In Part II of this series I looked at several inherent incompatibilities between true crime podcasts and the criminal process. My underlying assumption is that many true-crime podcasters who investigate cold cases and wrongful convictions (as opposed to the more entertainment-oriented ones, which merely recount crime stories) want to propel real change in how these cases are investigated and adjudicated. This may or may not overlap with the goal of having the podcast recognized as having propelled real change, which I’m sure matters as well. But here’s what worries me.

In 1995, Samuel Walker wrote a fantastic book called Taming the System, in which he addressed the struggle to contain and limit pockets of unfettered discretion in the criminal process: policing, bail setting, plea bargaining, and sentencing. Policing, as Joseph Goldstein explains in this great classic, largely happens under the radar, and very little control can be exercised over what individual police officers do in the streets when they have to decide on a course of action (the efforts, for example, to get officers to write up paperwork on their stop-and-frisk encounters have met with very partial success). What has been successful, though, is wrangling police activity into judicial review through constitutional tools. As Walker explains, the Warren Court’s project of incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states–culminating in constitutional criminal justice blockbuster cases like Mapp and Miranda–impacted the calculus police officers make when collecting evidence for a case. They now know that, for example, if they bust into a person’s home without probable cause and a warrant–even if they find an entire meth lab in there–the evidence will be suppressed. They now know that certain ways to pressure people into giving incriminating statements do not pay off because the confessions will be suppressed. What’s the point of gathering evidence if can’t be used at trial? Indeed, it’s because of these discretion-curbing effects that policing has, actually, become tamer than it was before the 1960s, and Walker believes that the exclusionary rule therefore acts as a watchdog over discretion and needs to be upheld (in a tragicomic twist, in Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Scalia wrote that the exclusionary rule has worked so well so far that it’s not needed anymore and cited Walker’s book. An irate Walker wrote an L.A. Times piece about how his work was misunderstood, memorably titled “Thanks for Nothing, Nino.”)
But I digress. The point is that, given that the police are invested in seeing their investigatory efforts come to fruition in the form of a criminal conviction, they are not motivated to find just any evidence: the exclusionary rule is designed to incentivize them to find usable, admissible evidence, that will survive motions to suppress. Which brings me to the question: can we expect the same set of incentives to work on podcasters?
In light of the podcast examples I’ve looked at here (the Adnan Syed case, the Paul Flores case, and especially the Michael Turney case) think we’re safe in making two assumptions about podcasters: one, that podcasters are interested in following up on the legal developments in the cases they cover (meaning that, if motions to suppress were to be filed in these cases, they would know and keep tabs on them), and two, that they generally want justice to be done (and preferably credited to them, at least in part, but that’s not the point.) In other words, they have very similar interests to cops.
The problem is, of course, that the incentive structure vis-a-vis law enforcement can be controlled through the Bill of Rights, while the incentive structure vis-a-vis podcasts cannot. Moreover, any restrictions on podcast reporting of cases would be violations of free speech. That some UK commenters have proposed this makes sense in the context of British law, where free speech protections are not unlimited and it is much easier to obtain relief on claims of libel and/or defamation (this, by the way, is the reason people are sometimes surprised to be sued for libel in the UK when they are US based; if jurisdiction can be established, the UK is much more favorable to plaintiffs.)
It would be ineffective to look for laws with enforcement “teeth” against true crime podcasters, nor is it desirable, I think; instead, it might make sense to propose a thick web of “best practices” and ethics advice that podcasters will have an interest in following for their own purposes. When I attended CrimeCon in 2003, there was a panel hosted by National Center for Victims of Crime Director Renée Williams, who was joined by Bill Williams of the “Mind Over Murder” podcast, survivor and author Kathy Kleiner Rubin, and journalist Brian Entin, which tried to do just that for the consumers of the genre. I was saddened to see the panel was not well attended, but thankfully it has been preserved for posterity:
Some of these best practices for consumers of the genre include: recognize that cases featured in true crime are real people, who can be impacted not only by the coverage, but also by community response; be suspicious of true crime itself (what are the motivations of the producers? why a certain case is being covered while others are not? etc.); think before you hit post; do not malign strangers with little evidence; require and expect victim voices in media covering their crime; do no harm (and leave families, who are public figures by necessity, alone); respect boundaries; don’t get sucked into the genre; and, turn your interest into real impact (e.g., volunteer at or donate to victim services organizations, hold unethical true crime producers accountable, provide DNA).
With some adaptations, many of these rules can help bridge the incompatibilities we reviewed in Part II. For example, refraining from speculating about a killer’s identity should not be limited to a mechanical disclaimer about the presumption of innocence at the beginning of episodes. This sort of speculation, which can taint jury pools later, can and should be discouraged by mindfully moderating the social media and online communities of podcast listeners. Flagging whether a piece of evidence would or would not stand up in court–and more importantly, why it might not–can calibrate public expectations from the criminal process. This is especially important when interviewing people: podcasters don’t necessarily have an obligation to cross-examine, but they might want to explain, after an interview, what questions a defense attorney might have asked the interviewee if they were to testify in court. But it also matters in terms of setting realistic expectations about DNA and other forensic evidence.
There are also some best practices for cops interacting with podcasters–namely, that the podcasters need to be made aware of things the investigating officers want to keep quiet for the benefit of the investigation, and that having to worry about the safety of a podcaster going rogue in search of definitive evidence can harm and derail, rather than aid, the investigation.
One of the questions I’m left with is whether, with the proliferation of podcasts and the possible saturation of the genre, we won’t see the wave of interest cresting. People seem to have insatiable appetites for true crime stories, but that might not be the case if they find that the stories sabotage the pursuit of justice. In the meantime, the least we can do is provide good legal consulting to podcasters, offer legal units in podcasting courses (of which there are many, like this one). Lawyers offering podcasters advice on legal liability might also initiate a conversation about the ultimate goal of the producers in the legal arena, beyond eyeballs and monetization. Since I’m not sure the public can be trusted wholesale with driving a demand for ethical podcasting, the demand has to come from the people who do this for a living and want their hard work to bear fruit in the courtroom.