Aquarius, Episode 1: Spoiler Alerts

“Charlie has a vision; one day he’s gonna be more famous than the Beatles, and we’re gonna help him get there.”

The first episode of Aquarius feels a bit like a Sixties Smorgasbord. Everything is there: revolution, Vietnam, Nation of Islam, homophobia and closeted homosexuality… and also, Manson, his nascent cult, and some ideas on old and new policing.

Our exposition to Manson in this double episode introduces him already as a diabolical character. His charm toward girls, grandiosity, mystical talk, and hidden violence and “pull” with the Los Angeles upper crust, as well as his love of music, are all already there. Of course, the viewers already know the aftermath, and so, many features that would otherwise appear innocent–your typical musical aspirant hustler–take on a much darker meaning. On at least two occasions, Manson is already engaging in terrifying violence, against a shopkeeper and against his former lawyer and lover, Ken Karn. Karn attempts to regain his daughter, Emma, who lives with the Family, but ends up being pulled himself back into the clutches of Manson and his cult, in a storyline reminiscent of RuthAnn “Ouisch” Morehouse and her father, Deane. We are also introduced to Sadie (Susan Atkins) and Katie (Patricia Krenwinkel) and to a biker/bodyguard, as well as to Manson’s extensive criminal record. As the police officer in charge of the investigation, Hodiak, discusses his criminal history with Manson’s parole officer, we get a glimpse of what criminal justice was like before the sex offender panic: no time served for pimping, and seven years served on four grams of marijuana in a state park.

Using the classic tropes identified in Richard Spark’s TV Cops, we are introduced to this series’ version of the bond-between-two-different-police-officers: old-skool Hodiak and new-generation Shafe. The former, always in a suit, was a cop very long before the birth of Miranda (two years before the show is set); the idea of suspect rights is more natural to the latter, always in hippy clothes and, as a narc underground, “gone native” to an extent. Collaborating on a homicide, Hodiak arrests an unrelated, innocent man–a member of the Nation of Islam whom he knows from a previous case–radicalizing him in the process. Using this false arrest to obtain a confession that avoids compliance with Miranda, Hodiak creates a ruse that holds off and confounds the real suspect’s attorney (a maneuver later considered constitutionally kosher in Moran v. Burbine). Promising the suspect, a terminally-ill man, no jail time, Hodiak prevents him from meeting his attorney, arresting him after he obtains a confession. Only then he gives the suspect his warnings, which he reads out of a card.

The ruse itself does not upset Shafe; shortly before, they both collaborate on a similar Miranda ruse, and seem to already engage in the evasive waiver maneuvers that Richard Leo identifies in Police Interrogation and American Justice. What upsets Shafe is Hodiak’s false, strategic arrest of the innocent Black man, whom he believes would not have been arrested if he were white. The next scene exposes just how transgressive and “not subtle” Shafe’s personal life is (a mere year after the decision in Loving v. Virginia):


The scenes in minority neighborhoods, as well as the protest scenes, are particularly poignant to watch in the post-Ferguson era; I have a hard time figuring out if the language is anachronistic or if today’s movements simply regurgitate the identity politics and lexicon of the 1960s. It is clear, however, that the introduction of civil rights as a barrier to aggressive policing is relatively new and foreign, but that evasive interrogation tactics are already practiced and accepted; that the Nixonian law-and-order campaign resonates with police practices; and that the perception among African Americans is already that of the (white) police as an occupying force.

Stay tuned for a review of Aquarius: Episode 2, in the next post on the series.

Aquarius – New NBC Series, Loosely Based on Manson Family

NBC has released a new series, Aquarius, featuring David Duchovny as an LAPD officer in the late ’60s. The series also features a central storyline loosely based on Charles Manson and the “family.” But the Panthers and the explosive years of political rising and race consciousness also figure quite prominently. The series feels, so far, like a ’60s smorgasbord, but it is not devoid of interest.

I’m currently working on my second book, tentatively titled Yesterday’s Monsters, which examines parole hearings through the lens of the Manson family members’ parole hearing transcripts, and am therefore interested in the depiction of the period in this show. My reviews of Aquarius episodes will be posted on the CCC blog, with links to full episode viewing and spoiler alerts.

Enjoy your summer. Or not.

Will Executions in California Resume?

Apparently, a new effort to revive executions in California is under way. The Los Angeles Times reports:

The settlement of a lawsuit brought by crime victims’ families requires Gov. Jerry Brown’s administration to unveil a new method of lethal injection this year. That method, which Brown officials said would be a single-drug lethal injection, will be subject to public comment and court challenges.

If the plan survives the scrutiny and litigation, it still could be stymied by difficulty in obtaining drugs needed for executions. Manufacturers, pressed by death penalty opponents, are refusing to sell drugs for executions. Compounding pharmacies, another possible source of the drugs, also could have trouble procuring the necessary chemicals to make them.

Still, the settlement remains the first breakthrough in a years-long hiatus in executions in California. It is likely to reignite the debate over capital punishment in the state and test the resolve of the Brown administration. Brown personally opposes capital punishment but defended the death penalty when he was attorney general.

The text of the settlement can be found in full here.

A few comments spring to mind. First, having read Austin Sarat’s Gruesome Spectacles, and knowing that most death penalty litigation for the last few years focuses on the potential for botched executions, I can’t imagine that a new chemical will not usher a new era of litigation. I doubt executions will pick up as a result, but that is, of course, a possibility. This might be why, at least as of last year, three-drug executions persisted.

Second, in the face of all this tinkering with the machinery of death, it’s astounding to see the Brown administration cling to the death penalty, rather than be hard at work to abolish it. Any new iteration of the death penalty brings in its wings nothing but problems, litigation, concerns, and costs. Let go of the death penalty and you let go of the problem.

And third, the legal settlement is in a lawsuit brought by victims’ families. But not all victims are the same, and many victims’ families oppose the death penalty. I don’t want to discount the feelings of vindication and closure that an execution may bring to the family members of a loved one. But it is unfair, and untrue, to assume that pushing for the death penalty is a monolithic pro-victim move.

Should California “Talk Its Walk” About Corrections?

Over the weekend, at the Law and Society Association meeting in Seattle, I learned from colleagues that California is largely responsible for the 6 percent decline in U.S. incarceration. Three large-scale reforms are responsible for this contribution: the Schwarzenegger-era SB xxx 18, which provided good-time credits and reformed parole; the Brown-era Criminal Justice Public Safety Realignment, which shifted groups of low-level felons from prisons to jails and allowed for mandatory supervision and split sentences; and, most recently, Prop 47, which shifted several low-level offenses from felonies to misdemeanors.

Given the overall effect of these reforms not only on California prisons, but on the U.S. prison population as a whole, you’d expect California to take pride in its role as decarceration pioneer. But that would only be if you were unfamiliar with California and its neopopulist, polarized political culture. Instead, these reforms were justified as responses to the budgetary crisis; politicians did not openly acknowledge their connection to the decision in Plata v. Schwarzenegger, later Brown v. Plata; and they were justified as small-scale reforms and jurisdictional shifts, with at least the architects of Realignment proclaiming “no early releases”. Contrast this to the proclamations from red states about prison closures and “returns on investment” that I review in Cheap on Crime, and ask yourselves–wouldn’t it be better if California boasted more about its contribution to decarceration?

I’m trying to think about the relationship between rhetoric and practices, and am wondering whether the fact that California is controlled by a Democrat legislature means that Republicans here don’t have to sound bipartisan as they do elsewhere (such as, for example, in the federal government). I’m also wondering why gubernatorial candidates–Jerry Brown, now in his fourth term–still espouse, at least in name, law-and-order politics and think this is a good idea. I find this modest rhetoric puzzling and am curious to hear your thoughts.

Risks and Ethics of Criminal Justice Ethnography: The Case of Alice Goffman’s On the Run

Alice Goffman’s Life on the Run, based on her  dissertation work, is an ethnography of gang life in Philadelphia. Here’s a chapter from the book. It has received plenty of praise, and some critique (though I found the critique fairly weak), but now it raises an interesting issue: If an ethnographer tags along her subjects, who are incensed by a friend’s death and on the move to avenge it, is she part of a conspiracy to murder? In her methodological appendix, Goffman presents a narrative that many of us ethnographers refer to as “going native”: 
During the period surrounding Chuck’s death, I started studying shootouts in earnest: how and when they happened and what the ongoing conflicts looked like over time. But I don’t believe that I got into the car with Mike because I wanted to learn firsthand about violence, or even because I wanted to prove myself loyal or brave. I got into the car because, like Mike and Reggie, I wanted Chuck’s killer to die.
Goffman was criticized for, essentially, collaborating on a criminal enterprise, and her later explanation, in response to the critique, differs somewhat from that provided in the book:
One night, when Mike could not find anybody else to go with him, I agreed to drive. I felt ambivalent, but I went because I knew these drives were about expressing anger and about grieving, not about doing actual violence. I had talked Mike down from violence in the past, as did many other women in his and his friends’ lives.

I have just read Eugene Volokh’s interesting commentary on Volokh’s commentary includes views from several folks about this, among them Jack Katz:

As a citizen, as well as in my career as a sociologist, I’m concerned about interventions in this discussion that might embrace the flexibility of “conspiracy” and aiding and abetting laws to shut down descriptions of social life that many readers will take as resources for criticizing the government. Personally, I realize that it has not been since the Chicago 8 (then Chicago 7) that the use of conspiracy laws to shut down dissent or critical expression was something I had to think about in this country. (But maybe I have been asleep for 40 or so years.) I realize as well that labeling yourself a sociologist, like labeling yourself a journalist, gets you no privileges, but when conspiracy laws alone are the only formula available for prosecution, the abuse potential should remain the first and central concern.
As someone who, in order to inform policy and advance sociological knowledge, promotes close-up descriptions of social life through immersion fieldwork, I’m concerned about the potential of this controversy to quash the whole field of participant observation research in areas of social life that the government considers rife with criminality. In the history of academic sociology, ethnographic immersion in social life on “the other side” has been an important contributor to political culture in the US, going back to studies of gangs and “vice” institutions in the 1920s, through Becker’s and others’ studies of “deviance” in the 1950s and 1960s… I see Alice in that tradition and fear that academic sociologists, the great majority of whom work at a much safer distance from the people they write about, who indeed spend virtually all of their research life within the halls of academe, will become very wary of fieldwork that takes the researcher intimately into social worlds that are rife with what the government considers crime.
What do you think?

How Should the Police Deal with an Armed and Violent Mentally Ill Suspect?

Today, the Supreme Court decided San Francisco v. Sheehan, 6:2 sort-of-in favor of the city (Justice Breyer recused himself–his brother decided the case in a lower instance.) The facts, taken verbatim from the case syllabus, are as follows:

Respondent Sheehan lived in a group home for individuals with mental illness. After Sheehan began acting erratically and threatened to kill her social worker, the City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco) dispatched police officers Reynolds and Holder to help escort Sheehan to a facility for temporary evaluation and treatment. When the officers first entered Sheehan’s room, she grabbed a knife and threatened to kill them. They retreated and closed the door. Concerned about what Sheehan might do behind the closed door, and without considering if they could accommodate her disability, the officers reentered her room. Sheehan, knife in hand, again confronted them. After pepper spray proved ineffective, the officers shot Sheehan multiple times [seriously injuring, but not killing her–H.A.].

What should the cops do under such circumstances? Sheehan sued the City, arguing that when dealing with a mentally ill patient, the cops are bound by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

In lower courts, the city tried to argue that the ADA does not apply to police dealings with an armed and dangerous individuals. However, before the Supreme Court, the city presented and argued a brief merely stating that there was no way to accommodate Sheehan under the ADA due to the circumstances, in which she was not “participating” in an activity from which she might “benefit”. The dissent, written by Justice Scalia, would deny the city relief because of this change of tactics.

But the majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, stated that the police officers had qualified immunity from Sheehan’s lawsuit, because their actions did not clearly violate her Fourth Amendment rights; Fourth Amendment doctrine at the time did not include a clear and explicit mandate to accommodate suspects with disabilities, and the question whether it should has been left open.

Bottom line:
1. The city does not have to pay; the cops have immunity.
2. We have no answer whether the ADA covers armed and dangerous individuals.
3. We have no answer whether an arrest is an “activity” covered by the ADA.
4. We have no answer whether not accommodating an armed, violent, mentally-ill suspect is a Fourth Amendment violation.

Some thoughts:

1. These sorts of situations are going to be really difficult to parse out constitutionally, because the devil really is in the details. The degree to which the police might be aware that the suspect is mentally ill and the extent of the threat she or he pose would vary from situation to situation, and whatever Fourth Amendment standard is adopted will have to take that into account.

2. Let’s set aside constitutional doctrine for a minute and look at sound judgment. If you were the cops, what would you do? Presumably, your decision whether to let things calm down inside before going in might depend on whether there are innocent people inside that are being threatened by the suspect, no?

3. It’s also important to keep in mind that this decision occurs in a context of overall public lack of trust in the police, and particularly in its discretion using lethal force. It’s interesting that the timing didn’t bait the Supreme Court into saying something about this more generally, or even attempt to answer the question of mentally ill suspects for the future. Perhaps this reluctance stems from their willingness to give the police a wide berth of discretion.

Congress Lifts Federal Ban on Medical Marijuana

This is huge news, friends: Congress has ended the era of medical prohibition.

The L.A. Times reports:

Tucked deep inside the 1,603-page federal spending measure is a provision that effectively ends the federal government’s prohibition on medical marijuana and signals a major shift in drug policy.

The bill’s passage over the weekend marks the first time Congress has approved nationally significant legislation backed by legalization advocates. It brings almost to a close two decades of tension between the states and Washington over medical use of marijuana.

Under the provision, states where medical pot is legal would no longer need to worry about federal drug agents raiding retail operations. Agents would be prohibited from doing so.

The Obama administration has largely followed that rule since last year as a matter of policy. But the measure approved as part of the spending bill, which President Obama plans to sign this week, will codify it as a matter of law.

Some initial thoughts about what this means:

1. Businesses focused on medical marijuana can now operate with no fear of raids. This might lead to new types of business initiatives.
2. Even though the feds are still too wary to call off the war against recreational marijuana, loose gatekeeping in getting medical cards might make it a de-facto thing.

As an aside, the L.A. Times is quickly becoming my favorite California paper, because of excellent stories like this. Well, done, Evan Halper.

SB 443: Bring an End to Civil Asset Forfeiture in CA!

A new bill sponsored by Senator Holly Mitchell proposes to reform the absurdities of civil asset forfeiture in California.

From the bill text:

The purpose of this bill is to 

1) require a criminal conviction for forfeiture of alleged cash drug proceeds and assets in excess of 
$25,000; 
2) reduce the percentage of forfeiture proceeds distributed to prosecutors, law enforcement and the 
General Fund; 
3) distribute 5% of forfeiture proceeds to each of the courts and public defense; 
4) require that California standards be met before federal forfeiture proceeds can be distributed to 
a state of local law enforcement agency through equitable sharing; 
5) grant a right to counsel for indigent defendants in civil drug forfeiture matters; 
6) authorize attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing defendants in forfeiture cases; 
7) prohibit adoption by federal authorities of a state forfeiture matter; and 
8) require the California Department of Justice's annual asset forfeiture report to include data on 
forfeitures initiated under California law,federal adoptions, forfeiture case that were prosecuted 
under federal law, the number of suspects charged with drug crimes, the number of criminal charges brought under each of state and federal law and the disposition of these cases.

In short, to stop this travesty:

Inequality and Traffic Courts

Sam Levin’s East Bay Express story illuminates a hidden corner in the criminal justice system: traffic courts and their contribution to inequality and social stratification.

Statewide data that Bay Area legal aid and civil rights organizations recently compiled and analyzed — along with detailed accounts from people saddled with insurmountable traffic violation debts — demonstrate that municipal courts and aggressive debt collectors in California routinely trap low-income people in poverty with exorbitant fines. Minor traffic offenses that once cost $100 now cost roughly $500, which people living paycheck to paycheck can’t afford.

And when defendants miss a single payment or court date, the fines increase exponentially — and their driver’s licenses are suspended. In those cases, the courts also frequently block defendants from having a trial unless they post full bail, which means innocent people or those with extenuating life circumstances often can’t even present their cases to a judge.

Over the past eight years, there have been 4.2 million cases in which the state suspended driver’s licenses because of people’s failure to appear or pay fines in court, according to the East Bay Community Law Center, a nonprofit that provides legal services to defendants in traffic court. That means an estimated 17 percent of adults in California currently have suspended licenses for missing a hearing or payment deadline.

Cellmate Compatibility: Why Not?

According to media reports, California state prisoners are killed at a rate that doubles the national average [update: I’m not sure this is true, having looked at the numbers more recently]. A sensible proposition has been made–and rejected: The Merced Sun-Star reports:

The department will not reinstate a policy dropped 15 years ago that required potential sensitive needs cellmates to fill out a compatibility form before they are housed together, Ralph Diaz, acting deputy director for adult institutions, told a Senate budget subcommittee.

Sex offenders, former gang members and other vulnerable inmates are placed in special sensitive needs housing for their protection.

However, the inspector general and an analysis by The Associated Press published in February found that a disproportionate number of homicide victims were sensitive needs inmates.

The compatibility forms help officials assess whether inmates can live peacefully together. They are required for inmates housed together in other segregated living units, and Sen. Loni Hancock said they should be required for sensitive needs inmates as well.

“We do look for inmates who we feel should not be celling with others,” Diaz testified. However, he said using the forms for sensitive needs and general population inmates would be too cumbersome and the department’s current process can appropriately address housing concerns.

There are two ways of viewing this debate. One is through the usual old-skool impasse between carceral discourse and rights discourse. The other, however, is cost-oriented. CDCR is refusing to reinstate this policy because it believes that it would needlessly complicate its operations; Senator Hancock thinks that the costs in lives and healthcare offset these considerations.

This debate is an example of a situation in which a prison is not really sui generis. In any other setting, in which people are thrown together–especially in total institutions–it’s best if they spend time in close quarters with people with whom they can get along. This is not merely a matter of finding the roomie’s company enjoyable; it’s about preventing exploitation, abuse, and conflict.