Parsing Out Evidentiary/Procedural Issues in Nima Momeni Murder Trial

“You play fast and loose with the rules of war, Monsieur.”

“I play to win, Monsieur.”

–Horatio Hornblower

The jury is still out (literally!) at Nima Momeni’s trial for the murder of CashApp tech executive Bob Lee during a nighttime outing. A couple of interesting litigation moments–particularly defense strategy during closing arguments–have caught my attention, and I did a bit of punditry about this for the SF Standard (FYI, in an effort to simplify my life with multiple work/school/demands, I’m doing a lot less punditry than I used to–if you recall, during the first Trump administration, I was on TV multiple times a week–but this stuff caught my attention because of the interesting evidentiary and procedural questions it brings up).

Here’s a summary of the legal issue: The prosecution’s story is that Momeni had it in for Lee because he believed Lee had placed Momeni’s sister in the (abusive) hands of Lee’s drug dealer, who sexually assaulted her. Momeni brought a knife with him to the outing, planning to fatally stab Lee. The defense’s story is that Lee pulled the knife on Momeni after Momeni made a “bad joke,” and Momeni managed to take the knife from him and stab him in self defense.

To strengthen their respective stories, prosecution and defense relied on video evidence. The prosecution showed a video in which Momeni made stabbing motions. The defense showed a computer animation depicting the events as they occurred according to Momeni’s version. Take a look at this video:

In the last few years, opening and closing arguments are accompanied by ubiquitous PowerPoint presentations, and increasingly by video evidence, but this marks a first for me in terms of quality and verisimilitude. It features the date and location of the incident in a way that makes it feel “real” or “official” (see the still take at this post’s heading), and it incorporates the texts between Lee and Momeni, lending it more credibility. The two computer-animated figures are dressed the same as the people were in the real video, and there’s a transition from animation to real video that feels natural and seamless. This has made me worry that, in a world that increasingly blends the line between fake and real, more and more trials will include such reenactments at closing that might confuse some jurors into thinking that they are seeing evidence, rather than a story.

But that’s not the only edgy evidentiary issue that came up at this trial. On day two of closing arguments, the defense showed a video in which Lee and one of the prosecution’s witnesses, Bo Mohazzabi, could be seen taking cocaine “bumps” off of a shiny object. Defense attorney Zangeneh stopped the video and called out, “This is the knife!” If, indeed, that object is the knife, that bolsters the claim that what happened to Lee was not planned in advance–that Momeni stabbed Lee with Lee’s own knife–and therefore strengthens the self-defense claim.

Here’s the thing, though: the closing argument was the very first time that the jury saw this video. Trial coverage suggested that the video had not been entered into evidence, in which case it would’ve been an unethical–and illegal–move to show it to the jury (and I was surprised that the prosecution did not object.) But SF Standard reporter Beki San Martin (who did a great job with the coverage!) asked the defense what the deal was, and it turns out that the video *was* in fact introduced as evidence. The prosecution received it from SFPD during the murder investigation and agreed to enter it into evidence, but made the strategic choice not to show or discuss it when presenting evidence.

This, of course, changes matters. It means that the defense’s choice not to bring this up during trial spared them the adversity they might have encountered had the prosecution had the time to impeach the evidence. Lee’s ex-wife says he only took cocaine bumps off of a metallic shirt collar stay and, had the prosecution been privy to the defense’s intent to show the video, they probably would’ve put her on the stand. I have to say, I find the idea of snorting anything off a knife strange and dangerous (wouldn’t you be worried about stabbing your own nose?) but I’ve never snorted cocaine and perhaps there’s something I’m missing. Jurors might come to the same conclusion, who knows. Zangeneh avoided this risk of impeachment by sitting on the evidence. Does this feel disquieting in the sense that the jury’s been bamboozled a bit and not given a chance to carefully consider the evidence? Sure. Is it illegal or unethical? No, it’s strategic.

Which raises the second question: was it an error on the part of the prosecution not to show the video themselves, giving them an opportunity to dispel a possible argument that it was a knife before the defense made it? Maybe, but during trial every side always makes quick decisions like this, and it’s possible that they, too, made a strategic decision not to make too much of the video, which could be akin to telling the jury not to think about a pink elephant.

If the jury ignores the video debacle, what they’ll be left with is the DNA analysis of the knife: the handle has Momeni’s DNA on it and the blade has Lee’s. It’s not a big knife–the blade is only 3.5 inches long–which makes the DNA findings just a bit too neat. Moreover, and weirdly, it seems that the knife was not analyzed for fingerprints, nor was it analyzed for presence of drugs. This matters because ,if there’s no cocaine on the knife, then that’s not a knife we see in that video, period, but we’re never going to know this if it hasn’t been tested.

After the verdict comes in, I hope the lawyers–and if not them, the media–interview the jurors and figure out how they parsed the knife issue. I, for one, am on the edge… of my seat.

Lessons from CA Propositions on the 2024 Ballot: Instead of Admonishing, Listen

The election came and went, and we all know how that turned out. The Internet is full of Jeremiads and admonitions about the presidential outcome, and surely one more riff on the topic is not what anyone needs and wants. What I didn’t see a lot of is coverage of the criminal justice propositions on the CA ballot, so here are my two cents.

Let’s start with the obvious: I think the outcomes on both 6 and 36 are wrong and counterproductive. Prop 6 (which failed 46.7-53.3) was a no-brainer, and was going to fix a very ugly aspect of our correctional system: the abhorrent exploitation of prison labor, that we all benefit from in many imperceptible ways. People behind bars manufacture silkscreened college merch and furniture, do the boring telecommunications tasks for companies that go unappreciated (but better rewarded) on the outside, and most importantly, perhaps, save my life and yours as firefighters in fire camps. This is real labor, with real effort, sweat, skill, and expertise that goes into it, and people on the outside get paid market wages for it. There’s an exquisite irony in that this outcome emerges from the same election cycle in which San Francisco residents voted yes on Proposition H (52-48), which lowers the retirement age for the free firefighters who protect us alongside the incarcerated ones.

Prop 36 passed with an overwhelming majority (68.5-31.6) and will result in the creation of two new theft felonies (all theft offenses were downgraded to misdemeanors in 2014, through a voter initiative that also passed with an overwhelming majority) and ratcheting up consequences for some drug crimes as well. Under the Criminal Justice Realignment, people convicted of felonies–unless these are serious, violent, or sexual–serve their sentences in county jails anyway. And I don’t see that the potential for a few more months behind bars, especially if all it does is give the prosecution yet another card they can play to push more folks to plea bargain, deters anyone from offending, supports rehabilitation in a meaningful way, or even effectively incapacitates folks. Au contraire, without meaningful vocational and educational training behind bars that leads to a robust reentry continuum, all convicted folks will learn is how to be better at thefts and drugs, and will drift further into the lifestyle that got them in trouble in the first place.

It’s fair to say that I think we got it wrong this time. And yet, to be honest, I understand why this happened, I respect the people who voted differently than me, and I think that, rather than launching into the usual sloganeering, it’s worth listening to them.

Prop 6 was close. And I suspect that many Californians who voted against it would be proud to vote for it, had it been marketed differently. There are excellent, pro-social reasons, that law-abiding people can respect and understand, for why prison labor has to be compensated fairly– and they come from a classic in criminology, David Matza’s Delinquency and Drift. People who earn a decent living through their work benefit from having a stake in conformity, the pride and support of their families, and a network that waits for them. They have, perhaps, some small savings for when they get out, that could keep them out of trouble in the first few months that pose the greatest risk of recidivism. They learn the dignity that comes with earning a paycheck, and they get a little push toward a law-abiding, taxpaying life. This is something that folds our fellow Californians into the family of man the way we want, and it should be encouraged.

Instead, the Yes on 6 folks decided to wag fingers and sloganeer: we were told that Prop 6 was going to abolish slavery (which most CA voters would understandably believe was never legal in CA and ended in the South in 1863). This framing is not without merit when you look at it carefully. Plenty of research supports the link between the abolition of slavery and the exception, introduced into the constitution in the same breath as the repeal, for prison labor. Plenty of examples exist of prisons that continued to look, feel, and behave exactly like antebellum plantations. But the effort and money put into Prop 6, I want to believe, was not spent just to admonish people or to introduce them to academic analogies. These people played to win; they wanted to eliminate forced unpaid labor in prisons. And the thing is, people do not respond well when they are being admonished. After years of forced reeducation in schools and workplaces, in which decent, well-meaning people were reduced to tears being told that they were racist, sexist, homophobic, transphobic, etc., they’ve lost their taste for being chastised, and they draw the line at the implication that they are modern-day enslavers. I’m saddened, but not surprised, that they lashed out by voting no on this.

This, after all, is why the financial crisis of 2008 moved the needle for death penalty abolition: excellent arguments–barbarism, innocence, racial discrimination, etc.–stopped being effective at some point. And then–boom, boom, boom, abolitions, moratoria, and now more than half of US states no longer have the death penalty. Slow progress, yes, but better than no progress. The key? Decent, hardworking, law abiding people who disagree with me on the death penalty on principle realized that capital punishment is expensive, and the recession made that impossible to ignore. I wish the architects of Yes on 6 had considered something alongside the “win-win” framing instead of reverting to the righteous scolding that permeates so much of California’s public discourse. That might’ve won them the election.

[Incidentally: One would think that incarcerated people themselves overwhelmingly supported Prop 6, but I’m not even sure that’s the case. The days of assuming, or finding, that the prison population voted overwhelmingly Democrat are over. After the election, the Marshall Project surveyed 54,000 prisoners and found the following:

Most respondents said they would vote for Trump, and support was particularly strong among White men. A substantial minority of Black men said they’d vote for Trump, too, if given the chance.

As previous surveys showed, a large share of people behind bars from all racial backgrounds don’t identify with either major political party — instead identifying as independent.

A majority of those who identified as Democrats and independents said the country is ready for a woman president. Republicans are more divided on the question.

When Harris replaced President Biden as the nominee, she won more support, appealing to a subset of Trump supporters or people who said they wouldn’t vote in a previous version of the survey.

According to a poll conducted by Ear Hustle, the Quentin vote would have gone to Harris. But then again, Quentin is in CA, and the CA vote also went to Harris. And many people shared why they preferred Trump. Fancy that! People in prison are just like people outside prison! They have thoughts and opinions about politics! They change their mind from election to election, just like their neighbors on the outside! In other words, the left side of the political map does not necessarily speak for incarcerated people–just like it clearly does not speak for the majority of non-incarcerated people. But let’s go on.]

Prop 36 is a more difficult case. I have no doubt that the proposition is not the solution to the fentanyl crisis, the moribund vibe around the downtown area, and all kinds of other horrors. But at least it is a solution, proposed by people who accept the fact that there really is a problem. Along the lines of scolding, moralizing, and admonishing voters comes the unbearable hubris of telling people that what they see is not what they see, that what they experience is not what they experience, that the things that blight their daily life are not problems, that feeling scared and inconvenienced is really down to being racist/classist/bigoted/cruel, and that it is not okay to be bothered by any display of public disorder or lack of safety that falls short of a multiple homicide. It is true that, by objective measures, serious/violent crime is down, and that crime levels overall are low. But people do not experience crime by objective measures. They care about how their everyday life is affected.

The point where I started being really sore about this was way back in 2018, when Heather Knight wrote a piece for the Chron about how a homeless encampment affected life in a San Francisco neighborhood. The neighbors–good, decent people, who truly felt for their unhoused neighbors–got to their breaking point when rats, needles, garbage tossing, screams, and a suitcase full of poop became part of their getting-ready-for-school routine. Knight wrote:

The people who have homes on Isis aren’t get-off-my-lawn types. The neighbors I met seemed very progressive and genuinely heartsick that other people were living in these filthy conditions on sidewalks.

“I really strongly believe San Francisco is for everybody, not just us, but the community should be livable for everybody,” said Schoen-Rene’s wife, Jill, an attorney and children’s book author. “The suitcase is a symbol. Nobody should have to poop in a suitcase, and nobody should have to find a suitcase full of poop.”

To read the comments on the article, you’d think these people were unfeeling monsters. A whole parade of check-your-privilege scolding ensued. Knight was roasted for “privileging” these people’s feelings about how they live and work, for “giving them a voice,” rather than interviewing the folks who owned the only, apparently, valid perspective on the situation: the unhoused people themselves.

Yes, like anyone who lived in NYC in the 1980s knows, life is scary and dangerous when there are drive-by shootings and muggings on the subway. But life can also be plenty unsettling and unpleasant when, like me, you sit on BART next to a person who seems to have died hours ago and no one noticed. Or when a fellow passenger lights up multiple joints, or even a crack pipe, in a closed train car, between the West Oakland and Embarcadero stations, when you can’t pick up your asthmatic lungs and escape to another car (why does this always seem to happen when the train tunnel is submerged under the bay?). Or when a passenger hopped up on something terrible breaks the fire extinguisher glass compartment, shakes it violently, and hammers it on the car train floor as it drives, to try and spray the foam on you and your stuff. Or when there is nightly screaming and fighting and tossing glass bottles in your residential street that wakes up your child. Life is plenty unpleasant when you walk around the city with your kid and folks defecate right in front of him, or come close to you and scream profanities in your face. Or when you drive slowly on a narrow street and a person naked from the waist up, wrapped some rag and in a plastic hose that dangles behind her, walks down the street, in the middle of the road, toward your car, and as you brake, all you can see is her vacuous stare as she drapes herself on the hood of the car, then goes around it and just keeps walking. Or when your kid and his school friends play in a city park as part of recess, and a person who is clearly suffering a serious mental health crisis physically attacks two of their beloved teachers. All of the above happened to me personally in the last few months. Variations on the same theme have happened to every resident of a major urban area in California in the last few years, especially if they walk/bike to work or take transit. Yes, it is possible, and it is a human imperative, to feel empathy for the poor folks who are out in the street, unloved, uncared for, cold and hungry and maybe in drug withdrawal or mentally afflicted. Their suffering is immense. And at the same time, the people who have to bear the brunt of this suffering are also human beings, who want to work and study and raise their families in peace. And they are right that it’s not them-against-their-unhoused-neighbors. It’s them against a local government that does not offer solid solutions for this problem. So who are they going to vote for: the people who say, “I see you, I know the streets have become unsettling and upsetting, here’s how to solve it”–even if the solution is misguided–or the people who say, “you’re a middle-class douchebag and there’s no problem here?”

During COVID-19, Chad and I and many folks on the front lines of the San Quentin coalition were disheartened that no one cared about how the virus ravaged the prison, that no one stood up to cry against the mismanagement and the indifference and the neglect. But I think the big problem was–as is the case with so much of public policy–that people saw COVID as a zero-sum game. If prisons are cushy club Feds, it’s a bite out of our tax bill. If vaccines are distributed to prisons first, my grandma has to wait in line. The government did everything to avoid telling the truth: that the fight against COVID had to be fought on behalf of all human beings. That if people behind bars get sick, people on the outside–me and you and our loved ones–get sick also. That’s why we wrote FESTER, and I wish more social problems were addressed like this, instead of pitting people against each other.

I don’t think it’s time to roll over and stop working. If anything, we need to advocate harder. The more misery and suffering is wrought on the bottom rung of the socio-economic ladder in this state, the more we have to think hard and work hard to fix this. But alienating people and gaslighting them and pretending that they don’t know their own interests is not working. It hasn’t worked in the past, and with people feeling so fed up with being on the receiving end of so much schoolmarmish lecturing, it’s not going to work in the future. So what’s it going to be in the next election cycle? Do we want to congratulate ourselves for our goodness or actually do good things? Can you expand your circle of compassion beyond the poor folks who are cold and sick and have to sleep rough on this cold winter to the folks who have to absorb their misery, even if they have the good fortune to be housed and employed? Can you see that it’s about our government finding a solution that works for all of us? That if our government takes us seriously, rather than telling us to suck it up, we all benefit?

In Memoriam: Barry Krisberg

eulogy prepared for a memorial panel at the American Society of Criminology 2024 Annual Meeting

In 2009, when we held our first California Correctional Crisis conference shortly after the order to reduce the prison population, we hosted a panel about the incarceration of special populations. One of the panelists was a California legislator who said, “we have to get rid of solitary confinement for juveniles.” Sitting in the audience, I was struck by lightning, and I could see that many audience members were as well: we have solitary confinement for juveniles? Even after years in the field, it felt as if under every stone was a fresh, undiscovered horror, that would take a litfime to repair.

You know who was not surprised? Barry Krisberg. Barry straddled numerous divides at that conference, between academics, activists, policymakers, and impacted people, speaking to all of these constituencies with the same ease, expertise, passion, and mastery. Those qualities characterized his advocacy work as well as his writing, which has so often shaped and supported my own education and views on criminal justice topics.

Even though Barry’s work encompassed a wide variety of issues, he is perhaps best known for his work on juvenile punishment. Rereading it for this panel, which I regrettably cannot attend in person because of an unforeseen conflict, I was struck by the multitudes it contains. These can be classified into three apparent tensions that dissolve as one understand the magnitude and impact of Barry’s work.

Tension no. 1: Be in the Same Storm but Not in the Same Boat

This sentence, which we heard ad nauseam during the pandemic, is a great descriptor for Barry’s work. He had a clear understanding of the entire carceral giant as a locus of corruption, futility, and cruelty, but also understood that different populations experienced carcerality in different ways. In particular, Barry was able to see the special harms and indignities suffered by incarcerated women and children and ground those in empirical research about these populations’ unique backgrounds and needs.

It is often said that California has not one criminal justice apparatus, but dozens. Barry’s encyclopedic familiarity with the adult and juvenile facilities of the Golden State was such that he could rattle, from memory, what a particular facility under the care of a particular sheriff was like. Every child’s experience of being locked up was different, and Barry understood that better than anyone making generalizations.

Tension No. 2: See the Forest and the Trees

This relates to a second tension in Barry’s work. It is very common among punishment scholars–indeed, probably many people in the room–to launch broad, vague tirades against the carceral state. I say this with love, because many of the tirades are justified and grounded in truth. Barry could rail against these along with the best of us. But his bird’s-eye view of the process did not cloud his eyes from having granular expertise with particular carceral settings, which he honed through hundreds of hours of speaking with youth at California’s Youth Authority (CYA). For decades, Barry devoted himself to reforms in these facilities, developing his vast, unmatched expertise not only about the geographic but also about the historical dimensions of juvenile incarceration. He saw, with his own eyes, filthy and dilapidated cells. He saw cells in which kids were chained to the walls with rings. He saw and heard of horrific violence and fear allowed to flourish in these facilities through the neglect of the staff. These were not abstractions to him; they were specific, carefully documented scenarios, that Barry used effectively when negotiating policy changes and when partnering with the Prison Law Office to sue some of these places. Which brings us to a third tension in Barry’s work.

Tension no. 3. Stay Angry But Be Useful

I’ve been doing this work for close to three decades now, and I see trends that worry me. For one thing, I see some folks who are happy to reap the prestige and accolades of fancy, armchair radicalism without getting dirty in the trenches and actually engage with the people they publish and lecture about. For another, I see some folks who become so consumed with anger and frustration about what they see and experience that they cannot be useful. Sometimes I think of these problems as short-term versus long-term battles: folks who understandably want and expect the demise of the “carceral state,” whatever that even is, and who rail against what they call “non-reform reforms,” forget the small but important relief that they can offer one child today, or worse, think that it comes at the expense of liberation for all children tomorrow. Barry was the rare person whose anger at the large-scale evils of the entire enterprise was always palpable not only in his words, but also in his tone of voice: he stayed steadfast in his belief that kids should never be put under lock and key. But at the same time, he deftly fueled his anger into useful, productive avenues. He was well known in all of California’s counties for his careful documentation of conditions at CYA as a member of the expert team appointed by the court’s consent decree, a role he performed for more than a decade. His contribution to the final closure of these horrific institutions in 2020 was significant, and he was also an architect of the Close to Home program that brought many suffering, justice-impacted youth close to their families.

In Swahili culture, I’m told, people who are no longer with us fall into two categories: the sasha and the zamani. The dead who are remembered among the living are the sasha. Once the last person who knew or remembered you is gone, you pass into the realm of the zamani. Barry’s work lives through the commitment and action of the many people he inspired. Anyone who takes the trouble to go into the field and speak directly with the people who suffer keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who can speak not only the language of academic umbrage, but also of bureaucratic reform, keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who steps up when courts finally intervene and helps with the long process of righting an established wrong keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who finds out, through research, something they cannot countenance and follow up with a phone call or an email keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who cares enough to see the small details that comprise the big picture keeps Barry’s legacy alive. And what is remembered, lives.

Euthanize the Death Penalty Already: Scenes from Capital Punishment’s Chronic Deathbed

(published: The Green Bag 27(3), Spring 2024)


INTRODUCTION

J.R.R. Tolkien’s immortal Lord of the Rings tells of the crossing of the Bridge of Khazad-dûm, during which members of the Fellowship of the Ring inadvertently awaken the Balrog. A monstrous holdover from ancient times, the Balrog attacks the Fellowship. Gandalf, the wizard leader of the Fellowship, successfully fights the monster, but at the very last moment, as the Balrog plunges to its death, it swings its whip one last time, capturing Gandalf and dragging him along into the abyss under the Bridge of Khazad-dûm.

The U.S. death penalty in the 21st century is like the Balrog – arcane, decrepit, still grasping and lashing its whip even as it approaches its demise. The score, state-by-state, is practically against capital punishment: 23 states have abolished it, and out of the 27 states that retain it, six (plus the federal government under President Joe Biden) have instated moratoria upon its use.

Even in retentionist states, the rate of executions has slowed almost to a grinding halt, and initiatives to abolish the death penalty frequently appear on the ballot. Even as Americans hang on to their support of the death penalty by a thread,3 and these ballot initiatives continue to be defeated,4 the death penalty continues to lose practical ground.5 Much like people on death row, most of whom die natural deaths after decades of incarceration and litigation,6 the death penalty itself is dying a slow, natural death.

As Ryan Newby and I explained more than a decade ago, the slow decline of the death penalty has been caused by a confluence of several factors.7 The first is the advent of cheap-on-crime politics in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, which drew attention to the immense, disproportionate expenditure on capital punishment. 8 The second is the rising prominence of the innocence movement, which has shone a light on the widespread problem of wrongful convictions, supported in recent years by
the popular reach of true-crime podcasts highlighting miscarriages of justice.9 The third is the growing attention to racial disparities in criminal justice which, while a tough argument to bring up in litigation,10 has impacted the national policy field through Obama-era reforms.11

The expense, discrimination, and potential for harrowing mistakes are all aspects of the chronic disease afflicting the death penalty. But like many natural deaths from chronic disease, the end is prolonged, undignified, and sometimes bitingly cruel. Anyone who has cared for a loved one through the end of life can probably recall the chaotic, arbitrary, sometimes contradictory indignities that every day of decline brings in its wings. And so, in this paper, I offer you a safari tour of horrors, injustices, absurdities, and embarrassments that have characterized the death penalty through its prolonged chronic demise.


TRUMP’S LAST KILLING SPREE: RELUCTANT VICTIMS, ALZHEIMER’S, AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPARITIES


Tolkien is a master storyteller, and he sets up the moment when the Balrog’s whip ensnares Gandalf as poignantly tragic – a sudden, unnecessary reminder that, even at its demise, the ancient monster can still unleash vicious harm. The last few days of the Trump administration offered ample proof of this, through the Supreme Court’s decision in Barr v. Lee.12

Like much of latter-day death penalty litigation, Lee focused on chemicals used in federal executions – to wit, a single shot of pentobarbital, a mainstay of state executions as European countries no longer export lethal drugs to the U.S.13 As Ryan Newby and I explained in 2013, this sort of litigation is a classic example of what Justice Harry Blackmun referred to in the early 1990s as “tinkering with the machinery of death.” Blackmun could afford a direct, stop-beating-around-the-bush approach to the tiresome and technical minutiae of postconviction litigation, but capital defense lawyers cannot; arguments about human rights and racial disparities have long been futile, for various procedural reasons, and the limits of the sayable on appeal and on habeas revolve around chemicals and number of injections. Barr v. Lee, decided 5-4, was no exception: the plaintiffs, whose cases were final and cleared for executions, provided expert declarations correlating pentobarital use to flash pulmonary edema, a form of respiratory distress that temporarily produces the sensation of drowning or asphyxiation. The federal government provided contrary expert testimony, according to which pulmonary edema occurs only after the prisoner has died or been rendered
fully insensate. The Supreme Court found, per curiam, that the plaintiffs had not carried the burden of proof and cleared the way for the executions. Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent echoed Blackmun’s distaste for what death penalty litigation has become, remarking, “[t]his case illustrates at least some of the problems the death penalty raises in light of the Constitution’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’” Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in turn, remarked on the absurdity of doing justice to fundamental questions via “accelerated decisionmaking.”

Then came three troubling executions. Daniel Lewis Lee was put to death against the express, vocal, and repeated wishes of his victims’ families to spare him.14 The judicial and executive branches’ trampling of those requests followed the usual capital punishment theater in which, as Sarah Beth Kaufman explains in American Roulette, prosecutors, governors, and death penalty advocates use victims as props, assuming that punitiveness is faithful to their wishes – a position that does not faithfully represent the diverse views among victims of violent crime.15 According to the first-ever national survey of crime, twice as many victims prefer that the criminal justice system focus more on rehabilitation than on punishment; victims overwhelmingly prefer investments in education and in job creation to investments in prisons and jails, by margins of 15-to-1 and 10-to-1 respectively; by a margin of 7-to-1, victims prefer increased investments in crime prevention and programs for at-risk youth over more investment in prisons and jails; and 6 in 10 victims prefer shorter prison sentences and more spending on prevention and rehabilitation than on lengthy prison sentences.

Then, the federal government executed 68-year-old Wesley Purkey, who was described by his lawyer, Rebecca Woodman, as a “severely braindamaged and mentally ill man who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease” and does not understand “why the government plans to execute him.”16 The debate over Purkey’s mental illness was emblematic of the decades and billions of dollars spent poring over the fitness for execution of elderly, decadeslong death row residents. It also made a mockery of Atkins v. Virginia,
17 which forbade the execution of mentally challenged people but left it up to individual jurisdictions to duke out the details of who, precisely, they deem smart or sane enough to be injected with pentobarbital.

Finally came Dustin Honken’s execution, which offered a grim reminder of the gap between the inexplicable federal enthusiasm for executions and the waning interest of states in the penalty. Honken was the first person from Iowa to be executed since 1963; Iowa abolished the death penalty in 1965. Honken’s lawyer, Shawn Nolan, said, “There was no reason for the government to kill him, in haste or at all. In any case, they failed. The Dustin Honken they wanted to kill is long gone. The man they killed today was a human being, who could have spent the rest of his days helping others and further redeeming himself.”18

Another development was the reintroduction of electrocutions and firing squads as permissible execution methods by the administration of President Donald Trump in late November 2020 – after Biden had defeated Trump in the presidential election. The change was intended to offer federal prosecutors a wider variety of options for execution in order to avoid delays if the state in which the inmate was sentenced did not provide other alternatives. At the same time, the Department of Justice said it would keep federal executions in line with state law: “the federal government will never execute an inmate by firing squad or electrocution unless the relevant state has itself authorized that method of execution.”19

Trump’s appetite for executions was, at least, consistent with his positions on capital punishment since the 1980s, when he regularly purchased large ads and gave interviews advocating for the death penalty for the Central Park Five20 (who have since been exonerated, as is well known). In the early days of his presidency, he chased headlines expressing support for capital punishment for drug dealers.21 While consistent with Trump’s presidential positions, the viciousness of his last-minute addition of federal electrocutions and firing squads seemed pointless, since Biden was known to oppose the death penalty and had made campaign promises to work toward federal abolition.22 Moreover, any effort to electrocute or shoot death row convicts would embroil the federal government in interminable Eighth Amendment litigation, given the always-present risk of botched executions.

The last slew of planned Trump executions included more cases that provoked moral anguish. For example, the execution of Lisa Montgomery, the only woman on federal death row.23 Montgomery’s crime was shockingly brutal. She strangled a pregnant woman before cutting her stomach open and kidnapping her baby. Her own experiences of victimization were torturous and harrowing. She was sexually assaulted by her father starting at 11 years old, trafficked by her mother, and horrifically abused by her stepbrother, who became her husband. She was involuntarily sterilized, deteriorated into severe mental illness, and lived in abject poverty at the time the crime was committed. The uproar about the sentence provoked heated debates about the Trump administration’s appetite for creating controversies that the Biden administration would then have to undo. What is the point, one might ask, of all this cruelty? And the answer, as Adam Serwer wrote in a different context, might be: the cruelty is the point.24

OKLAHOMA: CHEMICALS AND INNOCENCE

A tragic Talmudic story tells how Yehuda ben Tabbai, President of the Sanhedrin, once wrongly convicted a man of perjury. By the time ben Tabbai realized his mistake, it was too late; the man had already been put to death. Shocked by his complicity in injustice, ben Tabbai would never again rule singlehandedly on a legal point, and every day of his life he would prostrate himself on the grave of the wrongly executed man, begging forgiveness and weeping.25

One wishes that more judicial and executive officials would take a page from ben Tabbai’s book. Instead, a sense of confusion, lack of commitment, and being in perpetual limbo has characterized capital punishment for the last decade. The story of Richard Glossip, the lead petitioner in Glossip v. Gross, is a case in point. In 2015, the Supreme Court rejected Glossip’s petition against the use of midazolam in his execution, just a brief time after the same drug played a horrendous part in the botched execution of Clayton Lockett. In line with the aforementioned trend of technical litigation, the decision revolved around whether Glossip had shown that Oklahoma had better execution methods than midazolam.26

Anyone reading the decision could be forgiven for having no idea that Glossip is widely believed to be innocent, and that Oklahoma’s Attorney General, who reviewed his case, does not stand behind the conviction. Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would not halt Glossip’s execution. Judge David Lewis wrote that the case “has been thoroughly investigated and reviewed,” with Glossip given “unprecedented access” to prosecutors’ files, “[y]et he has not provided this court with sufficient information that would convince this court to overturn the jury’s determination that he is guilty of first-degree murder and should be sentenced to death.” It took yet another petition to the U.S. Supreme Court to halt the execution.27

CALIFORNIA: DEATH BY MORATORIUM

For more ambiguity and discombobulation on the death penalty in the 21st century, consider California, where several rounds of abolitionist voter initiatives failed in the last decade.28 I want to spend more time discussing California, not only because I am intimately familiar with capital punishment law where I live and work, but also because I think the last decade in the Golden State perfectly encapsulates what a chronic, slow death for capital punishment looks like. In 2016, while narrowly defeating the abolitionist Prop 62, California voters narrowly approved Prop 66, which was supposed to speed up executions, as well as allow death row residents to be relocated to other prisons where they could pay restitution to their victims. Some aspects of Prop 66 – specifically, those which remove safeguards against wrongful executions – have been found unconstitutional, but most of it has survived constitutional review.29

When explaining what the death penalty in California was like in the late 2010s, I sometimes borrow a framework from the construction world. When planning a project, general contractors might draw a triangle, writing in each corner one word – respectively, “good,” “fast,” and “cheap.” They then say to the client, “you can’t have all three; pick two.” This is an apt description of why death penalty opponents often refer to California’s capital punishment as “broken beyond repair.” A “good” and “cheap” death penalty would require finding some way to seriously litigate postconviction motions on a lengthy timeline and on a shoestring, relying mostly on California’s minuscule existing cadre of capital habeas litigators. Cases would drag on and on, as they do now, until people received representation, a situation that at least one federal judge found to violate the Eighth Amendment.30 A “good” and “fast” death penalty, which is what some supporters of Prop 66 perhaps wanted, would require massive expenditures so that proper, high-quality representation could be found and habeas writs could efficiently work their way through the courts. A “fast” and “cheap” death penalty, which is what Prop 66 might have produced had all its aspects been found constitutional, would do away with many safeguards against wrongful executions and result in more deadly mistakes. Even if
one approves of capital punishment in theory, as many California voters do (for example, through a retributive framework), it is therefore hard to compare its abstract form to the way it is administered in practice: There is no way of fashioning capital punishment in California in a way that guarantees it to be “good,” “fast,” and “cheap.”

These concerns, and many others, led California Governor Gavin Newsom to take a step that his abolitionist predecessors had shied away from: placing a moratorium on the death penalty in California and ordering the
death chamber dismantled.31 Newsom is also turning San Quentin prison, home to the country’s largest death row, into a Scandinavian-style “center for innovation focused on education, rehabilitation and breaking cycles of crime.” For the first time in decades, residents of death row are able to move freely within the facility, and many of them will be transferred to other facilities, a monumental change in their life circumstances that some death row residents, acclimated to their peculiar, restrictive lives, view with apprehension.32 But these are executive, not legislative acts. Because the death penalty still has a legal, if not ontological, existence, people whose lives were saved by the moratorium are still, legally, capital convicts, and costly postconviction litigation on their cases continues, to the tune of $150 million per annum.33

To cynical commenters, who might observe that this new incarnation is not “good,” “fast,” or “cheap,” one might respond, “at least we’re not executing people.” But saying, “no one is being executed on death row” is
far from saying, “no one dies on death row.” In late May 2020, as a San Francisco Chronical exposé revealed – and as a subsequent investigation by the California Inspector General’s office and litigation in state courts confirmed – San Quentin, still home to the country’s largest death row, was overcrowded to 113% of design capacity.34 Alarmed by a horrific COVID19 outbreak at the California Institute of Men in Chino, custodial and
medical officials there sought to mitigate the spread by transferring 200 men out of the facility, 122 of them to San Quentin. The men were not tested for COVID-19 for weeks prior to their transfer. On the morning of
the transfer, several transferees told nurses that they were experiencing COVID-19 symptoms (fever and coughing). According to email correspondence between health officials, these men were treated as malingerers and the transfer proceeded as planned. No effort was made to facilitate social distancing within the buses; the transferees heard and felt their neighbors cough throughout the lengthy journey to the destination facilities.35

The virus spread quickly throughout San Quentin. By the end of June, more than three quarters of the prison population had been infected and 29 had died – 28 prisoners and one worker.36 San Quentin’s death row was especially vulnerable to COVID-19, both because of the low quality of the physical plant – a dilapidated, poorly constructed, and thinly staffed long-term home to approximately 750 men (now many fewer) – and because the death row population tends to be older and sicker than the general prison population. The virus tore quickly through death row, and while prison authorities did what they could to obscure the calamities, San Francisco Chronicle journalists broke the story:

A coronavirus outbreak exploding through San Quentin State Prison has reached Death Row, where more than 160 condemned prisoners are infected, sources told The Chronicle on Thursday. One condemned inmate, 71-year-old Richard Eugene Stitely, was found dead Wednesday night. Officials are determining the cause of death and checking to see whether he was infected.

State prison officials declined to confirm that the virus has spread to Death Row, but three sources familiar with the details of the outbreak there provided The Chronicle with information on the condition they not be named, and in accordance with the paper’s anonymous source policy. Two of the sources are San Quentin employees who are not authorized to speak publicly and feared losing their jobs.

There are 725 condemned inmates at San Quentin, and of those
who agreed to be tested for the coronavirus, 166 tested positive, the
sources said. . . .

It is unclear whether Stitely was infected with the coronavirus. He refused to be tested, according to the three sources with knowledge of the situation.37

By contrast to general population residents, whose identities were hidden from the public for medical privacy reasons, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sent emails to interested parties about
deaths of people on death row, listing their names and full details. Through subtracting the named casualties from the total death toll, a horrifying truth emerged: More people died on death row from COVID-19 under Newsom’s moratorium than California had executed since the reestablishment of the death penalty in 1978.38

This outcome was deeply ironic, because even after the moratorium, with no death chamber and bereft of lethal chemicals, California courts continued to be clogged with death penalty litigation concerning details
revolving around whether various modes and aspects of the execution process are “cruel and unusual” even as the death penalty itself was still deemed “kind and usual.”39 Flying in the face of this precious and expensive effort to sever the death penalty from any of its potentially cruel and unusual implications were executions clearly not prescribed by the California Penal Code: deaths from a contagious pandemic, compounded by incompetence and neglect.

At the same time, even stalwart supporters of the death penalty realized that capital verdicts that will never be carried out make no sense, logically or practically. In summer 2020, Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeff Rosen, by no means a capital-punishment-shy public prosecutor, announced that his office would no longer seek the death penalty. Rosen claimed that his visit to the Civil Rights Museum in Alabama inspired him to see the death penalty not only “through eyes of the victims and families of those whose lives were taken,” but also “through the lens of race and inequity.” The rationales he offered for the policy change were in line with those behind the penalty’s decline in popularity more generally: “These cases use up massive public resources and cruelly drag on for years with endless appeals that give no finality to the victims’ families,” he said. “There’s the tragic but real risk of wrongful conviction. And, shamefully, our society’s most drastic and devastating law enforcement punishment has been used disproportionately against defendants of color.”40 Rosen was facing an election challenge from a more progressive candidate, which could partly explain his change in position. Nevertheless, his reliance on the more general arguments means that the gubernatorial changes at San Quentin did resonate.

Perhaps even more important was the announcement by George Gascón, upon his election as Los Angeles District Attorney in fall 2020, that the county would no longer seek the death penalty41 – an inflection point for one of California’s four “killer counties” and one of the entire country’s three highest sources of capital sentences. 42 Even more striking is a remarkable data point from Sacramento: Joseph DiAngelo, otherwise known as the Golden State Killer, was finally caught and convicted using innovative forensic investigative tools.43 The Sacramento County prosecutor did not even ask for the death penalty, and rightly so, as it would have allowed DiAngelo to continue litigating at the state’s expense only to die a natural death, like everyone else on death row. Which raises a fair question: If not the most notorious and heinous criminal in the history of California, then who?

WHAT DEATH PENALTY EUTHANASIA MIGHT LOOK LIKE

Capital punishment’s last gasps are, as these examples show, rife with inconsistencies, ironies, and changes of direction, which raise the question when, and how, the end will come. As public opinion and results at the ballot box show, the death penalty retains a symbolic hold over the American imagination. But judges and politicians are exposed to its unsavory sides.

It is hard to provide facile explanations for the different modes of the capital penalty’s demise in recently abolitionist states. In Washington, abolition arrived through a judicial decision about racial disparities in the penalty’s application;44 in Delaware, through a case involving arbitrary jury decisions in capital cases, which was later extended to the remaining cases on death row;45 in New Hampshire, through a non-retroactive statute; 46 in Colorado, through a combination of a statute and gubernatorial commutations;47 in Virginia, the first Southern state to abolish the death penalty, through a bipartisan legislative vote.48

One is left wondering whether it is easier to get rid of the death penalty in retentionist states – such as in Illinois, where abolition followed Governor George Ryan’s mass commutations, largely due to his concerns about innocence and wrongful executions49 – or in states with moratoria – such as California, where one wonders whether the dismantlement of the death chamber and the disbanding of death row, along with the vanishing prospect of an execution as a lightning rod, might be slowing down the dismantling of the death penalty itself. Without the physical reminder of the remnants of this archaic punishment, and with the growing resemblance of the death penalty to the two other members of the “extreme punishment trifecta” (life with and without parole),50 does the effort to abolish a thoroughly defanged (but still expensive) death penalty lose its steam?

What signals a new phase in the death penalty’s terminal illness is a combination of factors: a critical mass of abolitionist states; backlash caused by the Trump administration’s execution spree; the absence of capital sentencing nationwide and, especially, in high-profile cases; abolitionist thinking and decisionmaking at the county prosecution level; the specter of COVID-19 deaths; and, of course, the ever-rising costs. We are unlikely to see a definitive kiss of death. Instead, many local developments may eventually mean – perhaps, to our surprise – that, like so many people on death row itself, capital punishment has died a quiet, natural death.

NOTES


1 J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING bk. II, ch. 5
(2012 [1954]).

2 Abolitionist states with date of abolition: Alaska (1957), Colorado (2020), Connecticut (2012), Delaware (2016), Hawaii (1957), Illinois (2011), Iowa (1965), Maine (1887), Maryland
(2013), Massachusetts (1984), Michigan (1847), Minnesota (1911), New Hampshire (2019),
New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York (2007), North Dakota (1973), Rhode
Island (1984), Vermont (1972), Virginia (2021), Washington (2023), West Virginia (1965),
Wisconsin (1853). Retentionist states (including states with moratoria): Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming.
States with moratoria, along with moratorium date: California (2019), Pennsylvania (2023),
Oregon (2022), Arizona (2023), Ohio (2020), Tennessee (2022). The federal moratorium
was put in place by the Biden administration in 2021. Source: Death Penalty Information
Center (“Death Penalty Info”) website, deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-landing. 3 Megan Brenan, “Steady 55% of Americans Support Death Penalty for Murderers,” Gallup, Nov. 14, 2022.

4 AUSTIN SARAT, JOHN MALAGUE, AND SARAH WISHLOFF, THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
BALLOT: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FATE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2019).

5 DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (2016).

6 166 non-execution deaths, as of 2024: Death Penalty Focus, deathpenalty.org/facts/.

7 Hadar Aviram and Ryan Newby, “Death Row Economics: The Rise of Fiscally Prudent
Anti-Death Penalty Activism,” 28 CRIM. JUST. 33 (2013).

8 HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015).

9 Keith A. Findley, “Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Criminal Justice,”
in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3-20 (2016); Lindsey A. Sherrill,
“Beyond Entertainment: Podcasting and the Criminal Justice Reform ‘Niche,’” and Robin
Blom, Gabriel B. Tait, Gwyn Hultquist, Ida S. Cage, and Melodie K. Griffin, “True
Crime, True Representation? Race and Injustice Narratives in Wrongful Conviction Podcasts,” in TRUE CRIME IN AMERICAN MEDIA 67-82 (2023).

10 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

11 Barack Obama, “The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,” 130 HARV.
L. REV. 811 (2017).

12 Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979 (2020).

13 “Europe’s moral stand has U.S. states running out of execution drugs, complicating capital
punishment,” CBS NEWS, Feb. 18, 2014.

14 Hailey Fuchs, “Government Carries Out First Federal Execution in 17 Years,” NEW YORK
TIMES, July 14, 2020.

15 SARAH BETH KAUFMANN, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING TRIALS (2020).

16 Khaleda Rahman, “U.S. Executes Wesley Purkey, Who Calls It a ‘Sanitized Murder’ In
Last Words,” NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2020.

17 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

18 Shawn Nolan, “Statement From Shawn Nolan, Attorney For Dustin Honken,” FEDERAL
DEFENDER, July 17, 2020.

19 Matt Zapotosky and Mark Berman, “Justice Dept. rule change could allow federal executions by electrocution or firing squad,” WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 27, 2020.

20 Colby Itkowitz and Michael Brice-Saddler, “Trump still won’t apologize to the Central
Park Five. Here’s what he said at the time.” WASHINGTON POST, June 18, 2019.

21 Michael Krasny, “President Trump Announces Plan to Fight Opioid Abuse, Including
Death Penalty,” KQED FORUM, Mar. 20, 2018.

22 Dakin Andone, “Biden Campaigned on Abolishing the Federal Death Penalty. But 2 Years
In, Advocates See an ‘Inconsistent’ Message,” CNN, Jan. 22, 2023.

23 Reuters, “Lisa Montgomery: US Executes Only Woman on Federal Death Row,” BBC
WORLD, Jan. 13, 2021.

24 Adam Serwer, “The Cruelty Is the Point,” THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 3, 2018.

25 Bavli Hagiga 16:2.

26 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015); Jeffrey E. Stern, “The Cruel and Unusual Execution
of Clayton Lockett,” THE ATLANTIC, June 15, 2015.

27 Glossip v. State, www.okcca.net/cases/2023/OK-CR-5/ (2023); Glossip v. Oklahoma, 143.Ct. 2453 (2023).

28 Prop 34 failed in 2012: David A. Love, “Prop 34 Fails But Signals the Imminent Demise
of California’s Death Penalty,” THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 2012. Prop 66 failed in 2016:
Sarah Heise, “Death Penalty Supporters Claim Victory with Failure of Prop 62,” KCRA3, Nov. 9, 2016.

29 Bob Egelko, “California Supreme Court Upholds Most Of Expedited Death Penalty
Initiative,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 24, 2017.

30 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

31 Kyung Lah, “How Kamala Harris’ Death Penalty Decisions Broke Hearts on Both Sides,”
CNN, Apr. 8, 2019; Eric Westervelt, “California Says It Will Dismantle Death Row.
The Move Brings Cheers and Anger,” NPR, Jan. 13, 2023.

32 Nigel Duara, “Gavin Newsom Moves to ‘Transform’ San Quentin as California Prison
Population Shrinks,” CALMATTERS, Mar. 21, 2023; Sam Levin, “The Last Days of Death
Row in California: ‘Your Soul is Tested Here’,” THE GUARDIAN, May 1, 2023.

33 Arthur Rizer and Marc Hyden, “Why Conservatives Should Oppose the Death Penalty,”
THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, Jan. 10, 2019.

34 Mary Harris, “California’s Carelessness Spurred a New COVID Outbreak,” SLATE, July 7,2020; Roy W. Wesley and Bryan B. Beyer, “COVID-19 Review Series, Part Three,” OFFICEOF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Feb. 1, 2021, 1-2, www.oig.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/OIG-COVID-19-Review-Series-Part-3-%E2%80%93-Transferof-Patients-from-CIM.pdf; “Monthly Report of Population As of Midnight June 30, 2020,”CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, July 1, 2020, 2, www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/174/2020/07/Tpop1d2006.pdf.

35 For a thorough examination of COVID-19 and California’s death row, see HADAR AVIRAM AND CHAD GOERZEN, FESTER: CARCERAL PERMEABILITY AND CALIFORNIA’S COVID19 CORRECTIONAL DISASTER (2024).

36 Daniel Montes, “Trial Over COVID-19 Outbreak at San Quentin State Prison That Left29 Dead to Begin Thursday,” BAY CITY NEWS, May 20, 2021.Euthanize the Death Penalty AlreadySPRING 2024 193

37 Megan Cassidy and Jason Fagone, “Coronavirus Tears through San Quentin’s Death Row;
Condemned Inmate Dead of Unknown Cause,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 25, 2020,
www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Coronavirus-tears-through-San-Quentin-s-Death15367782.php.

38 Patt Morrison, “California Is Closing San Quentin’s Death Row. This Is Its Gruesome
History,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 8, 2022.

39 Aviram & Newby, supra note 7; George Skelton, “In California, the Death Penalty is Allbut Meaningless. A Life Sentence for the Golden State Killer Was the Right Move,” LOSANGELES TIMES, July 2, 2020.

40 Quoted in Michael Cabanatuan, “Santa Clara County DA Jeff Rosen No Longer to SeekDeath Penalty,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 22, 2020.

41 Alexandra Meeks and Madeline Holcombe, “New Los Angeles DA Announces End to
Cash Bail, the Death Penalty and Trying Children as Adults,” CNN, Dec. 8, 2020.

42 “Death Penalty Info: ACLU Study: Los Angeles Death Penalty Discriminates Against
Defendants of Color and the Poor,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/aclu-study-los-angelesdeath-penalty-discriminates-against-defendants-of-color-and-the-poor.

43 Paige St. John, “The Untold Story of How the Golden State Killer Was Found: A Covert
Operation and Private DNA,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 2020.

44 State v. Gregory, 427 P.2d 621 (Wash. 2018).

45 “Death Penalty Info: Delaware,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/
delaware.

46 “Death Penalty Info: New Hampshire,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/stateby-state/new-hampshire.

47 “Death Penalty Info: Colorado,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/
colorado.

48 “Death Penalty Info: Virginia,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/virginia-legislature-votes-toabolish-the-death-penalty.

49 Sarah Schulte, “20 Years After Commuting 167 Illinois Death Sentences, Ex-Gov.
George Ryan Has No Regrets,” ABC7 CHICAGO, Jan. 10, 2023.

50 HADAR AVIRAM, YESTERDAY’S MONSTERS: THE MANSON FAMILY CASES AND THE ILLUSION
OF PAROLE (2020).

The Scouring of Samson: Incarceration and Corporal Punishment

One of the major assumptions of modern penologists is that prison, as an artifact of modernity, came to replace other forms of punishment: executions, maiming, etc. Overall, I think there are three main approaches that support this idea:

The legalistic approach

Some punishment scholars—primarily those who study incarceration from a formal, doctrinal perspective—rightly point out that the legal definition of prison differed greatly in antiquity and in modernity. The modern conceptualization of criminal punishment adheres to the Enlightenment-Era logics regarding the rule of law: laws forbidding undesirable behavior must be preemptively enacted, universal in their verbiage, fairly and impartially applied by an independent judicial entity, and prescribe the minimal amount of set punishment that satisfies retributive and/or utilitarian goals. Descriptions of incarceration in antiquity (and, in particular, in the bible) rarely, if ever, conform to this model: determination of guilt is not a necessary precursor to incarceration, and when it occurs, it does not necessarily reflect what modern doctrinalists would regard as a fair, impartial judicial trial. Sentences, if meted at all, are not necessarily determinate in length. The entry and exit points of ancient confinement facilities are not always well defined and, as we will see, often reflect erratic, casuistic decisionmaking by monarchs in the throes of whims and dreams.

If the argument dismissing incarceration in antiquity relies on legalistic comparisons, it is seriously undermined by the fact that the study of incarceration in modernity has long ago transcended such formal categories. For decades, scholars have been studying the function of legal institutions on the ground, unlimited by the rational or articulated goals of said institutions. The entire field of law and society is concerned with the gaps between “law in the books” and “law in action,” often identifying the ways in which the actual operations of institutions deviate from their legal definitions. More specifically, current scholarship about the modern carceral state applies to an entire body of institutions, facilities, and practices, of a dazzling variety of shapes and sizes, and encompassing multiple goals and functions. Adopting a limiting, legalistic project of studying incarceration would miss out on a wealth of scholarship about pretrial detention, immigration detention, bail, electronic monitoring, parole conditions, and postrelease supervision, as well as on illuminating comparisons between correctional facilities and other forms of extractive confinement, such as cattle towns and private sector surveillance.

In other words, save for when stating the obvious—that confinement systems looked different and served different purposes thousands of years ago—clinging to formalism is not particularly instructive when studying the incarceration experience.

The arc-of-enlightenment approach

By contrast to the legalistic approach, some sociological pioneers have examined penal changes over the longue durée, attributing the emergence of incarceration as the most salient form of punishment to large-scale social transformation. In his classic text The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim analyzes the shift from simple societies, in which collectivity is a function of sameness and conformity, to complex ones, based on diversification and socio-economic exchange. This shift manifests in numerous ways, one of which is the emblematic penal regime. In a later essay, titled The Two Laws of Penal Evolution, Durkheim observed that punishment would change as societies became more complex: laws designed to address transgressions through repression would shift toward restitution, and corporal punishment would shift toward incarceration. Durkheim, then, tied incarceration to social complexity, which he identified with modernity.

Setting aside the many critiques of Durkheim’s identification of “simple” and “complex” societies, which exceed the framework of this book, it is notable that prison symbolized, for him, a progressive step. Other sociologists were even more explicit in identifying prison with progress. In The Civilizing Process, Norbert Elias advances the idea of a gradual reduction in interpersonal violence as a political and cultural shift. Post-medieval times, Elias argues, saw a top-down trickling of new standards regarding violence, sexual behavior, bodily functions, table manners, etc., from courtier society to lower societal strata, reflecting sublimation and self-restraint.  The formation of this more rarified etiquette paralleled the emergence of the modern state. As monarchs amassed and consolidated power, Elias argues, they assumed a monopoly over legitimate physical violence, centralizing the infliction of punishment and eliminating violent forms of dispute resolution between individuals.

Elias’ observations are echoed in the work of other people who documented long-term trends in crime and punishment. V.A.C. Gattrell notes a decline in bloodthirstiness and delight at spectacles of public savagery in Early Modern England. Robert Nye documents the increasing regulations and limitations on, and eventually decline in and disappearance of, dueling as the modern state assumed a monopoly on punishment. And Pieter Spierenburg notes the gradual disappearance of more savage forms of punishment and the turn toward confinement. In The Spectacle of Suffering, Spierenburg painstakingly documents the gradual disappearance of public executions and the emergence of penal restraint. Importantly, these scholars, especially Spierenburg, shy away from praising these trends as an unqualified good, describing them in neutral language.

The neutrality seems appropriate, given a considerable flaw in Durkheim’s take on the evolution of punishment: the transition from repression to restitution is a premise that careful historical observation does not bear out, and even if plausible, it would not necessarily dovetail with a transition from corporal punishment to incarceration. As Leon Sheleff has observed, social complexity often generates repressive forms of punishment, and as Martin Killias’ careful study of dozens of historical and modern societies shows, a rise in incarceration often occurs alongside repressive efforts.

Moreover, the extent to which these works, which focus on the emergence of the Early Modern European state, can offer useful insights about punishment in antiquity, is very limited. Durkheim and Elias were inspired by dramatic social transformations that occurred in their time and place—the long industrialization process—and likely did not give much thought to their application to a completely different setting. If the emergence of centralized state power represses savagery and interpersonal violence, one might wonder what these big-picture sociologists and historians would make of ancient empires, including those reflecting great levels of sophistication and social complexity, such as ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome. It is hard to responsibly draw comparisons between these empires and the emergence of the European modern state, and even harder to speak of penological parallels, but there are indications that Fourth century Athenians, for example, believed that institutionally channeling anger through formal punishment was beneficial.

The body-to-soul approach

A more sinister take on the emergence of the prison in modernity is Michel Foucault’s influential Discipline and Punish. Foucault observes the emergence of “great confinements” in hospitals, military barracks, schools, and prisons, as a new form of governmentality. At the outset of the book, Foucault contrasts a scene of royally prescribed torture for a regicide, culminating in drawing and quartering the condemned, with a monotonous daily schedule for inmates at a juvenile facility. The shift from the former to the latter, Foucault argues, reflects a turn from centralized, dramatic displays of governing power focused on the body of the condemned to something much more pervasive: a vague but widespread web of institutions designed to produce changes in the soul through surveillance and supervision. As his central metaphor for the carceral, Foucault relies on Jeremy Bentham’s famous prison design: the panopticon. Housed in cells organized in a circle, facing a central tower, inmates have no way of knowing whether they are being watched, and thus begin to control and modify their own behavior to comply with the institutional standards, internalizing them.

Plenty of works about the emergence of the modern prison have adopted Foucault’s observations, finding evidence that control and fear increasingly shape behavior in societies with mass incarceration, identifying carceral features in many settings and areas of life beyond physical prisons, and focusing on the growing classification of people according to risk. There is also evidence that certain punishments, such as the death penalty, are increasingly regulated, medicalized, and removed from the public eye. But importantly, just like Durkheim and Elias, Foucault focuses on the transition from a European court society to the modern state, and the applicability of his framework for understanding antiquity is limited. 

When Foucault identifies incarceration with modernity, he is describing a very particular form of incarceration: one that is highly regulated and operates on a massive scale, according to the government and administration principles of Weberian formal rationality. The basic premise of Foucault’s analysis does not discount the possibility that ancient societies might have had a very different sort of prison, one that exhibits some common features with the “gloomy festival of punishment” era.

Another challenge to Foucault’s observations, as well as those of the other two approaches, has to do with the classification of incarceration as categorically distinguishable from other forms of punishment, often referred to as corporal punishment. And I have to say, the more I think about the history of punishment over the longue durée, the more I realize that the boundary between incarceration and corporal punishment is false. Not only, as I’ve said many times before, is prison itself corporal punishment, but it often comes hand in hand with corporal mortifications of various kinds. People on death row, for example, are incarcerated. People put to hard labor are incarcerated. People awaiting deportation are incarcerated. People awaiting public humiliation are incarcerated.

In other words, incarceration and other forms of punishment do not have the sort of see-saw correlation that simplistic accounts of penology would have us believe. One does not necessarily rise when the other one falls. What throws us off is that the scale of incarceration in modernity is so immense that it dwarfs the other accompanying things. But that doesn’t mean that incarceration wasn’t always there.

Samson Captured by the Philistines

Today’s example of this is Samson, whom, as I’ve just realized, I haven’t yet discussed in the context of the book. The story of Samson’s capture, incarceration, and suicide, is told in Judges 16. If the Joseph/Daniel/Esther trio can be classified as exilic fantasy/folktale and Jeremiah as political thriller, Samson is definitely in the action/adventure category, and while we have plenty of evidence for the existence of the Philistines (though their ethnicity is debated, see here, here, and here), the Samson stories are superhero fiction. By contrast to other judges, characterized by their wisdom, righteousness, and/or military strategic acumen, Samson is, first and foremost, a man of astounding physical force. David Grossman’s terrific reimagining of the Samson story casts him as a man of contradictions: his blessing is his curse, he is a terrifying antagonist of the Philistines but is fatally attracted to Philistine women, and his desire for vulnerability and openness is his undoing.

What leads to Samson’s incarceration is his disclosure to Delilah that his physical prowess stems from his long hair. Once he falls asleep, she cuts his tresses, and begins to torture him. Interpreters differ in how they understand this torture: some believe she called someone else to cut Samson’s hair, and some believe that she started taunting him physically to test whether, indeed, his power has dissipated. Then she calls out that the Philistines are upon him, and they charge, and immediately inflict horrific torture: they gauge out Samson’s eyes. They then take him to Gaza, place him in “beit ha-asurim” (literally: the house of prisoners), where he is put to work at the grinding mill. Rabbi Steinzaltz explains that the grinder works in a circle, so Samson did not need his eyesight to engage in this labor: it was well fitted for his new disability. Radak posits that prisoners had to earn their keep and therefore ground the mill.

But Radak offers an additional, and more sinister, take on Samson’s forced labor: he sees “grinding” as a euphemism for sexual slavery. According to Radak, Samson, not to put too fine a point on it, was put to stud, to impregnate Philistine women (one wonders why: did they still believe that he possessed some special supernatural powers and was therefore a valuable progenitor?) Generally, this reading dovetails with what I saw in some medieval readings of Esther: really unsavory sexual undertones and a fleshing out of the power differential stuff, which suggests that these commentators might have read the Biblical material through the lens of medieval punitive savagery. Which is not to say, of course, that sexual slavery was not within the realm of the imaginable in antiquity (we have plenty of examples). What is interesting about the Samson story is the emasculation of Samson but the preservation of his manliness for the utility of his captors (I’ve read a couple of queer readings of the Samson story that make a lot out of this stuff.)

In any case, the Philistines hold a big party at their temple, and they bring in Samson to mock him in his weakness. Unbeknownst to them (and this is a truly genius literary device from the author of this tale, I think) Samson’s hair has begun to grow back while at the prison, and when he is brought to the temple, he asks the youth who minds him to place him between the columns of the temple. He begs for God to restore his power so that he can avenge one of his eyes, and calling out “Let me die with the Philistines!” he demolishes the temple, slaughtering more Philistines than he had killed in his life. This, by the way, is often a spectacular moment in operatic productions of Samson and Delilah.

Samson and Delilah production at the Metropolitan Opera

The Samson story is instructive in several important ways. First, it offers an example of incarceration that goes hand in hand with torture, humiliation, and forced labor. Second, it offers some notions of what would have been imaginable to those reading and interpreting what was surely a work of complete fiction in terms of the scope of carceral torture. And third, this story–not unlike the Jeremiah incarceration story–does a terrific job capturing the deep rage and desire for revenge by someone treated so cruelly by his captors.

Does Being Sick Excuse, or Compound, Being Bad?

One of the classic texts that left the most lasting impression on me in grad school was Peter Conrad and Joseph Schneider’s Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness. Our marvelous penology professor, the late Leslie Sebba, was deeply interested in the theoretical currents that shape penal ideology, and the shift from moralizing to pathologizing was of great interest to him and, consequently, to us. Conrad and Schneider’s basic argument is that, over time, more and more deviant behaviors that were classified as religious or moral failings, or as evidence of a wicked character, come to be seen in a clinical light. Some examples include a variety of mental illnesses, alcoholism, opiate addiction, homosexuality, delinquency, and child abuse; in a new chapter added long after the original publication date in 1980, they discussed AIDS, domestic violence, co-dependency, hyperactivity in children, and learning disabilities.

The process of medicalizing, or pathologizing, behavior is interesting in itself, as it originates from, and in turn generates, more knowledge, more diagnoses, more professionals, more institutions, and more therapies. But for lawyers, an interesting perspective is how this affects criminal culpability and punishment severity. The law recognizes a narrow subset of cases, in which proven mental illness or defect is so grave that it can be a complete defense (e.g., when the person has no ability to discern what they are doing, or to comprehend the wrongness of their actions, per the M’Naghten Rule.) Some U.S. states and other countries recognize additional paths to a complete acquittal on the basis of mental illness, including irresistible impulses (what happens to a person deemed insane after the acquittal, as Bailey Wendzel explains, is a different story.) But even in cases where mental illness cannot excuse the crime, various clinical conditions can lead to more lenient punishment; lead poisoning, for example, is often brought up as a mitigating factor.

Which is why I was riveted to a recent news item about legal proceedings in the case of Amanda Riley who, as podcast aficionados may know, was convicted in 2021 of fabricating and faking a cancer diagnosis and fleecing supportive friends and fellow churchgoers of more than $105,000. She was sentenced to five years in prison. Riley–referred to in the podcast as Scamanda–went as far as to shave her head and take pictures in actual hospitals, use medical equipment to stage photos that simulated medical treatment, and keep a blog that documented dramatic ups and downs in her treatment journey, including miracle recoveries and last-hope therapies. To get a sense of how profound her deceit was, I highly recommend listening to the podcast, which includes plenty of primary sources and interviews, but obscures some aspects of the case, such as the extent of her husband’s complicity in the ruse (the husband, who did collaborate with her in a vicious custody battle against his ex-wife, was not charged in the case.)

Anyway, Megan Cassidy of the Chronicle reports this morning that Riley’s federal petition for early release was rejected. Here are some of the interesting details:

But Riley’s list of maladies, which were laid out in a recent bid for an early prison release, drew sharp rebuke from prosecutors, who maintain that, yet again, she’s faking it. 

“Perhaps not surprisingly … Defendant’s medical records make clear that she does not actually suffer from any acute health problems at all,” U.S. Attorney Michael Pitman said in a reply  to Riley’s motion for a sentence reduction this spring. 

Citing notes from medical records, Pitman said health care professionals repeatedly witnessed Riley attempting to skew test results: Riley was allegedly seen holding her breath during an oxygen saturation test, manipulating an infusion pump that was administering potassium to her, and “intentionally stress (ing) her body to create tachycardia,” which is a heart rate of more than 100 beats per minute, according to court documents. 

Prosecutors said at least four doctors and a nurse wrote in their notes concerns of a possible “factitious disorder,” or listed it as an actual diagnosis. Factitious disorder, also known as Munchausen syndrome, is described by the Mayo Clinic as a “serious mental disorder in which someone deceives others by appearing sick, by purposely getting sick or by self-injury.” 

Notably, it was the prosecutors, not the defense, who trotted out the factitious disorder/Munchausen diagnosis. Which, at least to me, exposes a contradiction. The argument against early release is that Riley “does not actually suffer from any acute health problems at all,” but isn’t factitious disorder itself a health problem? One that Riley has, apparently, been diagnosed with by at least one clinician? Not an acute physical malady, but something that undermines some of Riley’s culpability?

If, like me, you’ve watched a bunch of sensational trash TV, you might have encountered Munchausen before and wondered whether it has been exaggerated for dramatic effect. For what it’s worth, factitious disorder is recognized in the DSM-5 and is a legitimate mental health condition. A few factors seem to be important here. First, in terms of differential diagnosis, authors caution that “[i]t is important to distinguish Munchausen from malingering in which an external gain is a primary motivation.” In Riley’s case, I’m unclear on whether it is possible to disaggregate the financial fleecing from the pleasure and attention, which Riley seemed to revel in. She and her family were showered not only with money, but also with affection and adoration. It doesn’t seem to have been merely a cold, calculating scam.

At the same time, the authors remind us that Munchausen patients, as opposed to people suffering from other psychiatric disorders, “have insight into their disorder and are aware that they are fabricating their illness.” This, of course, negates the possibility of wriggling out of criminal culpability, but makes one think back of the eponymous literary character, who was said to believe his own lies.

According to the medical encyclopedia, the standard therapy for factitious disorder patients is psychotherapy, though most patients refuse:

It is not necessary for the patient to admit to their factitious disorder and, in fact, most patients rarely do.

In certain cases, it may be helpful to target cognitive-behavioral therapy toward childhood trauma that could be the instigator for the disorder. It has also been concluded that various medical interventions such as anti-depressants and/or anti-psychotics showed no benefit in the disorder. 

This raises a thorny question from a criminal law standpoint. Someone who seems to be resistant to treatment might embark on a similar course of action when they get out. But if they do, isn’t that proof that there’s something about them that is pathological and resistant to treatment, and therefore their misdeeds are, perhaps, less culpable than those of a healthy, calculating malingerer?

I also worry about the extent to which social media, Tik Tok in particular, encourages people, especially teens, to self-diagnose as suffering from a variety of ailments and parade the symptoms online. As sympathies pour in the form of likes and reposts, folks who already have a tendency for seeking attention through malingering will have more incentive to engage in this behavior, further blurring the line between pathology and grift.

The podcast portrays Riley in a decidedly unsympathetic manner, which is understandable given that the interviewees are, for the most part, people caught in her web of lies. I think there are both retributivist and utilitarian reasons why a five-year sentence is adequate here. The extent of the deceit, the exploitation of good people, the devastation of extended family, the way incidents like this make it harder for people whose medical problems are genuine to be trusted and receive help (“boy who cried wolf”, the detrimental effect that Doron Dorfman investigates in Fear of the Disability Con), and the risk she’ll do it again, are all fair reasons for it. But I, for one, would be interested in further elaborating the path we take when pathology enters the conversation.

The Perfect, Yet Again, Is the Enemy of the Good: LWOP Edition

Back in 2016, I was campaigning with a group of determined activists, some of them formerly incarcerated, for Prop 62, which would have abolished the death penalty in California. Most of our messaging, just like when we had campaigned for Prop. 34 in 2012, was aimed at centrists, who were on the fence about the death penalty but would care how much it cost. It was only pretty late in the game that I realized there was another group we had not been addressing: progressives.

You’d think progressives were not a demographic that needed convincing about death penalty abolition. But in the topsy-turvy, horseshoe-theory world of progressive activism, being against the death penalty doesn’t equal voting against the death penalty. The usual reason people gave was something like this: getting rid of the death penalty would merely retrench life without parole, which is not that different from the death penalty given that we’re not executing anyone, and life without parole is wrong and bad, so let’s vote against abolition, so that… wait a minute, so that what?

Back when this happened, I was a lot more sanguine about progressive activism–it was eight years ago, Trump hadn’t been elected yet, and much of the nonsense that now plagues my political environs was in its infancy–but even then, this position seemed absurd to me. Don’t these people understand that legal change works incrementally? I agonized. Or are they pretending not to know so they can posture about how good, and how against LWOP, they are? So I ended up writing this:

You know what? I agree with you. Life without parole is, indeed, an extreme form of punishment. Like you, I am committed to a struggle to bring a possibility of hope–an exit possibility–to any prison sentence.

Unfortunately, we can’t start our fight against life without parole until we win our fight against the death penalty, which is within reach. This is, unfortunately, how political reform works: incrementally, with bipartisan support, and with a big base of consensus.

I wish there were a critical mass of Californians of all political persuasions convinced that our criminal justice system needs to be immediately reformed. Not just at the edges, not just for nonviolent inmates, not just for juveniles, but for everyone. But that is not the world we live in. The political reality is that, in order to make change, incremental steps have to be taken. Remember same-sex marriage? That didn’t happen overnight. There were revolutionaries calling for marriage back in the seventies, when it was unthinkable. Then, the movement had to regroup, advocate for lesser protections (domestic partnerships, workplace protection). Yes, domestic partnership was less than marriage in important ways. But this is why public opinion changed, between the mid-1990s and the early 2010s. Incremental change is what led to the triumph of that movement. 

For an even more relevant example, see what is happening with juvenile justice. Life without parole for juveniles is horrible, right? And look at how close we are to eradicating it–because in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons (2005) the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for juveniles. It was the first step in a long series of reforms. In Graham v. Florida (2010) the Supreme Court felt comfortable relying on the same arguments to abolish life without parole for nonhomicide crimes. In Miller v. Alabama (2012) the Supreme Court relied on that logic to abolish mandatory life without parole for all juveniles, and then felt comfortable making that ruling retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016). We are now within striking distance of abolishing life without parole for juveniles. None of this would have been possible without Roper v. Simmons.

This is even truer for legislative/public campaigns than for judicial change. To make reform happen, we need wide public consensus–not just an agreement among progressives. We need our conservative and moderate friends to live with the new situation for a while, realize that the sky doesn’t fall if punishment is less extreme, and accustom themselves to the idea of further reform. A classic example is marijuana legalization. Recreational marijuana would not be on the ballot–within reach and polling great so far–if Californians of all persuasions didn’t have a chance to live with medical marijuana for years and realize that it was not the end of the world. Do you think we would have been here, at this point in time, if progressive voters had declined to vote for medical marijuana, claiming that limiting legalization to medical patients wasn’t good enough? Similarly, conservatives and centrists grew accustomed to same sex marriages because they lived with domestic partnerships. They will be willing to consider a reform of life without parole if and when they see that the death penalty was abolished and it didn’t lead to a rise in crime rates, a decline in public safety, or any other negative consequences. You and I already know that giving reformed, aging folks a chance at parole is also not a safety risk. But not everyone knows that, and we need our friends across the political map to agree with us. We can’t make change otherwise.

I’ve been studying criminal justice reforms for the last sixteen years. I have not seen a single criminal justice reform that sprang perfectly from nothing. Every change we’ve seen since 2008–and we’ve seen plenty, believe me–was the product of incremental, bipartisan reform. This will be no exception. We can’t get from A to Z skipping steps along the way. I know you’re ready for Z. So am I. But the people whose hearts and minds we have to change so that Z happens–and we can’t make it happen without them–need us to go through all the steps so that we can have a coalition. What we want won’t happen otherwise.

We all know what happened with Prop 62. It was exactly what happened with Prop 34 four years earlier. We lost by a small gap, and the death penalty remained, and it is still sucking the soul and the funds of California for the sake of absolutely nothing, as I explain in an article that’s coming out in a couple of months in The Green Bag (I’ll post it when it is published). But today we have more proof of how we ignore the incremental path of change at our own peril. Stephanie Lam wrote for the Mercury News:

State lawmakers have dismissed a bill by a Santa Clara County senator that would have provided a chance at release for some inmates serving life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder.

Sen. Dave Cortese, a San Jose Democrat, authored SB 94 in 2022 in hope of offering inmates who were convicted of murders committed before June 5, 1990, and who already have served a minimum of 25 years, opportunities to seek parole.

“After two years of negotiations and over a dozen deliberated amendments, I am incredibly disappointed that SB 94 was not granted the opportunity to be heard and the amendments considered for vote by the full Legislature,” Cortese said in a statement. “The bill, like those it would’ve helped, did not get its day in court.”

Does the bill make sense? Of course it does. It’s not automatic release, it’s a resentencing hearing for people who have already spent decades behind bars. If anyone knows that not everyone gets out on parole, it’s me. But folks, you can’t sell people on abolishing LWOP before you abolish the death penalty. You just can’t. I know there’s a moratorium. I know the death chamber has been dismantled. The reason it had to be done by executive decree is that it couldn’t yet be done through the legislature. I think that day is coming really fast, I really do. But the death penalty, like the Balrog, can be at its most vicious just as it appears to fall into the abyss. And until it finally does, all the beautiful speeches about how LWOP is merely “death by another name” and how we’re “retrenching” or “non-reform reforming,” won’t do. Either you don’t know how the sausage is made, or you pretend you don’t, but the result is that the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. And here we are. Again.

Two Federal Rulings on Campus Protests

This week saw two federal district court decisions against Harvard and UCLA, respectively, regarding their failure to protect their Jewish and Israeli students from antisemitic discrimination, which you can read in their entirety here and here. Both complaints have a run-through of the upsetting facts we saw at play in many college campuses last year. I’ve already seen some coverage of the decisions and, as expected, it is understandably politically inflamed (as is some of the language in the briefs and the decisions.) What I hope to contribute to the discussion is a concise run-through of the legal arguments made by the plaintiffs and the defendants, which may illuminate the issues that are likely to come up in future litigation on this topic in the fall.

The Harvard case is a ruling on a motion by Harvard University to strike a complaint, based on the Civil Rights Act, by Students Against Antisemitism (SAA), against the university for its failure to rein in antisemitic behaviors and actions that targeted Jewish and Israeli students. The court dismissed in part and granted in part. The Title VI case based on a deliberate indifference claim will go through, whereas the case based on direct discrimination will not.

Harvard raised two preliminary hurdles to the SAA lawsuit, the first of which involved SAA’s standing to bring it forth. There are three conditions for granting standing to an association: at least one member of the association must have standing to sue individually (members of SAA were affected and targeted by the litany of antisemitic events described in the lawsuit), the interests involved in the lawsuit are germane to the org’s purpose (in this case, fighting antisemitism), and the claims and types of relief sought do not require the participation of individual plaintiffs (which SAA can represent).

The second issue was that the lawsuit was unripe: Harvard argued that it was still in the process of formulating its response to antisemitism on campus. The court, however, rejected this argument, asserting its authority to rule on incidents that already happened. The lawsuit would examine whether actions Harvard had taken before the lawsuit was filed had been adequate and whether they will be adequate going forward.

On the merits, the court acknowledged that SAA brings a valid Title VI case on the basis of deliberate indifference. It has provided a prima facie showing that (1) SAA members suffered harm that (2) hindered their educational opportunities, (3) that the school knew of these deprivations, (4) that the deprivations were related to school programs and activities, and (5) that the school exhibited deliberate indifference toward the denial of these opportunities. Harvard argued that some steps to remedy the situation had been taken, but the court disagreed, characterizing the university response as “indecisive, vacillating, and at times internally contradictory.”

By contrast, the court did not find that SAA’s direct discrimination claim was valid. When arguing that discrimination has taken place, plaintiffs have to offer the right comparators: X is discriminated against while Y is not. The examples offered by SAA were diffuse and insufficient to show discrimination: they argued that Harvard canceled speakers who were trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) but not antisemitic speakers. In the broader context of the culture wars, if one is hell-bent on viewing all political questions as lying on a right-to-left axis, this argument might make sense: it shows a progressive bias in speaker invitations. But I think the court was right in discouraging this way of thinking about things, because it is crucially important to disaggregate how people think about various questions of social, political, and economic interest. Take a look, for example, at this interesting story in the Stanford Review. Overall, yes, there’s a proliferation of leftiness on campus, but when one digs into the nuances of student opinions, one finds rich diversity on questions of foreign policy, domestic civil rights, and fiscal policy. Students and faculty who are deprived of a say in the invitation of speakers on Israel/Gaza/Hamas/Palestine might not be deprived of a say in gender policies. I also think that the association of “rightthink” on gender matters and “rightthink” on the Middle East is misguided at best and poisonous at worst, for reasons that should be obvious to any thinking person on either side of both issues. I like that the court decided not to conflate this stuff.

The UCLA case that resulted in a preliminary injunction revolved around the university’s failure to dismantle an encampment at the Royce Quad, which barred students for entering for failing to dismantle an encampment. The injunction prohibits UCLA from offering any educational programming to which Jewish students do not have access, and from colluding in preventing Jewish students from attending programs on campus in the future where other students can do so.

The plaintiffs in this case, by contrast to the Harvard case, were three Jewish students, who argued that they were prevented from accessing the Royce Quad, including the library, because of an encampment whose members would confront them about their opinions about Israel. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs were directly affected, UCLA argued lack of standing, making the point that there was no proof that such hindrances would be in place in the future. The court, clearly incensed about the antisemitic incidents at UCLA, rejected this logic, expressing concerns about how the fall semester would unfold given the university’s paltry response to the spring encampment.

Another argument brought about by UCLA was lack of causation, which I think is best understood as a “wrong defendant” argument. The protestors, it is claimed, were private students and entities, and the university itself did not contribute to what happened with the encampments. The court swiftly did away with this arguments as well, finding that UCLA continues to offer educational opportunities knowing that the Jewish students cannot avail themselves of these opportunities (including physical access to campus areas and buildings).

There are three conditions for obtaining a preliminary injunction: (1) likelihood of success, (2) irreparable harm to the plaintiffs should the injunction not be granted, and (3) a balance of equities. It looks like the federal judge thought that this lawsuit would eventually succeed, that the students’ education would be hampered were the injunction not to be granted, and that the discomfort, such as it is, to UCLA in having to grant equal access to its programming to all students did not outweigh the injury to the plaintiffs.

A few general observations are in order. First, while not all the facts in these cases were germane for the disposition of these preliminary matters (the actual lawsuits could drag on for years), they do paint a distressing picture of the daily life on campus. The images from Columbia are, of course, in the news today due to their president’s resignation, but the stuff quoted in these lawsuits is profoundly upsetting and dovetails with things I’ve heard from clients and colleagues about other campuses. I’m left wondering whether the emotional effect of the real-time unfolding of these events will wear out as the lawsuits go on. That the judges in both cases were deeply disturbed is evident in both decisions, though the Massachusetts judge uses more measured tones.

The second observation has to do with the proverbial “incident of the dog in the nighttime”–an issue that some might have expected to be brought up, but does not come up in either case, which surprised me because of its centrality to the Brandeis lawsuit against Berkeley Law–namely, whether Zionism is germane to Judaism to the point that hostile action against people for adhering to Zionist worldviews counts as religious discrimination. It simply did not come up at all in either case. The UCLA decision identifies the plaintiffs as “three Jewish students who assert they have a religious obligation to support the Jewish state of Israel,” taking their nexus between religion and political opinion at face value. The Harvard decision summarily acknowledges the proper basis for discrimination: religion (against Jews) and national origin (against Israelis.) It looks like both judges were not interested in the minutiae of how this debate unfolds in the intellectual communities which they examined, such as: can you disaggregate Zionism from Israeliness, can you disaggregate it from Jewishness, can you disaggregate it from support of, or objection to, the Israeli government, and other hairsplitting typologies and dichotomies in which academics are profoundly interested but judges and lawyers are not. It might be that the judges simply concluded what many of us also have: if it walks and quacks like a duck, that’s what it is, regardless of the verbal pretzeling around who might be a Jew and nevertheless pass muster with the protestors. It’s also a valuable lesson for potential plaintiffs and defendants in these cases of what to focus on. I’ve recently observed that what seems of high importance to academic (e.g., the particulars of why this or that expression is an antisemitic dogwhistle given the history and semantics of bigotry) is of little importance to people more worried about concrete examples of physical violence, vandalism, blocking entrance, etc. What I take away from this is the following: plaintiffs can and should grow thicker skins and focus on clear, discrete examples of discrimination and administrative inaction, while defendants should not prepare to expound on why they were violent and vicious toward someone because of quality A but not quality B. Looks like, when things come to court, no one cares.

Joseph in the Joint: Fatalism, Transformation, and the Bible’s Most Illustrious Prisoner

In the last few weeks I’ve been sharing snippets from my new book in progress, Behind Ancient Bars. Chapter 2 of the book will be devoted to the Hebrew Bible’s most illustrious prisoner, Joseph. You can find the full story in Genesis 39-41. Briefly, Joseph is thrown in prison following a false rape accusation by the wife of Potiphar, to whom Joseph had been sold as a servant. The biblical story offers us a rather rich account of Joseph’s carceral experience, including his responsible role in prison management while a prisoner himself and his interaction with two fellow inmates (the chief cupbearer and the chief baker). We also learn of his unsuccessful efforts to have the chief cupbearer curry favor for him with Pharaoh and of his eventual release, and auspicious rise, when his dream interpretation skills are needed.

Medieval midrashists found Joseph a fascinating subject, but tended to focus on his dreams, the salacious story with Potiphar’s wife, and Joseph’s later reconciliation with the brothers who sold him to the Ishmaelites. But one also finds quite a bit about his prison journey there, and the expanded stories tend to adhere to two important messages. The first is a concerted effort to frame the entire incarceration journey—in terms of time as in terms of content—as orchestrated by God for specific purposes, suggesting God’s interest not only in the people of Israel but also in geopolitical matters. I see examples of this in other biblical incarceration stories, but it is especially pronounced here. Second, and relatedly, there is an idea I’ve already discussed in the context of Daniel, Esther, and Jeremiah: the notion that Joseph undergoes a penological transformation within confinement that prepares him for his prophetic leadership after reentering Egyptian society.

I’ve recently come across Nicholas Reid’s excellent book Prisons in Ancient Mesopotamia. In his analysis of primary sources, Reid urges us to use a wide lens when discussing prisons in antiquity, similar to what we now do in modern incarceration studies. He says this, with which I’m wholeheartedly in agreement:

When thinking of a history of prisons and imprisonment, one must look beyond the stated goals and stated functions of the prison to the actual practice. . . since prisons are multifunctional, the historical investigation into imprisonment should not revolve solely around the question of punishment. . . the adaptability of limiting corporal movement through imprisonment to meet numerous social goals and handle numerous social ‘problems’ has deep roots in history, even though direct connections and linear developments do not exist.

Even though Joseph was not sentenced to a prescribed period behind bars, and even though biblical punishment is usually retributive in nature, there is enough in the biblical descriptions and the midrashim to point to a message eerily similar to the one parroted in rehabilitation programs and parole hearings today: that incarceration is a “rock bottom” point in a prisoner’s journey that is an essential part of his or her coherent life story, that one goes down in order to go up, and that one develops important prosocial and other skills in confinement that set him or her up for a pivotal historical role postincarceration. In light of this, I decided to rewrite the Joseph story as a parole hearing transcript, relying heavily on the medieval midrashim. Here’s a short snippet:

PHARAOH: Okay, since we’ve moved to the inmate’s C-file, let’s see how he did in prison. From what I see from the record, you haven’t had many visitors in the twelve years you’ve been inside.

JOSEPH: No, Your Majesty. I believe only in the early days, when Zulycah still visited me.

AMHOST: I’m not sure I understand: The woman whom you claim falsely accused you of rape visited you in prison?

POTIPHAR: Your Priestly Eminence, since I oversee the prison, she can come and go as she pleases, and she even helps me with the logistics.

PHARAOH: And when she visited you, what did you talk about?

JOSEPH: She was trying to persuade me to give in to her. You know, “How ‎long wilt thou remain in this house? do but listen unto my voice, and I will release thee from ‎thy prison.” Like that. I had to keep saying: It is better for me to remain in this house, ‎than to listen unto thy words, and transgress against God.[1]

AMHOST: I guess we keep things nice and cushy for you in Thebes. Some people would easily mistake you for a prison administrator, rather than an actual prisoner, and think Potiphar just moved you to another job to put some distance between you and his wife.[2]

MERITAMUM: It’s not like that, Your Grace. The write-up about the visit documents that the inmate was repeatedly threatened by his accuser‎. She was overheard saying, “if thou wilt not do my wishes, I will put out thine eyes, and I will put ‎additional chains upon thy feet, and I will surrender thee into the hands of such as thou hast ‎not known, neither yesterday nor day before yesterday.”

HAT: Looks like it was even worse. I have the 128 write-up that she put in his file, and it says that, while they were setting the table at chow hall, cleaning the drinking glasses and all that, she would say to him: ‘In this matter, I mistreated [ashaktikha] you. As you live, I will mistreat you regarding other matters.’

MERITARIUM: Oh, but he gave as good as he got. Basically played her at her own game. Like she said “ashaktikha,” so he would say to her: ‘[God] “Performs justice for the oppressed [laashukim].”’ (Psalms 146:7) [She would say:] ‘I will reduce your sustenance.’ He would say to her: ‘[God] “Provides food for the hungry.”’ (Psalms 146:7) [She would say:] ‘I will shackle you.’ He would say to her: ‘“The Lord frees the imprisoned.”’ (Psalms 146:7) [She would say:] ‘I will cause you to be bent over.’ He would say to her: ‘“The Lord straightens the bent.”’ (Psalms 146:8) [She would say:] ‘I will blind your eyes.’ He would say to her: ‘“The Lord opens the eyes of the blind.”’ (Psalms 146:8)[3]

PHARAOH: Dear Maat. How far did all of this go?

MERITARIUM: We’re not entirely sure, because there’s a lot of hearsay in prison intelligence. Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi Aḥa, you know, that sort of thing. But rumor was that she placed an iron bar beneath his neck until he would direct his glance toward her and look at her. Nevertheless, he would not look at her. That is what is written: “They tortured his legs with chains; his body was placed in iron.” (Psalms 105:18)[4]

PHARAOH: Nice facility you run there, Potiphar.

POTIPHAR: I can’t possibly screen my own wife from the list of visitors, Your Majesty.

PHARAOH: Why would you let her do it? Did you think he was guilty?

POTIPHAR: Oh, no, I knew he was innocent. Even my kids knew.

PHARAOH: What?

POTIPHAR: We all knew. My kid kept saying, “stop beating on him, my mom is lying.”[5] Even on the way in, when I was booking him, I said to him, “Joseph, I know you didn’t do this, but I’m locking you up so I will not attach stigma to my children.”[6]

MERITAMUM: And even so, Your Majesty, when she visited him in prison, it didn’t seem to faze the Inmate. He was overheard replying, hold on, it’s hard to read the hieroglyphs, “‎Behold the God of all the earth, he is able to deliver me from all that thou wouldst do unto me. ‎For he giveth sight to the blind and he freeth the captives and he preserveth the strangers ‎that are in the land they never knew.” Eventually she gave up and stopped coming.  

PHARAOH: Do we have any laudatory chronos in the file?

MERITAMUM: Yes, Your Majesty. The inmate was charged, de facto, with the functioning of the entire administration.

PHARAOH: You entrusted. The entire prison administration. To a prisoner.

POTIPHAR: The whole thing. Eating, drinking, binding people, releasing them, torturing them, giving them a rest. He would call the whole thing and whatever he said, went.[7]

HAT: It says in this chrono, “the minister did not have to see anything he put in the inmate’s hand.” I’m not sure what this means.

POTIPHAR: It means I didn’t have to supervise him, because God helped him succeed in prison as well as on the outside. It’s a kal vahomer.

HAT: A what?

POTIPHAR: A kal vahomer. Argument a fortiori. They have to say he was successful in prison, because success on the outside would be self-evident.[8]

HAT: See, I read it differently. I read it that you didn’t see anything fishy or poorly performed.[9]

POTIPHAR: You know these prison write-ups. You can read them seventy different ways.

HAT: Mr. Jacobson, do you feel that you were treated fairly in prison?

JOSEPH: To be honest, I did end up feeling relieved. Back home, whenever we ate, my father would give me the choice portions, and I always had to look over my shoulder lest my brothers take revenge. And I confess that here in prison I could breathe a bit easier. But God likes to give me a challenge, so I figure he’ll sic a bear on me anytime soon.[10]

HAT: Not sure I understand what the bear’s got to do with any of this.

JOSEPH: It’s got to do with the grain.

AMHOST: What grain?

JOSEPH: You’ll see.


[1] Sefer HaYashar (midrash), Book of Genesis, Vayeshev 19

[2] McKay (2009).

[3] Bereshit Rabbah 87: 10.

[4] Bereshit Rabbah 87: 10.

[5] Sefer HaYashar (midrash), Book of Genesis, Vayeshev 18-19

[6] Bereshit Rabbah 87: 9.

[7] Midrash Sekhel Tov, Bereshit 39:22:2

[8] Bereshit Rabbah 87:10; Midrash Sekhel Tov, Genesis 39:23:3.

[9] Midrash Sekhel Tov, Bereshit 39:23:2

[10] Midrash Sekhel Tov, Bereshit 39:23:4

Dark Esther

My new project Behind Ancient Bars looks at several prominent incarceration stories in the Hebrew Bible. One that is often missed is Esther’s stint at Ahasuerus’s harem. Because most of the story is a bedroom farce, and some of it a bloodthirsty schadenfreude fest, many commentators skip over Esther’s confinement before she is taken to the king, which you can find in Chapter 2. But this short vignette illuminates not only commentary about empire in general (and probably Persian empire in particular), but also about the multiple forms of vulnerability of women and the ways in which governmental systems are crafted to exploit these vulnerabilities. This paints the festive Esther story a much darker, more sinister hue.

Seeing the Esther story as an incarceration story to begin with requires doing what modern penologists do on the regular: expanding our definition of incarceration. I find it interesting that people who happily read Foucault and Goffman, seeing obvious parallels and symmetries among total institutions and across the carceral archipelago, suddenly adopt a hyper-legalistic approach to punishment in antiquity, forcefully arguing that there is no incarceration in the bible because it is not listed as a sanction for a criminal conviction in Deuteronomy or in Hammurabi’s law. If incarceration scholarship in modernity can look at pretrial detention, immigration detention, and even cattle towns–because those are carceral experiences–then incarceration scholarship in antiquity can and should encompass political detention and shady government programs for locking up and reeducating children. And indeed, some commentary on the Book of Esther moves away from the entertaining popular presentations of beauty pageants to identifying incarceration elements.

How much of this represents true carceral practices, or is a realistic portrayal of royal harems, is hotly debated. Summarizing the literature for and against a reading of Esther as fiction, Adele Berlin opines that the story, like the Daniel story, dates to the Hellenistic period, and reflects stereotypical Athenian perceptions of Persia: “luxury, hierarchy, bureaucracy, wine drinking, the postal system, imperial law, bowing down, eunuchs, impalement, a royal garden, and a sexually virtuous queen.” But at least some of this fed commentators who used it to glean more about imperial Persian governmentality.

The background to the Esther story is well known: during a royal feast with his courtiers, an inebriated king orders his queen, Vashti, to appear before the courtiers. She refuses, angering the king, and is either banished or executed, which results in a vacancy. The king’s servants propose that all good looking virgins in the kingdom be gathered at the “women’s house” in Shushan, the capital, under the supervision of Hege, the king’s eunuch, so that the king may pick whichever one pleases him to be his queen in lieu of Vashti.

Julia Schwartzmann points out that the details of Esther’s arrival in the harem can be disturbing to modern readers, because of Mordechai and Esther’s “ambiguous uncle/niece relationship, the way Mordechai hands over Esther to the king’s harem, and his manipulative handling of his silent and passive niece.” Not only modern readers: Two important medieval commentators, Abraham Ibn Ezra and Immanuel of Rome, propose that Mordechai planned, as a foster parent, to marry his beautiful charge, a-la Dickens character John Jarndyce (his charge in the book, you’ll remember, is also called Esther!) One can only imagine many young women and girls in similarly precarious situations who would end up swept into the harem–a rather hopeless prospect, as only one girl would be officially crowned queen, and as no girl, per Ibn Ezra, would be available for marriage or any life outside the harem after having bedded the king–with girls like Esther, without parents and with guardians who have agendas beyond their charges’ best interests, more vulnerable to apprehension and lockdown.

The pageant story will have us believe that the girls gathered at the capital out of their own free will, but some commentators see this more as a coercive executive action. Shelom Esther draws the readers’ attention to the large number of officers and bureaucrats involved in the concubine-gathering operation, which had to visit each house to prevent parents from hiding their daughters. Joseph Ibin Yahya adds that Mordechai hid Esther, and that she was taken against his will and against hers.

The administration of the harem, as we saw in the Daniel court stories, is given to eunuchs. The word “saris” (eunuch) might be used differently in different biblical contexts, and could be a reference to a high government official rather than to the sexuality of these personages, but what we know of various empires–especially the Persian empire–suggests that, at least in some contexts, the meanings converge. Last week, at our archaeology course, Brett Kaufman told us that it was common to entrust military commands in imperial armies to eunuchs because they would have no dynastic aspirations and thus would not attempt to usurp the throne. But it makes sense that confinement operations, where sexual exploitation is a serious risk, would be entrusted to sexually inactive supervisors, as 19th century commentator Malbim very explicitly explains.

Even if sexual abuse was not a risk, there were other ways to render the eunuchs’ charges pliable and docile. Much is made in chapter 2 of the issue of cosmetics (“tamrukim”). Some commentators, like Ibn Yahya, interpret these in a straightforward way as beauty-enhancing products, while others, like Immanuel of Rome, thought these could be medications, including first-aid supplies. What is interesting is that the sole purveyors of these items were the eunuchs, which Malbim shrewdly interprets as part and parcel of the king’s power play which, in turn, reflects the lessons learned from the Vashti episode:

He feared that [the girl he would choose] would not want to marry him, and [his advisors] said that after they examined those who came willingly and did not find an appropriate wife for him, then he will appoint officers and they will round up all the girls with a strong arm, (and they even shrewdly said that he should appoint new officers, so that it would be someone who has not been bribed to ignore the rich people’s girls), and against the fear based on his memory, and the concern that [the prospective bride] would do as Vashti did, they advised to gather the girls around Hege, and that they must not bring their own cosmetics from home, but rather only receive them from the eunuchs, and from this side will always be submissive toward the Eunuch and not uppity as Vashti was.

Malbim on Esther 2: 3: 2

When Julia Schwarzmann marvels at how captivating the Esther story is given its telenovela-like synopsis, I want to add: the power of the story is that both ancient and modern readers would recognize the patriarchal fear of subversive and disobedience, the injured pride, the opportunities for exploitation and exertion of power. But it also points to a source of power and ingenuity on the part of the incarcerated person. We’ve already seen how Daniel, when failing to negotiate his diet with chief Eunuch Ashpenaz, makes a deal with “the waiter” on the sly to receive his special vegan rations. Here, we see Esther realizing that the key to surviving in the harem is to charm Hege, who proceeds to favor her with food and luxury items.

Another aspect of the story that exudes verisimilitude is Mordechai’s concern for Esther’s welfare–whether because of the general situation or because, at his request, she hid her identity from harem management. He is told to come to the harem yard every day to inquire after her, and perhaps one advantage of charming the pants off Hege was the availability of daily reports of her wellbeing.

By contrast to the later story of her tenure as queen, Esther of chapter 2 is described passively: she is beautiful, parentless, young, vulnerable, and puppeteered by her uncle/guardian as well as by the various government officials. But between the lines, one finds glimmers of transformation. Placed in a complicated logistical and social scenario, Esther figures out that personal charm and charisma are useful tools, and that performing modesty and restraint pays off. Both Ibn Ezra and Immanuel of Rome emphasize that her restraint, which earned her the favor of Hege, reflect her intelligence. Ibn Yahya opines that she had the good fortune to be taken to the king in the winter, when one enjoys intimacy and closeness more than in summer, thus improving the odds of being the king’s favorite, but what if Hege, who was in her corner, was the one in charge of the schedule and deliberately scheduled her sexual audition for an auspicious date? The emerging picture is one of strategic thinking, charming the key people responsible for her welfare, and performing royal virtue even prior to her selection (perhaps impressing Hege as “queen material”) which the story does not demonize or regard as duplicitous but rather as an understandable, even commendable, survival strategy.

This is interesting for two reasons. The first is that, regardless of the official goal of incarceration in biblical stories, there is evidence of personal transformation occurring behind bars. Martin Pritkin, who approaches biblical punishment from a more doctrinal perspective, finds evidence of rehabilitative motives amidst the retributive rationales, but I think these stories make a somewhat different point: there’s a difference between the espoused nature of a confinement program and the sociological and psychological features of the experience of going though said program. Second, and relatedly, personal transformations in incarceration stories are a means to an end. Notably, incarceration serves as a cauldron, a crucible, a vehicle, for developing leadership characteristics that predict the protagonist’s success at his or her post-incarceration life. Joseph, for example, is incarcerated as punishment for a wrongful accusation or to allow Potiphar and his household to save face; behind bars, however, he develops not only the administrative and logistics acumen that will later serve him well in Egyptian administration, but also a prosocial approach to dream interpretation and the skills of getting along with different kinds of people (skills he lacked as a youth). Daniel learns some wheeling and dealing and perhaps impresses Ashpenaz and “the waiter” with his initiative. Jeremiah, admittedly a “finished character” by the time of his incarceration, has an opportunity to flex against Zedekiah and to leverage his existing friendship with Ebed Melekh to obtain relief, as well as to forge an important alliance with Nebuchadnezzar that grants him relative freedom in exile. And Esther’s reputation for virtuousness and humility and capacity to marshal personal charm and good looks to make important friendships goes a long way toward earning the favor of the king, both at her audition and later, when her skills are needed at a time of national crisis. The dire straits of incarceration are an essential part of the formulaic, fatalistic narrative. Theologically, they support the idea that the divine jails these people to foster the development of the personal characteristics that will come in handy later. I don’t see this as being much different than the sort of logic I see and here at many a rehabilitation program in prisons–namely, the way people are encouraged to construct and tell a coherent personal narrative, in which the prison journey, the crucible of change, is an essential ingredient on the way up, and support for an “everything happens for a reason” notion of meaning-making.

There are two ways of looking at this–benign and cynical. The benign approach relies on Victor Frankl’s logotherapy to argue that people survive and thrive after suffering–even extreme suffering–by imbuing their experiences with meanings. Shadd Maruna’s Making Good offers many examples for the role that a personal narrative of hardship and redemption plays in desistance from reoffending. The more cynical approach, akin to the one I developed in Yesterday’s Monsters, is that rehabilitative programming becomes sort of a mediocre community play that has to follow a script that prison authorities and parole commissioners recognize and validate: follower-to-leader, toxic-thinking-to-empathy, anger-to-understanding, opacity-to-insight. These scripts have a quasi-theological flavor (in some cases, the programs that encourage them, such as Twelve Steps groups, actually have a religion component.) Whether or not the fatalism and meaning-making project is genuine or artificial, it is a well-recognized story, and so, these incarceration stories feel familiar and similar to each other because they evoke a recognizable, universally familiar trope.