subjective determination, and judicially delving into these questions inevitably brings in ideological perspectives and heuristics. I’m already seeing some troubling incidents in Israel in which universities and schools waste precious time and energy on McCarthyist investigations of their students, faculty, and staff.
It’s important to distinguish the general question of what should and should not be legally allowed from the more particular question, what these opinions tell us about the quality of the education we provide and about the quality of the people who espouse them. For some idea on how these ideas fester and infect people to this degree, read Julia Steinberg’s account of her own education. It exposes many of the flaws of what passes nowadays for progressive education, and dovetails with my unwillingness to responsibly participate in similar indoctrination efforts at my workplace and elsewhere. Steinberg’s piece was an important reminder that hateful idiots don’t spring into being, fully formed, in college or law school; they are raised to be the way they are in their K-12 years. I, for one, plan to keep a very watchful eye on my child’s education, to ensure that essentialist, separatist identitarian rubbish isn’t inflicted on the kids in this mindless manner.
It is also important to distinguish the right to free speech from the consequences of putting oneself out in public espousing horrendous views. Several law students in fancy schools are finding out, to their shock and surprise, that law firms are not all that keen to hire people who publicly extol the virtues of slaughtering, raping, maiming, burning alive, beheading, and kidnapping people. That being an antisemitic idiot with repugnant views is not a professional asset and has consequences in the job market shouldn’t be particularly surprising, unless you spent your undergraduate years under the tutelage of morally bankrupt people for whom espousing these “edgy” and “interesting” views was a calculated career strategy that catapulted them to prominence in fields like ethnic studies (read here a courageous letter by a UC Regent calling out the Ethnic Studies faculty council letter for what it is.) No wonder these students think they can spew horrid opinions in public and face no consequences whatsoever. What I find most amazing about the whole thing is that some of my colleagues are surprised by what they see on the campus quad. How is any of this surprising? Academic institutions, including the ones I work for, have breathed life into this Golem for years, and the last thing they should find astonishing is when it comes for them. They taught these people, but they didn’t educate them, and the proof’s in the rancid pudding.
A week ago I was asked to comment on an announcement by the Governor of New Mexico who, reacting to a terrifying rise in gun violence in Albuquerque, issued an executive order that would suspend both open and concealed carry laws in Albuquerque and Bernalillo County, temporarily banning the carrying of guns on public property with certain exceptions. Following quite a bit of backlash from both parties, the Governor then limited the ban to parks and playgrounds.
Because this is not my area of expertise/publication, I quickly consulted with my colleague Prof. Jennifer Carlson, who is one of the nation’s most impressive experts on gun policy. Jennifer agreed with me that, even though the Governor’s action makes sense from both moral and practical stand point, it is not constitutionally defensible, certainly not in this judicial climate, after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bruen. Still, it’s worth asking ourselves the question whether, even if the constitution allows us to bear arms, it is a good idea to go ahead and do it.
Recently, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives released a report on guns, which you can read here in its entirety. This NPR story provides some important takeaways which, in my opinion, all boil down to the same conclusion: anyone thinking that the world of gun ownership can be easily dichotomized into good guys/bad guys or legal/illegal guns is not seeing the full picture.
For one thing, it turns out that more than half of gun crimes utilize lawfully purchased guns. To this number, we must add a million stolen guns which were held in legal hands until recently. Notably, the vast majority of guns used for criminal activity are pistols, which a lot of people favor for legal personal use. I think the big question anyone considering a gun purchase should ask themselves is: are the chances that you’ll be using this gun to stop the proverbial bad guy anywhere near the chances of an accident in your household or your gun being stolen?
On a personal note, as many readers know, I was in the Israeli army for five years, engaging in no combat whatsoever (unless criminal appellate litigation counts, but it does not require guns.) For much, albeit not all, of that period, I walked everywhere with my M-16 strapped to my body, including to the bathroom. The idea of lugging around a thing that presented far more inconvenience and risk than comfort and safety holds no charm or mystique for me, and I suspect that, if the symbolic/emotional attachment to the idea of gun ownership is effectively stripped away, a lot more people will see the risk calculus as I do–because it is in congruence with the data.
In the sixties, Todd Gitlin, then a young, passionate student, became involved in the fight against the Vietnam war and in the struggle for equality. Alongside his friends at Students for a Democratic society (he was the president in 1963-1964) he agitated, organized, protested, held movements, registered people to vote in the Deep South, and fought against orthodoxy in the Democratic party and for a New Left. Many years later, already a sociology professor and incisive critic of the movement he helped create, he evocatively wrote about how much activism had meant to him. The first half of his masterpiece The Sixties reads like a manifesto of hope; the second half, though, is rife with confusion. Plans for political action got muddled with self expression and individuality a-la diggers and the Mime Troupe (to read a different perspective on those, read Peter Coyote’s fantastic memoir Sleeping Where I Fall); people he admired and respected as leaders disappointed at best and disintegrated at worst; former comrades slid further and further to the left, established the Weather Report, and engaged in clumsy but frightening violent actions Gitlin could not condone or comprehend (learn more about those in the podcast Mother Country Radicals). Gitlin’s later books reveal an author and thinker who still very much believes in the ideals of socialism and peace, but resents the splintering and performativity of identity politics that he believes shattered the movement in the 1970s.
Today I found myself going back to one of my favorite books by Gitlin, Letters to a Young Activist, which evokes that deep ambivalence and wisdom that comes only from spending years in a movement you both admire and fiercely critique. Gitlin talks about the importance of passionate motivation but also reminds young activists not to “think with their blood”; highlights the crucial role of shining a light on the wrongs of your own side, but also the importance of letting self-flagellation by the wayside; and warns against the dangers of “marching on the English department”, as it were, while one’s opponents “march on Washington.”
What brought me back to Gitlin were a number of recent conversations with younger folks I like and admire a lot about their disillusionment with infighting and lack of integrity in radical movements and organizations with noble goals and true dedication. People admired and respected in positions of leadership turn out to behave in disappointing ways; serious issues get buried or, on the opposite end of the spectrum, debated to death, complete with public denunciations and humiliations; minute complaints turn into struggle sessions that sap everyone’s will to come back; and eventually people come to demonize their comrades and brothers in arms more than they do the bad guys they are fighting against.
Hearing about this stuff is always heartbreaking, especially when I see folks who I know put in countless, tireless, thankless energy, time and effort into organizing and activism express disillusionment and despair. I can offer very little solace in this sort of situation; dealing with big disappointment as an idealist is really hard, and calls for more than one self-compassion break.
Kristin Neff, who has written and spoken extensively about self compassion and mindfulness, offers a three-step formula for anyone who is struggling. The first step is to admit that this is, indeed, a moment of suffering, a low point in the person’s life. The second, which I’ll elaborate more on in a bit, is understanding that suffering is universal, a part of life, and that everyone suffers–sometimes intensely–from time to time. And the third is offering oneself some kindness, either through expressing it or through a gentle hand touching one’s own heart.
I like this exercise a lot, and find the second step especially important, because as Brené Brown explains, one of the traps of shame and self-pity (by contrast to self compassion) is to see one’s experience as unique and idiosyncratic. I see a lot of this horror in young, committed activists, who are so distraught by occurrences in their group or community that they believe it must be prey to some special variety of pathology. This is where I can offer some comfort. As regular readers know, I’ve written and spoken quite a bit about the sixties, and part of my work on Yesterday’s Monsters included learning about cults and movements that swirled around the California counterculture when Manson put together his “family.” When the murders occurred, and when Manson and his followers were identified as the culprits, they evoked a wave of horror because cults and their inner workings were not well known or understood at the time. Indeed, the idea of thought control and brainwashing was associated at the time only with Communist regimes such as China and Korea (see an example of this in The Manchurian Candidate.)
But while this group stood out in the heinousness of their crimes, they were by no means the only group led by charismatic leaders and/or a vision to be plagued by exploitation, violence, and oppression. In the mid-seventies, the California legislature held a hearing for family members of young adults who had joined cults, hearing testimony after testimony about how their loved ones fell in thrall to some charismatic leader or other, started believing some stranger things, dramatically changed their appearance or habits, isolated from them to the point of estrangement, and gave all their effort and resources to the cult. Witnesses testified about the Moonies and about a variety of Christian apocalyptic cults. The legislators at the hearing tiptoed between expressing deep concern and sympathy and reminding everyone that cult members were adults with the freedom of religion and expression.
To this day, whenever I see people criticize radical activist movements that fall prey to unsavory activity and conflict, the demonizing language compares the movement to a cult. This is not a scientific or easy process, because cults turn out to be quite a malleable category. But one need not go into the reeds to identify pathological cultish elements in pretty much every activist movement, including influential and notable ones. Three years ago I wrote a post about this stuff that identified a lot of the obvious issues: betrayals of the cause, identitarian splintering, sexual exploitation or perceived exploitation, financial malfeasance, etc. Having read a lot about movements in the 1960s and 1970s, I see situations where the FBI were infiltrating and persecuting organizations and cells and eventually didn’t have to do anything to hasten their demise: these outfits crumbled on their own, without the malignant interference of the feds, because they suffered from these inherent issues. Stanley Nelson’s fantastic documentary about the Black Panthers is a case in point: there’s nothing the FBI could have done to dissolve the Panthers that Huey Newton didn’t do himself. Larry Kramer’s acerbic account of ACT UP in The Normal Heart shows the awful indifference and demonization the activists were working against, but also how they sabotaged themselves through horrendous infighting. I see this stuff again and again.
Here are some factors–and this is by no means an exhaustive list–that are part of this malignant cocktail. Oftentimes, radical organizing draws people who seek the type of camaraderie and belonging that membership in a close-knit group of likeminded people working for an important cause can provide. Some young folks get swept in this energy because home life is rife with trauma or neglect, or because their school or employment networks haven’t improved their lot socially. I’m not saying their commitment to the goal is not genuine; all I’m saying is that excitement about a common vision is infectious and promises an embrace that is very difficult to resist if one feels lonely or traumatized. The fact that a lot of radical movements strive toward ideological purity is also part of this. It isolated people and drives them further into the insular experience of the group, with no reality checks and balances on the outside. I’ve spoken to mixed-race couples that broke up on account of a commitment to racial justice that was so strong that it eclipsed years of love and commitment. I know of people who took the Liberation Pledge (not to eat where animals are served) and ended up unable to eat with anyone from their family or friend group outside vegan movements. Not only does this mean all of one’s social efforts are invested in a relatively small group of people, but that group ends up being an echo chamber and it’s very difficult to test ideas in the real world. And moreover, anytime purity and adherence to principles are the yardstick for worthiness, people turn on each other and compete over who is a more zealous advocate for social change. This process of eating each other seems to accelerate as shit starts hitting the fan, because people who are afraid and fighting for their own survival are sure to lash out at the people standing closest to them.
The fact that crappy things are happening to committed activists throughout the social justice field is not cause for cheer, but I think that anyone who thinks their organization is uniquely pathological might derive some comfort from knowing that, apparently, homo sapiens seems to find a way to ruin communities centered on ideals and struggles pretty much all the time. I don’t think we’ve found a way to organize and seek social change that doesn’t end up marred in these kinds of self destructive crap. I wish we could, but I’m in my late forties, have organized and agitated plenty, and I’m just not seeing it. The one that came closest to being a healthy organizing container, for me, was the #StopSanQuentinOutbreak coalition; it wasn’t without its warts, but it was highly effective and overall a really positive, supportive environment. I suspect the magic had something to do with the fact that, in addition to the long-term decarceration vision, we had tangible, short-term emergency goals, and thus no time for faffing. Perhaps human nature, like nature in general, abhors a vacuum, and will fill any available space with infighting and oneupmanship.
I don’t know what the answer is. But I do think that understanding we’re talking about universal phenomena that radical movements go through can be helpful to people who think they’re stuck in a uniquely dysfunctional scenario. Every unhappy family, as Tolstoy famously wrote, is unhappy in its own unique way, but they are still all unhappy. And that means that any person who believes in an ideal, a vision, a blueprint for far-reaching social change, and is committed enough to put a lot of work into it, will experience heartbreak from time to time. If this is you now, then it’s simply your turn. Offer yourself all the kindness you need to get through the rough patch, and then see if there’s another path for you to change the world or bring about your values in a way that supports your heart better.
One more indictment! This time, it comes from Fulton County, Georgia, where Trump tried to bulldoze the Secretary of State into “finding” him enough votes to win. Eighteen additional friends (and 30 unnamed co-conspirators, probably anonymized to entice them to flip on the named defendants as in the recent federal indictment) come aboard for the ride with RICO violations and a conspiracy. Read the indictment in full here.
This is a lengthy indictment, containing 41 charges, the first of which is a violation of the Georgia RICO Act, which requires that the defendants “while associated with an enterprise, unlawfully conspired and endeavored to conduct and participate in, directly and indirectly, such enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity.” Beyond the strategic value of using the RICO Act as a framework for the conspiracy (it is easier to prove than its federal equivalent, and it encompasses a lot of the remaining charges, thus helping create a streamlined narrative), there’s something symbolic about relying on a statutory machine birthed for the purpose of bringing down crime organizations, which, come to think of it, is exactly what this enterprise was.
One’s gotta love the simplicity of the opening paragraph:
Defendant Donald John Trump lost the United States presidential election held on November 3, 2020. One of the states he lost was Georgia. Trump and the other Defendants charged in this Indictment refused to accept that Trump lost, and they knowingly and willfully joined conspiracy to unlawfully change the outcome of the election in favor of Trump. That conspiracy contained common plan and purpose to commit two or more acts of racketeering activity in Fulton County, Georgia, elsewhere in the State of Georgia, and in other states.
After defining the relationship between the defendants and their co-conspirators as an “enterprise,” the indictment continues its on-the-nose organized crime reference by listing the “manner and methods of the enterprise”: holding hearings in which they issued false statements about the election results, repeating these falsehoods to various office holders in Georgia, convening a fake slate of electors (complete with forged documentation–as part of the Eastman-Chesebro scheme), false accusations of election workers, stealing data, soliciting the assistance of Pence and the DOJ to bring about the reversal of fortune in Georgia and, of course, the inevitable coverup, including perjury.
As per RICO requirements, the indictment then lists 161 racketeering acts, breaking the aforementioned modus operandi into discrete events. These are a real eye opener even for those of you who were following the events in real time. At the time, I was under the impression that the Trump phone call to Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger was the coup de grâce of the whole thing, and I don’t think that was far from the truth, particularly if you listen to the whole thing:
I remember listening only to the critical bit, in which Trump bullies and threatens Raffensperger, but in the full recording you can hear his usual tactics: bombard the listeners with facts that sort of sound valid but are completely false, and revert to insults, etc., when that doesn’t yield immediate submission.
Thing is, reading each of the additional acts fleshes out a story of brutal, systematic intimidation, complete with utter disregard for the safety of election workers who simply did their job and were rewarded with death threats. The remaining 40 charges are of more particular crimes: forgeries, impersonations, threats against public office holders, etc. The emerging picture is well worth the criminal enterprise framing; this indictment, even more than the federal ones, calls Trump and his lackeys what they are.
It’s a surreal experience to read the new Trump indictment, which you can find here verbatim with NYT annotations, while in Israel – it reads disturbingly prophetic about other parts of the world. It’s also been deeply unpleasant to relive the events from last year, as they are narrated chronologically and concisely (rather than revealed daily through the news cycle.) I just spoke about this with the one and only Mitch Jeserich on KPFAand here’s a link to the show. Here are some of the basics.
Charges
The indictment consists of four counts, all of which are based on the same factual basis:
Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, which requires proving that (a) two or more people (b) conspire to commit an offense against or defraud the United States and (c) at least one of them commits an act to further the conspiracy (5yrs max and/or a fine);
Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, which requires proving that (a) two or more people (b) conspire to obstruct justice [see below] and (c) at least one of them commits an act to further the conspiracy (sentence is the same as for obstruction, a 3yr exposure);
Obstruction or Attempted Obstruction of Justice, which requires proving that the defendant (a) knowingly (b) use intimidation/threats/corruption to (c) persuade or attempt to persuade another person to (d) change documents or withhold records needed for an official proceeding, or, which is more directly applicable here, that the defendant (a) corruptly (b) obstruct, influence, or impede, (c) an official proceeding (3yr exposure); and
Conspiracy Against Rights, which requires proving that (a) two or more persons (b) conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person (c) in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege [in this case, the right to vote.]
Who
Only Trump is listed by name in the indictment, with six other co-conspirators referenced by numbers. The purpose is, likely, to leave the door open for any of them to decide to testify against Trump before they are named and officially charged. Five of the co-conspirators are fairly easy to identify based on the information we already have about the 2020 election putsch: Co-conspirator 1 is Rudy Giuliani, Trump’s right-hand and spreader-par-excellence of manufactured election fraud conspiracies; co-conspirator 2 is John Eastman, the spirit behind the effort to puppeteer Pence, VP and President of the Senate, into subverting his ceremonial role by refusing to certify the electors for Biden and certifying fake electors for Trump in their stead; co-conspirator 3 is Sidney Powell, disgraced attorney who tried (and lost) Trump’s baseless election cases; co-conspirator 4 is Jeffrey Clark, Trump’s man in the Department of Justice who met with Trump behind his bosses’ back to further the conspiracies even they would not back and tried to fire his own boss; co-conspirator 5 is likely Kenneth Chesebro, the mind behind the fake electors’ scheme and the operator filing sham legal proceedings so as to swindle the fake electors into agreeing to participate in the scam; I’m unclear on who the sixth co-conspirator can be, and it looks like mainstream media commentators are alsounsure. This person, who is described as a “political consultant,” was behind some of the memos that crafted the language submitted to the fake electors.
What They Did
The story of what happened before January 6th was eclipsed by the violent putsch that follows, which is why you can be forgiven for forgetting the details (they were also doled out chaotically and serially while the events were happening.) Reading the indictment brought the story and the characters back into clear focus, and here’s a simple (hopefully not oversimplified) chronology.
The way the U.S. presidential election works is this: each state has its own regulations for figuring out the popular vote.
This means that, when challenging presidential election results, candidates have to interact with state bureaucracies and pursue litigation in the different states attacking the integrity of the election. The indictment does not attack all of Trump’s litigation challenges which, while frivolous (32 submitted, 0 won) were not unlawful. It focuses on illegitimate pressures and threats that Trump & Co. placed upon various state bureaucrats, most famously in Georgia (the “find me enough votes” threat emitted to the Georgia Secretary of State, now the focus of a state criminal investigation that might ensnare Trump in more criminal proceedings.) Trump’s incessant harassment of state bureaucrats–most of them loyal to Trump, people who worked for his campaign and hoped he would win but did not go as far as to throw the election his way–consisted of banding around (and repeating) false theories of fraud (which Giuliani and others parroted around social media), consistently ignoring the refutations of state officials, lying to them about supposed evidence that backed up the conspiracy theories, threatening them with criminal charges or political consequences, and repeatedly pestering them to deliver results in the face of no factual support for fraud claims.
Severe as these behaviors were, the heart of the indictment has to do with how Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to manipulate the electoral college process to thwart the popular vote. This NPR story, published during Trump’s scheming but before January 6th, offers a good primer to how states select their electors. In short, there are 538 electors, one for each U.S. senator and U.S. representative, plus three for Washington, D.C. Electors are selected by the state, usually from lists made by state parties. In 32 states and D.C., electors must vote for the candidate the party has nominated, and the Supreme Court has found that laws that bind electors to the outcome of the popular vote are constitutional. The list of electors by party is certified at the state level and then sent, through a special verification process, to the senate, where it is ceremonially certified by the Vice President. The electors then cast their votes–if a candidate won by majority, he or she receives all the electoral votes–and thus the presidential election is decided (watch this video of how the electors announce their vote casting.)
Trump’s conspiracy targeted this process. [Probably] John Eastman and [probably] Kenneth Chesebro concocted a legal theory according to which the Vice President, who is also the President of the Senate, holds an authority over the electoral process that goes beyond his purely ceremonial role of certifying the electors. According to their theory, Mike Pence could simply refuse to certify the electors’ votes, opting instead to certify votes by a slate of alternative electors casting their votes for Trump. To make this theory into reality, they reached out to prospective electors to persuade them to participate in this scheme. Some refused to have anything to do with it, and many others expressed doubts about the legality of this plan. To mollify and assuage them, the co-conspirators lied to some of the alternative electors in some of the states, telling them that their votes for Trump would only be used in the event that litigation produces evidence of election fraud. For verisimilitude of these false claims, Trump’s operatives–Giuliani, Powell, and their lackeys–actually filed frivolous cases in the seven states in which this plan was pursued, persuading the so-called alternative electors that things were being set in motion that could result in their votes counting (the plan was to push forward these fictitious votes regardless of the lawsuits.) In some cases, the co-conspirators (notably, Chesebro) crafted the fallacious elector certificates themselves. The co-conspirators tried to push these slates of electors onto the Vice President’s staff, in some cases with the staff members declining to receive them on his behalf.
Pence also had to be convinced to go along with this scheme, and so, Trump et al. conducted numerous meetings with Pence, putting direct pressure on him to participate in the face of his repeated declarations that he did not believe he had the authority to thwart the popular vote. Trump’s choice of words at these meetings matters: he threatened Pence to publicly criticize him for his refusal to participate in the plan (this rebuke reverberating in the social networks during the ramp-up toward January 6) and included only certain people at the meetings (notably, not the White House Counsel, who repeatedly stated that the plan was not legitimate.) Trump also used Jeff Clark to pressure his superiors at the Justice Department (notably, Jeffrey Rosen, then the Acting Attorney General) to go along with the electoral thwarting plan. You can find more information about the near-catastrophe in the Justice Department in this Washington Post piece. Essentially, if Rosen et al. were not going to go with the fraudulent electoral votes, Trump would fire them and place Jeff Clark atop the Justice Department; he backed down from this plan only when told by White House counsel that mass resignations would ensue.
Even though the indictment does not tackle Trump’s role in inciting the Jan. 6 putsch, it does tie those events to the charged offenses. While engaging in the machinations required for the fraudulent electoral plan, Trump continuously manufactured public belief in the integrity of the plan by tweeting about it to his fans and stoking their anger toward Pence and others who would not play ball. This was the trigger for the Jan 6 gathering, which Trump initiated, and the hook for the insurgents’ rage.
Criminal Behavior vs. Atrocious Behavior that Isn’t Criminal
The indictment seeks to provide clarity on what parts of Trump’s behavior surrounding the elections were and were not criminal. Much of his truly atrocious behavior, such as the lies he massively and systematically spread about the legality of the election, were the epitome of maliciousness and political irresponsibility, but according to the indictment do not constitute criminal offenses, as they fall under the umbrella of free speech: Trump had “a right, like any American. . . to claim, falsely, that there had been outcome-determinative fraud during the election and that he had won.” He also had a right–which he used, by engaging in frivolous litigation–to use legitimate means to challenge the results of the election. The indictment distinguishes these behaviors from the unlawful steps Trump and his co-conspirators undertook to change the results of the election–namely, threats, pressure, and efforts to bring about a fictitious and delusional legal process by which Pence, singlehandedly, would discount the votes of American citizens and instead would hand the decisionmaking process to fake electors.
This distinction might be clear to me and you, but I decided to take a trip through the looking glass and read up on Fox News to see what Jonathan Turley and Andy McCarthy are peddling. Out of all the drivel in that story (political witchhunt yada yada) the least preposterous proposition comes from Andy McCarthy, who has this to say about the fake electors theory: “[I]n this country, what we do with frivolous legal theories is we figure that the jury system will take care of it or the political system will. We don’t criminalize them. And that’s what this indictment attempts to do.” In other words, McCarthy seems to bundle John Eastman and Ken Chesebro’s fake electors plan with the legitimate efforts to reverse the course of the election: rather than a malicious, fictitious scheme to wrest the election results from the hands of the electorate, this was merely a legal theory–and don’t all legal theories stand a chance? The answer the indictment provides is this: there’s a difference between submitting to a court the possibility that the Dominion machines were flawed or that people who shouldn’t vote did (nonexistent folks, nonresidents, noncitizens, dead people), all of which are legitimate challenges to the election whether they succeed or (as in this case) fail, and submitting a proceeding according to which it is, on this planet, totally fine to substitute actual votes for imaginary ones and then threaten, pressure, and push people to pretend that the imaginary votes are real. At least McCarthy admits the theory was “frivolous”; even a broken clock shows the right time twice a day.
The Mental Element (Mens Rea)
All the charges pursued in the indictment require a fairly high degree of intent: conspiracy calls for intent to further the aims of the conspiracy itself, and obstruction of justice requires general intent. For our purposes, a criminal conviction here could result only if a jury agrees that Trump actually knew that the false fraud theories he was peddling on social media and threatening state secretaries to accept were, indeed, false. The indictment spends a long time elaborating how we know that Trump was lying, rather than delusional. I’m not sure the distinction is as clear to me as it is to them. We’re clearly talking about someone with serious delusions of grandeur, and I think that serial liars and psychopaths are successful in what they do because, on some level, they believe the lies they tell. I wonder whether the defense theory here will be that the lies were actually true (this is not a winning proposition in court, but they might luck out with some Trumper jurors) or that Trump thought they were true (which is also going to be tough to prove, given the multiple sources, including people close to him and credible to him, who repeatedly tried to disabuse him of these notions.) I’m betting his ego will not let him claim any sort of mental deficiency or clinical delusion.
What This Portends for 2024
Dan Rather (whose newsletter Steady is always a worthy read) wrote today:
Today marks a reckoning, but it’s far from a resolution. The danger Trump and his legions of MAGA supporters pose remains very present, very real, and very dire. The polls indicate this con man, divisive charlatan, and wrecking ball to the rule of law is running away with the Republican nomination for the presidency. And he looks, at this point, despite everything, to be competitive with President Biden. He could be reelected.
The more scrutiny he receives, the more evidence of his unfitness for office is laid out publicly, the more his stalwarts rally behind him. Trump has no coherent or persuasive rejoinders to the numerous charges he faces. He instinctively relies on his overused playbook of lies, divisiveness, and dystopian rhetoric. It’s all he’s got. Nevertheless, his crowds roar their delight without hesitation.
This is certainly true with respect to the Fox News commentators whose takes I read this morning, and I’m sure the talking points were set long ago. Nothing will persuade the truly faithful. A lot of what will happens here depends on timing. Should Trump be able to run and, perhaps, get elected, all this effort will come to naught, and if, Goddess forbid, I were on the defense team, my number one mission would be to file for continuances upon continuances. It’s not likely that there will be immediate movement on this in a criminal courtroom anytime soon. The voir dire will be absolute hell and the media coverage will be ridiculous.
