Fleeing Justice: b.Sanhedrin 71

In keeping with the general theme of this sugiyah, today’s page features four Gemaraic takes on Mishnaic rules designed to narrow the unpalatable rebellious son rule as much as possible. The trend remains the same: the Mishna narrows the rule in the Torah, and the Gemarah narrows it further.

The first rule has to do with a son who steals:

מַתְנִי׳ גָּנַב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו, מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים, מִשֶּׁל אֲחֵרִים וְאָכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אָבִיו – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה עַד שֶׁיִּגְנוֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וְיֹאכַל בִּרְשׁוּת אֲחֵרִים. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּגְנוֹב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו וּמִשֶּׁל אִמּוֹ.

The gemara explains the two relevant factors: the difficult of going through with the theft and the extent to which fearing apprehension will deter the son from further crime. This, by the way, is straight out of the playbook espoused today by situational crime prevention experts. In their work on routine activity theory, Cohen and Felson say that the likelihood that crime will be committed is a function of the convergence in time and place of three factors: likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against crime. Assuming that our kid is a bad ‘un, what remains is to make the target less accessible and the guardian more potent. Accordingly, stealing from your father is easy, but eating on your father’s property puts you in fear of your dad catching you and will thus discourage you from reoffending. Stealing from others is difficult, but if you eat it on your father’s property, you still could be frightened into going straight. Stealing from others is hard to do, and thus daunting. So, it is only the son who steals from his father and eats it elsewhere who counts are rebellious.

A further limitation requires stealing from both parents. Presumably, whatever the mother has belongs to the father (ugh), so the rebellious son gets dinged for stealing from a meal prepared to both of them (to purchase himself the aforementioned cheap meat and wine), or from stealing from property designated as belonging to the mother only.

The second rule requires both parents to be on board with declaring their son a rebellious one:

מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה אָבִיו רוֹצֶה וְאִמּוֹ אֵינָהּ רוֹצֶה, אָבִיו אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה וְאִמּוֹ רוֹצָה – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם רוֹצִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אִם לֹא הָיְתָה אִמּוֹ רְאוּיָה לְאָבִיו, אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה.

The gemara goes further than that: they start off by trying, for size, the idea that if the parents aren’t a good match from a halakhic perspective then they can’t be on board with each other. Then again, one might have parents who are not married to each other and nevertheless both on board with declaring him rebellious. So, the gemara argues that the parents have to be on par with each other, so that their uniform declaration ״אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקֹלֵנוּ״ (“he doesn’t listen to us”) sounds homogenous. So, they have to have a similar voice, visage, and height מִדְּקוֹל בָּעֵינַן שָׁוִין, מַרְאֶה וְקוֹמָה נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן שָׁוִין.

If you think, “this is ridiculous! They’re just finding any excuse to ensure that no one gets labeled rebellious,” you’re absolutely right, and they are aware of it and say so explicitly: בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה לֹא הָיָה וְלֹא עָתִיד לִהְיוֹת – a rebellious son has never existed and will never exist. This rule, they say, exists just for the sake of learning it–same as the Draconian rule about destroying idolatrous cities. The funny thing is that one rabbi, Rabbi Yonatan, is not on board with the rest, and says, “I saw a rebellious son’s grave once.” Then, when they all exclaim that an idolatrous city also cannot exist, he pipes up again saying, “I saw one once.” Rabbi Yonatan reminds me of the sole “non-individual” in this immortal Life of Brian scene:

The third rule creatively interprets the biblical text to exclude sons of people with various disabilities:

מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה אֶחָד מֵהֶם גִּידֵּם, אוֹ חִיגֵּר, אוֹ אִלֵּם, אוֹ סוֹמֵא, אוֹ חֵרֵשׁ – אֵינוֹ נַעֲשֶׂה בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְתָפְשׂוּ בוֹ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ״ – וְלֹא גִּדְמִין, ״וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֹתוֹ״ – וְלֹא חִגְּרִין, ״וְאָמְרוּ״ – וְלֹא אִלְּמִין, ״בְּנֵנוּ זֶה״ – וְלֹא סוֹמִין, ״אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקֹלֵנוּ״ – וְלֹא חֵרְשִׁין. .

Let’s recap: since the biblical rule requires the parents to (1) catch the son, (2) take him out, (3) speak up and say (4) “this is our son… (5) he doesn’t listen to us” they must have all their limbs in good functioning order, they must be able to speak, see, and hear. If this strikes you as silly, remember the end goal: to make sure the rule is unenforceable.

In the extremely unlikely event that some unlucky rebellious kid does face the court, the mishna specifies the procedure to follow:

מַתְרִין בּוֹ בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה, וּמַלְקִין אוֹתוֹ. חָזַר וְקִלְקֵל – נִדּוֹן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְאֵינוֹ נִסְקָל עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שָׁם שְׁלֹשָׁה הָרִאשׁוֹנִים, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בְּנֵנוּ זֶה״ – זֶהוּ שֶׁלָּקָה בִּפְנֵיכֶם.

The kid gets warned before two people, then flogged before three (which is a legal court). The sages deduce this flogging process–akin to the 1980s practice of administering a “short sharp shock” or what today’s probarion officers call “flash incarceration” to scare people straight–from a similar procedure prescribed in the bible for defamers. If the kid recidivates, he is to face justice before 23 judges, including the former three, and identified again by the parents.

The fourth rule has to do with a kid who flees his trial for rebelliousness before reaching puberty :

מַתְנִי׳ בָּרַח עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמַר דִּינוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן – פָּטוּר. וְאִם מִשֶּׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בָּרַח, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִקִּיף זָקָן הַתַּחְתּוֹן – חַיָּיב.

In the two prior pages, you’ll recall, the sages tried to limit the application of the rebellious son doctrine to teenagers within a rather narrow timeline of their maturation process. The situation covered here is of a kid who was still within that range but not yet found guilty and managed to run away. If that kid is found afterwards, when they are beyond the allowed age range, he will have successfully escaped the law. However, if there’s a verdict already and then the kid runs, he will face justice after he is apprehended. The analogy proposed by Rabbi Hanina is of a gentile who curses God and later converts to Judaism. הוֹאִיל וְנִשְׁתַּנָּה דִּינוֹ, נִשְׁתַּנֵּית מִיתָתוֹ (as his legal situation has changed, his fate changes as well). The analogy is not perfect, but the idea is that once the verdict is pronounced, the rebellious son is already a dead man and thus cannot escape his fate.

This principle reminds me a lot of the distinctions made between substantive and procedural new law for the purpose of retroactivity. If, for example, a new law exempts a category of people from punishment (e.g., no more death penalty for juveniles), it acts retroactively. If the change is merely procedural (e.g., new wrinkle to jury selection), it only operates prospectively. And if the case is final, generally speaking, new rules will not apply nor will they be announced.

Blood of a Salamander: b.Sanhedrin 63-65

Today’s limmud is dedicated to the precious memories of Kfir, Ariel, and Shiri Bibas, and Oded Lifshitz. עַל־אֵ֣לֶּה ׀ אֲנִ֣י בוֹכִיָּ֗ה עֵינִ֤י ׀ עֵינִי֙ יֹ֣רְדָה מַּ֔יִם כִּֽי־רָחַ֥ק מִמֶּ֛נִּי מְנַחֵ֖ם מֵשִׁ֣יב נַפְשִׁ֑י הָי֤וּ בָנַי֙ שֽׁוֹמֵמִ֔ים כִּ֥י גָבַ֖ר אוֹיֵֽב׃ {ס} (Lamentations 1:16).

***

“My Father in the Heavens, how far I’ve gone,” says the hero of Shai Agnon’s story The Lady and the Peddler. And so have we, my fellow Talmud travelers – a busy week of grading and preparing for a conference and sitting with the vast grief of the news set us back a few pages, so we’re catching up today.

Reading a bigger portion is not necessarily a bad thing. It reminded me that the Talmud is a little bit like Forrest Gump’s mom’s bag of chocolates—you never quite know what you’re going to get. Personally, I don’t feel obligated to find beauty in all of it; the misogynistic locker talk doesn’t tickle my fancy at all, which raises some worrisome questions about what will happen with this Substack the day we hit Tractate Sotah. But, as Aragorn says in Return of the King, “it is not this day”: today’s portion is peppered with peculiar curiosities, which is my jam!

It all starts as a continuation of yesterday’s discussion of how to count violations—the unit of prosecution issue—with the sages finding biblical anchoring for their legal opinions. For example, there are three biblical mentions of the prohibition to bow to idols, and since nothing in the Torah is deemed superfluous, the sages opine that the first is for worship that follows the protocol, the second for unconventional worship, and the third to call attention to the distinction: אַחַת לִכְדַרְכָּהּ, וְאַחַת שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ, וְאַחַת לְחַלֵּק.

A further issue pertains to the difference between speech and action–whether saying to an idol, “you are my god” differs, in terms of punishment, from actually performing ritual worship. The general view is that actual worship is a capital offense, and mere speech can be addressed through a guilt offering. Interestingly, they fold into this another issue: that of recognizing the right and wrong gods in the same speech.

The key biblical source for this is the worship of the golden calf, to which the worshippers said, “These are your gods, Israel, which brought you up out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 32:8). Rabi Yohana says it was lucky that they said “gods” and “they” (implying a partnership between the right god and the wrong one, but at least mentioning the former), rather than attributing the exodus *only* to the golden calf. But Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai believes that even this formulation is to be condemned: not only does it repudiate monotheism, but it might also imply *more* wrong gods beyond the golden calf.

The sages try to parse out the differences between the various types of idolatry using the speech-vs.-act distinction, but then they come up with another distinction: between the principal actor (the person who does the actual idolatry) and the inciter. While the latter is, technically, speech, it can also be seen as acting through others–causing idolatry to happen: וְלֹא יִגְרוֹם לַאֲחֵרִים שִׁידְּרוּ בִּשְׁמוֹ וְשֶׁיְּקַיְּימוּ בִּשְׁמוֹ. The concern about indirect idolatry extends to doing business with foreigners that might require taking an idolatrous oath alongside them, and also to situations such as this one:

כִּי אֲתָא עוּלָּא, בָּת בְּקַלְנְבוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְהֵיכָא בָּת מָר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּקַלְנְבוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָכְתִיב ״וְשֵׁם אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים לֹא תַזְכִּירוּ״? אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה הַכְּתוּבָה בַּתּוֹרָה – מוּתָּר לְהַזְכִּיר שְׁמָהּ. וְהָא הֵיכָא כְּתִיבָא? דִּכְתִיב: ״כָּרַע בֵּל קֹרֵס נְבוֹ״

Ulla stayed in a place called Kalnevo, which also happens to be the name of an idol. So when asked, “where did you stay?” he said, “in Kalnevo.” When he was chided for blasphemy, Ulla explained that saying idol names that are mentioned in the Torah is allowed, and it says, in Isaiah 46:1, “כָּרַע בֵּל קֹרֵס נְבוֹ” (crouching Bel, hidden Nevo, if you will). While general clowning is disallowed, mockery of idolatry is allowed, and “כָּרַע בֵּל קֹרֵס נְבוֹ” is said to be a mockery of the idols, as if they crouched or knelt to defecate.

From here on, in pages 63 and 64, we get a lot of anthropology: the sages describe different forms of idolatry. These include: having a little pocket idol one can take out and kiss once in a while; placing pictures of rich people near the troughs of hungry cattle, so that the calves paw them; worshipping images of chickens, roosters, a bald goat, a dog and a donkey; sacrificing their children to images of a mule and a horse. Then, we get a side remark: turns out that even the father of Hezekiah, the king who fortified the walls of Jerusalem, wanted to burn him as sacrifice–אֶלָּא שֶׁסָּכַתּוּ אִמּוֹ סָלָמַנְדְּרָא–but his mom smeared salamander blood on him, which rendered him fireproof. The storytelling continues; some of the stories are distasteful, especially on a difficult day like today, so I’m going to leave them be and move on.

The sages observe, though, that biblical and mishnaic sources tend to treat the worship of the Molekh–the idol to whom people would sacrifice their children–as more severe than the worship of other idols. Perhaps, as some sages argue, this is about any idol said to be king (מולך means “reigning”), and perhaps there should be distinctions between worshipping temporary molekhs and permanent ones.

Page 65 turns to witchcraft, trying to distinguish the different kinds of divination based on biblical verses, including necromancers and tellers of omens. I think we’ll leave it at that for today and continue tomorrow.

More Transgressions for the Same Amazing Price: b.Sanhedrin 62

Today’s page continues on the theme of idol worship, still reflecting a continuing curiosity about the motives. The previous page considered the idea of cult suasion. Today’s page opens with a dispute between Abaye and Rava:

אִיתְּמַר: הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מֵאַהֲבָה וּמִיִּרְאָה, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: חַיָּיב, רָבָא אָמַר: פָּטוּר. אַבָּיֵי אֲמַר: חַיָּיב, דְּהָא פַּלְחַהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: פָּטוּר, אִי קַבְּלַיהּ עֲלֵיהּ בֶּאֱלוֹהַּ – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא.

The issue is whether a person who worships an idol not out of true reverence for the idol, but rather to please someone they love or fear is liable (as Abaye says) or not (as Rava says).

In modern criminal law, as any first-year law professor will tell her students, motive usually does not matter. some offenses require a specific type of intent (for example, to commit a theft one has to have an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen thing), but *why* the theft happens doesn’t make a difference. Is it greed? jealousy? need, as in Jean Valjean‘s case? Doesn’t matter. If you took and carried the item without permission, intending to permanently deprive, you’ve stolen it in the eyes of the law. Nevertheless, there are some scenarios in which the motive might matter. Proving a strong motive in court could strengthen the jury’s certainty that the defendant committed the offense. Arguing for a virtuous motive to commit a crime can play a role in sentencing, and sometimes might even dissuade prosecutors from pressing charges.

In this case, says Abaye, the motive does not matter, and his proof is threefold:

  1. The original mishna repeats the words “one who worships” twice – one of those is meant to imply our worshipper-with-an-unusual-motive. Rava’s counterargument is that the repetition is about the form of worship, not about the motive.
  2. The original mishna forbids not only bowing to idols, but rather any form of worship; bowing to another person out of love or fear is permitted, as a sign of respect and subservience, but here we have actual worship. Rava’s counterargument: It is possible to bow out of respect or to bow as a form of worship of the person (e.g., the aforementioned cult leader).
  3. There’s a baraita that teaches that, if an anointed high priest unintentionally worships an idol, he must offer sacrifice as his penance. But if the scenario reflects a truly honest mistake (bowing to the statue of a king to honor the king rather than to worship), then the guilt offering is unnecessary; this situation differs from others, where there is a motive to worship. The other sages seem to at least agree that, for the high priest to do such a thing must be a very serious lapse of judgment that does require a guilt offering.

Which brings us to another interesting criminal law principle. Fear not, all will be explained soon enough:

תָּנֵי רַבִּי זַכַּאי קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זִיבַּח, וְקִיטֵּר, וְנִיסֵּךְ, וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פּוֹק תְּנִי לְבָרָא. אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: הָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זַכַּאי מַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי נָתָן, דְּתַנְיָא: הַבְעָרָה לְלָאו יָצָאת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְרַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַבְעָרָה לְלָאו יָצָאת, הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה נָמֵי לְלָאו יָצָאת. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַבְעָרָה לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת, הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה נָמֵי לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: דִּילְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הָתָם הַבְעָרָה לְלָאו יָצָאת, דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ חִילּוּק מְלָאכוֹת מֵ״אַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״? דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר, ״וְעָשָׂה מֵאַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״ – פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן, פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? דִּכְתִיב ״וְעָשָׂה מֵאַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״. אַחַת, מֵאַחַת. הֵנָּה, מֵהֵנָּה. ״אַחַת״ שֶׁהִיא ״הֵנָּה״, וְ״הֵנָּה״ שֶׁהִיא ״אַחַת״. אַחַת – ״שִׁמְעוֹן״, מֵאַחַת – ״שֵׁם״ מִ״שִּׁמְעוֹן״. ״הֵנָּה״ – אָבוֹת, ״מֵהֵנָּה״ – תּוֹלָדוֹת. ״אַחַת״ שֶׁהִיא ״הֵנָּה״: זְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת. ״הֵנָּה״ שֶׁהִיא ״אַחַת״: שִׁגְגַת שַׁבָּת וּזְדוֹן מְלָאכוֹת. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא נָפְקָא לֵיהּ חִילּוּק מְלָאכוֹת מִדּוּכְתָּא אַחֲרִיתִי, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה לְחַלֵּק יָצָאת. חִילּוּק מְלָאכוֹת דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה נָמֵי תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מֵ״אַחַת מֵהֵנָּה״? ״אַחַת״ – זְבִיחָה, ״מֵאַחַת״ – סִימָן אֶחָד. ״הֵנָּה״ – אָבוֹת: זִיבּוּחַ, קִיטּוּר, נִיסּוּךְ, וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָאָה. ״מֵהֵנָּה״ – תּוֹלָדוֹת: שָׁבַר מַקֵּל לְפָנֶיהָ. ״אַחַת״ שֶׁהִיא ״הֵנָּה״: זְדוֹן עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְשִׁגְגַת עֲבוֹדוֹת. ״הֵנָּה״ שֶׁהִיא ״אַחַת״: שִׁגְגַת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּזְדוֹן עֲבוֹדוֹת.

The issue here is what I call, when I teach double jeopardy, unit of prosecution. Idol worship could include an entire sequence of actions: killing the animal, smoking it, dripping its blood, bowing to the idol. Is each of these a separate offense, or are they all part of a single idol-worship transgression? The different sages try to count the offenses in different ways, finding anchoring for their logic in various biblical verses. They relate it to a similar issue: violating the Shabbat and lighting a fire on Shabbat–with the latter treated so severely that it is counted as a separate offense. Setting aside the biblical juggling, I can see good arguments for a variety of reasonable approaches to this problem–and indeed, Rabbi Yose says that these scenarios should be figured out on a case-by-case basis (פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיב אַחַת עַל כּוּלָּן, פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת). Here, for example, is U.S. federal law trying to sort out the very same problem. On one hand, overcharging is petty and creates what could be an unfair lever toward plea bargaining. On the other, undercharging could incentivize people to commit more crimes, knowing that the charges will not become more serious.

This brings the sages back to the questions of motive and intent, and they opine that the misguided idol worshipper, regardless of what he did, is liable only for one guilt offering – and they proceed to dismiss the idea of separating the offense into difference charges, with the rare closing וְתוּ לָא מִידֵּי (“there’s nothing more to discuss.”) Really? Have they decided to dismiss the whole unit of prosecution issue?

NOPE!

They’re back to it. Rav Shmuel arrives in Babylonia from Eretz Israel and discusses a baraita according to which each Shabbat violation is counted separately. And as it happens, I have a case in point in which common law concluded the opposite! I’m not making this up! In Crepps v. Durden (1777), “the plaintiff was convicted of selling small hot loaves of bread, the same not being any work of charity, on the same day (being Sunday) by four separate convictions.” The court concluded, as Lewis Hoccheimer explains in this law review article from 1900 (ah, the days in which these things were merely six pages long!) that the sales of the loaves (albeit to different customers) all constitute one offense. The contradiction is illusionary: as the sages explain, if one lights a fire AND mows one’s field, those are two transgressions; but two instances of mowing (like two instances of selling bread) count as only one transgression.

Now, the sages try to reconcile the two issues, which appear to involve different logical principles: repeated violations on the Sabbath and unintentional idol worship. They combine both into one: an unintentional idolator who engages in a series of worship actions owes only one guilt offering.

Cuddling with Idols: b.Sanhedrin 60-61

Today we’re going over two pages (the Shabbat page and today’s). I might make this a habit, as our family Saturdays are packed with the holy religion of children’s sports. We’ll see how it goes. Anyway, the bulk of both pages is a continuous discussion of the offense of idolatry.

The beginning of p. 60, though, continues the rabbinical discussion from pp. 57-59 about the universal application of various obligations. Rabbi Shimon, you might remember, thought the prohibition on witchcraft applies to Jews and gentiles alike. The reasoning is that the prohibition uses universal language: ״מְכַשֵּׁפָה לֹא תְחַיֶּה״ (“thou shalt not suffer a witch to live”), which includes various commandments, including the prohibition against bestiality, that do have universal application. A similar maneuver is used by Rabbi Elazar to universalize the prohibition on mixing different types of seed and textile. This issue relates directly to the question of the two covenants, which came up in the previous pages: the Noahide one, which applies to all humans, and the Sinaitic one, which applies to Israelites/Jews. The rabbis carefully parse the obligation language: the phrase ״וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי״ (and you shall keep my statutes) refers to statutes handed now, whereas the phrase ״אֶת חֻקֹּתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״ (my statutes you shall keep) refers to statutes generally, in principle (including the ones already in place.) Which, to me at least, sounds like the vast difference between the People’s Front of Judea and the Judean People’s Front.

The page now returns to an issue we had discarded halfway through: the criminal trials of blasphemers, specifically the prohibition on witnesses to utter the blasphemy even when reporting the out-of-court statement. Remember that the witnesses have to use the euphemism YOSE in lieu of the actual name? They carve out the elements of the offense: to be liable, one must use at least the Tetragrammaton (the four-letter name of God); the two-leter YH is not enough for committing the offense.

Thing is, if the witnesses and judges were all talking around the issue, how can we be sure what the defendant said? The mishna teaches that when the judgment is over, one witness (the eldest) says the actual name that was uttered, and then the judges rise and tear their garment. The gemara finds biblical anchoring for this custom. In Judges 3:20, when Ehud comes to give news to Eglon the Moabite, he says, “I have a message from God to you”, and Eglon rises => the judges must rise (and if a gentile rose, Israelites surely must!). And in II Kings 18:37, after Rabshakeh gives his Mouth-of-Sauron speech, the Judean officials tear their garments => so must the judges. The judges must not mend their clothes, which they get from the emphasis and repetition in the description of Elisha tearing his garments (וַיִּקְרָעֵם לִשְׁנַיִם קְרָעִים, and he tore them into two pieces). The witnesses do not need to do so, as they would presumably have already done so when they heard the blasphemy in the first place. And the best zinger of the lot is this:

וּפְלִיגִי דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ אַזְכָּרָה בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לִקְרוֹעַ, שֶׁאִם אִי אַתָּה אוֹמֵר כֵּן – נִתְמַלֵּא כׇּל הַבֶּגֶד קְרָעִים.

Meaning, there’s a controversy over whether, nowadays there’s a need to tear one’s cloth when hearing blasphemy; Rabbi Hiya says one doesn’t have to, otherwise the entire garment will be torn to pieces, which is such a poetic way to convey desensitization; others dispute this, doubting we’ve become so bad-spoken and suggesting that one still needs to tear their clothes when hearing blasphemy by a Jew.

The last issue the sages flag here is the deviation from the usual procedure, in which witnesses do not testify in each other’s presence to prevent them from hearing each other’s testimony (and thus tailoring their testimony to harmonize with that of other witnesses.) In modern U.S. evidence law, this is addressed in Rule 615, which was recently amended to clarify that, in addition to excluding witnesses from the courtroom, the court may also prohibit the excluded witness from learning about, obtaining, or being provided with trial testimony. The blasphemy business, though, requires an exception from this rule, because how will witness #2 be able to say “I heard that also”? Apparently, the concern about repeating the blasphemy outweighs the concern of witness collusion–both in two witnesses and in three.

Which brings us to a new issue: the definition of idolatry, an offense punishable by death. The mishna lists the forms of punshable idolatry, distinguishing them other forms of dealing with idols, such as cuddling and bathing them, which are not punishable:

מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה: אֶחָד הָעוֹבֵד, וְאֶחָד הַמְזַבֵּחַ, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַטֵּר, וְאֶחָד הַמְנַסֵּךְ, וְאֶחָד הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, וְאֶחָד הַמְקַבְּלוֹ עָלָיו לֶאֱלוֹהַּ, וְהָאוֹמֵר לוֹ ״אֵלִי אַתָּה״.

אֲבָל הַמְגַפֵּף, וְהַמְנַשֵּׁק, וְהַמְכַבֵּד, וְהַמְרַבֵּץ, וְהַמְרַחֵץ, וְהַסָּךְ, וְהַמַּלְבִּישׁ, וְהַמַּנְעִיל – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. הַנּוֹדֵר בִּשְׁמוֹ, וְהַמְקַיֵּים בִּשְׁמוֹ – עוֹבֵר בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה.

הַפּוֹעֵר עַצְמוֹ לְבַעַל פְּעוֹר – זוֹ הִיא עֲבוֹדָתָהּ. הַזּוֹרֵק אֶבֶן לְמַרְקוּלִיס – זוֹ הִיא עֲבוֹדָתָהּ.

One of the most interesting bits about the gemara on this is the interest the sages have in foreign forms of worship. Rabbi Yirmeyah says that bowing to an idol, even if it’s not the usual manner of worshiping that particular idol, is prohibited (there are verses about idol worship that specifically mention bowing, from which they deduce that bowing is especially offensive). The sages pay special attention to the punishable worship of idols in the same way that the Jewish God is worshipped, to prevent a situation where they accidentally prohibit the proper form and target of worship. Some sages believe that cuddling with idols, which is not mentioned, is not forbidden; others believe that the term “bowing” is a general term meant to imply all forms of idol worship–or at least to any worshipful behavior that would be honorable re the Jewish God but is dishonorable re idols.

The rabbis then elicit a principle of “transferred intention”: if one performs an idolatrous labor thinking of another idolatrous labor, the offense is still punishable, as the intent shifts from labor to labor (דִּמְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה). This reminds me a bit of the transferred intent doctrine in modern criminal law: if you wanted to kill A but killed B, your intent to commit murder carries and you are culpable either way. But the sages raise another problem with transferred intention in the context of idolatry: Slaughtering animals, they say, is allowed for mundane purposes. But what if the intent (to use the blood for idol worship) does not come to fruition? There’s a conflict of opinion, and some debate over whether the issue is the person’s liability or the dead animal’s suitability for mundane labors.

So, there’s a lot more of this here, but I want to turn to a little side issue. Often, when relaying a debate, there’s a little tidbit about when and where the conversation happened. Somewhere on page 61, we learn the following:

רַב הַמְנוּנָא אִירְכַסוּ לֵיהּ תּוֹרֵי. פְּגַע בֵּיהּ רַבָּה, רְמָא לֵיהּ מַתְנְיָתִין אַהֲדָדֵי: תְּנַן ״הָעוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה״ – עוֹבֵד אִין, אוֹמֵר לָא. וְהָאֲנַן תְּנַן: ״הָאוֹמֵר ׳אֶעֱבוֹד׳, ׳אֵלֵךְ וְאֶעֱבוֹד׳, ׳נֵלֵךְ וְנַעֲבוֹד׳״?

Rav Hamnuna lost his oxen and, presumably when searching for them, ran into Rabba, who joined him, and along the way they chatted about a contradiction between two mishnayot, which reach opposite conclusions about the liability of someone who declares he’s going to worship an idol but doesn’t actually do it. I love that whoever redacted this stuff wanted to provide us the mental image of these two guys, walking around, looking for oxen, and hashing out the mishnaic contradictions. But the linguistic issue they raise is interesting, because modern law, too, struggles with the point at which declaring an intent becomes an act. Is declaring “I’m going to go worship idols” merely speech, or is it speech-act, which might spur toward idol worship, or which is somehow performative on its own?

One difficult case involves a person who posits themselves as a god and asks others to worship them. The way the sages address this scenario is pretty cool. Some worry that this incitement is worrisome, because folks might be persuaded (שָׁמְעִי לֵיהּ) and some think that it’s harmless, because people will likely say, “how is he different than us?” mock the guy, and then no harm is done. The sages consider that inciting an individual can work, but trying to sway a whole group of people will likely not work, as there will probably be more inertia in a group and less deviant energy.

וּמַתְנְיָתִין: כָּאן בְּיָחִיד הַנִּיסָּת, כָּאן בְּרַבִּים הַנִּיסָּתִים. יָחִיד – לָא מִימְּלַךְ, וְטָעֵי בָּתְרֵיהּ; רַבִּים – מִימַּלְכִי, וְלָא טָעוּ בָּתְרֵיהּ.

And the contradiction between the mishnayot can be resolved as follows: There, where the mishna states that one is liable for speech alone, the reference is to an individual who was incited; here, where the mishna indicates that one is not liable for speech alone, it is referring to a case of an incited multitude of people. The Gemara explains: An individual who was incited does not typically change his mind, and he goes astray after idol worship. Therefore, once he agrees to the suggestion to worship an idol, he has fully accepted the idol upon himself as a god and is liable. By contrast, a multitude of people are apt to change their minds, and consequently they do not go astray after idol worship.

This makes me think of the many studies on cults I read when working on Yesterday’s Monsters, and on the acquisition of followers one by one. The sages don’t seem to consider a scenario in which the cult leader accrues a critical mass of worshippers, which would make it easier to tip the scales for the as-of-yet unconvinced. To the extent that the matter of who is swayed, how many, and by whom, has some implications as to the punishment–and the sages debate whether it makes a difference re stoning-vs.-beheading–the arguments that are being made are more about anchoring the punishments in verse than about the psychology of cult suasion.

Fish At Work: b.Sanhedrin 59

If you like nerding out on legal interpretation principles, today’s your day and b.Sanhedrin 59 is your page! In a nice, self-contained argument, the sages debate two important legal principles.

The first issue has to do with the criminal energy required for an act and for an omission. Generally speaking, as Graham Hughes explains in this 1957 article, the law in general is preoccupied not only with the things we should not do, but also with the things we ought to do. But to make it a crime to refrain from doing something–essentially to demand action–is to ask a lot from people, and therefore any criminal omission must come equipped with some justification for setting the duty to act: a special job or relationship or set of circumstances. Expecting strangers, for example, to actively intervene to save lives they do not have a special connection to, is setting the bar very high, which is why the new slew of Good Samaritan 911 laws regarding drug overdoses merely excuse any 911 callers reporting an overdose from any criminal action for drugs, to incentivize them to call, rather than place an obligation on people to call and a sanction for not doing so.

The discussion of this principle in the context of the Noahide obligations starts in a peculiar manner. Resh Lakish says it is an offense for a non-Jew to observe the Sabbath. Ravina expounds: descendants of Noah are not supposed to take a religious day of rest at all–even, say, on a Monday (this, I’m sure, is news to every Christian and Muslim person in the world!). Anyway, yes, this is a bit ridiculous, but check this out:

וְלִיחְשְׁבַהּ גַּבֵּי שֶׁבַע מִצְוֹת? כִּי קָא חָשֵׁיב – שֵׁב וְאַל תַּעֲשֶׂה, קוּם עֲשֵׂה לָא קָא חָשֵׁיב.

The sages think that this Sabbath prohibition business is overreach. When issuing commandments beyond our own religious jurisdiction, we cannot overextend too much: the Noahide obligations must only apply to שֵׁב וְאַל תַּעֲשֶׂה (“sit and don’t do”) – in other words, they must only forbid acts. By contrast, penalizing omissions – קוּם עֲשֵׂה (“arise and do”) – goes too far.

So now, of course, we have to look at the Noahide obligations and ensure that they all criminalize acts, not omissions, and there’s an immediate problem: וְהָא דִּינִין קוּם עֲשֵׂה הוּא, וְקָא חָשֵׁיב? The obligation to establish courts requires gentiles to take considerable action! How can it be included in the Noahide obligations list, then? The response is that it encompasses both an act and an omission: קוּם עֲשֵׂה וְשֵׁב אַל תַּעֲשֶׂה נִינְהוּ. The omission is failing to establish courts; the act is committing injustice.

This is not quite how modern criminal law would look at this. If an implicit act is folded into every omission by way of an undesired result (e.g., letting someone drown is an “act” as well as an omission, the failure to save them), then there are no real omissions, are there?

But the fact that we’ve just engaged with the issue of gentiles obeying a commandment that seems to single Jews out (Shabbat) leads the sages to discuss other such cases, such as studying Torah. According to Rabbi Yohanan, gentiles are forbidden from studying Torah; ״תּוֹרָה צִוָּה לָנוּ מֹשֶׁה מוֹרָשָׁה״, לָנוּ מוֹרָשָׁה וְלֹא לָהֶם (the Torah is for us, not for them). Doing so is akin to stealing the Torah from those who are entitled to it (מִיגְזָל קָא גָזֵיל לַהּ). Rabbi Meir disagrees: from the use of the word אָדָם (person) in the mandate to study, rather than a more exclusive term, he learns that gentiles are permitted to study Torah and if they do so, they are like the High Priest. On first sight, this can be pretty amusing; not that you need me to tell you this, but any gentiles who are following along are very much welcome to study as much Torah as they like! I like reading other religions’ texts, too! You’re not stealing anything; there’s plenty of text to go along. But on second thought, I imagine that if there’s something animating this conversation, and it could be a scenario in which neighbors of these stricken and exiled Jews take a look at Jewish texts to find reasons to berate Jews and incite against them, and this might be a way of lashing out by putting on a show of power.

Which is where the page shifts gears to another interesting legal question. The pretext for that is the Noahide prohibition to consume limbs or blood torn from a living animal (factory farms, please take notice). This prohibition appears twice in the text: once in application to the sons of Noah and once at Sinai. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamliel asks–why the repetition?

The underlying assumption is that the law–the Torah–does not repeat things merely for emphasis; any repetition has a justification. All the more so when the repetition is addressed to different crowds. Which suggests the following principle according to Rabbi Hanina: כׇּל מִצְוָה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה לִבְנֵי נֹחַ וְנִשְׁנֵית בְּסִינַי – לָזֶה וְלָזֶה נֶאֶמְרָה – the repetition indicates that the obligation applies to both Jews and non-Jews. But there is another way to look at it: repeating a Noahide commandment at Sinai might be interpreted as an intent to shift that obligation away from the Noahides and toward the Israelites: מִדְּנִשְׁנֵית בְּסִינַי – לְיִשְׂרָאֵל נֶאֶמְרָה וְלֹא לִבְנֵי נֹחַ. The first approach seems to govern: idol worship, for example, was repeated in both places, and they learn that gentlies were liable for it as well as Jews.

But what about Noahide commandments that were not repeated at Sinai? Some sages think that the obligation is then transferred to the Israelites; others (the position I find more logical) is that the obligation only applies to the folks who were commanded it, i.e., the gentiles, not the Israelites.

Several examples follow in which behaviors that appear to be permitted to Jews are forbidden to gentiles, and excused by the different contexts of the behavior (circumcision? reproduction?) And there are numerous wrinkles to the interpretive principle. Perhaps repeating them at Sinai is by way of explication that, from now on, they only apply to the recipients of the covenant? Or perhaps not repeating them at Sinai should be interpreted as keeping their original application–to Jews and gentiles alike–intact?

This brings us to an interesting conversation about eating meat. Rabbi Yehuda says that Adam was not allowed to eat meat, as the vegetables were permitted to both humans and animals, but the animals were not explicitly permitted to humans. What, then, do we do with fish, given the biblical permission וּרְדוּ בִּדְגַת הַיָּם (and have dominion over the fish of the sea)? The sages say: the dominion is for the sake of using animals for labor, rather than for eating. In case you’re now cracking up, like me, imagining a construction sign that reads FISH AT WORK, you’re not alone. The gemara itself asks: דָגִים בְּנֵי מְלָאכָה נִינְהוּ? and then, וְעוֹפוֹת בְּנֵי מְלָאכָה נִינְהוּ? meaning – does it make sense to expect fish and birds to work? What kind of labor dominion might you have over fish and birds? After trying to figure out what sort of labor one can possibly do with geese and chickens, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasia provides the following awesome ode to a snake:

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא אוֹמֵר: חֲבָל עַל שַׁמָּשׁ גָּדוֹל שֶׁאָבַד מִן הָעוֹלָם, שֶׁאִלְמָלֵא לֹא נִתְקַלֵּל נָחָשׁ, כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל הָיוּ מִזְדַּמְּנִין לוֹ שְׁנֵי נְחָשִׁים טוֹבִים – אֶחָד מְשַׁגְּרוֹ לַצָּפוֹן וְאֶחָד מְשַׁגְּרוֹ לַדָּרוֹם, לְהָבִיא לוֹ סַנְדַּלְבּוֹנִים טוֹבִים וַאֲבָנִים טוֹבוֹת וּמַרְגָּלִיּוֹת. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא שֶׁמַּפְשִׁילִין רְצוּעָה תַּחַת זְנָבוֹ וּמוֹצִיא בָּהּ עָפָר לְגִנָּתוֹ וּלְחוּרְבָּתוֹ.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Woe over a great attendant that has been lost to the world; as had the snake not been cursed that it should go on its belly, there would have been two fine snakes at the disposal of each and every one of the Jewish people. One he would send to the north, and the other one he would send to the south, to bring him precious sandalbonim, a type of precious stone, and other precious stones and pearls. Moreover, he would attach a strap under his snake’s tail like a harness to an animal, and use it to take dirt out to his garden and to rebuild his ruin, as he does with other animals. This demonstrates that the snake was capable of performing labor.

But our relationship with the snake has been irrevocably spoiled, as anyone who has read Genesis knows, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima has a theory of what went wrong:

אָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן מֵיסֵב בְּגַן עֵדֶן הָיָה, וְהָיוּ מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת צוֹלִין לוֹ בָּשָׂר וּמְסַנְּנִין לוֹ יַיִן. הֵצִיץ בּוֹ נָחָשׁ וְרָאָה בִּכְבוֹדוֹ, וְנִתְקַנֵּא בּוֹ. הָתָם בְּבָשָׂר הַיּוֹרֵד מִן הַשָּׁמַיִם.

Adam, the first man, would dine in the Garden of Eden, and the ministering angels would roast meat for him and strain wine for him. The snake glanced at him and saw his glory, and was jealous of him, and for that reason the snake incited him to sin and caused his banishment from the Garden. According to this, evidently Adam would eat meat. The Gemara answers: There the reference is to meat that descended from heaven, which was created by a miracle and was not the meat of animals at all.

That’s the end of our daf today, and I’m off to prepare a vegan breakfast that even snakes will covet.

Euthanize the Death Penalty Already: Scenes from Capital Punishment’s Chronic Deathbed

(published: The Green Bag 27(3), Spring 2024)


INTRODUCTION

J.R.R. Tolkien’s immortal Lord of the Rings tells of the crossing of the Bridge of Khazad-dûm, during which members of the Fellowship of the Ring inadvertently awaken the Balrog. A monstrous holdover from ancient times, the Balrog attacks the Fellowship. Gandalf, the wizard leader of the Fellowship, successfully fights the monster, but at the very last moment, as the Balrog plunges to its death, it swings its whip one last time, capturing Gandalf and dragging him along into the abyss under the Bridge of Khazad-dûm.

The U.S. death penalty in the 21st century is like the Balrog – arcane, decrepit, still grasping and lashing its whip even as it approaches its demise. The score, state-by-state, is practically against capital punishment: 23 states have abolished it, and out of the 27 states that retain it, six (plus the federal government under President Joe Biden) have instated moratoria upon its use.

Even in retentionist states, the rate of executions has slowed almost to a grinding halt, and initiatives to abolish the death penalty frequently appear on the ballot. Even as Americans hang on to their support of the death penalty by a thread,3 and these ballot initiatives continue to be defeated,4 the death penalty continues to lose practical ground.5 Much like people on death row, most of whom die natural deaths after decades of incarceration and litigation,6 the death penalty itself is dying a slow, natural death.

As Ryan Newby and I explained more than a decade ago, the slow decline of the death penalty has been caused by a confluence of several factors.7 The first is the advent of cheap-on-crime politics in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, which drew attention to the immense, disproportionate expenditure on capital punishment. 8 The second is the rising prominence of the innocence movement, which has shone a light on the widespread problem of wrongful convictions, supported in recent years by
the popular reach of true-crime podcasts highlighting miscarriages of justice.9 The third is the growing attention to racial disparities in criminal justice which, while a tough argument to bring up in litigation,10 has impacted the national policy field through Obama-era reforms.11

The expense, discrimination, and potential for harrowing mistakes are all aspects of the chronic disease afflicting the death penalty. But like many natural deaths from chronic disease, the end is prolonged, undignified, and sometimes bitingly cruel. Anyone who has cared for a loved one through the end of life can probably recall the chaotic, arbitrary, sometimes contradictory indignities that every day of decline brings in its wings. And so, in this paper, I offer you a safari tour of horrors, injustices, absurdities, and embarrassments that have characterized the death penalty through its prolonged chronic demise.


TRUMP’S LAST KILLING SPREE: RELUCTANT VICTIMS, ALZHEIMER’S, AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPARITIES


Tolkien is a master storyteller, and he sets up the moment when the Balrog’s whip ensnares Gandalf as poignantly tragic – a sudden, unnecessary reminder that, even at its demise, the ancient monster can still unleash vicious harm. The last few days of the Trump administration offered ample proof of this, through the Supreme Court’s decision in Barr v. Lee.12

Like much of latter-day death penalty litigation, Lee focused on chemicals used in federal executions – to wit, a single shot of pentobarbital, a mainstay of state executions as European countries no longer export lethal drugs to the U.S.13 As Ryan Newby and I explained in 2013, this sort of litigation is a classic example of what Justice Harry Blackmun referred to in the early 1990s as “tinkering with the machinery of death.” Blackmun could afford a direct, stop-beating-around-the-bush approach to the tiresome and technical minutiae of postconviction litigation, but capital defense lawyers cannot; arguments about human rights and racial disparities have long been futile, for various procedural reasons, and the limits of the sayable on appeal and on habeas revolve around chemicals and number of injections. Barr v. Lee, decided 5-4, was no exception: the plaintiffs, whose cases were final and cleared for executions, provided expert declarations correlating pentobarital use to flash pulmonary edema, a form of respiratory distress that temporarily produces the sensation of drowning or asphyxiation. The federal government provided contrary expert testimony, according to which pulmonary edema occurs only after the prisoner has died or been rendered
fully insensate. The Supreme Court found, per curiam, that the plaintiffs had not carried the burden of proof and cleared the way for the executions. Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent echoed Blackmun’s distaste for what death penalty litigation has become, remarking, “[t]his case illustrates at least some of the problems the death penalty raises in light of the Constitution’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’” Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in turn, remarked on the absurdity of doing justice to fundamental questions via “accelerated decisionmaking.”

Then came three troubling executions. Daniel Lewis Lee was put to death against the express, vocal, and repeated wishes of his victims’ families to spare him.14 The judicial and executive branches’ trampling of those requests followed the usual capital punishment theater in which, as Sarah Beth Kaufman explains in American Roulette, prosecutors, governors, and death penalty advocates use victims as props, assuming that punitiveness is faithful to their wishes – a position that does not faithfully represent the diverse views among victims of violent crime.15 According to the first-ever national survey of crime, twice as many victims prefer that the criminal justice system focus more on rehabilitation than on punishment; victims overwhelmingly prefer investments in education and in job creation to investments in prisons and jails, by margins of 15-to-1 and 10-to-1 respectively; by a margin of 7-to-1, victims prefer increased investments in crime prevention and programs for at-risk youth over more investment in prisons and jails; and 6 in 10 victims prefer shorter prison sentences and more spending on prevention and rehabilitation than on lengthy prison sentences.

Then, the federal government executed 68-year-old Wesley Purkey, who was described by his lawyer, Rebecca Woodman, as a “severely braindamaged and mentally ill man who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease” and does not understand “why the government plans to execute him.”16 The debate over Purkey’s mental illness was emblematic of the decades and billions of dollars spent poring over the fitness for execution of elderly, decadeslong death row residents. It also made a mockery of Atkins v. Virginia,
17 which forbade the execution of mentally challenged people but left it up to individual jurisdictions to duke out the details of who, precisely, they deem smart or sane enough to be injected with pentobarbital.

Finally came Dustin Honken’s execution, which offered a grim reminder of the gap between the inexplicable federal enthusiasm for executions and the waning interest of states in the penalty. Honken was the first person from Iowa to be executed since 1963; Iowa abolished the death penalty in 1965. Honken’s lawyer, Shawn Nolan, said, “There was no reason for the government to kill him, in haste or at all. In any case, they failed. The Dustin Honken they wanted to kill is long gone. The man they killed today was a human being, who could have spent the rest of his days helping others and further redeeming himself.”18

Another development was the reintroduction of electrocutions and firing squads as permissible execution methods by the administration of President Donald Trump in late November 2020 – after Biden had defeated Trump in the presidential election. The change was intended to offer federal prosecutors a wider variety of options for execution in order to avoid delays if the state in which the inmate was sentenced did not provide other alternatives. At the same time, the Department of Justice said it would keep federal executions in line with state law: “the federal government will never execute an inmate by firing squad or electrocution unless the relevant state has itself authorized that method of execution.”19

Trump’s appetite for executions was, at least, consistent with his positions on capital punishment since the 1980s, when he regularly purchased large ads and gave interviews advocating for the death penalty for the Central Park Five20 (who have since been exonerated, as is well known). In the early days of his presidency, he chased headlines expressing support for capital punishment for drug dealers.21 While consistent with Trump’s presidential positions, the viciousness of his last-minute addition of federal electrocutions and firing squads seemed pointless, since Biden was known to oppose the death penalty and had made campaign promises to work toward federal abolition.22 Moreover, any effort to electrocute or shoot death row convicts would embroil the federal government in interminable Eighth Amendment litigation, given the always-present risk of botched executions.

The last slew of planned Trump executions included more cases that provoked moral anguish. For example, the execution of Lisa Montgomery, the only woman on federal death row.23 Montgomery’s crime was shockingly brutal. She strangled a pregnant woman before cutting her stomach open and kidnapping her baby. Her own experiences of victimization were torturous and harrowing. She was sexually assaulted by her father starting at 11 years old, trafficked by her mother, and horrifically abused by her stepbrother, who became her husband. She was involuntarily sterilized, deteriorated into severe mental illness, and lived in abject poverty at the time the crime was committed. The uproar about the sentence provoked heated debates about the Trump administration’s appetite for creating controversies that the Biden administration would then have to undo. What is the point, one might ask, of all this cruelty? And the answer, as Adam Serwer wrote in a different context, might be: the cruelty is the point.24

OKLAHOMA: CHEMICALS AND INNOCENCE

A tragic Talmudic story tells how Yehuda ben Tabbai, President of the Sanhedrin, once wrongly convicted a man of perjury. By the time ben Tabbai realized his mistake, it was too late; the man had already been put to death. Shocked by his complicity in injustice, ben Tabbai would never again rule singlehandedly on a legal point, and every day of his life he would prostrate himself on the grave of the wrongly executed man, begging forgiveness and weeping.25

One wishes that more judicial and executive officials would take a page from ben Tabbai’s book. Instead, a sense of confusion, lack of commitment, and being in perpetual limbo has characterized capital punishment for the last decade. The story of Richard Glossip, the lead petitioner in Glossip v. Gross, is a case in point. In 2015, the Supreme Court rejected Glossip’s petition against the use of midazolam in his execution, just a brief time after the same drug played a horrendous part in the botched execution of Clayton Lockett. In line with the aforementioned trend of technical litigation, the decision revolved around whether Glossip had shown that Oklahoma had better execution methods than midazolam.26

Anyone reading the decision could be forgiven for having no idea that Glossip is widely believed to be innocent, and that Oklahoma’s Attorney General, who reviewed his case, does not stand behind the conviction. Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would not halt Glossip’s execution. Judge David Lewis wrote that the case “has been thoroughly investigated and reviewed,” with Glossip given “unprecedented access” to prosecutors’ files, “[y]et he has not provided this court with sufficient information that would convince this court to overturn the jury’s determination that he is guilty of first-degree murder and should be sentenced to death.” It took yet another petition to the U.S. Supreme Court to halt the execution.27

CALIFORNIA: DEATH BY MORATORIUM

For more ambiguity and discombobulation on the death penalty in the 21st century, consider California, where several rounds of abolitionist voter initiatives failed in the last decade.28 I want to spend more time discussing California, not only because I am intimately familiar with capital punishment law where I live and work, but also because I think the last decade in the Golden State perfectly encapsulates what a chronic, slow death for capital punishment looks like. In 2016, while narrowly defeating the abolitionist Prop 62, California voters narrowly approved Prop 66, which was supposed to speed up executions, as well as allow death row residents to be relocated to other prisons where they could pay restitution to their victims. Some aspects of Prop 66 – specifically, those which remove safeguards against wrongful executions – have been found unconstitutional, but most of it has survived constitutional review.29

When explaining what the death penalty in California was like in the late 2010s, I sometimes borrow a framework from the construction world. When planning a project, general contractors might draw a triangle, writing in each corner one word – respectively, “good,” “fast,” and “cheap.” They then say to the client, “you can’t have all three; pick two.” This is an apt description of why death penalty opponents often refer to California’s capital punishment as “broken beyond repair.” A “good” and “cheap” death penalty would require finding some way to seriously litigate postconviction motions on a lengthy timeline and on a shoestring, relying mostly on California’s minuscule existing cadre of capital habeas litigators. Cases would drag on and on, as they do now, until people received representation, a situation that at least one federal judge found to violate the Eighth Amendment.30 A “good” and “fast” death penalty, which is what some supporters of Prop 66 perhaps wanted, would require massive expenditures so that proper, high-quality representation could be found and habeas writs could efficiently work their way through the courts. A “fast” and “cheap” death penalty, which is what Prop 66 might have produced had all its aspects been found constitutional, would do away with many safeguards against wrongful executions and result in more deadly mistakes. Even if
one approves of capital punishment in theory, as many California voters do (for example, through a retributive framework), it is therefore hard to compare its abstract form to the way it is administered in practice: There is no way of fashioning capital punishment in California in a way that guarantees it to be “good,” “fast,” and “cheap.”

These concerns, and many others, led California Governor Gavin Newsom to take a step that his abolitionist predecessors had shied away from: placing a moratorium on the death penalty in California and ordering the
death chamber dismantled.31 Newsom is also turning San Quentin prison, home to the country’s largest death row, into a Scandinavian-style “center for innovation focused on education, rehabilitation and breaking cycles of crime.” For the first time in decades, residents of death row are able to move freely within the facility, and many of them will be transferred to other facilities, a monumental change in their life circumstances that some death row residents, acclimated to their peculiar, restrictive lives, view with apprehension.32 But these are executive, not legislative acts. Because the death penalty still has a legal, if not ontological, existence, people whose lives were saved by the moratorium are still, legally, capital convicts, and costly postconviction litigation on their cases continues, to the tune of $150 million per annum.33

To cynical commenters, who might observe that this new incarnation is not “good,” “fast,” or “cheap,” one might respond, “at least we’re not executing people.” But saying, “no one is being executed on death row” is
far from saying, “no one dies on death row.” In late May 2020, as a San Francisco Chronical exposé revealed – and as a subsequent investigation by the California Inspector General’s office and litigation in state courts confirmed – San Quentin, still home to the country’s largest death row, was overcrowded to 113% of design capacity.34 Alarmed by a horrific COVID19 outbreak at the California Institute of Men in Chino, custodial and
medical officials there sought to mitigate the spread by transferring 200 men out of the facility, 122 of them to San Quentin. The men were not tested for COVID-19 for weeks prior to their transfer. On the morning of
the transfer, several transferees told nurses that they were experiencing COVID-19 symptoms (fever and coughing). According to email correspondence between health officials, these men were treated as malingerers and the transfer proceeded as planned. No effort was made to facilitate social distancing within the buses; the transferees heard and felt their neighbors cough throughout the lengthy journey to the destination facilities.35

The virus spread quickly throughout San Quentin. By the end of June, more than three quarters of the prison population had been infected and 29 had died – 28 prisoners and one worker.36 San Quentin’s death row was especially vulnerable to COVID-19, both because of the low quality of the physical plant – a dilapidated, poorly constructed, and thinly staffed long-term home to approximately 750 men (now many fewer) – and because the death row population tends to be older and sicker than the general prison population. The virus tore quickly through death row, and while prison authorities did what they could to obscure the calamities, San Francisco Chronicle journalists broke the story:

A coronavirus outbreak exploding through San Quentin State Prison has reached Death Row, where more than 160 condemned prisoners are infected, sources told The Chronicle on Thursday. One condemned inmate, 71-year-old Richard Eugene Stitely, was found dead Wednesday night. Officials are determining the cause of death and checking to see whether he was infected.

State prison officials declined to confirm that the virus has spread to Death Row, but three sources familiar with the details of the outbreak there provided The Chronicle with information on the condition they not be named, and in accordance with the paper’s anonymous source policy. Two of the sources are San Quentin employees who are not authorized to speak publicly and feared losing their jobs.

There are 725 condemned inmates at San Quentin, and of those
who agreed to be tested for the coronavirus, 166 tested positive, the
sources said. . . .

It is unclear whether Stitely was infected with the coronavirus. He refused to be tested, according to the three sources with knowledge of the situation.37

By contrast to general population residents, whose identities were hidden from the public for medical privacy reasons, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sent emails to interested parties about
deaths of people on death row, listing their names and full details. Through subtracting the named casualties from the total death toll, a horrifying truth emerged: More people died on death row from COVID-19 under Newsom’s moratorium than California had executed since the reestablishment of the death penalty in 1978.38

This outcome was deeply ironic, because even after the moratorium, with no death chamber and bereft of lethal chemicals, California courts continued to be clogged with death penalty litigation concerning details
revolving around whether various modes and aspects of the execution process are “cruel and unusual” even as the death penalty itself was still deemed “kind and usual.”39 Flying in the face of this precious and expensive effort to sever the death penalty from any of its potentially cruel and unusual implications were executions clearly not prescribed by the California Penal Code: deaths from a contagious pandemic, compounded by incompetence and neglect.

At the same time, even stalwart supporters of the death penalty realized that capital verdicts that will never be carried out make no sense, logically or practically. In summer 2020, Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeff Rosen, by no means a capital-punishment-shy public prosecutor, announced that his office would no longer seek the death penalty. Rosen claimed that his visit to the Civil Rights Museum in Alabama inspired him to see the death penalty not only “through eyes of the victims and families of those whose lives were taken,” but also “through the lens of race and inequity.” The rationales he offered for the policy change were in line with those behind the penalty’s decline in popularity more generally: “These cases use up massive public resources and cruelly drag on for years with endless appeals that give no finality to the victims’ families,” he said. “There’s the tragic but real risk of wrongful conviction. And, shamefully, our society’s most drastic and devastating law enforcement punishment has been used disproportionately against defendants of color.”40 Rosen was facing an election challenge from a more progressive candidate, which could partly explain his change in position. Nevertheless, his reliance on the more general arguments means that the gubernatorial changes at San Quentin did resonate.

Perhaps even more important was the announcement by George Gascón, upon his election as Los Angeles District Attorney in fall 2020, that the county would no longer seek the death penalty41 – an inflection point for one of California’s four “killer counties” and one of the entire country’s three highest sources of capital sentences. 42 Even more striking is a remarkable data point from Sacramento: Joseph DiAngelo, otherwise known as the Golden State Killer, was finally caught and convicted using innovative forensic investigative tools.43 The Sacramento County prosecutor did not even ask for the death penalty, and rightly so, as it would have allowed DiAngelo to continue litigating at the state’s expense only to die a natural death, like everyone else on death row. Which raises a fair question: If not the most notorious and heinous criminal in the history of California, then who?

WHAT DEATH PENALTY EUTHANASIA MIGHT LOOK LIKE

Capital punishment’s last gasps are, as these examples show, rife with inconsistencies, ironies, and changes of direction, which raise the question when, and how, the end will come. As public opinion and results at the ballot box show, the death penalty retains a symbolic hold over the American imagination. But judges and politicians are exposed to its unsavory sides.

It is hard to provide facile explanations for the different modes of the capital penalty’s demise in recently abolitionist states. In Washington, abolition arrived through a judicial decision about racial disparities in the penalty’s application;44 in Delaware, through a case involving arbitrary jury decisions in capital cases, which was later extended to the remaining cases on death row;45 in New Hampshire, through a non-retroactive statute; 46 in Colorado, through a combination of a statute and gubernatorial commutations;47 in Virginia, the first Southern state to abolish the death penalty, through a bipartisan legislative vote.48

One is left wondering whether it is easier to get rid of the death penalty in retentionist states – such as in Illinois, where abolition followed Governor George Ryan’s mass commutations, largely due to his concerns about innocence and wrongful executions49 – or in states with moratoria – such as California, where one wonders whether the dismantlement of the death chamber and the disbanding of death row, along with the vanishing prospect of an execution as a lightning rod, might be slowing down the dismantling of the death penalty itself. Without the physical reminder of the remnants of this archaic punishment, and with the growing resemblance of the death penalty to the two other members of the “extreme punishment trifecta” (life with and without parole),50 does the effort to abolish a thoroughly defanged (but still expensive) death penalty lose its steam?

What signals a new phase in the death penalty’s terminal illness is a combination of factors: a critical mass of abolitionist states; backlash caused by the Trump administration’s execution spree; the absence of capital sentencing nationwide and, especially, in high-profile cases; abolitionist thinking and decisionmaking at the county prosecution level; the specter of COVID-19 deaths; and, of course, the ever-rising costs. We are unlikely to see a definitive kiss of death. Instead, many local developments may eventually mean – perhaps, to our surprise – that, like so many people on death row itself, capital punishment has died a quiet, natural death.

NOTES


1 J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING bk. II, ch. 5
(2012 [1954]).

2 Abolitionist states with date of abolition: Alaska (1957), Colorado (2020), Connecticut (2012), Delaware (2016), Hawaii (1957), Illinois (2011), Iowa (1965), Maine (1887), Maryland
(2013), Massachusetts (1984), Michigan (1847), Minnesota (1911), New Hampshire (2019),
New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York (2007), North Dakota (1973), Rhode
Island (1984), Vermont (1972), Virginia (2021), Washington (2023), West Virginia (1965),
Wisconsin (1853). Retentionist states (including states with moratoria): Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming.
States with moratoria, along with moratorium date: California (2019), Pennsylvania (2023),
Oregon (2022), Arizona (2023), Ohio (2020), Tennessee (2022). The federal moratorium
was put in place by the Biden administration in 2021. Source: Death Penalty Information
Center (“Death Penalty Info”) website, deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-landing. 3 Megan Brenan, “Steady 55% of Americans Support Death Penalty for Murderers,” Gallup, Nov. 14, 2022.

4 AUSTIN SARAT, JOHN MALAGUE, AND SARAH WISHLOFF, THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
BALLOT: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND THE FATE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2019).

5 DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (2016).

6 166 non-execution deaths, as of 2024: Death Penalty Focus, deathpenalty.org/facts/.

7 Hadar Aviram and Ryan Newby, “Death Row Economics: The Rise of Fiscally Prudent
Anti-Death Penalty Activism,” 28 CRIM. JUST. 33 (2013).

8 HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2015).

9 Keith A. Findley, “Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Criminal Justice,”
in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3-20 (2016); Lindsey A. Sherrill,
“Beyond Entertainment: Podcasting and the Criminal Justice Reform ‘Niche,’” and Robin
Blom, Gabriel B. Tait, Gwyn Hultquist, Ida S. Cage, and Melodie K. Griffin, “True
Crime, True Representation? Race and Injustice Narratives in Wrongful Conviction Podcasts,” in TRUE CRIME IN AMERICAN MEDIA 67-82 (2023).

10 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

11 Barack Obama, “The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform,” 130 HARV.
L. REV. 811 (2017).

12 Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979 (2020).

13 “Europe’s moral stand has U.S. states running out of execution drugs, complicating capital
punishment,” CBS NEWS, Feb. 18, 2014.

14 Hailey Fuchs, “Government Carries Out First Federal Execution in 17 Years,” NEW YORK
TIMES, July 14, 2020.

15 SARAH BETH KAUFMANN, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING TRIALS (2020).

16 Khaleda Rahman, “U.S. Executes Wesley Purkey, Who Calls It a ‘Sanitized Murder’ In
Last Words,” NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2020.

17 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

18 Shawn Nolan, “Statement From Shawn Nolan, Attorney For Dustin Honken,” FEDERAL
DEFENDER, July 17, 2020.

19 Matt Zapotosky and Mark Berman, “Justice Dept. rule change could allow federal executions by electrocution or firing squad,” WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 27, 2020.

20 Colby Itkowitz and Michael Brice-Saddler, “Trump still won’t apologize to the Central
Park Five. Here’s what he said at the time.” WASHINGTON POST, June 18, 2019.

21 Michael Krasny, “President Trump Announces Plan to Fight Opioid Abuse, Including
Death Penalty,” KQED FORUM, Mar. 20, 2018.

22 Dakin Andone, “Biden Campaigned on Abolishing the Federal Death Penalty. But 2 Years
In, Advocates See an ‘Inconsistent’ Message,” CNN, Jan. 22, 2023.

23 Reuters, “Lisa Montgomery: US Executes Only Woman on Federal Death Row,” BBC
WORLD, Jan. 13, 2021.

24 Adam Serwer, “The Cruelty Is the Point,” THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 3, 2018.

25 Bavli Hagiga 16:2.

26 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015); Jeffrey E. Stern, “The Cruel and Unusual Execution
of Clayton Lockett,” THE ATLANTIC, June 15, 2015.

27 Glossip v. State, www.okcca.net/cases/2023/OK-CR-5/ (2023); Glossip v. Oklahoma, 143.Ct. 2453 (2023).

28 Prop 34 failed in 2012: David A. Love, “Prop 34 Fails But Signals the Imminent Demise
of California’s Death Penalty,” THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 2012. Prop 66 failed in 2016:
Sarah Heise, “Death Penalty Supporters Claim Victory with Failure of Prop 62,” KCRA3, Nov. 9, 2016.

29 Bob Egelko, “California Supreme Court Upholds Most Of Expedited Death Penalty
Initiative,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 24, 2017.

30 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

31 Kyung Lah, “How Kamala Harris’ Death Penalty Decisions Broke Hearts on Both Sides,”
CNN, Apr. 8, 2019; Eric Westervelt, “California Says It Will Dismantle Death Row.
The Move Brings Cheers and Anger,” NPR, Jan. 13, 2023.

32 Nigel Duara, “Gavin Newsom Moves to ‘Transform’ San Quentin as California Prison
Population Shrinks,” CALMATTERS, Mar. 21, 2023; Sam Levin, “The Last Days of Death
Row in California: ‘Your Soul is Tested Here’,” THE GUARDIAN, May 1, 2023.

33 Arthur Rizer and Marc Hyden, “Why Conservatives Should Oppose the Death Penalty,”
THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, Jan. 10, 2019.

34 Mary Harris, “California’s Carelessness Spurred a New COVID Outbreak,” SLATE, July 7,2020; Roy W. Wesley and Bryan B. Beyer, “COVID-19 Review Series, Part Three,” OFFICEOF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Feb. 1, 2021, 1-2, www.oig.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/OIG-COVID-19-Review-Series-Part-3-%E2%80%93-Transferof-Patients-from-CIM.pdf; “Monthly Report of Population As of Midnight June 30, 2020,”CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, July 1, 2020, 2, www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp-content/uploads/sites/174/2020/07/Tpop1d2006.pdf.

35 For a thorough examination of COVID-19 and California’s death row, see HADAR AVIRAM AND CHAD GOERZEN, FESTER: CARCERAL PERMEABILITY AND CALIFORNIA’S COVID19 CORRECTIONAL DISASTER (2024).

36 Daniel Montes, “Trial Over COVID-19 Outbreak at San Quentin State Prison That Left29 Dead to Begin Thursday,” BAY CITY NEWS, May 20, 2021.Euthanize the Death Penalty AlreadySPRING 2024 193

37 Megan Cassidy and Jason Fagone, “Coronavirus Tears through San Quentin’s Death Row;
Condemned Inmate Dead of Unknown Cause,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 25, 2020,
www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Coronavirus-tears-through-San-Quentin-s-Death15367782.php.

38 Patt Morrison, “California Is Closing San Quentin’s Death Row. This Is Its Gruesome
History,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 8, 2022.

39 Aviram & Newby, supra note 7; George Skelton, “In California, the Death Penalty is Allbut Meaningless. A Life Sentence for the Golden State Killer Was the Right Move,” LOSANGELES TIMES, July 2, 2020.

40 Quoted in Michael Cabanatuan, “Santa Clara County DA Jeff Rosen No Longer to SeekDeath Penalty,” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 22, 2020.

41 Alexandra Meeks and Madeline Holcombe, “New Los Angeles DA Announces End to
Cash Bail, the Death Penalty and Trying Children as Adults,” CNN, Dec. 8, 2020.

42 “Death Penalty Info: ACLU Study: Los Angeles Death Penalty Discriminates Against
Defendants of Color and the Poor,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/aclu-study-los-angelesdeath-penalty-discriminates-against-defendants-of-color-and-the-poor.

43 Paige St. John, “The Untold Story of How the Golden State Killer Was Found: A Covert
Operation and Private DNA,” LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 2020.

44 State v. Gregory, 427 P.2d 621 (Wash. 2018).

45 “Death Penalty Info: Delaware,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/
delaware.

46 “Death Penalty Info: New Hampshire,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/stateby-state/new-hampshire.

47 “Death Penalty Info: Colorado,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/
colorado.

48 “Death Penalty Info: Virginia,” deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/virginia-legislature-votes-toabolish-the-death-penalty.

49 Sarah Schulte, “20 Years After Commuting 167 Illinois Death Sentences, Ex-Gov.
George Ryan Has No Regrets,” ABC7 CHICAGO, Jan. 10, 2023.

50 HADAR AVIRAM, YESTERDAY’S MONSTERS: THE MANSON FAMILY CASES AND THE ILLUSION
OF PAROLE (2020).

Arresting Folks with Unsettled Lives

I recently came across an interesting Fourth Circuit case dealing with a situation that is probably quite common: what sort of constitutional protection do people have when their living situation is not clear-cut?

According to Fourth Amendment case law, the police need an arrest warrant in order to arrest A at home (Payton v. New York, 1980), but no warrant is necessary to arrest A in public (U.S. v. Watson, 1976). But there is a third situation: what to do when A is in B’s home? Under Steagald v. United States (1981), an arrest warrant is necessary but not sufficient in this situation: the warrant protects A against unreasonable deprivations of freedom, but does not protect B against the invasion of their premises. So, to arrest A at B’s home, the police need to have two documents in hand: an arrest warrant for A and a search warrant for B’s home (with A listed as the person to be seized therein.)

This is all fine. But it turns out that some people’s situations do not map neatly unto this framework. Enter U.S. v. Brinkley (2020), a 4th Circuit case dealing with a not uncommon person with an outstanding warrant: the international man of mystery with a woman at every port.

Law enforcement agents formed a federal-state task force to execute an outstanding arrest warrant against Brinkley. ATF Agent Murphy received intelligence of two possible addresses for Brinkley, one on, let’s say, Oak Street, and one on, let’s say, Elm Street. Because the water bill for the Oak Street address was in Brinkley’s name, Agent Murphy initially believed that address was Brinkley’s most likely residence.

Detective Stark from the local police force looked on the state law enforcement database and found that Brinkley’s many traffic citations were associated with several addresses. The newest citations referenced the Elm Street address, and Detective Stark reasoned that the older addresses were “probably family addresses” where Brinkley did not reside. He looked up Brinkley’s Facebook page and found pictures of Brinkley’s girlfriend, Marnie, who was also associated with the Elm Street address. Based on this information, Detective Stark concluded that Brinkley and Marnie lived together on Elm Street.

Detective Stark reported his conclusion to Agent Murphy, who came to agree that Brinkley probably resided in the Elm Street apartment. Neither officer was certain that they had uncovered Brinkley’s address, and Agent Murphy later testified that, in his experience, it was “common for someone like Brinkley… to have more than one place where they will stay the night.”

The next morning, Agent Murphy and Detective Stark went to the Elm Street apartment to conduct what both Agent Murphy and Detective Stark characterized as a “knock-and-talk” to “start [their] search for Brinkley.” The officers intended to “interview the occupants to find out if [he] was indeed there,” and to arrest him if he was. Agent Murphy acknowledged that he “had no idea if Brinkley was going to be there that morning,” but thought the Stoney Trace apartment was the “most likely address” to “find Brinkley or evidence of his whereabouts.”

Detective Stark knocked and announced, and after a few minutes Marnie, wearing pajamas, slowly opened the door. The officers could hear movement in the background. Detective Stark informed Marnie that the officers were looking for Brinkley and asked to enter the apartment. Marnie denied that Brinkley was there, and according to Detective Stark, she grew “very nervous”; her “body tensed” and her “breathing quickened,” and she looked back over her shoulder into the apartment. Detective Stark asked for consent to search the apartment and Marnie said she did not consent and asked to see a search warrant.The entire exchange with Marnie lasted a few minutes. Both officers testified that, based on Marnie’s demeanor, the movement they heard in the apartment, and the morning hour, they believed Brinkley was inside.

At this point, the officers decided not to follow the original plan to secure the area and wait to see if Brinkley left the home. Instead, Agent Murphy told Marnie that he believed she was hiding Brinkley and that the officers were going to enter the apartment to serve an arrest warrant on him. They walked around the apartment, found Brinkley in the bedroom, and arrested him. The officers proceeded to conduct a protective sweep to check for others hiding in the apartment. They did not find anyone else, but they did find several firearms and seized them.

On appeal from a conditional guilty plea, Brinkley argued that he did not reside on Elm Street and was there as Marnie’s guest, and that the officers’ warrantless entry was unconstitutional.

The Fourth Circuit sets up the problem as if it is about classifying Brinkley’s situation as a Peyton or a Steagald scenario. But what they actually end up doing is asking two questions that differ from each other. The first one is: how certain do the cops have to be that Brinkley both resides, and is currently present, at Elm Street to walk in there without a warrant? The Fourth Circuit panel concludes that the cops would need to have more than they did in order to walk into the Elm Street address with only an arrest warrant.

But the second question has to do with a different set of concerns: for a guy like Brinkley, who has four or five cribs in town, and lives an unsettled life, where is home? Do you forego the special protection that the Fourth Amendment awards to the home if you have several places you call sort-of-home? Do you have standing in each of these places? What makes home home?

BREAKING NEWS: In Blow to Netanyahu Government Agenda, Israeli High Court of Justice Restores Reasonableness Ground for Judicial Review

Today, the High Court of Justice published its 697-page decision (!), in which it granted the Movement for Quality Government and numerous other civil rights organizations a resounding victory against the Knesset and, especially, the Netanyahu government’s agenda to curb judicial review. By a 8-7 majority, the Court found that the amendment to the Basic Law, canceling the reasonableness ground for judicial review (a powerful tool for curbing government behavior that is technically lawful but makes no sense or excessively infringes on people’s rights), is invalid.

In a couple of days, I promise to provide a précis of the decision in English. For now, you can peruse the entire decision verbatim below.

Israel Crisis Q&A for US Audiences

What happened on Monday?

On Monday, Israel’s Knesset approved a basic law that prohibits judicial review of administrative and executive actions on the basis of “extreme unreasonableness.” In anticipation of this legislation, and the general plan to weaken basic democratic protections and civil rights guarantees, hundreds of thousands of Israelis walked, in high-90s temperatures, all the way to Jerusalem to protest. They were met with violent oppression by the police (high pressure hoses, horses trampling them) and some were injured. The protest continues, with millions of people out in the streets on an ongoing basis for the last 28 weeks.

How come I haven’t even heard about this?

Mainstream U.S. reporting on Israel is scant and of low quality, and most of what you hear would suggest that Netanyahu enjoys consensus and that all Israelis are in favor of this. The opposite is true–even people who voted right-wing are opposed to this governmental overhaul, and people have been in the streets nonstop for years now, and almost daily since this government assumed power.

Why are all these people so worried?

They know this is merely the opening shot in this government’s battle to weaken democratic protections. The planned judicial overhaul would also politicize judicial elections; undermine judicial tenure and independence; make governmental legal advisors into, essentially, personal assistants to their ministers; etc. This basic law is there to help usher in the rest of these reforms, as well as other outrageous legislation that is already in the pipeline. As Internal Security Minister, terrorist, and convicted criminal Itamar Ben Gvir tweeted on Monday, “the salad bar is open.”

Wait, back up for a minute. What is a basic law?

Israel does not have a written constitution. In the 1950s, efforts to establish one failed due to the irreconcilable differences between religious and secular legislators. A compromise was reached, according to which the Knesset would, from time to time, enact “basic laws” with an enhanced majority. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court awarded these laws a special, quasi-constitutional status, allowing the judiciary to strike down regular laws that contradicted basic laws. All laws that violate or undermine a principle in a basic law must entail minimal injury and be legislated “for an appropriate purpose.”

So what’s up with this “extreme unreasonableness” basic law?

Because Israel does not have the level of democratic control–through checks and balances, or through the constitutional review structures in places like the US–that other countries have, its courts could strike down executive decisions and actions that appear to be purely malicious or don’t make any sense. Now that this amendment is in the books, and enshrined as a basic law, supposedly any government action will be immune to judicial review provided that it is done under proper authority. For example, if a government minister chooses to uproot a Palestinian village, require all women in the office to dress a certain way and earn a quarter of what men earn, award jobs to unqualified people based on whims, etc., courts would not be able to do anything as long as the minister acts within their authority

Why would Netanyahu ram this amendment through? Does he not care at all about what the public wants?

Not even a little bit.

What does this government care about?

Israel has a coalition-based governance, which means that governments are put together out of various political parties that have different, and sometimes contradictory, values and interests, but they all benefit from being in power. In this particular case, what they all have in common is that they don’t care at all about the democratic culture of the country or its citizens (and certainly not the Palestinians.) Netanyahu chose this adventure for a simple reason: he is facing multiple charges of corruption. The offenses are serious and there’s plenty of evidence, and he could be serving years, or even decades, in prison. He will do anything and sell out to anyone to avoid that. These amendments will provide loopholes for him to escape criminal accountability. His partners, to whom he has sold out, are an assortment of convicted criminals (Arye Der’i, bribery; Itamar Ben-Gvir, terrorism); known homophobes (Smotrich, organizer of the Pride counterprotest “the beast march”); and theocracy-bound bureaucrats taking orders from the religious think-tank Kohelet Policy Forum (Yariv Levin, Simha Rothman.) What they want is a theocracy, consisting of Jewish supremacy; an annexation of the West Bank and elimination of any hope or reality of Palestinian independence; the denial of rights to Israel’s Arab citizens and other non-Jews; taking away rights from women and unconventional families; and shifting mountains of money from the tax-paying, military-service-performing secular people to the Ultra-Orthodox, who neither serve nor work or pay taxes.

How do we know that’s what they want?

They have been open about it since day one. Folks like Ben Gvir and Smotrich came into power explicitly to annex the West Bank, obliterate any hope of Palestinian independence, and grind to dust any hope of upward mobility for Arab Israeli citizens. All you need to do is look at the list of laws presented to the Knesset for approval yesterday, the day after they stripped judicial review: a law requiring compensation for “Torah students” to match that of people serving in the army, sometimes at great risk and sacrifice; a law that ministers or legislators suspected of criminal activity can only be removed from office by the coalition’s agreement, not through judicial review; new criminal penalties–three years in prison to anyone blocking roads (i.e., the nonviolent protesters); extensions to the criminal immunity of parliament members; affirmative defenses for rabbis publishing their opinions in religious pamphlets (including incitement to racism, murder, etc.); recognizing rabbinical certificates as the equivalent of academic degrees for all public jobs. And that’s just yesterday. This will not be a democracy for long.

Was Israel ever a democracy, you colonialist monsters?

The occupation of Palestine, whose tragic roots date back to 1948 and arguably, before that, to the British Mandate, is indeed an ugly and horrifying aspect that is inexorable from the rest of this mess. It is arguably the root of much of the problem, and inhumane policies and practices have been a fact of life in Palestinian territories since they were conquered in the Six-Day War in 1967. Many people live in horrid conditions, under a military regime that controls even minute aspects of their lives and accords these lives little to no value. At the same time, all Israeli governments, right and left alike, have allowed Jewish settlers to occupy and expand these territories, and often given them free rein in acts of agricultural vandalism, sabotage, and horrific violence against Palestinians with no consequences. Courts have offered precious little protection to Palestinians in these matters.

So why would Palestinians even care about judicial overhaul?

Even though the situation in Palestine has always been dire, any person who believes things cannot be worse is seriously deluded. With the de-facto elimination of Judicial review, people like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich can run unchecked and unfettered in Palestine. Since their explicit goal is to burn down Palestinian villages–and they’ve been acting on it–you can expect worse. At the same time, it’s understandable that people who have been through so much are cynical about the protest and not participating as the Jewish protesters would hope.

Isn’t there any merit to the claim that this government is trying to disempower the old, oppressive Ashkenazi elites and bring about more equality?

No, this is a cynical ploy that persuades people who have been neglected and kept in ignorance by Netanyahu et al.–the epitome of an oppressive Ashkenazi elite–so that they can be duped into supporting this nonsense. It is true that long-festering resentments have lingered since the 1950s, when immigrants from North Africa and Arab countries were treated condescendingly and appallingly by the local Ashkenazi authorities and residents. Ethnic tensions still exist. But many, many talented, hardworking people who came from nothing are utterly disgusted with the effort to make ethnic tension into a cudgel to foment hatred and schadenfreude and have spoken out publicly about this farce.

Is there nothing that can be done to change course?

Some of the more effective pressure has already been deployed: reservist pilots, military intelligence chiefs, and cyber unit specialists have withdrawn their commitment to volunteer for military service. This has considerably weakened Israel’s security situation and it’s not unlikely that the army is unfit to protect the country at this point. Iranian leadership, who now has nuclear weaponry that can reach Israel, won’t even have to use it. Yoav Galant, the security minister, has announced that, with these retreats, we must pause and reverse course before it’s too late. Similarly, the shekel is in free fall, investors are pulling out of tech companies, and bright minds are fleeing the country on the daily. Both of these things should have given anyone with an iota of public concern some pause (when you think about it, Israel’s survival in the Middle East is largely thanks to a few hundred pilots, some cyber defense systems, and robust scientific invention) but these government ministers are ruthless, unprincipled, and out for whatever they can get, and Netanyahu himself could not care less as long as it keeps his own ass out of the slammer.

Can the U.S. do something?

Emphatically, yes. The U.S. government generously and without asking any questions supports Israel with massive funds (these are sort of a reverse subsidy to American contractors, because the money purchases American weaponry and military equipment.) President Biden’s message to Netanyahu was an opening shot in this direction, and he can and should make it clear that the support is not unwavering or unconditional. Ben Gvir seems to think this is a bluff. Biden can call his bluff.

What can we do?

For heaven’s sake, speak out. It is inconceivable that the only U.S. Jewish voices heard on this topic come from nutty right-wingers or namby-pamby lefties mumbling DEI platitudes. If you don’t like fascism and want Biden to stop funding it, for heaven’s sake, pressure your rabbi, your Jewish organization, your nonprofit, your company, AIPAC, to say something.

I don’t want to seem antisemitic or offend anyone.

You know what’s worse than “seeming antisemitic” or “saying something offensive?” actually ushering in bigotry, discrimination, hatred, and animosity toward Israeli Americans and Jewish Americans by lending credibility to the government that has taken Israel hostage. The more Israel devolves into a decrepit, impoverished backward, theocratic, violent cesspool, the more credibility the bigots will have and the more difficult it will be for Israeli or Jewish people, businesses, and organizations to defend themselves against these noxious phenomena. It is your patriotic duty to both Israel and the U.S. to speak out.

What Democracy Erosion in Israel Means for U.S. Jews and Israeli-Americans

As I write this, hundreds of thousands of friends are protesting in Jerusalem, being beaten up by police thugs, as Israel’s theocratic, messianic government celebrates their massive success in eroding democracy. The first step was curtailing the type of discretion courts may apply when reviewing executive/administrative actions, by ruling out the use of “reasonability” as a standard. It should go without saying that whoever does not want their actions to be reviewed through a lens of reasonability is planning on doing unreasonable things, and given who is in government now and what their aims are–theocracy, annexation of Palestinian territories, etc.–it’s not a secret what these acts will be. After the new law passed, internal security minister Itamar Ben Gvir, a convicted terrorist who assaulted Palestinians and police officers and who never did a day of military service, tweeted, “the salad bar is open.” What more do you need to get a sense of where this is going?

I was going to write a long post, explaining the American implications, but Thomas Friedman did my job for me. Here he lists some ways in which the Israeli catastrophe can affect U.S. interests in the Middle East:

It should be obvious to every U.S. policymaker by now that Netanyahu’s cabinet, one that you described as one of the most “extreme” you’ve ever encountered, has its mind set on two dismantling projects.

One is to dismantle the power of the Supreme Court to rein in this government’s extreme agenda, and the other is to dismantle the Oslo peace process and its road map for a two-state solution, in order to pave the way for a unilateral Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Oslo has been a cornerstone of America’s Middle East policy since 1993.

These twin dismantlings are interconnected: the Jewish supremacists in Netanyahu’s cabinet need to get the Supreme Court out of the way in order to carry out their plans to annex the West Bank. Such a move could easily destabilize Jordan, as it would likely push more and more Palestinians there and change its fragile demographic balance. Jordan is the most important buffer state in the region for the U.S., which operates from Jordanian territory, in collaboration with Jordan, to deal with U.S. security threats from Syria and western Iraq, where ISIS forces continue to operate.

At the same time, Mr. President, you are wrestling with one of the biggest decisions ever involving U.S. strategy in the Middle East: whether to meet Saudi Arabia’s requests for a formal security guarantee from America, for a U.S.-overseen civilian nuclear program and for access to some of the most advanced U.S. arms. In return for this, Saudi Arabia would normalize its relations with Israel (provided that Israel makes some concessions to the Palestinians) and limit its collaboration with China.

It would be both difficult and unfortunate to get such a deal through Congress without strong support from Democrats in the Senate. As you know, Mr. President, Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman are two of the least popular world leaders among progressive Democrats, especially considering the way Netanyahu, over the past decade, moved to make support for Israel a Republican cause and spurned the embrace of secular American Jews for that of Christian evangelicals instead.

In short, winning enough support among Democrats to forge this complex deal with Saudi Arabia will be a huge lift on a good day; it will be even harder if Netanyahu neuters the Israeli Supreme Court — undermining our shared values of an independent judiciary — and moves ahead with plans to annex the West Bank. And without you as president, such a deal would be virtually impossible, because very few Democrats in the Senate would support it if it was pushed by a Republican president. In short, the window for this deal is small.

Moreover, in 2016 you and President Barack Obama signed a 10-year, $38 billion agreement to enhance Israel’s military. Are we supposed to just sit back and watch silently while that military — which we have made such a huge investment in to amplify our power projection in the Middle East — fractures over efforts to restrict the power of the Israeli Supreme Court? That would be a disaster for us and for Israel, which has real enemies like Iran and Hezbollah on its doorstep.

Also, we can already see that the extreme behavior of this Israeli government in expanding settlements in the West Bank is beginning to damage the historic relations forged by President Donald Trump between Israel and the U.A.E., Bahrain and Morocco with the Abraham Accords. All three Arab countries have been forced to cool their diplomatic ties with Israel.

Which leaves me to make a more minor comment, but important to me, anyway. I see a glaring failure on the part of U.S. Jewish authorities here. I suspect that Biden’s move to pick Friedman as his (able and well respected) messenger was calculated to reach the ears and minds of U.S. Jewry, especially those who are too apathetic or too hoodwinked by Netanyahu and Kohelet to reduce their ideological and financial support for this mess. It might have also been calculated for the benefit of the Jewish left (or, really, any left) that just waits to hear of more scandals to tarnish Israel completely, failing to distinguish between the government and its massive opposition.

This is not solely the audience’s fault: Before Friedman’s important reporting on this, U.S. coverage of recent Israel affairs tended to equate Israel’s 37th government with Israel itself. Generally speaking, U.S. media is very domestically focused compared to, well, every other country in the world, and on the rare occasions it reports on foreign affairs, it does so in an infantilizing and paternalistic way. To be fair, Netanyahu has been in government for so long that, for the ill-informed U.S. populace, it’s easy to identify him with the country he’s hijacked. Coverage of this mess has really diverged: U.S. newspapers extensively cover harm to Palestinian towns and villages (with good reason! Israeli media grossly and criminally downplays these horrors!) but remains mostly silent about the size and courage of the anti-government protest movement. To get a better idea of what is not being properly reported, imagine that half the U.S. had marched in the anti-Trump protests and risked serious violence by police and right-wing goons. The temperatures here are in the high 90s and, nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of people have walked by foot to Jerusalem, for days, to protest, and have taken over a park near the Knesset to continue their operations. Some have been injured, seriously even, by police water hoses and horses (poor, sensitive, gregarious creatures, again dragged into the depravity of homo sapiens.)

The outcome of all this is all too obvious to me, having lived in the United States for more than two decades. Pretty much every Israeli American has coped with hostile sentiments from both the right and the left. I won’t tire you with my “lived experience” of bigotry and ugliness, in some cases seriously career harming, because we don’t really need more earnest, whiny confessionals, nor will I get dragged into the tiresome and intractable problem of whether these noxious sentiments are antisemitic, anti-Zionist, or anti-Israeli (this is open to interpretation, and the sentiment is misguided and its expression sickening either way.) The bottom line is this: the more unconscionable governmental behavior takes place unchecked and unchallenged by Jewish authorities abroad, and the more Israeli consulates throughout the U.S. parrot it and defend it, the more justified and less objectionable these bigotries will be.

This has several corrosive implications. First, it means far fewer business opportunities, especially in tech, for Israeli companies. Second, it means that the unspoken but quite obvious sentiment that there seem to be “too many of us” in intelligentsia will strengthen and become spoken (back to the “quota system” in university admissions?) Third, it will unfairly and counterproductively target precisely the demographics that are doing what they can to oppose these travesties (this is why I’ve always thought BDS incredibly foolish when applied to academics and/or journalists. And yes, I’ve been on the receiving end of that nonsense as well.)

There are a few things Jewish leadership in the U.S. should be doing right now:

Speak out against all this. Yes, your congregation can and should have at least as much of an opinion about this as it does about Ukraine and Iran. You have a voice. Some of you have Biden’s ear. Sure, your lefty, scrappy, civil-rightsy temple/shul/congregation can marinate in the same advocacy that any progressive organization in the U.S. does–the usual DEI talking points and capitalizing on domestic controversies. Your duty is to expand your congregation’s parochial concerns and figure out how to talk to and about Israel.

Put your money where your mouth is. If you are funding think tanks like Kohelet, stop it immediately. Even Kohelet’s nauseating captains are horrified by the monster they helped create. Instead, put your money, openly and explicitly, in the service of the protest organizations. My friends are being brutalized by cops and fascist goons to cultivate a safe, democratic haven for you and yours. Help them.

Israel is not a fun summer camp for your kids. Stop sending them to Birthright which, at best, sickens them about the settler and antimiscegenation propaganda they are subjected to, and at worst, converts them to be Netanyahu supporters.

Dissent, even abroad, is patriotic. Join a local protest. I’ve seen people express precious qualms about how they don’t have a “right” or a “say” in Israel. And yet, when horrors happen elsewhere in the world you speak up and donate. What I keep hearing from my friends in Israel is how heartened they are when they see pictures from protests around the world.