Order Without Oppression: No Police Visibility at Women’s March

San Francisco’s City Hall was lit in pink yesterday as we, more than a hundred thousand residents, rose up to protest and march against the Trump Administration and to support civil rights. It was a powerful and encouraging experience.

San Francisco was not the only city in which huge crowds came together to protest what we fear might roll the course of progress decades back, and crowd scientists estimate that the numbers of protesters far exceeded the number of attendees at the inauguration itself.

Much has already been written, and will be written, about the positive energy of the march. I particularly appreciated the sentiment of unification: rather than carving injured identities and engaging in infighting, the left came together to support civil rights, equality, diversity, feminism, queer rights–all the things that have made our great city what it is. It gave me hope not only for a national movement to take our country back from reactionary fascists, but also for my own city, engaged in bitter conflict between old-timers and newcomers. For a few hours, we were all together, marching and chanting for what we believe in: that love and tolerance are what make a country great.

But as a criminologist, the most notable experience from yesterday’s march was the absence of visible law enforcement. More than 100,000 people got together, cramming some of the busiest streets in the city, and not one arrest took place. Not one expression of animosity by police. No visual police messaging to communicate that violations were expected.

I have written about protests and riots before, in the context of the protest gathering against Johannes Mehserle’s verdict. I very vividly remember arriving in downtown Oakland that day and being surrounded by helicopters, police vehicles, cops in riot gear. The messaging there was clear: people were expected to be violent and difficult and the officers were ready for them. The messaging at this march was the opposite. Even though the gathering had racial justice themes, and many of the walkers were people of color, the sense that the masses should be curbed and subdued was just not there. The only visible evidence of peacekeeping we saw were a few volunteers in colorful vests, but they were not vocal or dominant. The crowd controlled itself, and it did so beautifully and peacefully.

Apparently, this experience was not unique to San Francisco. No arrests in D.C., Los Angeles and other places. A handful of arrests in localized incidents the day before.

Cynics might say that the racial composition of the marchers and protesters might have something to do with police response. I think there’s a bigger truth behind that: events that promise to be peaceful, in which families march together with unifying messages, are perceived by law enforcement as being less threatening. This is not to say there aren’t legitimate law enforcement concerns at such events, starting with the obvious–making sure people are marching safely and not interfering with traffic–and continuing with the fear that someone will take advantage of the opportunity to kill and wound the crowd with explosives. I would not have resented calm and respectful police officers had they been there to engage in safety and protection, and I have no doubt that there *were* such officers, and that SFPD braced itself for a big undertaking. Somehow, to the extent that they were there, they were unseen and unfelt, and that was a very powerful experience.

Death Is Not a Victory: Dylann Roof and the Glorification of Hatred

Of all the people sentenced to death in the United States, Dylann Roof may be among the ones this planet will miss the least. He offered his North Carolina court and jurors no remorse or reflection for the vicious, pre-planned, racially-motivated murder of nine kind, generous people who welcomed him into their church with open hearts. And some of the statements I have heard from my friends on the left side of the map is that, while they “don’t believe in the death penalty,” this sentence offers some modicum of justice or vindication to black and brown people.

I couldn’t disagree more.

My perspective on this is likely skewed by the fact that I spent many of my formative years in a country in which the motivation of suicide bombers, who kill themselves along with innocent citizens–women, children, elderly people, folks of various ages, occupations, and walks of life–is a subject of daily debate. What we know for certain is that shahids acquire mythical notoriety after death, glorified in myths of heavenly rewards and propelling others to follow in their footsteps.

In that respect, I think Dylann Roof got exactly what he wanted from the criminal justice system. This is not a vindication of the Justice Department, as the New York Times argued yesterday. Sentencing a self-represented man to death after he deliberately refuses to mount an effective defense, and boasts of his murderous acts to the jury, is not a victory. It is a capitulation. It awards Roof his utmost wish: to become an unrepentant martyr for other murderous racists to worship and follow.

In my work on Yesterday’s Monsters, my book in progress, I look at correspondence between lifers and people on the outside, a small minority of which think that the heinous murders that landed their pen pals life without parole is “cool.” The subjects of my study have written books and articles and argued before the parole board that there is nothing they abhor more than these followers. But even though some like the attention, a living inmate is largely that: a curiosity. I am reminded of Charles Manson’s failed marriage, that petered out as a sick curiosity. No, a dead perverse hero is much better than a living, incarcerated one: a dead one lives on in glory in the twisted minds of his followers, while a living one is reduced to a dishonorable and diminished existence at the mercy of his jailers, marred and shrunk over time by age and sickness.

It is distressing to us, and especially to families of victims, when the state is manipulated into being lenient toward someone who is perceived to deserve punishment. I submit that it is far more distressing when the state is manipulated into being complicit in an act of violence so that its proposed victim, who orchestrates the violence, emerges as a victimized, lauded hero of “the system.” For that reason alone, if for no other, the death penalty should be abolished. Even, and perhaps especially, in cases such as Roof’s, in which it can only lead to the amplification and glorification of hatred.

Ganja in Trumpland: An Introduction

The campaigns for and against Prop. 64, the Adult Use of Marijuana Act, revolved around the minutiae of the proposition: Will the big guns get rich at the expense of mom-and-pop growers? Do we have to give away our medical marijuana cards and pay more for our pot? What do we do with impaired drivers?

It seems like pretty soon we’ll have more serious problems on our hands as a result of legalization. Trump’s planned nominee for Attorney General, Alabama senator Jeff Sessions, does not share the opinions espoused by reasonable, cost-minded Republicans about the harms of overcriminalization or the sensibility of a public health model for substance abuse. Instead, we will have to contend with a man whose acquaintances define as a “war on drugs dinosaur”, and who claims that good people don’t smoke marijuana.

(how do good people get their marijuana, then? Do they munch on edibles? Vape? Or maybe they smoke something else? What is it?)

The regime of state regulated-marijuana, as established by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Raich (2005), means that Congress, despite its federal prohibition of marijuana, has not preempted the states from regulating it within their borders. On the other hand, it is perfectly permissible for the use of marijuana to be legal statewise and illegal vis-a-vis the federal government: after all, citizens can freely choose to obey both laws by not using cannabis. Granted, this reason was more upsetting with regard to the original plaintiffs in Raich, who suffered from debilitating medical conditions, than with regard to the prospective users of recreational marijuana in 2016. Still, it is a reminder that, while the State of California has decided to opt out of a criminal justice model, the feds can freely ignore Eric Holder and James Cole’s memos about federal restraint in enforcement.

In other ways, gentle reader, there is nothing to stop Jeff Sessions from taking away your pot.

The progressive and libertarian outcry against prospect of federal intervention in recently-legalizing states is understandable. The Trump victory makes the marijuana victory hollow. Federal law enforcement can make, and has in the past made, the lives of marijuana growers, sellers, and users impossible, even in states with lack or no enforcement of their own. And some of the outcomes of this contradiction are downright bizarre. For example, gun salespeople are not allowed to sell guns to anyone who is a “unlawful user and/or an addict of any controlled substance”–including medical marijuana, as the Department of Justice clarified in 2011. Technically speaking, this state of affairs is legally permissible, because Americans can comply with both legal systems by not using marijuana, in which case nothing can stop them from buying guns. But to some commentators this is inappropriate federal intervention in state affairs.

This little example is nothing compared to what we might see during the tenure of a man who finds moral fault in cannabis users: a renewal of the federal war on drugs, with its futility, noxious tactics and tragic outcomes–but this time, with the disturbing history of the Nixon and Reagan eras to school police departments and states in carceral expansion. In this grotesque carnival mirror caused by the election, blue states will now be the ones crying out for state rights.

When They Go Low, We Go High

ExpertFile is a service that allows the public to contact experts with queries. Today, as we’re all reeling from the results of this election, I received the following query from them:

Event Inquiry Details
Event Name: fuck you cunt
Event Location: going to hell
Event Date: 11/30/2016
Event Description: hope you crash and die
Message: “voting to end the long wait for death to the fucking killers… hope you are a victim of one of them someday… karma cunt….”
Contact Details
Name: Dead Victim
Organization:
City: San Francisco
State/Prov: CA
Country: US
Email: localcemetary@aol.com
Phone:
Website:
******

In the last few days, people with far less support and social advantage than me have been on the receiving end of slurs, insults, threats, and hate crimes. This is a piece of cake compared to what many good people have been exposed to because of what they believe, how they look, or who they love.

I will not stand for it. Decent people everywhere–of which there are many–will not stand for it.

I am resolved to respond to noxious, misogynistic, threatening messages by doubling down on my commitment to criminal justice reform, the end of capital punishment, and . When they go low, we go high.

A Horrible Setback to Criminal Justice Reform

Prop. 66 is not the first “speed up the death penalty” proposition to pass in the last few years. Florida’s similar “fix” was tossed out by the courts as unconstitutional just a few months ago, and let’s hope this one meets a similar end.

What got me out of bed and into the office on Wednesday was this interview on ABC News, in which I express grave concerns for the deterioration in the quality of justice with the passage of 66. Capital punishment attorneys know: you cannot resolve a death row case in five years, and you certainly can’t do it in Superior Court. You cannot provide people adequate representation without pouring even more money into an already costly process.

This, by the way, is why Prop. 62 was a decent application of the ballot process and 66 was not. In The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, Lon Fuller distinguishes between monocentric and polycentric problems. I think that 62 is easily of the former variety: a simple yes/no question. 66 has a lot of moving parts (and funding) that are difficult for voters to understand. Even among my students, who are considerably better legally informed than the average voter, there were a few people who voted yes on both propositions, perhaps thinking that they could live with a death penalty “fix” one way OR the other. But it is hard to consider the ramifications of creating an entire system of reviewing huge cases with enormous consequences in lower courts and hiring new lawyers en masse to represent them (with what money???).

But I want to say something also to the families of victims, like Ms. Loya, who is interviewed in the newsstory.

Ms. Loya, I am so, so sorry for your loss. What terrible grief you must feel every day. Losing a loved one so violently is such a traumatic experience, and dealing with endless litigation on the part of the killer must be gut-wrenching.

When I hear you on TV, I worry, because I have heard from other victim families that fighting to get people killed faster intensifies the pain, fills you with soul-destroying feelings of revenge, and could compound your suffering in that this proposition could become the instrument of grave injustice.

Among the people whose executions could be expedited by this new law are people who are innocent of the crimes they committed–such as Shujaa Graham and Paris Powell, innocent men who spent long years on death row before their exonerations, and whom I met campaigning against Prop. 66. And these people also have mothers, like you, who will live to see their sons die violently, like you.

It is so hard to think beyond your personal pain. But I am so concerned about all this additional and unnecessary suffering this will bring to other people, just like you. I can’t see how this adds up to a net good in the world.

I feel for you and it breaks my heart to see you feel your loss so keenly after so many years. And at the same time, so that others will not know such losses at the hand of their government, I will continue to fight for the repeal of the death penalty in my lifetime.

With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility

Wry Craigslist ad created in the aftermath of the Malheur takeover acquittal.

My first reaction upon hearing of the acquittal of the defendants involved in the armed takeover in Oregon was probably similar to yours, gentle reader: I saw no legal argument for acquittal and it was plain as day to me that what happened here was jury nullification (despite what this juror says here, I find myself incredulous that it was difficult to deduce intent from what transpired there.) It was a powerful reminder of the unchecked and untamed potential that lies beneath the legal structures we have built. The right to a jury of your peers also has a built-in, hidden-from-sight extension, which is the right to vie for the kind of peers who might be sympathetic to you even when the law is not.

The web is ablaze with cynical commentary and comparison memes, and arguments of white privilege. But what has happened here is no different–legally speaking–than what happens when people follow The Wire creator David Simon‘s call, or, for that matter, critical race theory scholar Paul Butler‘s call, to nullify in drug cases, or in cases involving defendants of color.

The constitutional trial rights we all have apply universally: there is no boilerplate section in the Bill of Rights that restricts them only to defendants and causes we like and support. This is, in part, why I opposed the ban on grand juries in police violence cases and signed a letter against Judge Persky’s recall: When we take away justice and discretion “only” in cases of defendants we dislike, like police officers or entitled frat boys, we shouldn’t be surprised when these rights disappear for defendants we do like and support.

Nullification is not a constitutional trial right, but it is an implicit power that comes with the secrecy of jury deliberations, their exemption from providing reasons for their decisions, and the inability to appeal acquittals in the U.S. criminal justice system. With great power comes great responsibility, and when we call for the use of this power for causes we believe in, it shouldn’t be too shocking that people who vastly disagree with us use the same power for causes they believe in.

So, is nullification the tool of armed white supremacists, lynchers, and antigovernment insurgents, or of racial justice protesters and war-on-drugs opponents? There’s no way to measure who uses it more, because jurors interviewed after trial are very unlikely to admit that they nullified. Everyone wants their decisions to be perceived as legitimate. Without actually knowing what happened in the jury room and inside the head of each juror, we can never know with absolute certainty–even when it seems obvious–whether they nullified, misunderstood the law, misunderstood the (often badly phrased) jury instructions, or any combination of these factors. We are also unlikely to be able to reproduce and measure this in mock jury experiments, because I think jurors nullify in cases that matter to them a lot emotionally, and experimental conditions will not produce that amount of passion and anguish. In the absence of data on this, we have to assume that juries do this, and keep in mind the knowledge that it can be used by anyone, for any goal, to support any political agenda.

The one thing to learn from this, I think, is that the outcome in highly political contested cases depends on the skills, science and juju that went into the jury selection process, more than on those that went into the trial–and that holds true for all of these cases, sympathetic and antipathetic alike. Which is an excellent reason for every lawyer, on either side of the adversarial process, to learn the art and science of voir dire.

Are You Against the Death Penalty? Good. Then Vote Against the Death Penalty.

It’s no big surprise that the Prop 62 campaign, which calls for the death penalty repeal, is working hard to build a coalition across political lines. Because of that, the campaign rhetoric understandably aims at reassuring undecided voters that, even with abolition, they will remain safe; and its two main arguments, the obscene costs ($150 million a year) and the risks of wrongful convictions, are arguments that should appeal to all of us, regardless of our political convictions. But lately I’ve been hearing from some folks on the very left edge of the political map–progressives and radicals–who are thinking of voting no on 62 for various progressive reasons. If you are one of these people, this blog post is addressed to you.

First of all, friend who cares about progressive causes and criminal justice reform: I hear you. I hear that you are frustrated because you need the system to change at a faster pace and that some provisions in these propositions aren’t exactly what you’d hope for, and that you are concerned that if we pass these it’ll stall further steps. I hear that the democratic process is not moving things far enough and soon enough for you. I hear that you are giving this a lot of thought and are genuinely concerned about aspects of the proposed reform. I believe you that your dilemma is real. I understand that you are trying to do what you think is best for people in vulnerable situations.

I hope you can hear me when I say that, when you tell me you might be voting to keep the death penalty in place, it really, really frightens me.

I am frightened because I’ve been thinking, writing, and speaking about criminal justice reform for twenty years, five as a practitioner and sixteen as an academic, and the one thing I learned is this: in criminal justice, the perfect is the enemy of the good. And I am really afraid that in our quest to attain a perfect criminal justice system we might opt out of a crucial step on the way to where we want to be.

Please allow me to address your concerns one by one.

“If we get rid of the death penalty, aren’t we entrenching life without parole? I think life without parole is horrible, and we are affirming it as the upper range of punishment.”

You feel that life without parole is a hopeless, soul-destroying punishment, which offers a person no prospect of ever seeing life outside prison. And you feel this is especially cruel for very young people (a big chunk of our prison population) who become incarcerated in their twenties and are looking at a very long stretch behind bars.

You know what? I agree with you. Life without parole is, indeed, an extreme form of punishment. Like you, I am committed to a struggle to bring a possibility of hope–an exit possibility–to any prison sentence.

Unfortunately, we can’t start our fight against life without parole until we win our fight against the death penalty, which is within reach. This is, unfortunately, how political reform works: incrementally, with bipartisan support, and with a big base of consensus.

I wish there were a critical mass of Californians of all political persuasions convinced that our criminal justice system needs to be immediately reformed. Not just at the edges, not just for nonviolent inmates, not just for juveniles, but for everyone. But that is not the world we live in. The political reality is that, in order to make change, incremental steps have to be taken. Remember same-sex marriage? That didn’t happen overnight. There were revolutionaries calling for marriage back in the seventies, when it was unthinkable. Then, the movement had to regroup, advocate for lesser protections (domestic partnerships, workplace protection). Yes, domestic partnership was less than marriage in important ways. But this is why public opinion changed, between the mid-1990s and the early 2010s. Incremental change is what led to the triumph of that movement. 

For an even more relevant example, see what is happening with juvenile justice. Life without parole for juveniles is horrible, right? And look at how close we are to eradicating it–because in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons (2005) the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for juveniles. It was the first step in a long series of reforms. In Graham v. Florida (2010) the Supreme Court felt comfortable relying on the same arguments to abolish life without parole for nonhomicide crimes. In Miller v. Alabama (2012) the Supreme Court relied on that logic to abolish mandatory life without parole for all juveniles, and then felt comfortable making that ruling retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016). We are now within striking distance of abolishing life without parole for juveniles. None of this would have been possible without Roper v. Simmons.

This is even truer for legislative/public campaigns than for judicial change. To make reform happen, we need wide public consensus–not just an agreement among progressives. We need our conservative and moderate friends to live with the new situation for a while, realize that the sky doesn’t fall if punishment is less extreme, and accustom themselves to the idea of further reform. A classic example is marijuana legalization. Recreational marijuana would not be on the ballot–within reach and polling great so far–if Californians of all persuasions didn’t have a chance to live with medical marijuana for years and realize that it was not the end of the world. Do you think we would have been here, at this point in time, if progressive voters had declined to vote for medical marijuana, claiming that limiting legalization to medical patients wasn’t good enough? Similarly, conservatives and centrists grew accustomed to same sex marriages because they lived with domestic partnerships. They will be willing to consider a reform of life without parole if and when they see that the death penalty was abolished and it didn’t lead to a rise in crime rates, a decline in public safety, or any other negative consequences. You and I already know that giving reformed, aging folks a chance at parole is also not a safety risk. But not everyone knows that, and we need our friends across the political map to agree with us. We can’t make change otherwise.

I’ve been studying criminal justice reforms for the last sixteen years. I have not seen a single criminal justice reform that sprang perfectly from nothing. Every change we’ve seen since 2008–and we’ve seen plenty, believe me–was the product of incremental, bipartisan reform. This will be no exception. We can’t get from A to Z skipping steps along the way. I know you’re ready for Z. So am I. But the people whose hearts and minds we have to change so that Z happens–and we can’t make it happen without them–need us to go through all the steps so that we can have a coalition. What we want won’t happen otherwise.

“We are not really executing people in California anyway, and the delays are lengthy, so our death penalty really is just life without parole, with or without an execution at the end. So what would abolition actually achieve?”


Our peculiar situation in California is that we have about 750 folks in limbo. We could execute them, but through litigation efforts and mobilization we’re trying to stall their executions. Being on death row, friend, is not the same as being in general populations. Folks on death row are also in solitary confinement, do not work, and do not have access to the social and educational opportunities available in general populations. Our death row is notoriously dilapidated.

Also, can you imagine living with the uncertainty of whether you’ll be executed by the state some day? Ernest Dwayne Jones couldn’t. And in Jones v. Chappell (2014), a conservative District Court judge from Orange County agreed with him. Based on sound research on the effects of uncertainty, and the horrible thing it is to live with the prospect of being killed by your fellow men, the judge found the death penalty unconstitutional. We didn’t win that fight, even though we tried very hard: the Attorney General decided to appeal, and the Ninth Circuit reversed for technical reasons. But the reasoning behind Jones is sound: it is very different to be a death row inmate than a lifer.

But let’s assume for a minute that these two experiences are comparable (after all, we always compare them to each other.) If you really can’t see that the death penalty is worse than life without parole, how about a tie breaker? We don’t like to talk much about savings in the progressive left–it’s an argument that some of us think is designed to appeal to centrists. But we’re talking about a lot of money here: $150 million a year, to be precise. If you really have no preference between the death penalty and life without parole, does this obscene waste of money not tip the scale in the repeal direction for you? Think about all the things you care about: education, health care, roads. Is it really a progressive move to keep something happening, in which you see no virtue, and spend this much on it when we could spend it on the things you care for?

Finally, I know you’d like to see the death penalty go away not only in California, but also in other places. You know where people on death row do get executed? In Texas, for example. Unfortunately, change in Texas is not going to spring to life, fully formed, out of nowhere. We have the biggest death row in the country and have been the vanguard of criminal justice innovation, for better and for worse. Determinate sentencing? Us. Enhancements? Us. The most punitive version of Three Strikes? Yup, we started that one, too. But we can use this power we have, as a huge and influential state, to make changes in other places as well. We adopted Realignment; we reformed Three Strikes; we passed Prop. 47. These things have a ripple effect in other states. We have to make the first step here. The death penalty doesn’t take the same shape in all states, but it is abhorrent in all of them. Reform in Texas begins here, with you.

“If we abolish the death penalty, aren’t we depriving people of valuable and free legal representation? Only death row inmates get two free lawyers paid for by the state, and that increases their odds of exoneration.”


It’s true: The California Constitution awards death row inmates two free attorneys to represent them in their appellate and habeas proceedings. But what does this mean in practice? We have hundreds of inmates on death row who are unrepresented and unable to benefit in any way from this constitutional provision.

As of August 2016, 46 inmates are awaiting appointment of both an appellate attorney and a habeas corpus attorney. 310 inmates have been appointed an appellate attorney, but are still awaiting appointment of a habeas corpus attorney. This is almost half of all death row inmates, and there are only 34 attorneys employed by the Habeas Corpus Resource Center. You could do what tough-on-crimes conservatives might do and vote yes on 66, but to actually close the huge representation gap we’d have to train and appoint 402 defense attorneys just for the cases now pending. This is a huge expense, and it would come with the added price tag of speedy proceedings that run the risk of executing innocent people. And that is something neither of us wants (I really hope you’re voting no on 66. It’s a horrible and draconian proposition.) So, if we’re staying with the existing situation, what guarantees of exoneration do we really have?

Ask Shujaa Graham, who spent 16 years in San Quentin for a crime he did not commit. Yes, he was exonerated at the end, but what a huge risk he ran while he was still there! Beyond the horrible conditions, the cruelty, the loneliness, the boredom–an innocent person on death row lives every hour or every day of his life with the fear that the miscarriage of justice that happened to him will be irreversible. For that matter, ask any of the 150 exonerees whether they’d trade what happened to them with a guarantee that they won’t be in a situation where the horrible wrong done to them can never be rectified.

“Hey, wasn’t there some survey of death row inmates four years ago where they said they preferred to keep the attorneys they have? Why would we oppose something that the inmates themselves support?”


Four years ago, indeed, the Chronicle published a survey with death row inmates who said something like this. But the Chronicle did not disclose the methodology of the survey, nor did it share the questions they were asked. How does one even conduct a valid survey on death row? And how do we know whether the people who asked the questions weren’t only those who are represented–and not the hundreds of people who wait, on average, 16 years to even get an attorney so they can begin the proceedings?

Of course we care what death row inmates think. And former death row inmates who have been exonerated have been aggressively campaigning against the death penalty and on behalf of Prop 62. Have you heard a single exoneree publicly praising his good luck in being sentenced to death? Maybe there’s a reason for that and we should listen to them.

You know who else is worth listening to? Lifers. I teach lifers in San Quentin and what I hear from them is uniform, wall-to-wall support of death penalty repeal. They think that the death penalty is a massive waste of resources. And, while they yearn for the day we fight against life without parole, they are relieved to be in general population, studying, working, and interacting with others, rather than on death row. Most importantly: they know that we are spending a lot of effort on a policy that affects only 750 people instead of focusing on the thousands of lifers out there. And they know that we can’t get to other penal reforms before we make this one happen. You want us to get to the business of reforming LWOP? Great, me too! Let’s repeal the death penalty so we can get there sooner – there are no shortcuts that don’t pass through death penalty repeal.

“Prop. 62 is mandating that the folks we commute to life without parole work and give money to victims. That’s forced labor and I don’t support that.”


I know how the concept of work in prison makes you feel. It’s a grim reminder of how, when we abolished slavery, we threw in a little exception: forced labor is allowed in prisons. It is something that we have come to abhor, because it means that our prison regime perpetuates, in a new guise, abhorrent forms of coercion and racial domination.

But abolishing labor in prisons is not on the ballot. Abolishing the death penalty is.

Some progressive voters bristle at the campaign’s emphasis on making lifers work to compensate victim families. You can be forgiven for mistakenly thinking that the proposition “creates forced labor.” But that is, simply, not factually true. Section 2700 of the Penal Code, which requires that inmates work, has existed for a very long time, and already applies to everyone on life without parole. Prop 62 doesn’t hasn’t invented anything new and does not change that section; it would merely apply to a few hundred more lifers–for the simple reason that they would now be lifers, not death row inmates.

The only modification that Prop. 62 would make is increasing to the maximum restitution withholding from wages (not family donations), from the 50% (which is already in effect) to 60%. Is objecting to an increase in victim restitution from wages really a progressive cause you feel proud to fight for? Considering the enormous change we can effect here, this is a fairly small matter to stand in the way.

Even if you are uncomfortable with this small increase in restitution, I want to remind you that it is not enough for confirmed progressives to vote Yes on 62. We have to have a majority of Californian voters, and that includes conservatives and centrists. It also includes families of victims that are campaigning against the death penalty. And one of the things that is a convincing argument for them–and not unreasonably so–is that the proposition addresses concerns about victims. Compromising on this point is part and parcel of getting things done in the political reality in which we live. And this is the world in which we have to vote.

“I’m against the initiative process. This, and other propositions, are a flawed feature of California lawmaking. I vote “no” in principle on all propositions.”


Friend, I hear you. Every election season it’s the same thing: money, deceptive ads, easily manipulated voters, a polarized state. Yes, this is a bad way to make a lot of decisions. For example, this is a bad way to create nuanced criminal justice reform.

But I want to ask you to really think about what’s at stake here. The legislature is not going to repeal the death penalty on its own. We know; we tried. Our governor (who is personally against the death penalty) is not going to unilaterally commute everyone’s sentences to life without parole. We know; we tried. Our courts cannot get rid of the death penalty. We know; we tried, and we came close, and we failed because of habeas technicalities.

The only one who can get rid of the death penalty in California is YOU.

And compared to other propositions, this one is actually fairly well suited to an initiative process: as opposed to, say, medical or recreational marijuana regimes, parole regimes, registration requirements, etc., death penalty repeal is a fairly simple question, which has a straightforward yes-or-no answer: repeal or retain. This is one of the least objectionable uses of the referendum method.

You have to decide: when you look back at this election, which of your values will you be more proud that you upheld: your concerns about direct democracy, or your opposition to the death penalty?

In Summary


Sometimes, with good intentions, we overthink things, and that leads us astray. Listen to your heart and your common sense. Are you against the death penalty? Good. So am I. For the reasons the campaign highlights, but also for all the traditional, good reasons to be against the death penalty: because it is barbaric, inhumane, risky, racially discriminatory, and obscenely expensive.

Are you against the death penalty? Then vote against the death penalty. 

Vote Yes on 62.

On the Ballot: CA Propositions on Criminal Justice, November 2016

It’s pretty early to start talking about these, n’est ces pas? But it’s not too early to start thinking about the November election as an opportunity for positive change. Here is a roster of the statewide propositions addressing criminal justice issues, with some initial thoughts. We will take each in turn in the coming weeks.

YES on 57: Civil and Criminal Trials

This is the Jerry Brown proposition, which essentially does two things: takes the authority to file charges against juveniles out of the hands of prosecutors and places it back in the hands of judges (this bit is a no-brainer. OF COURSE it’s a good idea) and offers incarcerated folks the opportunity to earn more good credits on their path to release, resuscitating some version of parole for non-lifers. As to the latter part, the devil’s in the details, but even at its worst, it won’t make people’s sentences worse than they are now. There’s nothing to lose by saying yes, and moreover, any day someone with a proven rehabilitation record spends outside, working, paying taxes, and quietly living his/her life, is not a day you pay taxes to house him/her.

YES on 62: Death Penalty Repeal

We came close in 2012, and this is our chance to finally join the industrialized Western world and get rid of a punishment that does not serve us well. If you’re philosophically inclined, ask yourself what you think about state-sanctioned killings. If you dislike miscarriages of justice, ask yourself how comfortable you are with executing innocent people. If you feel the system is racially biased, here’s one classic setting where that is abundantly clear. And if none of these things matter to you, perhaps, like me, you think that $150 million a year is a pretty extreme expenditure for keeping 750 old and sick folks in a dilapidated facility, paying for their endless appeals and habeas, and letting them, for the most part, die of natural causes. Remember: you are not voting about the philosophical appeal of a theoretical death penalty, but rather about the ridiculously expensive, ineffectual, and non-deterrent process we have now in place. Let’s say goodbye to this archaic festival of waste and punitivism once and for all.

YES on 64: Marijuana

This legalization proposition is a considerable improvement over its 2010 predecessor. That one was imperfect, and as you recall, I recommended a “yes” despite of its imperfections, because whatever we do, we can’t go on doing what we’re doing now. Arrests, trials, and convictions, have not impacted the marijuana market at all. Taxation and regulation might–if we do a clever job at setting price points and the appropriate sales tax. Two things have changed since 2010 that make this one a stronger pitch for you: the feds have fairly consistently stayed out of the business of states that legalized recreational marijuana, and we have the experience of five states who legalized and the sky didn’t fall down. There are some complicated implications that this proposition might have on marijuana use rates, and we will discuss them in the weeks to come–as well as the reasons why this is of no particular concern in California.

NO on 66: Death Penalty Reform

This is the District Attorneys’ Association’s horrible response to 62, which consists of something similar to what happened in Florida a few years ago. The idea is that the death penalty is, indeed, broken, but that it can be reformed, and by taking away important constitutional protections, and “streamlining” (read: removing) options for post-conviction relief we can “cure” the delays in its administration and save a bit. This is only a good option if you are indifferent to the risk of executing innocent people or don’t care much for state misconduct, which is sure to result from it–it might be cheaper, but also considerably more cruel and stupid. If you feel that the death penalty is too costly or cumbersome, let’s get rid of it altogether, rather than serve a barbaric version of it with a side order of miscarriage of justice. NO NO NO.

Long Sentences for Juveniles: Does Parole Fix Everything?

Today, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Franklin in a way that probably had both the defendant and the state feeling unsatisfied.

The story is tragic in the same way that too many stories are: Tyris Lamar Franklin, 16 years old, was in conflict with other teenage boys, whom they referred to as the Crescent Park Gang. Shortly before the crime, the Crescents fired multiple shots into the apartment where Tyris lived with his grandmother and brothers, and attacked Tyris’ 13-year-old brother. In retaliation, Tyris shot and killed Gene, a boy who was associated with the Crescents but who had nothing to do with the attack on the little brother.

Under California law at the time, the judge had no choice: he had to sentence Tyris to 25-to-life for the murder and to a consecutive 25-to-life for the weapon enhancement. The math is easy: Tyris would come up for parole for the first time after 50 years, at the age of 66. But the judge felt very uncomfortable with this decision. His explanation of the sentence echoes not only his grief and frustration with the unnecessariness of the crime AND the punishment, but also his thinking, which was influenced by the new Supreme Court line of cases, starting with Roper v. Simmons and continuing with Graham v. Florida. These cases relied on new findings in neuroscience and developmental psychology, which suggest that juvenile brains continue developing well into their mid-20s, and that until their prefrontal cortex is fully developed, they are less capable of thinking about consequences, factoring in long-term considerations, and resisting peer pressure. Reflecting this “rediscovery of childhood” perspective, the judge said:

The sentence is the sentence that‘s prescribed by law, not one that the Court chooses. And I will impose it in this case, but first I just want to say a couple of words to both families. I see a lot of pain in this courtroom all the time. And so often it‘s because of senseless things that happen. And if there‘s a senseless case, this is a senseless case. We‘ve got two young men‘s lives destroyed. . . . We‘ve lost two young men. And for what? It‘s so senseless. I would have loved to have seen these two young men grow up to be people, to be the people they‘re supposed to be, both of them. And neither of them is going to have that opportunity. It‘s because of unspeakably stupid choices that you made, Mr. Franklin. And I just hope that something can come out of this that‘s productive. I‘m impressed with Gene[‘s] . . . family‘s dignity going through this. Their empathy for Mr. Franklin‘s family and even Mr. Franklin. And I‘m impressed with Mr. Franklin‘s family‘s understanding and empathy for [Gene]‘s family. And if we can take something from this, I would love for it to be, get the guns out of Richmond, get the violence out of Richmond, and don‘t have these young black men going after each other because we see it so much in this courthouse. And what ends up happening is we have some young men going to prison for the best years of their lives at the least, and other young men who don‘t get to grow up. And how crazy is this? How crazy. So if both families can do anything to try to make some sense and find some good out of this, work together to try to get the guns out of Richmond, get the guns out of the pockets of these young men who haven‘t got the frontal lobes yet to figure out how to deal with their issues.

Shortly after Tyris Franklin was sentenced to 25 + 25, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama. Under Miller, mandatory life-without-parole schemes for juveniles are unconstitutional. Even before the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, which applied Miller retroactively, California was already searching for ways to fix these problems. One such way was through SB 260, later codified as Penal Code 3051, which provides a special “youth offender hearing” before the parole board. For someone serving a sentence like Tyris Franklin’s, that would mean a parole hearing after 25 years, in lieu of the 50 that the law provided before the amendment. Moreover, under the new law, the board is encouraged to take the person’s age when the offense was committed into account in a serious way. For evidence that the parole board takes the “rediscovery of childhood” perspective seriously, see their recent decision recommending Leslie Van Houten’s release.

The California Supreme Court found today that the “youth offender parole hearings” provided by Penal Code 3051 preempted Franklin’s argument that his sentence violated Miller, because he is already eligible for the “fix” via an earlier parole date. Nonetheless, the Court remanded the case to determine whether Franklin was able to fully present evidence as to his level of maturity, which won’t make a difference for the sentence but will make a difference twentysomething years from now on parole. It’s a bit of a “neither here nor there” decision. The state representatives would say: if the sentence is fine, and if there’s evidence in the judicial explanation that the judge was aware of youth issues, why not take that into account? And Franklin would say: if the judge clearly was unhappy with the mandatory sentence, and the mandatory sentence was unconstitutional, why not give the judge a chance to fix this at resentencing, rather than waiting twenty-five years?

Part of the discomfort with relying on the parole “fix” in this case relates to the proximity between Miller and Franklin. Even though, legally, it doesn’t matter whether the case we’re remedying with a parole hearing happened one day or fifty years before Miller, it somehow feels different. When the Supreme Court decided Montgomery, Henry Montgomery was in his late 60s, having served fifty years behind bars for a crime committed when he was a teenager. A parole hearing to release him could be held immediately. Here, by contrast, the result is that with the “fix”, which was just held to preempt the constitutional channel, Franklin has to wait more than twenty years to argue something that we know the judge felt very strongly about as recently as 2011.

Whether or not you think the result in Franklin was constitutionally permissible, the deeper questions about the parole “fix” emerge. We’re very good at ratcheting up sentences and we’ve done a masterful job at forgetting that children were children. And now that we’ve remembered the difference between youth and adults, it’s taking us a very long time to fix things using very small steps, which put a dent in ultra-severe sentences, but are still very far from undoing their destructive effects.

Foster v. Chatman and the Limits of the Sayable

This morning, the Supreme Court decided Foster v. Chatman, a case involving race considerations in jury selection proceedings in Georgia.

There are two types of challenges that the prosecution and the defense may use to disqualify prospective jurors from the panel: for cause challenges, in case there’s evidence that the prospective juror is biased and might not be able to decide the case fairly, and a limited number of peremptory challenges, which either side can use for no express reason at all. There is one limitation on the use of peremptories: under a 1986 Supreme Court decision, Batson v. Kentucky, race is not an appropriate reason for a peremptory challenge (J.E.B. v. Alabama extended this decision to gender.)

In cases in which a party suspects that the other party is disqualifying jurors due to their race or gender, that party needs to prove a prima facie case that there is a systematic pattern of disqualification. If successful, the ball moves to the other party’s court, and they have to provide a race-neutral (or gender-neutral) reason for the disqualification. The reason need not be a good one; after all, if there were a good reason they could have used a for-cause challenge. It just needs to be unrelated to race or gender. Then, the court has to decide whether the challenges were race or gender based.

Foster, an African-American man, was charged with the sexual assault and murder of a 79-year-old white woman. The prosecution, which under Georgia law has ten peremptory challenges, used nine of them, and four of those were used to strike all four black prospective jurors. Foster immediately lodged a Batson challenge, which the court rejected. And here is where things get dicey.

At the time of trial, the prosecutors provided various race-neutral reasons for their use of peremptory challenges, relying partly on their perception that some of the black jurors were hesitant about the death penalty (which was on the table, given the severity of Foster’s crime.) However, on appeal Foster was able to produce the papers on which the prosecutors scribbled notes for themselves. You can see a section of one of those at the top of these post. The prosecutors marked black jurors with a “b” next to their name. In one occasion, a prosecutor scribbled, “no black church” next to a juror’s name. The author of those “b” letters and other comments could not be ascertained, but it had to be someone in the prosecutor’s office.

The Supreme Court decision analyzes carefully the race-neutral reasons the prosecutor provides, and shows that these were pretextual. Chief Justice Roberts’ method of analysis is to compare the black jurors to white counterparts on the panel who had similar circumstances and, yet, were not disqualified. In the Opinion of the Court, he therefore finds these reasons pretextual, “reek[ing] of afterthought”, or in short: a mere coverup for the real reasons for the disqualification: race, the reason expressly prohibited in Batson.

From a doctrinal perspective, the decision in Foster is the correct one. I have no doubt in my mind that they got the facts completely right. There is a clear contradiction between the reasons the prosecutors proffered for the disqualifications and the reasons that their paperwork clearly suggests. Their complicated race-neutral explanations easily fall apart when comparing jurors to each other. The court’s thorough analysis is a great example for why we need federal review of state practices: federal courts are removed from the judicial and legal climate on the states, and this is especially important in the context of racially controversial proceedings.

It’s also a decision that supports solid values, and one that heralds back to the reason the death penalty was temporarily abolished in Furman v. Georgia in 1972: jury selection and trial processes designed to disfavor African American defendants.

And yet, I’m left feeling very uneasy about the lessons prosecutors might learn from Foster. There’s no reason to pretend, or be facetious, about consistent social science findings, which confirm again and again that people’s demographics–including their race and gender–correlate significantly with their criminal justice perspectives. In experimental settings, when confronted with incidents of police brutality, race is a significant predictor of whether prospective jurors support the police or the suspect.  In mock jury experiments, white male jurors significantly and disproportionately sentence black defendants to death, and influence other jurors to do the same. According to Gallup data, men support the death penalty significantly more than women. With race, the differences are even more stark: whites support the death penalty 75 to 24, whereas blacks oppose it 49 to 44. I could cite dozens, if not hundreds, of studies coming to the same conclusions.

This shouldn’t come as a big shocker to anyone. The reason race is influential in forming criminal justice opinions is the racialized nature of criminal justice itself, its history as a system of racial domination, and its massively disparate impact based on race. Some might not like Paul Butler’s prescription to fellow African-American jurors to nullify in every case involving race, but at least he’s honest about the fact that many folks see our system of incarceration as the battlefront in race war–and with substantial justification.

So what is really going on? Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, all know what social science clearly tells them: that racial identity, and racialized life experiences, are one important and influential way in which people form opinions about the world. They will not excise this piece of information from their memory. What they have learned this morning from the Supreme Court is that they need to find better ways to hide what they know. Indeed, post-Foster, we probably won’t see better race-neutral explanations; we just won’t see racial notations on papers, and whatever texts the prosecutors might send each other under the table will be deleted before discovery proceedings find what’s there. Maybe the prosecution will recur to various real or perceived proxies for race (neighborhood, income, family structure), and maybe, as is increasingly the case, professional trial consulting firms and software will come up with some corporatespeak or sciencespeak that will appear to be racially neutral. Because that’s what we do every time a word becomes offensive and unsayable: we put it through the laundromat and it comes out worded differently, within the realm of the sayable, and the discrimination creeps underground.

This is even more depressing considering that the legal system itself has a massively ambivalent approach to the social science truth that demographics impact opinions. Under Taylor v. Louisiana, when the legal process excludes a distinctive social group (again, the clearest cases are race and gender), we don’t like this, and the court says that we lose a “distinctive flavor” or a special perspective. In that context, we’re perfectly comfortable admitting that a person’s experiences–including her race and gender–might impact the way she sees a criminal justice issue. But when the day comes to pick the actual jury, when lawyers draw the exact same conclusion, and use it in a partisan fashion, we get upset and would like them to do a better job pretending that they’re not doing that. The difference is that blocking groups of people from the venire and disqualifying individuals, whom you can presumably question to detect bias, are two different types of enterprise. And yet, how much can you possibly learn about a stranger’s inner life and worldview in open court?

The bottom line: this decision, while correct and certainly better than the opposite, is a mere band-aid on a problem that is intractable. I cannot see, in the current climate or in any future version of it, a time in which people’s racial identity will not be inexorably linked to their criminal justice opinions. Teaching prosecutors to do a better job hiding these considerations from view does not make them less racially motivated; they’ll keep their opinions, which happen to be aligned with scientific findings, and become so good at covering their tracks that post-Foster defendants will have a difficult time uncovering them. Holding our nose doesn’t make something smell better; it just helps better disguise the smell. If the current presidential campaign teaches us anything, it’s that hiding our ugly racism problem under the rug, in the realm of the unsayable, has done little to improve racial equality in the United States. What we’re seeing now, when Trump makes the unsayable sayable, is merely the ugly truths that were there all along.