In Memoriam: Barry Krisberg

eulogy prepared for a memorial panel at the American Society of Criminology 2024 Annual Meeting

In 2009, when we held our first California Correctional Crisis conference shortly after the order to reduce the prison population, we hosted a panel about the incarceration of special populations. One of the panelists was a California legislator who said, “we have to get rid of solitary confinement for juveniles.” Sitting in the audience, I was struck by lightning, and I could see that many audience members were as well: we have solitary confinement for juveniles? Even after years in the field, it felt as if under every stone was a fresh, undiscovered horror, that would take a litfime to repair.

You know who was not surprised? Barry Krisberg. Barry straddled numerous divides at that conference, between academics, activists, policymakers, and impacted people, speaking to all of these constituencies with the same ease, expertise, passion, and mastery. Those qualities characterized his advocacy work as well as his writing, which has so often shaped and supported my own education and views on criminal justice topics.

Even though Barry’s work encompassed a wide variety of issues, he is perhaps best known for his work on juvenile punishment. Rereading it for this panel, which I regrettably cannot attend in person because of an unforeseen conflict, I was struck by the multitudes it contains. These can be classified into three apparent tensions that dissolve as one understand the magnitude and impact of Barry’s work.

Tension no. 1: Be in the Same Storm but Not in the Same Boat

This sentence, which we heard ad nauseam during the pandemic, is a great descriptor for Barry’s work. He had a clear understanding of the entire carceral giant as a locus of corruption, futility, and cruelty, but also understood that different populations experienced carcerality in different ways. In particular, Barry was able to see the special harms and indignities suffered by incarcerated women and children and ground those in empirical research about these populations’ unique backgrounds and needs.

It is often said that California has not one criminal justice apparatus, but dozens. Barry’s encyclopedic familiarity with the adult and juvenile facilities of the Golden State was such that he could rattle, from memory, what a particular facility under the care of a particular sheriff was like. Every child’s experience of being locked up was different, and Barry understood that better than anyone making generalizations.

Tension No. 2: See the Forest and the Trees

This relates to a second tension in Barry’s work. It is very common among punishment scholars–indeed, probably many people in the room–to launch broad, vague tirades against the carceral state. I say this with love, because many of the tirades are justified and grounded in truth. Barry could rail against these along with the best of us. But his bird’s-eye view of the process did not cloud his eyes from having granular expertise with particular carceral settings, which he honed through hundreds of hours of speaking with youth at California’s Youth Authority (CYA). For decades, Barry devoted himself to reforms in these facilities, developing his vast, unmatched expertise not only about the geographic but also about the historical dimensions of juvenile incarceration. He saw, with his own eyes, filthy and dilapidated cells. He saw cells in which kids were chained to the walls with rings. He saw and heard of horrific violence and fear allowed to flourish in these facilities through the neglect of the staff. These were not abstractions to him; they were specific, carefully documented scenarios, that Barry used effectively when negotiating policy changes and when partnering with the Prison Law Office to sue some of these places. Which brings us to a third tension in Barry’s work.

Tension no. 3. Stay Angry But Be Useful

I’ve been doing this work for close to three decades now, and I see trends that worry me. For one thing, I see some folks who are happy to reap the prestige and accolades of fancy, armchair radicalism without getting dirty in the trenches and actually engage with the people they publish and lecture about. For another, I see some folks who become so consumed with anger and frustration about what they see and experience that they cannot be useful. Sometimes I think of these problems as short-term versus long-term battles: folks who understandably want and expect the demise of the “carceral state,” whatever that even is, and who rail against what they call “non-reform reforms,” forget the small but important relief that they can offer one child today, or worse, think that it comes at the expense of liberation for all children tomorrow. Barry was the rare person whose anger at the large-scale evils of the entire enterprise was always palpable not only in his words, but also in his tone of voice: he stayed steadfast in his belief that kids should never be put under lock and key. But at the same time, he deftly fueled his anger into useful, productive avenues. He was well known in all of California’s counties for his careful documentation of conditions at CYA as a member of the expert team appointed by the court’s consent decree, a role he performed for more than a decade. His contribution to the final closure of these horrific institutions in 2020 was significant, and he was also an architect of the Close to Home program that brought many suffering, justice-impacted youth close to their families.

In Swahili culture, I’m told, people who are no longer with us fall into two categories: the sasha and the zamani. The dead who are remembered among the living are the sasha. Once the last person who knew or remembered you is gone, you pass into the realm of the zamani. Barry’s work lives through the commitment and action of the many people he inspired. Anyone who takes the trouble to go into the field and speak directly with the people who suffer keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who can speak not only the language of academic umbrage, but also of bureaucratic reform, keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who steps up when courts finally intervene and helps with the long process of righting an established wrong keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who finds out, through research, something they cannot countenance and follow up with a phone call or an email keeps Barry’s legacy alive. Anyone who cares enough to see the small details that comprise the big picture keeps Barry’s legacy alive. And what is remembered, lives.

Euthanize the Death Penalty Already: Scenes from Capital Punishment’s Chronic Deathbed

(published: The Green Bag 27(3), Spring 2024)


INTRODUCTION

J.R.R. Tolkien’s immortal Lord of the Rings tells of the crossing of the Bridge of Khazad-dûm, during which members of the Fellowship of the Ring inadvertently awaken the Balrog. A monstrous holdover from ancient times, the Balrog attacks the Fellowship. Gandalf, the wizard leader of the Fellowship, successfully fights the monster, but at the very last moment, as the Balrog plunges to its death, it swings its whip one last time, capturing Gandalf and dragging him along into the abyss under the Bridge of Khazad-dûm.

The U.S. death penalty in the 21st century is like the Balrog – arcane, decrepit, still grasping and lashing its whip even as it approaches its demise. The score, state-by-state, is practically against capital punishment: 23 states have abolished it, and out of the 27 states that retain it, six (plus the federal government under President Joe Biden) have instated moratoria upon its use.

Even in retentionist states, the rate of executions has slowed almost to a grinding halt, and initiatives to abolish the death penalty frequently appear on the ballot. Even as Americans hang on to their support of the death penalty by a thread,3 and these ballot initiatives continue to be defeated,4 the death penalty continues to lose practical ground.5 Much like people on death row, most of whom die natural deaths after decades of incarceration and litigation,6 the death penalty itself is dying a slow, natural death.

As Ryan Newby and I explained more than a decade ago, the slow decline of the death penalty has been caused by a confluence of several factors.7 The first is the advent of cheap-on-crime politics in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, which drew attention to the immense, disproportionate expenditure on capital punishment. 8 The second is the rising prominence of the innocence movement, which has shone a light on the widespread problem of wrongful convictions, supported in recent years by
the popular reach of true-crime podcasts highlighting miscarriages of justice.9 The third is the growing attention to racial disparities in criminal justice which, while a tough argument to bring up in litigation,10 has impacted the national policy field through Obama-era reforms.11

The expense, discrimination, and potential for harrowing mistakes are all aspects of the chronic disease afflicting the death penalty. But like many natural deaths from chronic disease, the end is prolonged, undignified, and sometimes bitingly cruel. Anyone who has cared for a loved one through the end of life can probably recall the chaotic, arbitrary, sometimes contradictory indignities that every day of decline brings in its wings. And so, in this paper, I offer you a safari tour of horrors, injustices, absurdities, and embarrassments that have characterized the death penalty through its prolonged chronic demise.


TRUMP’S LAST KILLING SPREE: RELUCTANT VICTIMS, ALZHEIMER’S, AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPARITIES


Tolkien is a master storyteller, and he sets up the moment when the Balrog’s whip ensnares Gandalf as poignantly tragic – a sudden, unnecessary reminder that, even at its demise, the ancient monster can still unleash vicious harm. The last few days of the Trump administration offered ample proof of this, through the Supreme Court’s decision in Barr v. Lee.12

Like much of latter-day death penalty litigation, Lee focused on chemicals used in federal executions – to wit, a single shot of pentobarbital, a mainstay of state executions as European countries no longer export lethal drugs to the U.S.13 As Ryan Newby and I explained in 2013, this sort of litigation is a classic example of what Justice Harry Blackmun referred to in the early 1990s as “tinkering with the machinery of death.” Blackmun could afford a direct, stop-beating-around-the-bush approach to the tiresome and technical minutiae of postconviction litigation, but capital defense lawyers cannot; arguments about human rights and racial disparities have long been futile, for various procedural reasons, and the limits of the sayable on appeal and on habeas revolve around chemicals and number of injections. Barr v. Lee, decided 5-4, was no exception: the plaintiffs, whose cases were final and cleared for executions, provided expert declarations correlating pentobarital use to flash pulmonary edema, a form of respiratory distress that temporarily produces the sensation of drowning or asphyxiation. The federal government provided contrary expert testimony, according to which pulmonary edema occurs only after the prisoner has died or been rendered
fully insensate. The Supreme Court found, per curiam, that the plaintiffs had not carried the burden of proof and cleared the way for the executions. Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent echoed Blackmun’s distaste for what death penalty litigation has become, remarking, “[t]his case illustrates at least some of the problems the death penalty raises in light of the Constitution’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’” Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in turn, remarked on the absurdity of doing justice to fundamental questions via “accelerated decisionmaking.”

Then came three troubling executions. Daniel Lewis Lee was put to death against the express, vocal, and repeated wishes of his victims’ families to spare him.14 The judicial and executive branches’ trampling of those requests followed the usual capital punishment theater in which, as Sarah Beth Kaufman explains in American Roulette, prosecutors, governors, and death penalty advocates use victims as props, assuming that punitiveness is faithful to their wishes – a position that does not faithfully represent the diverse views among victims of violent crime.15 According to the first-ever national survey of crime, twice as many victims prefer that the criminal justice system focus more on rehabilitation than on punishment; victims overwhelmingly prefer investments in education and in job creation to investments in prisons and jails, by margins of 15-to-1 and 10-to-1 respectively; by a margin of 7-to-1, victims prefer increased investments in crime prevention and programs for at-risk youth over more investment in prisons and jails; and 6 in 10 victims prefer shorter prison sentences and more spending on prevention and rehabilitation than on lengthy prison sentences.

Then, the federal government executed 68-year-old Wesley Purkey, who was described by his lawyer, Rebecca Woodman, as a “severely braindamaged and mentally ill man who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease” and does not understand “why the government plans to execute him.”16 The debate over Purkey’s mental illness was emblematic of the decades and billions of dollars spent poring over the fitness for execution of elderly, decadeslong death row residents. It also made a mockery of Atkins v. Virginia,
17 which forbade the execution of mentally challenged people but left it up to individual jurisdictions to duke out the details of who, precisely, they deem smart or sane enough to be injected with pentobarbital.

Finally came Dustin Honken’s execution, which offered a grim reminder of the gap between the inexplicable federal enthusiasm for executions and the waning interest of states in the penalty. Honken was the first person from Iowa to be executed since 1963; Iowa abolished the death penalty in 1965. Honken’s lawyer, Shawn Nolan, said, “There was no reason for the government to kill him, in haste or at all. In any case, they failed. The Dustin Honken they wanted to kill is long gone. The man they killed today was a human being, who could have spent the rest of his days helping others and further redeeming himself.”18

Another development was the reintroduction of electrocutions and firing squads as permissible execution methods by the administration of President Donald Trump in late November 2020 – after Biden had defeated Trump in the presidential election. The change was intended to offer federal prosecutors a wider variety of options for execution in order to avoid delays if the state in which the inmate was sentenced did not provide other alternatives. At the same time, the Department of Justice said it would keep federal executions in line with state law: “the federal government will never execute an inmate by firing squad or electrocution unless the relevant state has itself authorized that method of execution.”19

Trump’s appetite for executions was, at least, consistent with his positions on capital punishment since the 1980s, when he regularly purchased large ads and gave interviews advocating for the death penalty for the Central Park Five20 (who have since been exonerated, as is well known). In the early days of his presidency, he chased headlines expressing support for capital punishment for drug dealers.21 While consistent with Trump’s presidential positions, the viciousness of his last-minute addition of federal electrocutions and firing squads seemed pointless, since Biden was known to oppose the death penalty and had made campaign promises to work toward federal abolition.22 Moreover, any effort to electrocute or shoot death row convicts would embroil the federal government in interminable Eighth Amendment litigation, given the always-present risk of botched executions.

The last slew of planned Trump executions included more cases that provoked moral anguish. For example, the execution of Lisa Montgomery, the only woman on federal death row.23 Montgomery’s crime was shockingly brutal. She strangled a pregnant woman before cutting her stomach open and kidnapping her baby. Her own experiences of victimization were torturous and harrowing. She was sexually assaulted by her father starting at 11 years old, trafficked by her mother, and horrifically abused by her stepbrother, who became her husband. She was involuntarily sterilized, deteriorated into severe mental illness, and lived in abject poverty at the time the crime was committed. The uproar about the sentence provoked heated debates about the Trump administration’s appetite for creating controversies that the Biden administration would then have to undo. What is the point, one might ask, of all this cruelty? And the answer, as Adam Serwer wrote in a different context, might be: the cruelty is the point.24

OKLAHOMA: CHEMICALS AND INNOCENCE

A tragic Talmudic story tells how Yehuda ben Tabbai, President of the Sanhedrin, once wrongly convicted a man of perjury. By the time ben Tabbai realized his mistake, it was too late; the man had already been put to death. Shocked by his complicity in injustice, ben Tabbai would never again rule singlehandedly on a legal point, and every day of his life he would prostrate himself on the grave of the wrongly executed man, begging forgiveness and weeping.25

One wishes that more judicial and executive officials would take a page from ben Tabbai’s book. Instead, a sense of confusion, lack of commitment, and being in perpetual limbo has characterized capital punishment for the last decade. The story of Richard Glossip, the lead petitioner in Glossip v. Gross, is a case in point. In 2015, the Supreme Court rejected Glossip’s petition against the use of midazolam in his execution, just a brief time after the same drug played a horrendous part in the botched execution of Clayton Lockett. In line with the aforementioned trend of technical litigation, the decision revolved around whether Glossip had shown that Oklahoma had better execution methods than midazolam.26

Anyone reading the decision could be forgiven for having no idea that Glossip is widely believed to be innocent, and that Oklahoma’s Attorney General, who reviewed his case, does not stand behind the conviction. Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would not halt Glossip’s execution. Judge David Lewis wrote that the case “has been thoroughly investigated and reviewed,” with Glossip given “unprecedented access” to prosecutors’ files, “[y]et he has not provided this court with sufficient information that would convince this court to overturn the jury’s determination that he is guilty of first-degree murder and should be sentenced to death.” It took yet another petition to the U.S. Supreme Court to halt the execution.27

CALIFORNIA: DEATH BY MORATORIUM

For more ambiguity and discombobulation on the death penalty in the 21st century, consider California, where several rounds of abolitionist voter initiatives failed in the last decade.28 I want to spend more time discussing California, not only because I am intimately familiar with capital punishment law where I live and work, but also because I think the last decade in the Golden State perfectly encapsulates what a chronic, slow death for capital punishment looks like. In 2016, while narrowly defeating the abolitionist Prop 62, California voters narrowly approved Prop 66, which was supposed to speed up executions, as well as allow death row residents to be relocated to other prisons where they could pay restitution to their victims. Some aspects of Prop 66 – specifically, those which remove safeguards against wrongful executions – have been found unconstitutional, but most of it has survived constitutional review.29

When explaining what the death penalty in California was like in the late 2010s, I sometimes borrow a framework from the construction world. When planning a project, general contractors might draw a triangle, writing in each corner one word – respectively, “good,” “fast,” and “cheap.” They then say to the client, “you can’t have all three; pick two.” This is an apt description of why death penalty opponents often refer to California’s capital punishment as “broken beyond repair.” A “good” and “cheap” death penalty would require finding some way to seriously litigate postconviction motions on a lengthy timeline and on a shoestring, relying mostly on California’s minuscule existing cadre of capital habeas litigators. Cases would drag on and on, as they do now, until people received representation, a situation that at least one federal judge found to violate the Eighth Amendment.30 A “good” and “fast” death penalty, which is what some supporters of Prop 66 perhaps wanted, would require massive expenditures so that proper, high-quality representation could be found and habeas writs could efficiently work their way through the courts. A “fast” and “cheap” death penalty, which is what Prop 66 might have produced had all its aspects been found constitutional, would do away with many safeguards against wrongful executions and result in more deadly mistakes. Even if
one approves of capital punishment in theory, as many California voters do (for example, through a retributive framework), it is therefore hard to compare its abstract form to the way it is administered in practice: There is no way of fashioning capital punishment in California in a way that guarantees it to be “good,” “fast,” and “cheap.”

These concerns, and many others, led California Governor Gavin Newsom to take a step that his abolitionist predecessors had shied away from: placing a moratorium on the death penalty in California and ordering the
death chamber dismantled.31 Newsom is also turning San Quentin prison, home to the country’s largest death row, into a Scandinavian-style “center for innovation focused on education, rehabilitation and breaking cycles of crime.” For the first time in decades, residents of death row are able to move freely within the facility, and many of them will be transferred to other facilities, a monumental change in their life circumstances that some death row residents, acclimated to their peculiar, restrictive lives, view with apprehension.32 But these are executive, not legislative acts. Because the death penalty still has a legal, if not ontological, existence, people whose lives were saved by the moratorium are still, legally, capital convicts, and costly postconviction litigation on their cases continues, to the tune of $150 million per annum.33

To cynical commenters, who might observe that this new incarnation is not “good,” “fast,” or “cheap,” one might respond, “at least we’re not executing people.” But saying, “no one is being executed on death row” is
far from saying, “no one dies on death row.” In late May 2020, as a San Francisco Chronical exposé revealed – and as a subsequent investigation by the California Inspector General’s office and litigation in state courts confirmed – San Quentin, still home to the country’s largest death row, was overcrowded to 113% of design capacity.34 Alarmed by a horrific COVID19 outbreak at the California Institute of Men in Chino, custodial and
medical officials there sought to mitigate the spread by transferring 200 men out of the facility, 122 of them to San Quentin. The men were not tested for COVID-19 for weeks prior to their transfer. On the morning of
the transfer, several transferees told nurses that they were experiencing COVID-19 symptoms (fever and coughing). According to email correspondence between health officials, these men were treated as malingerers and the transfer proceeded as planned. No effort was made to facilitate social distancing within the buses; the transferees heard and felt their neighbors cough throughout the lengthy journey to the destination facilities.35

The virus spread quickly throughout San Quentin. By the end of June, more than three quarters of the prison population had been infected and 29 had died – 28 prisoners and one worker.36 San Quentin’s death row was especially vulnerable to COVID-19, both because of the low quality of the physical plant – a dilapidated, poorly constructed, and thinly staffed long-term home to approximately 750 men (now many fewer) – and because the death row population tends to be older and sicker than the general prison population. The virus tore quickly through death row, and while prison authorities did what they could to obscure the calamities, San Francisco Chronicle journalists broke the story:

A coronavirus outbreak exploding through San Quentin State Prison has reached Death Row, where more than 160 condemned prisoners are infected, sources told The Chronicle on Thursday. One condemned inmate, 71-year-old Richard Eugene Stitely, was found dead Wednesday night. Officials are determining the cause of death and checking to see whether he was infected.

State prison officials declined to confirm that the virus has spread to Death Row, but three sources familiar with the details of the outbreak there provided The Chronicle with information on the condition they not be named, and in accordance with the paper’s anonymous source policy. Two of the sources are San Quentin employees who are not authorized to speak publicly and feared losing their jobs.

There are 725 condemned inmates at San Quentin, and of those
who agreed to be tested for the coronavirus, 166 tested positive, the
sources said. . . .

It is unclear whether Stitely was infected with the coronavirus. He refused to be tested, according to the three sources with knowledge of the situation.37

By contrast to general population residents, whose identities were hidden from the public for medical privacy reasons, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sent emails to interested parties about
deaths of people on death row, listing their names and full details. Through subtracting the named casualties from the total death toll, a horrifying truth emerged: More people died on death row from COVID-19 under Newsom’s moratorium than California had executed since the reestablishment of the death penalty in 1978.38

This outcome was deeply ironic, because even after the moratorium, with no death chamber and bereft of lethal chemicals, California courts continued to be clogged with death penalty litigation concerning details
revolving around whether various modes and aspects of the execution process are “cruel and unusual” even as the death penalty itself was still deemed “kind and usual.”39 Flying in the face of this precious and expensive effort to sever the death penalty from any of its potentially cruel and unusual implications were executions clearly not prescribed by the California Penal Code: deaths from a contagious pandemic, compounded by incompetence and neglect.

At the same time, even stalwart supporters of the death penalty realized that capital verdicts that will never be carried out make no sense, logically or practically. In summer 2020, Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeff Rosen, by no means a capital-punishment-shy public prosecutor, announced that his office would no longer seek the death penalty. Rosen claimed that his visit to the Civil Rights Museum in Alabama inspired him to see the death penalty not only “through eyes of the victims and families of those whose lives were taken,” but also “through the lens of race and inequity.” The rationales he offered for the policy change were in line with those behind the penalty’s decline in popularity more generally: “These cases use up massive public resources and cruelly drag on for years with endless appeals that give no finality to the victims’ families,” he said. “There’s the tragic but real risk of wrongful conviction. And, shamefully, our society’s most drastic and devastating law enforcement punishment has been used disproportionately against defendants of color.”40 Rosen was facing an election challenge from a more progressive candidate, which could partly explain his change in position. Nevertheless, his reliance on the more general arguments means that the gubernatorial changes at San Quentin did resonate.

Perhaps even more important was the announcement by George Gascón, upon his election as Los Angeles District Attorney in fall 2020, that the county would no longer seek the death penalty41 – an inflection point for one of California’s four “killer counties” and one of the entire country’s three highest sources of capital sentences. 42 Even more striking is a remarkable data point from Sacramento: Joseph DiAngelo, otherwise known as the Golden State Killer, was finally caught and convicted using innovative forensic investigative tools.43 The Sacramento County prosecutor did not even ask for the death penalty, and rightly so, as it would have allowed DiAngelo to continue litigating at the state’s expense only to die a natural death, like everyone else on death row. Which raises a fair question: If not the most notorious and heinous criminal in the history of California, then who?

WHAT DEATH PENALTY EUTHANASIA MIGHT LOOK LIKE

Capital punishment’s last gasps are, as these examples show, rife with inconsistencies, ironies, and changes of direction, which raise the question when, and how, the end will come. As public opinion and results at the ballot box show, the death penalty retains a symbolic hold over the American imagination. But judges and politicians are exposed to its unsavory sides.

It is hard to provide facile explanations for the different modes of the capital penalty’s demise in recently abolitionist states. In Washington, abolition arrived through a judicial decision about racial disparities in the penalty’s application;44 in Delaware, through a case involving arbitrary jury decisions in capital cases, which was later extended to the remaining cases on death row;45 in New Hampshire, through a non-retroactive statute; 46 in Colorado, through a combination of a statute and gubernatorial commutations;47 in Virginia, the first Southern state to abolish the death penalty, through a bipartisan legislative vote.48

One is left wondering whether it is easier to get rid of the death penalty in retentionist states – such as in Illinois, where abolition followed Governor George Ryan’s mass commutations, largely due to his concerns about innocence and wrongful executions49 – or in states with moratoria – such as California, where one wonders whether the dismantlement of the death chamber and the disbanding of death row, along with the vanishing prospect of an execution as a lightning rod, might be slowing down the dismantling of the death penalty itself. Without the physical reminder of the remnants of this archaic punishment, and with the growing resemblance of the death penalty to the two other members of the “extreme punishment trifecta” (life with and without parole),50 does the effort to abolish a thoroughly defanged (but still expensive) death penalty lose its steam?

What signals a new phase in the death penalty’s terminal illness is a combination of factors: a critical mass of abolitionist states; backlash caused by the Trump administration’s execution spree; the absence of capital sentencing nationwide and, especially, in high-profile cases; abolitionist thinking and decisionmaking at the county prosecution level; the specter of COVID-19 deaths; and, of course, the ever-rising costs. We are unlikely to see a definitive kiss of death. Instead, many local developments may eventually mean – perhaps, to our surprise – that, like so many people on death row itself, capital punishment has died a quiet, natural death.

NOTES


1 J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING bk. II, ch. 5
(2012 [1954]).

2 Abolitionist states with date of abolition: Alaska (1957), Colorado (2020), Connecticut (2012), Delaware (2016), Hawaii (1957), Illinois (2011), Iowa (1965), Maine (1887), Maryland
(2013), Massachusetts (1984), Michigan (1847), Minnesota (1911), New Hampshire (2019),
New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York (2007), North Dakota (1973), Rhode
Island (1984), Vermont (1972), Virginia (2021), Washington (2023), West Virginia (1965),
Wisconsin (1853). Retentionist states (including states with moratoria): Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming.
States with moratoria, along with moratorium date: California (2019), Pennsylvania (2023),
Oregon (2022), Arizona (2023), Ohio (2020), Tennessee (2022). The federal moratorium
was put in place by the Biden administration in 2021. Source: Death Penalty Information
Center (“Death Penalty Info”) website, deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-landing. 3 Megan Brenan, “Steady 55% of Americans Support Death Penalty for Murderers,” Gallup, Nov. 14, 2022.

4 AUSTIN SARAT, JOHN MALAGUE, AND SARAH WISHLOFF, THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
BALLOT: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FATE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2019).

5 DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (2016).

6 166 non-execution deaths, as of 2024: Death Penalty Focus, deathpenalty.org/facts/.

7 Hadar Aviram and Ryan Newby, “Death Row Economics: The Rise of Fiscally Prudent
Anti-Death Penalty Activism,” 28 CRIM. JUST. 33 (2013).

8 HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015).

9 Keith A. Findley, “Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Criminal Justice,”
in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3-20 (2016); Lindsey A. Sherrill,
“Beyond Entertainment: Podcasting and the Criminal Justice Reform ‘Niche,’” and Robin
Blom, Gabriel B. Tait, Gwyn Hultquist, Ida S. Cage, and Melodie K. Griffin, “True
Crime, True Representation? Race and Injustice Narratives in Wrongful Conviction Podcasts,” in TRUE CRIME IN AMERICAN MEDIA 67-82 (2023).

10 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

11 Barack Obama, “The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,” 130 HARV.
L. REV. 811 (2017).

12 Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979 (2020).

13 “Europe’s moral stand has U.S. states running out of execution drugs, complicating capital
punishment,” CBS NEWS, Feb. 18, 2014.

14 Hailey Fuchs, “Government Carries Out First Federal Execution in 17 Years,” NEW YORK
TIMES, July 14, 2020.

15 SARAH BETH KAUFMANN, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING TRIALS (2020).

16 Khaleda Rahman, “U.S. Executes Wesley Purkey, Who Calls It a ‘Sanitized Murder’ In
Last Words,” NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2020.

17 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

18 Shawn Nolan, “Statement From Shawn Nolan, Attorney For Dustin Honken,” FEDERAL
DEFENDER, July 17, 2020.

19 Matt Zapotosky and Mark Berman, “Justice Dept. rule change could allow federal executions by electrocution or firing squad,” WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 27, 2020.

20 Colby Itkowitz and Michael Brice-Saddler, “Trump still won’t apologize to the Central
Park Five. Here’s what he said at the time.” WASHINGTON POST, June 18, 2019.

21 Michael Krasny, “President Trump Announces Plan to Fight Opioid Abuse, Including
Death Penalty,” KQED FORUM, Mar. 20, 2018.

22 Dakin Andone, “Biden Campaigned on Abolishing the Federal Death Penalty. But 2 Years
In, Advocates See an ‘Inconsistent’ Message,” CNN, Jan. 22, 2023.

23 Reuters, “Lisa Montgomery: US Executes Only Woman on Federal Death Row,” BBC
WORLD, Jan. 13, 2021.

24 Adam Serwer, “The Cruelty Is the Point,” THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 3, 2018.

25 Bavli Hagiga 16:2.

26 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015); Jeffrey E. Stern, “The Cruel and Unusual Execution
of Clayton Lockett,” THE ATLANTIC, June 15, 2015.

27 Glossip v. State, www.okcca.net/cases/2023/OK-CR-5/ (2023); Glossip v. Oklahoma, 143.Ct. 2453 (2023).

28 Prop 34 failed in 2012: David A. Love, “Prop 34 Fails But Signals the Imminent Demise
of California’s Death Penalty,” THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 2012. Prop 66 failed in 2016:
Sarah Heise, “Death Penalty Supporters Claim Victory with Failure of Prop 62,” KCRA3, Nov. 9, 2016.

29 Bob Egelko, “California Supreme Court Upholds Most Of Expedited Death Penalty
Initiative,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 24, 2017.

30 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

31 Kyung Lah, “How Kamala Harris’ Death Penalty Decisions Broke Hearts on Both Sides,”
CNN, Apr. 8, 2019; Eric Westervelt, “California Says It Will Dismantle Death Row.
The Move Brings Cheers and Anger,” NPR, Jan. 13, 2023.

32 Nigel Duara, “Gavin Newsom Moves to ‘Transform’ San Quentin as California Prison
Population Shrinks,” CALMATTERS, Mar. 21, 2023; Sam Levin, “The Last Days of Death
Row in California: ‘Your Soul is Tested Here’,” THE GUARDIAN, May 1, 2023.

33 Arthur Rizer and Marc Hyden, “Why Conservatives Should Oppose the Death Penalty,”
THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, Jan. 10, 2019.

34 Mary Harris, “California’s Carelessness Spurred a New COVID Outbreak,” SLATE, July 7,2020; Roy W. Wesley and Bryan B. Beyer, “COVID-19 Review Series, Part Three,” OFFICEOF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Feb. 1, 2021, 1-2, www.oig.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/OIG-COVID-19-Review-Series-Part-3-%E2%80%93-Transferof-Patients-from-CIM.pdf; “Monthly Report of Population As of Midnight June 30, 2020,”CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, July 1, 2020, 2, www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/174/2020/07/Tpop1d2006.pdf.

35 For a thorough examination of COVID-19 and California’s death row, see HADAR AVIRAM AND CHAD GOERZEN, FESTER: CARCERAL PERMEABILITY AND CALIFORNIA’S COVID19 CORRECTIONAL DISASTER (2024).

36 Daniel Montes, “Trial Over COVID-19 Outbreak at San Quentin State Prison That Left29 Dead to Begin Thursday,” BAY CITY NEWS, May 20, 2021.Euthanize the Death Penalty AlreadySPRING 2024 193

37 Megan Cassidy and Jason Fagone, “Coronavirus Tears through San Quentin’s Death Row;
Condemned Inmate Dead of Unknown Cause,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 25, 2020,
www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Coronavirus-tears-through-San-Quentin-s-Death15367782.php.

38 Patt Morrison, “California Is Closing San Quentin’s Death Row. This Is Its Gruesome
History,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 8, 2022.

39 Aviram & Newby, supra note 7; George Skelton, “In California, the Death Penalty is Allbut Meaningless. A Life Sentence for the Golden State Killer Was the Right Move,” LOSANGELES TIMES, July 2, 2020.

40 Quoted in Michael Cabanatuan, “Santa Clara County DA Jeff Rosen No Longer to SeekDeath Penalty,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 22, 2020.

41 Alexandra Meeks and Madeline Holcombe, “New Los Angeles DA Announces End to
Cash Bail, the Death Penalty and Trying Children as Adults,” CNN, Dec. 8, 2020.

42 “Death Penalty Info: ACLU Study: Los Angeles Death Penalty Discriminates Against
Defendants of Color and the Poor,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/aclu-study-los-angelesdeath-penalty-discriminates-against-defendants-of-color-and-the-poor.

43 Paige St. John, “The Untold Story of How the Golden State Killer Was Found: A Covert
Operation and Private DNA,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 2020.

44 State v. Gregory, 427 P.2d 621 (Wash. 2018).

45 “Death Penalty Info: Delaware,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/
delaware.

46 “Death Penalty Info: New Hampshire,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/stateby-state/new-hampshire.

47 “Death Penalty Info: Colorado,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/
colorado.

48 “Death Penalty Info: Virginia,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/virginia-legislature-votes-toabolish-the-death-penalty.

49 Sarah Schulte, “20 Years After Commuting 167 Illinois Death Sentences, Ex-Gov.
George Ryan Has No Regrets,” ABC7 CHICAGO, Jan. 10, 2023.

50 HADAR AVIRAM, YESTERDAY’S MONSTERS: THE MANSON FAMILY CASES AND THE ILLUSION
OF PAROLE (2020).

The Scouring of Samson: Incarceration and Corporal Punishment

One of the major assumptions of modern penologists is that prison, as an artifact of modernity, came to replace other forms of punishment: executions, maiming, etc. Overall, I think there are three main approaches that support this idea:

The legalistic approach

Some punishment scholars—primarily those who study incarceration from a formal, doctrinal perspective—rightly point out that the legal definition of prison differed greatly in antiquity and in modernity. The modern conceptualization of criminal punishment adheres to the Enlightenment-Era logics regarding the rule of law: laws forbidding undesirable behavior must be preemptively enacted, universal in their verbiage, fairly and impartially applied by an independent judicial entity, and prescribe the minimal amount of set punishment that satisfies retributive and/or utilitarian goals. Descriptions of incarceration in antiquity (and, in particular, in the bible) rarely, if ever, conform to this model: determination of guilt is not a necessary precursor to incarceration, and when it occurs, it does not necessarily reflect what modern doctrinalists would regard as a fair, impartial judicial trial. Sentences, if meted at all, are not necessarily determinate in length. The entry and exit points of ancient confinement facilities are not always well defined and, as we will see, often reflect erratic, casuistic decisionmaking by monarchs in the throes of whims and dreams.

If the argument dismissing incarceration in antiquity relies on legalistic comparisons, it is seriously undermined by the fact that the study of incarceration in modernity has long ago transcended such formal categories. For decades, scholars have been studying the function of legal institutions on the ground, unlimited by the rational or articulated goals of said institutions. The entire field of law and society is concerned with the gaps between “law in the books” and “law in action,” often identifying the ways in which the actual operations of institutions deviate from their legal definitions. More specifically, current scholarship about the modern carceral state applies to an entire body of institutions, facilities, and practices, of a dazzling variety of shapes and sizes, and encompassing multiple goals and functions. Adopting a limiting, legalistic project of studying incarceration would miss out on a wealth of scholarship about pretrial detention, immigration detention, bail, electronic monitoring, parole conditions, and postrelease supervision, as well as on illuminating comparisons between correctional facilities and other forms of extractive confinement, such as cattle towns and private sector surveillance.

In other words, save for when stating the obvious—that confinement systems looked different and served different purposes thousands of years ago—clinging to formalism is not particularly instructive when studying the incarceration experience.

The arc-of-enlightenment approach

By contrast to the legalistic approach, some sociological pioneers have examined penal changes over the longue durée, attributing the emergence of incarceration as the most salient form of punishment to large-scale social transformation. In his classic text The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim analyzes the shift from simple societies, in which collectivity is a function of sameness and conformity, to complex ones, based on diversification and socio-economic exchange. This shift manifests in numerous ways, one of which is the emblematic penal regime. In a later essay, titled The Two Laws of Penal Evolution, Durkheim observed that punishment would change as societies became more complex: laws designed to address transgressions through repression would shift toward restitution, and corporal punishment would shift toward incarceration. Durkheim, then, tied incarceration to social complexity, which he identified with modernity.

Setting aside the many critiques of Durkheim’s identification of “simple” and “complex” societies, which exceed the framework of this book, it is notable that prison symbolized, for him, a progressive step. Other sociologists were even more explicit in identifying prison with progress. In The Civilizing Process, Norbert Elias advances the idea of a gradual reduction in interpersonal violence as a political and cultural shift. Post-medieval times, Elias argues, saw a top-down trickling of new standards regarding violence, sexual behavior, bodily functions, table manners, etc., from courtier society to lower societal strata, reflecting sublimation and self-restraint.  The formation of this more rarified etiquette paralleled the emergence of the modern state. As monarchs amassed and consolidated power, Elias argues, they assumed a monopoly over legitimate physical violence, centralizing the infliction of punishment and eliminating violent forms of dispute resolution between individuals.

Elias’ observations are echoed in the work of other people who documented long-term trends in crime and punishment. V.A.C. Gattrell notes a decline in bloodthirstiness and delight at spectacles of public savagery in Early Modern England. Robert Nye documents the increasing regulations and limitations on, and eventually decline in and disappearance of, dueling as the modern state assumed a monopoly on punishment. And Pieter Spierenburg notes the gradual disappearance of more savage forms of punishment and the turn toward confinement. In The Spectacle of Suffering, Spierenburg painstakingly documents the gradual disappearance of public executions and the emergence of penal restraint. Importantly, these scholars, especially Spierenburg, shy away from praising these trends as an unqualified good, describing them in neutral language.

The neutrality seems appropriate, given a considerable flaw in Durkheim’s take on the evolution of punishment: the transition from repression to restitution is a premise that careful historical observation does not bear out, and even if plausible, it would not necessarily dovetail with a transition from corporal punishment to incarceration. As Leon Sheleff has observed, social complexity often generates repressive forms of punishment, and as Martin Killias’ careful study of dozens of historical and modern societies shows, a rise in incarceration often occurs alongside repressive efforts.

Moreover, the extent to which these works, which focus on the emergence of the Early Modern European state, can offer useful insights about punishment in antiquity, is very limited. Durkheim and Elias were inspired by dramatic social transformations that occurred in their time and place—the long industrialization process—and likely did not give much thought to their application to a completely different setting. If the emergence of centralized state power represses savagery and interpersonal violence, one might wonder what these big-picture sociologists and historians would make of ancient empires, including those reflecting great levels of sophistication and social complexity, such as ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome. It is hard to responsibly draw comparisons between these empires and the emergence of the European modern state, and even harder to speak of penological parallels, but there are indications that Fourth century Athenians, for example, believed that institutionally channeling anger through formal punishment was beneficial.

The body-to-soul approach

A more sinister take on the emergence of the prison in modernity is Michel Foucault’s influential Discipline and Punish. Foucault observes the emergence of “great confinements” in hospitals, military barracks, schools, and prisons, as a new form of governmentality. At the outset of the book, Foucault contrasts a scene of royally prescribed torture for a regicide, culminating in drawing and quartering the condemned, with a monotonous daily schedule for inmates at a juvenile facility. The shift from the former to the latter, Foucault argues, reflects a turn from centralized, dramatic displays of governing power focused on the body of the condemned to something much more pervasive: a vague but widespread web of institutions designed to produce changes in the soul through surveillance and supervision. As his central metaphor for the carceral, Foucault relies on Jeremy Bentham’s famous prison design: the panopticon. Housed in cells organized in a circle, facing a central tower, inmates have no way of knowing whether they are being watched, and thus begin to control and modify their own behavior to comply with the institutional standards, internalizing them.

Plenty of works about the emergence of the modern prison have adopted Foucault’s observations, finding evidence that control and fear increasingly shape behavior in societies with mass incarceration, identifying carceral features in many settings and areas of life beyond physical prisons, and focusing on the growing classification of people according to risk. There is also evidence that certain punishments, such as the death penalty, are increasingly regulated, medicalized, and removed from the public eye. But importantly, just like Durkheim and Elias, Foucault focuses on the transition from a European court society to the modern state, and the applicability of his framework for understanding antiquity is limited. 

When Foucault identifies incarceration with modernity, he is describing a very particular form of incarceration: one that is highly regulated and operates on a massive scale, according to the government and administration principles of Weberian formal rationality. The basic premise of Foucault’s analysis does not discount the possibility that ancient societies might have had a very different sort of prison, one that exhibits some common features with the “gloomy festival of punishment” era.

Another challenge to Foucault’s observations, as well as those of the other two approaches, has to do with the classification of incarceration as categorically distinguishable from other forms of punishment, often referred to as corporal punishment. And I have to say, the more I think about the history of punishment over the longue durée, the more I realize that the boundary between incarceration and corporal punishment is false. Not only, as I’ve said many times before, is prison itself corporal punishment, but it often comes hand in hand with corporal mortifications of various kinds. People on death row, for example, are incarcerated. People put to hard labor are incarcerated. People awaiting deportation are incarcerated. People awaiting public humiliation are incarcerated.

In other words, incarceration and other forms of punishment do not have the sort of see-saw correlation that simplistic accounts of penology would have us believe. One does not necessarily rise when the other one falls. What throws us off is that the scale of incarceration in modernity is so immense that it dwarfs the other accompanying things. But that doesn’t mean that incarceration wasn’t always there.

Samson Captured by the Philistines

Today’s example of this is Samson, whom, as I’ve just realized, I haven’t yet discussed in the context of the book. The story of Samson’s capture, incarceration, and suicide, is told in Judges 16. If the Joseph/Daniel/Esther trio can be classified as exilic fantasy/folktale and Jeremiah as political thriller, Samson is definitely in the action/adventure category, and while we have plenty of evidence for the existence of the Philistines (though their ethnicity is debated, see here, here, and here), the Samson stories are superhero fiction. By contrast to other judges, characterized by their wisdom, righteousness, and/or military strategic acumen, Samson is, first and foremost, a man of astounding physical force. David Grossman’s terrific reimagining of the Samson story casts him as a man of contradictions: his blessing is his curse, he is a terrifying antagonist of the Philistines but is fatally attracted to Philistine women, and his desire for vulnerability and openness is his undoing.

What leads to Samson’s incarceration is his disclosure to Delilah that his physical prowess stems from his long hair. Once he falls asleep, she cuts his tresses, and begins to torture him. Interpreters differ in how they understand this torture: some believe she called someone else to cut Samson’s hair, and some believe that she started taunting him physically to test whether, indeed, his power has dissipated. Then she calls out that the Philistines are upon him, and they charge, and immediately inflict horrific torture: they gauge out Samson’s eyes. They then take him to Gaza, place him in “beit ha-asurim” (literally: the house of prisoners), where he is put to work at the grinding mill. Rabbi Steinzaltz explains that the grinder works in a circle, so Samson did not need his eyesight to engage in this labor: it was well fitted for his new disability. Radak posits that prisoners had to earn their keep and therefore ground the mill.

But Radak offers an additional, and more sinister, take on Samson’s forced labor: he sees “grinding” as a euphemism for sexual slavery. According to Radak, Samson, not to put too fine a point on it, was put to stud, to impregnate Philistine women (one wonders why: did they still believe that he possessed some special supernatural powers and was therefore a valuable progenitor?) Generally, this reading dovetails with what I saw in some medieval readings of Esther: really unsavory sexual undertones and a fleshing out of the power differential stuff, which suggests that these commentators might have read the Biblical material through the lens of medieval punitive savagery. Which is not to say, of course, that sexual slavery was not within the realm of the imaginable in antiquity (we have plenty of examples). What is interesting about the Samson story is the emasculation of Samson but the preservation of his manliness for the utility of his captors (I’ve read a couple of queer readings of the Samson story that make a lot out of this stuff.)

In any case, the Philistines hold a big party at their temple, and they bring in Samson to mock him in his weakness. Unbeknownst to them (and this is a truly genius literary device from the author of this tale, I think) Samson’s hair has begun to grow back while at the prison, and when he is brought to the temple, he asks the youth who minds him to place him between the columns of the temple. He begs for God to restore his power so that he can avenge one of his eyes, and calling out “Let me die with the Philistines!” he demolishes the temple, slaughtering more Philistines than he had killed in his life. This, by the way, is often a spectacular moment in operatic productions of Samson and Delilah.

Samson and Delilah production at the Metropolitan Opera

The Samson story is instructive in several important ways. First, it offers an example of incarceration that goes hand in hand with torture, humiliation, and forced labor. Second, it offers some notions of what would have been imaginable to those reading and interpreting what was surely a work of complete fiction in terms of the scope of carceral torture. And third, this story–not unlike the Jeremiah incarceration story–does a terrific job capturing the deep rage and desire for revenge by someone treated so cruelly by his captors.

Does Being Sick Excuse, or Compound, Being Bad?

One of the classic texts that left the most lasting impression on me in grad school was Peter Conrad and Joseph Schneider’s Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness. Our marvelous penology professor, the late Leslie Sebba, was deeply interested in the theoretical currents that shape penal ideology, and the shift from moralizing to pathologizing was of great interest to him and, consequently, to us. Conrad and Schneider’s basic argument is that, over time, more and more deviant behaviors that were classified as religious or moral failings, or as evidence of a wicked character, come to be seen in a clinical light. Some examples include a variety of mental illnesses, alcoholism, opiate addiction, homosexuality, delinquency, and child abuse; in a new chapter added long after the original publication date in 1980, they discussed AIDS, domestic violence, co-dependency, hyperactivity in children, and learning disabilities.

The process of medicalizing, or pathologizing, behavior is interesting in itself, as it originates from, and in turn generates, more knowledge, more diagnoses, more professionals, more institutions, and more therapies. But for lawyers, an interesting perspective is how this affects criminal culpability and punishment severity. The law recognizes a narrow subset of cases, in which proven mental illness or defect is so grave that it can be a complete defense (e.g., when the person has no ability to discern what they are doing, or to comprehend the wrongness of their actions, per the M’Naghten Rule.) Some U.S. states and other countries recognize additional paths to a complete acquittal on the basis of mental illness, including irresistible impulses (what happens to a person deemed insane after the acquittal, as Bailey Wendzel explains, is a different story.) But even in cases where mental illness cannot excuse the crime, various clinical conditions can lead to more lenient punishment; lead poisoning, for example, is often brought up as a mitigating factor.

Which is why I was riveted to a recent news item about legal proceedings in the case of Amanda Riley who, as podcast aficionados may know, was convicted in 2021 of fabricating and faking a cancer diagnosis and fleecing supportive friends and fellow churchgoers of more than $105,000. She was sentenced to five years in prison. Riley–referred to in the podcast as Scamanda–went as far as to shave her head and take pictures in actual hospitals, use medical equipment to stage photos that simulated medical treatment, and keep a blog that documented dramatic ups and downs in her treatment journey, including miracle recoveries and last-hope therapies. To get a sense of how profound her deceit was, I highly recommend listening to the podcast, which includes plenty of primary sources and interviews, but obscures some aspects of the case, such as the extent of her husband’s complicity in the ruse (the husband, who did collaborate with her in a vicious custody battle against his ex-wife, was not charged in the case.)

Anyway, Megan Cassidy of the Chronicle reports this morning that Riley’s federal petition for early release was rejected. Here are some of the interesting details:

But Riley’s list of maladies, which were laid out in a recent bid for an early prison release, drew sharp rebuke from prosecutors, who maintain that, yet again, she’s faking it. 

“Perhaps not surprisingly … Defendant’s medical records make clear that she does not actually suffer from any acute health problems at all,” U.S. Attorney Michael Pitman said in a reply  to Riley’s motion for a sentence reduction this spring. 

Citing notes from medical records, Pitman said health care professionals repeatedly witnessed Riley attempting to skew test results: Riley was allegedly seen holding her breath during an oxygen saturation test, manipulating an infusion pump that was administering potassium to her, and “intentionally stress (ing) her body to create tachycardia,” which is a heart rate of more than 100 beats per minute, according to court documents. 

Prosecutors said at least four doctors and a nurse wrote in their notes concerns of a possible “factitious disorder,” or listed it as an actual diagnosis. Factitious disorder, also known as Munchausen syndrome, is described by the Mayo Clinic as a “serious mental disorder in which someone deceives others by appearing sick, by purposely getting sick or by self-injury.” 

Notably, it was the prosecutors, not the defense, who trotted out the factitious disorder/Munchausen diagnosis. Which, at least to me, exposes a contradiction. The argument against early release is that Riley “does not actually suffer from any acute health problems at all,” but isn’t factitious disorder itself a health problem? One that Riley has, apparently, been diagnosed with by at least one clinician? Not an acute physical malady, but something that undermines some of Riley’s culpability?

If, like me, you’ve watched a bunch of sensational trash TV, you might have encountered Munchausen before and wondered whether it has been exaggerated for dramatic effect. For what it’s worth, factitious disorder is recognized in the DSM-5 and is a legitimate mental health condition. A few factors seem to be important here. First, in terms of differential diagnosis, authors caution that “[i]t is important to distinguish Munchausen from malingering in which an external gain is a primary motivation.” In Riley’s case, I’m unclear on whether it is possible to disaggregate the financial fleecing from the pleasure and attention, which Riley seemed to revel in. She and her family were showered not only with money, but also with affection and adoration. It doesn’t seem to have been merely a cold, calculating scam.

At the same time, the authors remind us that Munchausen patients, as opposed to people suffering from other psychiatric disorders, “have insight into their disorder and are aware that they are fabricating their illness.” This, of course, negates the possibility of wriggling out of criminal culpability, but makes one think back of the eponymous literary character, who was said to believe his own lies.

According to the medical encyclopedia, the standard therapy for factitious disorder patients is psychotherapy, though most patients refuse:

It is not necessary for the patient to admit to their factitious disorder and, in fact, most patients rarely do.

In certain cases, it may be helpful to target cognitive-behavioral therapy toward childhood trauma that could be the instigator for the disorder. It has also been concluded that various medical interventions such as anti-depressants and/or anti-psychotics showed no benefit in the disorder. 

This raises a thorny question from a criminal law standpoint. Someone who seems to be resistant to treatment might embark on a similar course of action when they get out. But if they do, isn’t that proof that there’s something about them that is pathological and resistant to treatment, and therefore their misdeeds are, perhaps, less culpable than those of a healthy, calculating malingerer?

I also worry about the extent to which social media, Tik Tok in particular, encourages people, especially teens, to self-diagnose as suffering from a variety of ailments and parade the symptoms online. As sympathies pour in the form of likes and reposts, folks who already have a tendency for seeking attention through malingering will have more incentive to engage in this behavior, further blurring the line between pathology and grift.

The podcast portrays Riley in a decidedly unsympathetic manner, which is understandable given that the interviewees are, for the most part, people caught in her web of lies. I think there are both retributivist and utilitarian reasons why a five-year sentence is adequate here. The extent of the deceit, the exploitation of good people, the devastation of extended family, the way incidents like this make it harder for people whose medical problems are genuine to be trusted and receive help (“boy who cried wolf”, the detrimental effect that Doron Dorfman investigates in Fear of the Disability Con), and the risk she’ll do it again, are all fair reasons for it. But I, for one, would be interested in further elaborating the path we take when pathology enters the conversation.

The Perfect, Yet Again, Is the Enemy of the Good: LWOP Edition

Back in 2016, I was campaigning with a group of determined activists, some of them formerly incarcerated, for Prop 62, which would have abolished the death penalty in California. Most of our messaging, just like when we had campaigned for Prop. 34 in 2012, was aimed at centrists, who were on the fence about the death penalty but would care how much it cost. It was only pretty late in the game that I realized there was another group we had not been addressing: progressives.

You’d think progressives were not a demographic that needed convincing about death penalty abolition. But in the topsy-turvy, horseshoe-theory world of progressive activism, being against the death penalty doesn’t equal voting against the death penalty. The usual reason people gave was something like this: getting rid of the death penalty would merely retrench life without parole, which is not that different from the death penalty given that we’re not executing anyone, and life without parole is wrong and bad, so let’s vote against abolition, so that… wait a minute, so that what?

Back when this happened, I was a lot more sanguine about progressive activism–it was eight years ago, Trump hadn’t been elected yet, and much of the nonsense that now plagues my political environs was in its infancy–but even then, this position seemed absurd to me. Don’t these people understand that legal change works incrementally? I agonized. Or are they pretending not to know so they can posture about how good, and how against LWOP, they are? So I ended up writing this:

You know what? I agree with you. Life without parole is, indeed, an extreme form of punishment. Like you, I am committed to a struggle to bring a possibility of hope–an exit possibility–to any prison sentence.

Unfortunately, we can’t start our fight against life without parole until we win our fight against the death penalty, which is within reach. This is, unfortunately, how political reform works: incrementally, with bipartisan support, and with a big base of consensus.

I wish there were a critical mass of Californians of all political persuasions convinced that our criminal justice system needs to be immediately reformed. Not just at the edges, not just for nonviolent inmates, not just for juveniles, but for everyone. But that is not the world we live in. The political reality is that, in order to make change, incremental steps have to be taken. Remember same-sex marriage? That didn’t happen overnight. There were revolutionaries calling for marriage back in the seventies, when it was unthinkable. Then, the movement had to regroup, advocate for lesser protections (domestic partnerships, workplace protection). Yes, domestic partnership was less than marriage in important ways. But this is why public opinion changed, between the mid-1990s and the early 2010s. Incremental change is what led to the triumph of that movement. 

For an even more relevant example, see what is happening with juvenile justice. Life without parole for juveniles is horrible, right? And look at how close we are to eradicating it–because in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons (2005) the Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for juveniles. It was the first step in a long series of reforms. In Graham v. Florida (2010) the Supreme Court felt comfortable relying on the same arguments to abolish life without parole for nonhomicide crimes. In Miller v. Alabama (2012) the Supreme Court relied on that logic to abolish mandatory life without parole for all juveniles, and then felt comfortable making that ruling retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016). We are now within striking distance of abolishing life without parole for juveniles. None of this would have been possible without Roper v. Simmons.

This is even truer for legislative/public campaigns than for judicial change. To make reform happen, we need wide public consensus–not just an agreement among progressives. We need our conservative and moderate friends to live with the new situation for a while, realize that the sky doesn’t fall if punishment is less extreme, and accustom themselves to the idea of further reform. A classic example is marijuana legalization. Recreational marijuana would not be on the ballot–within reach and polling great so far–if Californians of all persuasions didn’t have a chance to live with medical marijuana for years and realize that it was not the end of the world. Do you think we would have been here, at this point in time, if progressive voters had declined to vote for medical marijuana, claiming that limiting legalization to medical patients wasn’t good enough? Similarly, conservatives and centrists grew accustomed to same sex marriages because they lived with domestic partnerships. They will be willing to consider a reform of life without parole if and when they see that the death penalty was abolished and it didn’t lead to a rise in crime rates, a decline in public safety, or any other negative consequences. You and I already know that giving reformed, aging folks a chance at parole is also not a safety risk. But not everyone knows that, and we need our friends across the political map to agree with us. We can’t make change otherwise.

I’ve been studying criminal justice reforms for the last sixteen years. I have not seen a single criminal justice reform that sprang perfectly from nothing. Every change we’ve seen since 2008–and we’ve seen plenty, believe me–was the product of incremental, bipartisan reform. This will be no exception. We can’t get from A to Z skipping steps along the way. I know you’re ready for Z. So am I. But the people whose hearts and minds we have to change so that Z happens–and we can’t make it happen without them–need us to go through all the steps so that we can have a coalition. What we want won’t happen otherwise.

We all know what happened with Prop 62. It was exactly what happened with Prop 34 four years earlier. We lost by a small gap, and the death penalty remained, and it is still sucking the soul and the funds of California for the sake of absolutely nothing, as I explain in an article that’s coming out in a couple of months in The Green Bag (I’ll post it when it is published). But today we have more proof of how we ignore the incremental path of change at our own peril. Stephanie Lam wrote for the Mercury News:

State lawmakers have dismissed a bill by a Santa Clara County senator that would have provided a chance at release for some inmates serving life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder.

Sen. Dave Cortese, a San Jose Democrat, authored SB 94 in 2022 in hope of offering inmates who were convicted of murders committed before June 5, 1990, and who already have served a minimum of 25 years, opportunities to seek parole.

“After two years of negotiations and over a dozen deliberated amendments, I am incredibly disappointed that SB 94 was not granted the opportunity to be heard and the amendments considered for vote by the full Legislature,” Cortese said in a statement. “The bill, like those it would’ve helped, did not get its day in court.”

Does the bill make sense? Of course it does. It’s not automatic release, it’s a resentencing hearing for people who have already spent decades behind bars. If anyone knows that not everyone gets out on parole, it’s me. But folks, you can’t sell people on abolishing LWOP before you abolish the death penalty. You just can’t. I know there’s a moratorium. I know the death chamber has been dismantled. The reason it had to be done by executive decree is that it couldn’t yet be done through the legislature. I think that day is coming really fast, I really do. But the death penalty, like the Balrog, can be at its most vicious just as it appears to fall into the abyss. And until it finally does, all the beautiful speeches about how LWOP is merely “death by another name” and how we’re “retrenching” or “non-reform reforming,” won’t do. Either you don’t know how the sausage is made, or you pretend you don’t, but the result is that the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. And here we are. Again.

Two Federal Rulings on Campus Protests

This week saw two federal district court decisions against Harvard and UCLA, respectively, regarding their failure to protect their Jewish and Israeli students from antisemitic discrimination, which you can read in their entirety here and here. Both complaints have a run-through of the upsetting facts we saw at play in many college campuses last year. I’ve already seen some coverage of the decisions and, as expected, it is understandably politically inflamed (as is some of the language in the briefs and the decisions.) What I hope to contribute to the discussion is a concise run-through of the legal arguments made by the plaintiffs and the defendants, which may illuminate the issues that are likely to come up in future litigation on this topic in the fall.

The Harvard case is a ruling on a motion by Harvard University to strike a complaint, based on the Civil Rights Act, by Students Against Antisemitism (SAA), against the university for its failure to rein in antisemitic behaviors and actions that targeted Jewish and Israeli students. The court dismissed in part and granted in part. The Title VI case based on a deliberate indifference claim will go through, whereas the case based on direct discrimination will not.

Harvard raised two preliminary hurdles to the SAA lawsuit, the first of which involved SAA’s standing to bring it forth. There are three conditions for granting standing to an association: at least one member of the association must have standing to sue individually (members of SAA were affected and targeted by the litany of antisemitic events described in the lawsuit), the interests involved in the lawsuit are germane to the org’s purpose (in this case, fighting antisemitism), and the claims and types of relief sought do not require the participation of individual plaintiffs (which SAA can represent).

The second issue was that the lawsuit was unripe: Harvard argued that it was still in the process of formulating its response to antisemitism on campus. The court, however, rejected this argument, asserting its authority to rule on incidents that already happened. The lawsuit would examine whether actions Harvard had taken before the lawsuit was filed had been adequate and whether they will be adequate going forward.

On the merits, the court acknowledged that SAA brings a valid Title VI case on the basis of deliberate indifference. It has provided a prima facie showing that (1) SAA members suffered harm that (2) hindered their educational opportunities, (3) that the school knew of these deprivations, (4) that the deprivations were related to school programs and activities, and (5) that the school exhibited deliberate indifference toward the denial of these opportunities. Harvard argued that some steps to remedy the situation had been taken, but the court disagreed, characterizing the university response as “indecisive, vacillating, and at times internally contradictory.”

By contrast, the court did not find that SAA’s direct discrimination claim was valid. When arguing that discrimination has taken place, plaintiffs have to offer the right comparators: X is discriminated against while Y is not. The examples offered by SAA were diffuse and insufficient to show discrimination: they argued that Harvard canceled speakers who were trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) but not antisemitic speakers. In the broader context of the culture wars, if one is hell-bent on viewing all political questions as lying on a right-to-left axis, this argument might make sense: it shows a progressive bias in speaker invitations. But I think the court was right in discouraging this way of thinking about things, because it is crucially important to disaggregate how people think about various questions of social, political, and economic interest. Take a look, for example, at this interesting story in the Stanford Review. Overall, yes, there’s a proliferation of leftiness on campus, but when one digs into the nuances of student opinions, one finds rich diversity on questions of foreign policy, domestic civil rights, and fiscal policy. Students and faculty who are deprived of a say in the invitation of speakers on Israel/Gaza/Hamas/Palestine might not be deprived of a say in gender policies. I also think that the association of “rightthink” on gender matters and “rightthink” on the Middle East is misguided at best and poisonous at worst, for reasons that should be obvious to any thinking person on either side of both issues. I like that the court decided not to conflate this stuff.

The UCLA case that resulted in a preliminary injunction revolved around the university’s failure to dismantle an encampment at the Royce Quad, which barred students for entering for failing to dismantle an encampment. The injunction prohibits UCLA from offering any educational programming to which Jewish students do not have access, and from colluding in preventing Jewish students from attending programs on campus in the future where other students can do so.

The plaintiffs in this case, by contrast to the Harvard case, were three Jewish students, who argued that they were prevented from accessing the Royce Quad, including the library, because of an encampment whose members would confront them about their opinions about Israel. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs were directly affected, UCLA argued lack of standing, making the point that there was no proof that such hindrances would be in place in the future. The court, clearly incensed about the antisemitic incidents at UCLA, rejected this logic, expressing concerns about how the fall semester would unfold given the university’s paltry response to the spring encampment.

Another argument brought about by UCLA was lack of causation, which I think is best understood as a “wrong defendant” argument. The protestors, it is claimed, were private students and entities, and the university itself did not contribute to what happened with the encampments. The court swiftly did away with this arguments as well, finding that UCLA continues to offer educational opportunities knowing that the Jewish students cannot avail themselves of these opportunities (including physical access to campus areas and buildings).

There are three conditions for obtaining a preliminary injunction: (1) likelihood of success, (2) irreparable harm to the plaintiffs should the injunction not be granted, and (3) a balance of equities. It looks like the federal judge thought that this lawsuit would eventually succeed, that the students’ education would be hampered were the injunction not to be granted, and that the discomfort, such as it is, to UCLA in having to grant equal access to its programming to all students did not outweigh the injury to the plaintiffs.

A few general observations are in order. First, while not all the facts in these cases were germane for the disposition of these preliminary matters (the actual lawsuits could drag on for years), they do paint a distressing picture of the daily life on campus. The images from Columbia are, of course, in the news today due to their president’s resignation, but the stuff quoted in these lawsuits is profoundly upsetting and dovetails with things I’ve heard from clients and colleagues about other campuses. I’m left wondering whether the emotional effect of the real-time unfolding of these events will wear out as the lawsuits go on. That the judges in both cases were deeply disturbed is evident in both decisions, though the Massachusetts judge uses more measured tones.

The second observation has to do with the proverbial “incident of the dog in the nighttime”–an issue that some might have expected to be brought up, but does not come up in either case, which surprised me because of its centrality to the Brandeis lawsuit against Berkeley Law–namely, whether Zionism is germane to Judaism to the point that hostile action against people for adhering to Zionist worldviews counts as religious discrimination. It simply did not come up at all in either case. The UCLA decision identifies the plaintiffs as “three Jewish students who assert they have a religious obligation to support the Jewish state of Israel,” taking their nexus between religion and political opinion at face value. The Harvard decision summarily acknowledges the proper basis for discrimination: religion (against Jews) and national origin (against Israelis.) It looks like both judges were not interested in the minutiae of how this debate unfolds in the intellectual communities which they examined, such as: can you disaggregate Zionism from Israeliness, can you disaggregate it from Jewishness, can you disaggregate it from support of, or objection to, the Israeli government, and other hairsplitting typologies and dichotomies in which academics are profoundly interested but judges and lawyers are not. It might be that the judges simply concluded what many of us also have: if it walks and quacks like a duck, that’s what it is, regardless of the verbal pretzeling around who might be a Jew and nevertheless pass muster with the protestors. It’s also a valuable lesson for potential plaintiffs and defendants in these cases of what to focus on. I’ve recently observed that what seems of high importance to academic (e.g., the particulars of why this or that expression is an antisemitic dogwhistle given the history and semantics of bigotry) is of little importance to people more worried about concrete examples of physical violence, vandalism, blocking entrance, etc. What I take away from this is the following: plaintiffs can and should grow thicker skins and focus on clear, discrete examples of discrimination and administrative inaction, while defendants should not prepare to expound on why they were violent and vicious toward someone because of quality A but not quality B. Looks like, when things come to court, no one cares.

Joseph in the Joint: Fatalism, Transformation, and the Bible’s Most Illustrious Prisoner

In the last few weeks I’ve been sharing snippets from my new book in progress, Behind Ancient Bars. Chapter 2 of the book will be devoted to the Hebrew Bible’s most illustrious prisoner, Joseph. You can find the full story in Genesis 39-41. Briefly, Joseph is thrown in prison following a false rape accusation by the wife of Potiphar, to whom Joseph had been sold as a servant. The biblical story offers us a rather rich account of Joseph’s carceral experience, including his responsible role in prison management while a prisoner himself and his interaction with two fellow inmates (the chief cupbearer and the chief baker). We also learn of his unsuccessful efforts to have the chief cupbearer curry favor for him with Pharaoh and of his eventual release, and auspicious rise, when his dream interpretation skills are needed.

Medieval midrashists found Joseph a fascinating subject, but tended to focus on his dreams, the salacious story with Potiphar’s wife, and Joseph’s later reconciliation with the brothers who sold him to the Ishmaelites. But one also finds quite a bit about his prison journey there, and the expanded stories tend to adhere to two important messages. The first is a concerted effort to frame the entire incarceration journey—in terms of time as in terms of content—as orchestrated by God for specific purposes, suggesting God’s interest not only in the people of Israel but also in geopolitical matters. I see examples of this in other biblical incarceration stories, but it is especially pronounced here. Second, and relatedly, there is an idea I’ve already discussed in the context of Daniel, Esther, and Jeremiah: the notion that Joseph undergoes a penological transformation within confinement that prepares him for his prophetic leadership after reentering Egyptian society.

I’ve recently come across Nicholas Reid’s excellent book Prisons in Ancient Mesopotamia. In his analysis of primary sources, Reid urges us to use a wide lens when discussing prisons in antiquity, similar to what we now do in modern incarceration studies. He says this, with which I’m wholeheartedly in agreement:

When thinking of a history of prisons and imprisonment, one must look beyond the stated goals and stated functions of the prison to the actual practice. . . since prisons are multifunctional, the historical investigation into imprisonment should not revolve solely around the question of punishment. . . the adaptability of limiting corporal movement through imprisonment to meet numerous social goals and handle numerous social ‘problems’ has deep roots in history, even though direct connections and linear developments do not exist.

Even though Joseph was not sentenced to a prescribed period behind bars, and even though biblical punishment is usually retributive in nature, there is enough in the biblical descriptions and the midrashim to point to a message eerily similar to the one parroted in rehabilitation programs and parole hearings today: that incarceration is a “rock bottom” point in a prisoner’s journey that is an essential part of his or her coherent life story, that one goes down in order to go up, and that one develops important prosocial and other skills in confinement that set him or her up for a pivotal historical role postincarceration. In light of this, I decided to rewrite the Joseph story as a parole hearing transcript, relying heavily on the medieval midrashim. Here’s a short snippet:

PHARAOH: Okay, since we’ve moved to the inmate’s C-file, let’s see how he did in prison. From what I see from the record, you haven’t had many visitors in the twelve years you’ve been inside.

JOSEPH: No, Your Majesty. I believe only in the early days, when Zulycah still visited me.

AMHOST: I’m not sure I understand: The woman whom you claim falsely accused you of rape visited you in prison?

POTIPHAR: Your Priestly Eminence, since I oversee the prison, she can come and go as she pleases, and she even helps me with the logistics.

PHARAOH: And when she visited you, what did you talk about?

JOSEPH: She was trying to persuade me to give in to her. You know, “How ‎long wilt thou remain in this house? do but listen unto my voice, and I will release thee from ‎thy prison.” Like that. I had to keep saying: It is better for me to remain in this house, ‎than to listen unto thy words, and transgress against God.[1]

AMHOST: I guess we keep things nice and cushy for you in Thebes. Some people would easily mistake you for a prison administrator, rather than an actual prisoner, and think Potiphar just moved you to another job to put some distance between you and his wife.[2]

MERITAMUM: It’s not like that, Your Grace. The write-up about the visit documents that the inmate was repeatedly threatened by his accuser‎. She was overheard saying, “if thou wilt not do my wishes, I will put out thine eyes, and I will put ‎additional chains upon thy feet, and I will surrender thee into the hands of such as thou hast ‎not known, neither yesterday nor day before yesterday.”

HAT: Looks like it was even worse. I have the 128 write-up that she put in his file, and it says that, while they were setting the table at chow hall, cleaning the drinking glasses and all that, she would say to him: ‘In this matter, I mistreated [ashaktikha] you. As you live, I will mistreat you regarding other matters.’

MERITARIUM: Oh, but he gave as good as he got. Basically played her at her own game. Like she said “ashaktikha,” so he would say to her: ‘[God] “Performs justice for the oppressed [laashukim].”’ (Psalms 146:7) [She would say:] ‘I will reduce your sustenance.’ He would say to her: ‘[God] “Provides food for the hungry.”’ (Psalms 146:7) [She would say:] ‘I will shackle you.’ He would say to her: ‘“The Lord frees the imprisoned.”’ (Psalms 146:7) [She would say:] ‘I will cause you to be bent over.’ He would say to her: ‘“The Lord straightens the bent.”’ (Psalms 146:8) [She would say:] ‘I will blind your eyes.’ He would say to her: ‘“The Lord opens the eyes of the blind.”’ (Psalms 146:8)[3]

PHARAOH: Dear Maat. How far did all of this go?

MERITARIUM: We’re not entirely sure, because there’s a lot of hearsay in prison intelligence. Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi Aḥa, you know, that sort of thing. But rumor was that she placed an iron bar beneath his neck until he would direct his glance toward her and look at her. Nevertheless, he would not look at her. That is what is written: “They tortured his legs with chains; his body was placed in iron.” (Psalms 105:18)[4]

PHARAOH: Nice facility you run there, Potiphar.

POTIPHAR: I can’t possibly screen my own wife from the list of visitors, Your Majesty.

PHARAOH: Why would you let her do it? Did you think he was guilty?

POTIPHAR: Oh, no, I knew he was innocent. Even my kids knew.

PHARAOH: What?

POTIPHAR: We all knew. My kid kept saying, “stop beating on him, my mom is lying.”[5] Even on the way in, when I was booking him, I said to him, “Joseph, I know you didn’t do this, but I’m locking you up so I will not attach stigma to my children.”[6]

MERITAMUM: And even so, Your Majesty, when she visited him in prison, it didn’t seem to faze the Inmate. He was overheard replying, hold on, it’s hard to read the hieroglyphs, “‎Behold the God of all the earth, he is able to deliver me from all that thou wouldst do unto me. ‎For he giveth sight to the blind and he freeth the captives and he preserveth the strangers ‎that are in the land they never knew.” Eventually she gave up and stopped coming.  

PHARAOH: Do we have any laudatory chronos in the file?

MERITAMUM: Yes, Your Majesty. The inmate was charged, de facto, with the functioning of the entire administration.

PHARAOH: You entrusted. The entire prison administration. To a prisoner.

POTIPHAR: The whole thing. Eating, drinking, binding people, releasing them, torturing them, giving them a rest. He would call the whole thing and whatever he said, went.[7]

HAT: It says in this chrono, “the minister did not have to see anything he put in the inmate’s hand.” I’m not sure what this means.

POTIPHAR: It means I didn’t have to supervise him, because God helped him succeed in prison as well as on the outside. It’s a kal vahomer.

HAT: A what?

POTIPHAR: A kal vahomer. Argument a fortiori. They have to say he was successful in prison, because success on the outside would be self-evident.[8]

HAT: See, I read it differently. I read it that you didn’t see anything fishy or poorly performed.[9]

POTIPHAR: You know these prison write-ups. You can read them seventy different ways.

HAT: Mr. Jacobson, do you feel that you were treated fairly in prison?

JOSEPH: To be honest, I did end up feeling relieved. Back home, whenever we ate, my father would give me the choice portions, and I always had to look over my shoulder lest my brothers take revenge. And I confess that here in prison I could breathe a bit easier. But God likes to give me a challenge, so I figure he’ll sic a bear on me anytime soon.[10]

HAT: Not sure I understand what the bear’s got to do with any of this.

JOSEPH: It’s got to do with the grain.

AMHOST: What grain?

JOSEPH: You’ll see.


[1] Sefer HaYashar (midrash), Book of Genesis, Vayeshev 19

[2] McKay (2009).

[3] Bereshit Rabbah 87: 10.

[4] Bereshit Rabbah 87: 10.

[5] Sefer HaYashar (midrash), Book of Genesis, Vayeshev 18-19

[6] Bereshit Rabbah 87: 9.

[7] Midrash Sekhel Tov, Bereshit 39:22:2

[8] Bereshit Rabbah 87:10; Midrash Sekhel Tov, Genesis 39:23:3.

[9] Midrash Sekhel Tov, Bereshit 39:23:2

[10] Midrash Sekhel Tov, Bereshit 39:23:4

Dark Esther

My new project Behind Ancient Bars looks at several prominent incarceration stories in the Hebrew Bible. One that is often missed is Esther’s stint at Ahasuerus’s harem. Because most of the story is a bedroom farce, and some of it a bloodthirsty schadenfreude fest, many commentators skip over Esther’s confinement before she is taken to the king, which you can find in Chapter 2. But this short vignette illuminates not only commentary about empire in general (and probably Persian empire in particular), but also about the multiple forms of vulnerability of women and the ways in which governmental systems are crafted to exploit these vulnerabilities. This paints the festive Esther story a much darker, more sinister hue.

Seeing the Esther story as an incarceration story to begin with requires doing what modern penologists do on the regular: expanding our definition of incarceration. I find it interesting that people who happily read Foucault and Goffman, seeing obvious parallels and symmetries among total institutions and across the carceral archipelago, suddenly adopt a hyper-legalistic approach to punishment in antiquity, forcefully arguing that there is no incarceration in the bible because it is not listed as a sanction for a criminal conviction in Deuteronomy or in Hammurabi’s law. If incarceration scholarship in modernity can look at pretrial detention, immigration detention, and even cattle towns–because those are carceral experiences–then incarceration scholarship in antiquity can and should encompass political detention and shady government programs for locking up and reeducating children. And indeed, some commentary on the Book of Esther moves away from the entertaining popular presentations of beauty pageants to identifying incarceration elements.

How much of this represents true carceral practices, or is a realistic portrayal of royal harems, is hotly debated. Summarizing the literature for and against a reading of Esther as fiction, Adele Berlin opines that the story, like the Daniel story, dates to the Hellenistic period, and reflects stereotypical Athenian perceptions of Persia: “luxury, hierarchy, bureaucracy, wine drinking, the postal system, imperial law, bowing down, eunuchs, impalement, a royal garden, and a sexually virtuous queen.” But at least some of this fed commentators who used it to glean more about imperial Persian governmentality.

The background to the Esther story is well known: during a royal feast with his courtiers, an inebriated king orders his queen, Vashti, to appear before the courtiers. She refuses, angering the king, and is either banished or executed, which results in a vacancy. The king’s servants propose that all good looking virgins in the kingdom be gathered at the “women’s house” in Shushan, the capital, under the supervision of Hege, the king’s eunuch, so that the king may pick whichever one pleases him to be his queen in lieu of Vashti.

Julia Schwartzmann points out that the details of Esther’s arrival in the harem can be disturbing to modern readers, because of Mordechai and Esther’s “ambiguous uncle/niece relationship, the way Mordechai hands over Esther to the king’s harem, and his manipulative handling of his silent and passive niece.” Not only modern readers: Two important medieval commentators, Abraham Ibn Ezra and Immanuel of Rome, propose that Mordechai planned, as a foster parent, to marry his beautiful charge, a-la Dickens character John Jarndyce (his charge in the book, you’ll remember, is also called Esther!) One can only imagine many young women and girls in similarly precarious situations who would end up swept into the harem–a rather hopeless prospect, as only one girl would be officially crowned queen, and as no girl, per Ibn Ezra, would be available for marriage or any life outside the harem after having bedded the king–with girls like Esther, without parents and with guardians who have agendas beyond their charges’ best interests, more vulnerable to apprehension and lockdown.

The pageant story will have us believe that the girls gathered at the capital out of their own free will, but some commentators see this more as a coercive executive action. Shelom Esther draws the readers’ attention to the large number of officers and bureaucrats involved in the concubine-gathering operation, which had to visit each house to prevent parents from hiding their daughters. Joseph Ibin Yahya adds that Mordechai hid Esther, and that she was taken against his will and against hers.

The administration of the harem, as we saw in the Daniel court stories, is given to eunuchs. The word “saris” (eunuch) might be used differently in different biblical contexts, and could be a reference to a high government official rather than to the sexuality of these personages, but what we know of various empires–especially the Persian empire–suggests that, at least in some contexts, the meanings converge. Last week, at our archaeology course, Brett Kaufman told us that it was common to entrust military commands in imperial armies to eunuchs because they would have no dynastic aspirations and thus would not attempt to usurp the throne. But it makes sense that confinement operations, where sexual exploitation is a serious risk, would be entrusted to sexually inactive supervisors, as 19th century commentator Malbim very explicitly explains.

Even if sexual abuse was not a risk, there were other ways to render the eunuchs’ charges pliable and docile. Much is made in chapter 2 of the issue of cosmetics (“tamrukim”). Some commentators, like Ibn Yahya, interpret these in a straightforward way as beauty-enhancing products, while others, like Immanuel of Rome, thought these could be medications, including first-aid supplies. What is interesting is that the sole purveyors of these items were the eunuchs, which Malbim shrewdly interprets as part and parcel of the king’s power play which, in turn, reflects the lessons learned from the Vashti episode:

He feared that [the girl he would choose] would not want to marry him, and [his advisors] said that after they examined those who came willingly and did not find an appropriate wife for him, then he will appoint officers and they will round up all the girls with a strong arm, (and they even shrewdly said that he should appoint new officers, so that it would be someone who has not been bribed to ignore the rich people’s girls), and against the fear based on his memory, and the concern that [the prospective bride] would do as Vashti did, they advised to gather the girls around Hege, and that they must not bring their own cosmetics from home, but rather only receive them from the eunuchs, and from this side will always be submissive toward the Eunuch and not uppity as Vashti was.

Malbim on Esther 2: 3: 2

When Julia Schwarzmann marvels at how captivating the Esther story is given its telenovela-like synopsis, I want to add: the power of the story is that both ancient and modern readers would recognize the patriarchal fear of subversive and disobedience, the injured pride, the opportunities for exploitation and exertion of power. But it also points to a source of power and ingenuity on the part of the incarcerated person. We’ve already seen how Daniel, when failing to negotiate his diet with chief Eunuch Ashpenaz, makes a deal with “the waiter” on the sly to receive his special vegan rations. Here, we see Esther realizing that the key to surviving in the harem is to charm Hege, who proceeds to favor her with food and luxury items.

Another aspect of the story that exudes verisimilitude is Mordechai’s concern for Esther’s welfare–whether because of the general situation or because, at his request, she hid her identity from harem management. He is told to come to the harem yard every day to inquire after her, and perhaps one advantage of charming the pants off Hege was the availability of daily reports of her wellbeing.

By contrast to the later story of her tenure as queen, Esther of chapter 2 is described passively: she is beautiful, parentless, young, vulnerable, and puppeteered by her uncle/guardian as well as by the various government officials. But between the lines, one finds glimmers of transformation. Placed in a complicated logistical and social scenario, Esther figures out that personal charm and charisma are useful tools, and that performing modesty and restraint pays off. Both Ibn Ezra and Immanuel of Rome emphasize that her restraint, which earned her the favor of Hege, reflect her intelligence. Ibn Yahya opines that she had the good fortune to be taken to the king in the winter, when one enjoys intimacy and closeness more than in summer, thus improving the odds of being the king’s favorite, but what if Hege, who was in her corner, was the one in charge of the schedule and deliberately scheduled her sexual audition for an auspicious date? The emerging picture is one of strategic thinking, charming the key people responsible for her welfare, and performing royal virtue even prior to her selection (perhaps impressing Hege as “queen material”) which the story does not demonize or regard as duplicitous but rather as an understandable, even commendable, survival strategy.

This is interesting for two reasons. The first is that, regardless of the official goal of incarceration in biblical stories, there is evidence of personal transformation occurring behind bars. Martin Pritkin, who approaches biblical punishment from a more doctrinal perspective, finds evidence of rehabilitative motives amidst the retributive rationales, but I think these stories make a somewhat different point: there’s a difference between the espoused nature of a confinement program and the sociological and psychological features of the experience of going though said program. Second, and relatedly, personal transformations in incarceration stories are a means to an end. Notably, incarceration serves as a cauldron, a crucible, a vehicle, for developing leadership characteristics that predict the protagonist’s success at his or her post-incarceration life. Joseph, for example, is incarcerated as punishment for a wrongful accusation or to allow Potiphar and his household to save face; behind bars, however, he develops not only the administrative and logistics acumen that will later serve him well in Egyptian administration, but also a prosocial approach to dream interpretation and the skills of getting along with different kinds of people (skills he lacked as a youth). Daniel learns some wheeling and dealing and perhaps impresses Ashpenaz and “the waiter” with his initiative. Jeremiah, admittedly a “finished character” by the time of his incarceration, has an opportunity to flex against Zedekiah and to leverage his existing friendship with Ebed Melekh to obtain relief, as well as to forge an important alliance with Nebuchadnezzar that grants him relative freedom in exile. And Esther’s reputation for virtuousness and humility and capacity to marshal personal charm and good looks to make important friendships goes a long way toward earning the favor of the king, both at her audition and later, when her skills are needed at a time of national crisis. The dire straits of incarceration are an essential part of the formulaic, fatalistic narrative. Theologically, they support the idea that the divine jails these people to foster the development of the personal characteristics that will come in handy later. I don’t see this as being much different than the sort of logic I see and here at many a rehabilitation program in prisons–namely, the way people are encouraged to construct and tell a coherent personal narrative, in which the prison journey, the crucible of change, is an essential ingredient on the way up, and support for an “everything happens for a reason” notion of meaning-making.

There are two ways of looking at this–benign and cynical. The benign approach relies on Victor Frankl’s logotherapy to argue that people survive and thrive after suffering–even extreme suffering–by imbuing their experiences with meanings. Shadd Maruna’s Making Good offers many examples for the role that a personal narrative of hardship and redemption plays in desistance from reoffending. The more cynical approach, akin to the one I developed in Yesterday’s Monsters, is that rehabilitative programming becomes sort of a mediocre community play that has to follow a script that prison authorities and parole commissioners recognize and validate: follower-to-leader, toxic-thinking-to-empathy, anger-to-understanding, opacity-to-insight. These scripts have a quasi-theological flavor (in some cases, the programs that encourage them, such as Twelve Steps groups, actually have a religion component.) Whether or not the fatalism and meaning-making project is genuine or artificial, it is a well-recognized story, and so, these incarceration stories feel familiar and similar to each other because they evoke a recognizable, universally familiar trope.

Political Incarceration Under Siege: Jeremiah in the Pit of Mire

An important question in the sociology of punishment is whether the social reaction to deviance/challenge becomes more ferocious during times of social and political turmoil. This question is often attributed to Emile Durkheim and his concept of anomie. As Bruce DiCristina explains, Durkheim used the term “anomie” in various different ways in his scholarship: insufficient regulation of interactions, insufficient regulation of desires, excessive imprecision and weakening of the collective consciousness, and a decline in morality. Most crime and punishment theorists I am familiar with are interested in whether social control rises when the consensus is challenged: For example, Kai Erikson shows that, in Puritan colonies, repression and swift punishment were at their height during times in which religious authorities felt most challenged and imperiled. Similarly, there is a wonderful article by Martin Killias that compares 47 countries (as of 1972) in terms of their political structure and incarceration rates. Killias finds that countries plagued by dictatorships, high power concentration, unemployment, and unequal income distribution tend to be more punitive. Killias ties these punishment-enhancing factors into the concept of a “legitimation crisis,” which occurs “when rulers cannot meet the standards emanating from their own self-justification and when the power gap between rulers and subordinates grow and power is concentrated among a few.”

This makes a lot of sense: it doesn’t take a lot of heavy theorizing to figure out that a society at risk, in which the leadership faces challenges, lashes out at people and displays punitive power in a last-ditch effort to instill fear, if not earn legitimacy. A classic example of this can be found in Jeremiah, where the biblical authors outdid themselves painting a vivid picture of a city under siege, a king in decline, conflicts, intrigue, and secrets, and the resulting incarceration of a prophet suspected of being an enemy shill.

Harold Wilmington offers a thorough biographical sketch of Jeremiah, from which one learns that his fortunes swung high and low in the last few days of the kingdom of Judah. During the discovery (or the “discovery”) of the Torah under King Josiah’s reign, he served in an official capacity, helping implement religious reforms, but after Josiah was felled in the battle against Pharaoh Necho, Jeremiah fell out of favor with his descendants. The biblical text (as well as Wilmington’s biography) paints a picture of someone well known throughout the Judean kingdom as nobody’s patsy, and certainly someone who provokes strong reactions: steadfast friends and bitter enemies abound.

The text suggests that Jeremiah’s incarceration during the Babylonian siege was not his first time at the rodeo. In Jeremiah 36:5-6, the prophet dictates his prophecy to his scribe, Baruch ben Neriah, instructing the scribe to read the prophecy in public because “I am detained; I cannot go to the house of God.” It’s possible that short-term political detention of a tiresome dissident was a usual government approach during Josiah’s descendants’ reigns; the text, which describes a failed manhunt for Jeremiah and for Baruch, certainly suggests that Jeremiah was acting in the shadow of the law and had to evade capture. But things really come to a head under Zedekiah, the last king of Judea, a puppet monarch instilled by Nebuchadnezzar. Kevin Tolley contextualizes Jeremiah’s imprisonment:

Zedekiah came to the throne at a time of great spiritual, economic, and political turmoil. The previous kings had made “disastrous choices.” The city was caught between two external political powers since both Egypt and Babylon vied for power. Over the past decades, loyalties had shifted and allegiances had waned as Jerusalem was continually controlled by one side or another. Egypt had heavily taxed the people (2 Kings 23:33), and Babylon had pillaged the temple and national coffers and had exiled a portion of the inhabitants, leaving the state in financial ruin (2 Kings 24:13). Zedekiah had witnessed the murder of his father, Josiah, and the exile of his brother Jehoahaz. He had seen his brother Jehoiakim mismanage Jerusalem, which had caused the might of Babylon to come down on the city for a three-month siege, resulting in the death of Jehoiakim and the exile of his son Jehoiachin. Thousands of people were deported, and both the city’s economy and defenses were in shambles. Civil unrest prevailed, and various political groups competed for power. . .

For the next few years, Zedekiah maintained a quiet reign. The Babylonians had successfully cowed him. Few would have dared to question the might of Babylon after their armies had just sacked the city. Over his eleven-year reign, Zedekiah realized he needed to rebuild without provoking the ire of either Babylon or Egypt. Zedekiah was a well-intentioned leader (Jeremiah 38:14–16), but he was weak, vacillating, and fearful of public opinion (Jeremiah 38:5, 19).

Throughout Zedekiah’s reign, various political groups pressured Zedekiah to break his oath of allegiance to Nebuchadnezzar. Rumors began to arise that Egypt would assist in a rebellion against Babylon. News of civil unrest in Babylon reached Jerusalem; Zedekiah gave in to the pressures and joined an alliance with Egypt to rebel against Babylon (2 Kings 24:20). And so the countdown to Jerusalem’s destruction began.

In January 588 BC Nebuchadnezzar caught wind of the rebellion and moved quickly against Jerusalem, laying siege to the city. The blockade ultimately lasted over eighteen months. In the spring or summer of 588 BC, Judah became hopeful when the Egyptians began to march toward Jerusalem (Jeremiah 37:5–7). Nebuchadnezzar briefly left the siege of Jerusalem to smash this Egyptian resistance, and then he quickly returned Jerusalem. Zedekiah was in a desperate situation.

Kevin Tolley, “The Imprisonment of Jeremiah in Its Historical Context,” Religious Educator 20(3) 2019, https://rsc.byu.edu/religious-educator/vol-20-no-3-2019

What happens next, vividly described in Jeremiah 37-38, is a veritable political thriller. As the Babylonians lay siege to the city, Jeremiah prophesied the destruction of the city and the temple (presenting Nebuchadnezzar as an instrument of God) and outlined the three options: leave the city by escaping the siege, remain in the city and be ravaged by the Babylonians, or surrender and hope for the best. Jeremiah’s advice to surrender to the Babylonians did not sit well with a group of government officials, who managed to catch Jeremiah when he was dealing with some property matters at the Benjamin Gate. One of them, Irijah, accused Jeremiah of defecting to the Babylonians. Jeremiah said, “lie! I’m not defecting!,” but the denials fell on deaf ears and he was brought to the officials, who beat him up and put him in a place described as “beit ha’asur.”

Religious commentators fault the government officials for this grievous miscarriage of justice, and the classical midrashim, invested in Jeremiah’s image as righteous, all use remarkable linguistic gymnastics to explain how bad of a king Zedekiah was (by “bad” they don’t mean “politically weak, manipulated by the bureaucracy, and speaks out of both sides of his mouth,” but rather, “disloyal to God.”) Agaddat Bereshit 35:2 and Esther Rabbah, Petichta 6 both rely on the fact that Zedeikah is not described as a “king” (a word associated with the righteous), but rather through the verb “to reign” (suggesting that he is unworthy of the descriptive noun). But if one reads this story as a political thriller, rather than a theological morality tale, I think there is enough in the text to suggest that Jeremiah could be reasonably believed to be a Babylonian shill. Not only was he advocating surrender during a stressful time, which could erode everyone’s morale given the siege and resulting hunger, but he is later said to have been released and treated well in Babylonia (perhaps as an expression of Nebuchadnezzar’s gratitude?).

Rembrandt Van Rijn, The Prophet Jeremiah Mourning over the Destruction of Jerusalem, 1630

What sort of prison was “beit ha’asur”? Notably, the text does not speak in plural (‘beit ha’asurim”), and this perhaps strengthens the description of this facility: it is the house of Jonathan the scribe, converted into a makeshift jail, perhaps specifically to hold Jeremiah (was Jonathan in cahoots with Jeremiah’s jailers?) The architecture of this improvised prison is somewhat unclear, and different commentators have different takes on it. Jeremiah was put in “beit habor” and in the “hanuyot”, where he is said to sit for “many days.” The “bor,” translated as a pit, is said by 18th century commentator David Altschuler (“Metzudat David”) to be the worst place in prison (think “down in the hole”). But what are the “hanuyot”? Rashi translates this as “cells,” but Altschuler opts for the literal translation as “stores,” and Medieval commentator Radak explains that these stores were also converted into prison cells, akin to the conversion of Jonathan’s house. What I find interesting about this “hanuyot” business is that it is supported by some of today’s controversies about evidence of incarceration. Last week, as part of my rabbinical program, I attended our summer intensive, during which we took a phenomenal archaeology course with the one and only Brett Kaufman, who told me that some places where locked rooms were found were initially thought to be storage places, only to later be found to evince evidence that people were housed there (I need to dig, pun intended, deeper into this issue of material culture support for confinement structure.)

At this point, we’re thrown into a web of political intrigue to rival Game of Thrones. Zedekiah, who we already know is viewed very unfavorably in this text, gets Jeremiah out and into his own house in secret, asking him for the prophesy. Jeremiah repeats his dire predictions about Babylon, also complaining, “how have I sinned against you, your servants, and this people, that you put me in jail?” Jeremiah points to the fact that, so far, his predictive ability exceeds that of other prophets, who mistakenly (or perhaps buoyed by his brief sojourn in Egypt) prophesied that the King of Babylon would not move against Jerusalem. Jeremiah begs Zedekiah: “Don’t send me back to sit in the house of Jonathan the scribe, so I will not die there.” Zedekiah relents and moves Jeremiah to a place called “hatzar ha’matarah.”

Commentators differ widely on how they perceive this new space, which is obviously better than the “bor” and “hanuyot” area. Malbim says that Jeremiah sat there of his own free will, meaning that it was not a confinement space. Chomat Anakh says that this was a “spacious place, and even though it was still a prison, Jeremiah was not sorry” about the change in his circumstances. Metzudat David says that “incarceration wasn’t so hard there” and adds an important detail: that Jeremiah received bread from the bakeries every day until the bread supply was depleted, from which we learn that hunger and deprivation was beginning to affect everyone on the outside, too. Steinsaltz refers to this place as a “detention camp of sorts,” identifying it with a prior mention of the same place in Jeremiah 32:2. If these two places are not telling of the same incident, this implies that hatzar ha’matarah might have been a permanent detention camp, whereas the “bor” and the “hanuyot” were ad-hoc places with worse conditions, perhaps fashioned specifically for Jeremiah.

The story doesn’t end there, because apparently Jeremiah continues to advocate surrendering to the Babylonians even from his confinement in hatzar ha’matarah. Ministers who hear him speak to the people (unclear whether in person or through a scribe) turn to Zedekiah, asking for Jeremiah to be executed “for he disheartens the solders who remain in this town and the people when he speaks thus to them, because this man does not speak for the benefit/welfare of these people, but for evil.” If one removes the religious, pro-Jeremiah filter from this incident, the ministers’ concern seems valid, especially when mitigated by the lens of a siege and the prospect of destruction. Anyway, Zedekiah gives in, with a heavy implication that these ministers are more powerful than him and he simply does not have the clout to oppose them.

The descriptions of what happens next are horrifyingly vivid. The ministers use ropes to lower Jeremiah into a pit within hatzar ha’matarah, which is said to belong to one of Zedekiah’s sons. The cistern does not have water; it has mire, and Jeremiah sinks into it. But not all his friends have abandoned him. Ebed-melech the Cushite (or the Ethiopian, depending on translation), who was a eunuch in the king’s service, hears of this, and complains to the king that Jeremiah is to unjustly die of hunger. Zedekiah changes course again, ordering Ebed-Melech to take thirty men and pull Jeremiah out of the cistern.

The text offers a detailed description of the mechanics of this liberation effort. Ebed-Melech proceeds to take rags from the treasury and lower them carefully into the cistern using ropes (commentators explain that he does this so as not to drench them in mire.) He then calls out to Jeremiah to wrap these rags under his armpits, between his skin and the ropes. Once Jeremiah pads his armpits, the men pull the ropes, getting him out of the cistern, and returning him to his less constrictive confinement at hatzar ha’matarah.

It’s hard to tell who Zedekiah is more afraid of: Jeremiah, who perhaps he believes is telling him the truth, or the ministers, who can bring him down. Perhaps his concern for Jeremiah’s welfare is part and parcel of his fear of the Babylonians and he, like his ministers, suspects that Jeremiah is in cahoots with them. In any case, he tries to eat the cake and leave it whole. He again brings Jeremiah in, in private, through the third entrance of the House of God, and asks him to tell him the truth. Jeremiah understandably hesitates: “If I tell you, you will kill me for sure, and if I offer advice, you won’t follow it.” After Zedekiah swears he will spare Jeremiah’s life and protect him from his enemies, and Jeremiah repeats his dire predictions about the Babylonian destruction of the city and his advice to surrender so as to save it. Perhaps inspired by his own recent predicament, Jeremiah uses the pit of mire as a metaphor for Zedekiah’s fate. Leslie Allen comments that the “two crises are linked as cause and effect. The rejection of the prophetic message that resulted in Jeremiah’s dire predicament, despite the partial amelioration granted by the king, was to land Zedekiah himself in a comparable predicament. . . Zedekiah rescued Jeremiah from mud, but the king’s friends had abandoned him to it.”

Zedekiah keeps his word: he does not return Jeremiah to Jonathan’s house, but rather to hatzar ha’matarah. He even instructs Jeremiah to lie to the ministers and obfuscate about the true nature of his conversation with the king. Jeremiah manages to effectively deceive the ministers about his royal interview, and as a consequence remains in hatzar ha’matarah until the city falls. Notably, Zedekiah does not actually follow Jeremiah’s advice, and as a consequence sees his sons executed before he is blinded by the conqueror. Jeremiah fares better under the new empire–Nebuchadnezzar orders his captains and eunuchs to set him free, which they do, and he continues to prophesy to the freshly defeated people.

There are several remarkable features to this story. The first is the detailed, quasi-documentary description of the various confinement facilities: a pit, or pits; cells, or makeshift cells from converted storage rooms; a home converted into a makeshift facility as the worst location; an easier detention center. We are provided the minutia of lowering someone to the pit and elevating them from it, including the humane (?) measure of padding their armpits so they are not cut by the ropes. We are also told, akin to what we saw in Daniel’s story, details about food rationing, which are especially important during the miseries of a siege. And, we are offered a window into the use of incarceration as a tool in political conflict and intrigue, in which even the incarcerated person holds some modicum of negotiation power and how that plays into the reversals of fortune in the story.

This story is also a microcosm, a window into Zedekiah’s court. One thing I notice about all these exilic incarceration stories is the way the biblical authors use them: as a good index of quality of governance, akin to the well-known Tolstoy maxim. Lovers of Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish will remember his foundational distinction between punishment in antiquity (dramatic, violent, centralized) and punishment in modernity (decentralized, vague, aimed at the soul, normalizing, self-monitored). Foucault saw the prison as the epitome of a modern way of punishment, identifying earlier historical periods with corporal punishment. I think that descriptions of prison in antiquity both strengthen and challenge his framework. On one hand, incarceration stories tend to portray the regimes that run the prisons (Egypt, Persia, Babylon) and jails as capricious, risky, easily swayed by things like dreams or conspiracies, and spiteful. The power of incarceration is centralized and brutal. On the other hand, these are, undoubtedly, prisons. The sources do not make the distinction that modern penologists (including Foucault) make between prisons and corporal punishment. In other words, they support what I’ve come to see as true since we wrote Fester: incarceration IS corporal punishment. It can come in different flavors: it could be a drab, gray, vague experience at a modern juvenile facility that destroys the soul and makes people obedient and docile, or it can be the drama of throwing a particular person into a pit of mire and getting him out. But both are incarceration. We can, and should, revisit Discipline and Punish by decoupling prisons from modernity, and by seeing incarceration modes not as a historical rift, but along a historical continuum.

Behind Ancient Bars: Daniel’s Diet

This month I started working on what will eventually become my next book, tentatively titled Behind Ancient Bars. In this book I hope to illuminate the Biblical and Talmudic incarceration experience, and hopefully put to bed some misconceptions held by modern penologists and some held by historians of antiquity. Every penology textbook I’m familiar with speeds through punishment in antiquity, retrenching the common assumption that prison is a product of modernity and contrasting it to its predecessor, corporal punishment.

In an environment saturated with incarceration, it’s hard to see it as anything but modern, but once you start looking for it, you can’t unsee it: the Hebrew bible and the Talmud are filled with references to prisons and jails, and while nothing in antiquity would have come close to resembling our modern correctional apparatus, confinement was very much present in the sociopolitical arena. Moreover, what we’ve been educated to see as a rift is more of a continuum: not only does the variation in carceral experiences today echo the variation in antiquity, but the boundary between prison and corporal punishment is very, very blurry, if it even exists (working on FESTER was the starkest confirmation for me that prison IS corporal punishment.)

There’s not a shred of archaeological evidence of prisons and jails from empires thousands of years ago, and the texts we have are not trustworthy descriptions of confinement. Rather, they tell us something about what would have been within the realm of the imaginable for their authors, and in the process, have something to say about politics, personal transformation, and fatalism.

The story of Daniel and his three friends, Hananyah, Mishael, and Azaryah, is a case in point, and you can find it in Daniel ch. 1. The book opens with Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar’s victorious siege on Jerusalem, during which the Babylonians captured the implements of the temple into the land of Shinar, where they were deposited into the divine treasury. The king then ordered his high minister, Ashpenaz, to bring forth young Judahites of noble descent, teach them Babylonian literature and language, and feed them at the king’s expense, intending to incorporate them into the Babylonian administration. One of these children, Daniel, resolved not to defile himself (“lo itga’el”) with the Pat Bag and the wine, and after Ashpenaz expressed concern that his own life would be at risk if the children appeared poorly, appealed to the server/bursar to feed him and the other Judahites legumes and water. After a ten-day trial period, Daniel & Co. looked haler and healthier than the kids who fed on the path bag. The bursar continued to “carry” (remove? Keep for himself?) the king-allotted rations for the four and to serve them seeds instead. The kids are told to have done very well at the training, and when they came to the king, they were found to excel far beyond members of his senior administration.

Much of the exegetic chatter about this curious story focuses on Daniel’s refusal of the “path bag,” trying to establish precisely what was wrong with it. This is of deep interest to me, because I’ve been long interested in the awfulness of prison food, and Chad and I devoted much of the second chapter of FESTER to the horrific FUBAR of prison kitchens during COVID-19 (some of this story, complete with original emails, is here.) Of course, most religious commentators are not quite interested in that: rather, they spend their exegetical energy on explaining that Daniel et al. were trying to adhere to kashruth laws, the provenance of which is the ritual slaughter instruction in Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14, but which were far from developed in the early exilic period. Other commentators hypothesize that the four young Judahites were concerned about the possible use of the king’s meat and wine as libations to foreign gods. The dietary discussion among commentators then becomes a halakhic “hook” for backdating cleanliness and kashruth to the biblical text, thus creating linkages between the Torah prohibitions and the meticulous kashruth industrial complex of later periods. There’s a broader context to all this: revulsion at another nation’s food is often a proxy for differentiation, separation, setting oneself apart. As Daphne Barak-Erez explains in Outlawed Pigs, disgust of pig flesh has deep roots in Jewish tradition, and its implications persist to this day, and it could explain why this diet thing might have resonated as much as it has (it’s also worth considering, as I’m reminded by Rabbi Adam Chalom, that the Book of Daniel was likely composed during the Hellenistic period, when swine sacrifices and diet-based persecutions would explain the central role of diet in this story). As a secular humanistic Jew interested in penology, though, I find these particulars ancillary to the much more fundamental question about this curious story: what sort of facility, regime, or program, was this, exactly, and how does it relate to the overall Babylonian colonial project?

The exposition to the story places it in the context of the conquering of Jerusalem and seems to suggest an administrative response straight out of the playbook of colonial governance: identify potential leaders among the nobility of conquered population, remove them from potential leadership positions among their populace, bring them to the metropole, and coopt them into the colonial scheme through middle-management positions within the metropolitan government apparatus. Where this program lies along the continuum between benign and sinister, empowering and coercive, is fairly unclear. What we do know is this: Daniel, Hananya, Mishael, and Azarya are still children when the story takes place, and alongside them there are many other children subject to the same regime, most of which are not Judahites. The quartet (perhaps like all children in the program) is given Babylonian names (Belshatzar, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed Nego), a practice reminiscent of the “entry rituals” that Erving Goffman describes in Total Institutions. They are entrusted to the care of a high official (perhaps a minister, perhaps a eunuch), and their period of confinement, as explained above, includes an educational/vocational component: they are to learn Babylonian and the art of Babylonian governance, and when their three years of training conclude, they are expected to take a role in the Babylonian administration. They receive state-provided rations (“Path Bag HaMelech”) that are uniform for all residents of the facility. There is a special functionary who is responsible for the provision of foods, and he is identified as the “meltzar” (a word that will come to mean “waiter” or “server” in modern Hebrew.) It is also made clear that this is a high-stakes program: Ashpenaz himself—marked as a high administrator in Nebuchadnezzar’s court and clearly the chief administrator of this course or facility—is personally responsible for the welfare of his wards, to the point that his own head might roll should the king see that the children are upset, and that he feels comfortable enough with his wards to confide in them regarding this concern—a high official fostering amity with captive children who feel empowered enough to complain about their diets (and even to propose what might be the first Biblical experiment that has a valid control group!), presumably trying to get on their good side and eliciting their sympathy against the king. That the children’s welfare (not just their health, but their satisfaction) rates so highly with the king seems to speak well of his colonial enterprise, though the later stories in Daniel will do much to blemish his character. In any case, the fact that an entire story is devoted to the diet incident reminds me so much of what I know about the culinary aspect of CDCR administration, that I can only imagine the paper trail of the whole thing looking more or less like this:

***

From: Pahas-Bel@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: Saga-Saltiyas@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Pat-Bag Supplies

Hey Saga how’s your night going.

Well as for here, it’s not going too good. I got four kids here starting to act out over the food and I don’t blame them. We’re now giving everyone the King’s Path-Bag and wine and four kids are asking for special vegetarian ratios. Right now we don’t have special meals for anyone. They say eating our food defiles them. Hope there is something we can do. I think it’s going to get really bad really fast around here if other kids start asking for vegetarian food. Any help in this matter would be greatly appreciated.

***

From: Saga-Saltiyas@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: Pahas-Bel@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

CC: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Re: Pat-Bag Supplies

Hey Pahas, that’s the correct meal. Everyone gets the same meal, no special problems because of “defilement.”

Sir Ashpenaz, anything we can do to improve upon this meal? The fellas aren’t enjoying it much and I worry.

Thank you

***

From: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: Beltis@MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Veg Meals

Beltis, can you find out if we can order legumes cost-effective for four inmates for a few days? The king’ll have my head if he sees they’re unhappy. –Ashpenaz

***

From: Beltis@MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Veg Meals

Minister Ashpenaz, my cousin Babasu works for Balasi Beans. They have a ten-day special for a bean and seed combo I can order per person. Pls confirm.

***

From: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: Beltis@MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Veg Meals

Conf’d. Pls liaise directly with Pahas-Bel on next steps.

***

From: Balasi@BalasiBeans.com

To: Beltis@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

CC: Babasu@BalasiBeans.com

Subject: Order Confirmation

Order no. 1:14

Balasi Beans – Quality Legumes for a Great Price

Order Confirmation

Hi Beltis,

Thank you for your purchase!

We will send you another email once your order ships.

Many Thanks,

Balasi Beans

Bean and Seed Combo: Ten-day special  x 4

***

From: Pahas-Bel@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

To: HealthServices@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

CC: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Beans

Dear Dr. Shala,

  1. Inmate no. 49596 Muhibu is suffering from uncleanliness and inflammation. He is due for his alcohol, honey, and myrrh preparation. Can you grind it here for him?
  2. Kids no. 30303, 23041, 30453, and 30340, Shadrach, Mischach, Abed-Nego, and Belshatzar, have been approved a diet of bean and seed combo. If effective in maintaining participants’ health, Minister of Eunuchs says we might reorder for the whole prison. Can you check how they are doing after ten days?

***

From: HealthServices@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

To: Pahas-Bel@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

CC: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Beans

Just did initial assessment on the four kids you specified and a few kids receiving the usual rations. Will report back in ten days. –Dr. Shala

***

From: HealthServices@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

To: Pahas-Bel@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

CC: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Beans Follow-Up

Pahas-Bel: I just stopped by the prison to take vitals and metrics from the four seed-eating kids and the control group. The seed-eating children seem to be doing better than the control group. If the king is so inclined, I would recommend ordering from Balasi Beans for the entire facility, but I won’t push it. In any case, there is no medical reason to prevent the children from eating seeds and beans.

***

From: CorrectionalCounseling@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Participants no. 30303, 23041, 30453, and 30340

Dear Sir Ashpenaz,

In anticipation for the appearance of Participants no. 30303, 23041, 30453, and 30340 (Shadrach, Meschach, Abed-Nego, and Belshatzar) before His Majesty the King, we have conducted exit interviews. The children wish to thank you for accommodating their dietary requests and to especially commend Pahas-Bel for his cooperation.

***

From: MinisterOfEunuchs@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

To: Pahas-Bel@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl

CC: HealthServices@BabelPrisonsBureau.gov.bbl; CorrectionalCounseling@BabelPrisonBureau.gov.bbl

Subject: Path-Bag Discrepancy

Hi Pahas,

I’m looking at the books in preparation for the exit interview of the Judahite kids with His Royal Majesty and have to account for the Path-Bag rations they did not consume. I see three years’ worth of legume orders from Babasu, but I don’t see that the overall amount of path bag was reduced accordingly. What did you do with the meat and wine? Pls advise.

***

As some of you may know, the diet story is only the first of six court stories that found their way into the first half of the Book of Daniel. One of the more famous ones involves Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed Nego thrown into a furnace and emerging hale and healthy, which inspired this awesome gospel song:

Shadrach, Meschach, and Abed Nego, sung by the Golden Gate Jubilee Quartet

Another famous one involves Daniel, whose fortunes rise and fall quite dramatically in the first half of the book, being thrown into a lion’s den, inspiring works like this:

Daniel in the Lions’ Den, by Rubens

That the diet story was important enough to be a precursor to these dramatic tales tells me two things. First, that the confinement regime in Chapter 1 is being seen as part and parcel of the overall political/administrative arsenal at Nebuchadnezzar’s disposal: classic corporal punishments, like the furnace and the lions, do not exist to the exclusion of confinement, but rather alongside it. One wonders whether the spectacularly corporal punishments of Daniel & Co. are unique to them, in the sense of singling them out of the other young people, while the confinement regime was everyone’s baseline in the program, or was everyone in the program at risk of ending up “down in the hole” with the lions if they fell out of favor.

Relatedly, that all these royal reactions are being deployed is designed to paint a story of fractured, erratic, capricious governmentality. Not unlike the Pharaoh we meet in Joseph’s incarceration story (which will also be extensively told in the new book), Nebuchadnezzar runs the sort of administration where the fates of his underlings–especially his foreign subjects–widely swing up and down. This either reflects the erratic nature of these monarchies, or adds to the fairy tale aspect of the story by exaggerating the mobility and changing fortunes of the protagonists. It’s also notable that, like in the Joseph story, there’s very little in the way of institutional memory: if the confinement form ch1 incurred stigma, it hasn’t impacted Daniel’s fate later. This wild reversal of fortune continues throughout the stories: after a meteoric rise in the Babylonian administration, Daniel’s prospects seem to have changed for the worse in chapter 4, only to dramatically rise again when he interprets the king’s dream (this and other aspects of the story are why some commentators think that the Daniel and Joseph stories are versions of the same tale, and thus date Joseph’s prison story to the exilic period as well). There’s also a lot of elasticity in the use and misuse of power. We see exalted people afraid their heads will roll if some foreign kid complains to the king. And on the other hand, it looks like Daniel & Co., who are kids–and foreign kids, at that–feel comfortable not only complaining about a diet that does not work for them (quite rudely, too! Imagine telling an Emperor that his royal banquet fare defiles you!), but also proposing an experiment to gauge the health benefits of the diet they demand. They also seem to possess real savvy about who to deal with, and how, in a total institution: when negotiations with the higher-up authority hit a hurdle, they make a deal with the bursar on the sly. Not only that, but they are taken seriously enough that, even when the experiment succeeds, they are served legumes and water until their time is up.