How Bar Applicants with Criminal Records Experience the Moral Character Determination

My paper “Moral Character: Making Sense of the Experiences of Bar Applicants with Criminal Records” is out from the Manitoba Law Journal. It is an interview-based study of bar applicants, bar officials, and ethics attorneys, and the way they experience and process their pasts and presents via the California Bar’s moral character determination. The journal is open source, so you’re all welcome to read the full thing (which mostly speaks through my interviewees’ voices) but for those pressed for time, here are just a few of my findings:

  1. The most dominant emotion that arose in the interviews was shame, stemming from the juxtaposition of my interviewee’s pasts and their elite professional futures. My interviewees, most of whom had managed to
    morph their self-identity to conform to their new status as candidates for the legal profession, were reduced by the process into their former shoes as convicts and/or prisoners.
  2. The bar process exacerbated the shame. The stringent requirements of accuracy in disclosure are obtuse to the difficulties of recreating unsettled adolescent pasts, and the choreography of the hearings (no support for the applicants, cross examination styles, etc.) was described by six of my interviewees, without any prompting from me, as “the worst experience of my life.” This, mind you, included people who had done time in jail and/or juvie.
  3. There was a striking contrast between the Bar’s framing of remorse as monolithic and absolute and the much more complex ways in which people described their feelings about their past crimes. The certainty that bar officials can detect insincerity is not borne by empirical science, which casts very serious doubt on anyone’s ability to tell true from false remorse. Moreover, the mediocre community theater aspect of the hearings does not leave room for people to discuss their experiences with true insight and nuance, and they know this, and it frustrates them. Moreover, cultural performance/presentation stands in the way of communicating remorse in a way that will be properly “read” by officers of a largely white, elite, male profession.
  4. The demographic effects of professional exclusion from the bar are largely unknown because, until recently, the bar didn’t even collect data on the race/class of people and how they fared in the moral character process (we do have evidence that black male lawyers are significantly discriminated against in disciplinary proceedings.) White applicants felt that their deviance and alienation was unseen because it wasn’t part of the usual demographics boxes; applicants of color felt that they were doubly deviant and “otherized.”
  5. There is a lot of hubris, which echoes the hubris I found when I studied parole hearing, in the assumption that the key to rehabilitation is the performance of psychic excavation in front of a panel of strangers. This is nonsense from a research standpoint. We know that rehabilitation is what rehabilitation does: people who are holding down jobs and going through law school in good standing are great prospects for professional success–and they don’t necessarily overlap with people who give a convincingly weepy performance in front of 4-7 people in suits. Specifically, the bar ignores established, robust findings from life-course criminology according to which just going through and finishing law school is in itself a strong indicator of desistance.
  6. The bar frequently diagnoses substance abuse issues and forces people through substance abuse programs. The interviewees themselves report that they found some value in the programs even though they didn’t actually have a substance abuse problem. I don’t know whether this reflects people in denial about their problems, overcautiousness on the part of the bar, or both.
  7. Even as people experience joy and relief at their eventual admission to the bar, the experience continues to haunt them and adds stress to their professional and personal lives. The extent to which people are open about their backgrounds after their successful admission to the bar varies widely, with public interest lawyers much more open and corporate lawyers much more circumspect.
  8. What the bar views as uniformly negative baggage is actually a rich and important asset to the profession. My interviewees talked about their experiences as a catalyst for their decision to pursue justice for clients and about their deep understandings of injustice and oppression. But treating criminal records as liabilities, rather than resources, we are missing on an important opportunity to make the bar more receptive and service-oriented to clients who would greatly benefit from their lawyers’ empathy and compassion, through professional diversification beyond the usual census boxes and through education of the profession as a whole.
  9. Even though my interviewees regarded their law schools–and especially their faculty–as sources of empowerment and good advice, there’s more law schools can do. We can alert people, in law school application forms, that accuracy in describing their backgrounds is key to being regarded as honest and forthright later, in the bar admission process. We can give people access to their admissions package when they prep for the moral character. And we can devote a smidgeon of the immense energy we’ve devoted to lowering the bar passage rate to advocating for our students with criminal records.





Counseling Criminal Clients on Immigration: A Tall Order

In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky. Padilla, a long-time legal permanent resident of the United States and a Vietnam veteran, was caught with drugs in Kentucky. His lawyer advised him to take a plea deal and told him not to worry about the immigration consequences of the conviction because “he’s been in the country for so long.” Lo and behold, the conviction triggered immigration consequences and Padilla was subject to mandatory deportation.

In a surprising departure from its usual approach to the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine, the Court found that the defense attorney provided advice that fell beneath the minimum professional requirements and also prejudiced the client, thus failing the test from Strickland v. Washington. Justice Stevens’ opinion explains that immigration consequences of criminal conviction (“collateral” consequences) are often much more serious than the punishment meted out by the criminal justice system. In his words:

We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty”; but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature. . . deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century. . . And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. . . . Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult.  

Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.

All of which is true: deportation is, indeed, a life-altering penalty, and clients must absolutely take it into account when crafting their trial strategy. But where does this leave defense attorneys, who have had to learn an entire new field of law, rife with hypertechnical distinctions, arcane definitions, and jurisdictional messiness?

For the uninitiated, I’ll just say that the terms used by the INA and other immigration legislation do not mean what defense attorneys would be justified in thinking they mean. A “conviction” under the INA is not necessarily a conviction under state law. An “aggravated felony” under the INA need not be aggravated, nor a felony. “Drug crimes”, “domestic violence”, “firearm”, mean very different things in the immigration context than they do under state law. And don’t even get me started on crimes of moral turpitude, the meaning of which is so vague and fluid that immigration courts still refer to a legal dictionary from 1914. Unconvinced? How about a Jamaican citizen and legal permanent US resident busted for having 1.3 oz of marijuana facing deportation and having to take his case all the way to the Supreme Court to clarify whether this counts as an “aggravated felony”? Nor weird enough for you? Then why should it take a certiorary to the Supreme Court to save from deportation a mathematics professor–Green Card holder from Tunisia–caught with a sock containing four orange pills, who got nailed under Kansas law not for the pills, but for possession of the sock?

The point I’m trying to make is not that U.S. immigration law is nuts (that should be obvious), but rather that, in 2010, expecting garden variety defense attorneys to master all this, complete with all the contradictions and differences, was a tall order. Many people in the civil rights community (me included) hailed Padilla for finally drawing attention to the horror that collateral consequences can bring onto a person’s life. But what if Padilla completely backfired, and what we’ve created is an invitation to confusion at best and malpractice at worst?

Consider this: None of the criminal procedure bail-to-jail courses I am familiar with, including mine (this is going to change as of the next time I teach it), includes a crimmigration unit. Not all law schools even offer a crimmigration class, and of course if they do it’s not mandatory. The bar doesn’t test on immigration and certainly not on crimmigration. I did an informal poll among my former students who practice as defense attorneys. Those who work at public defender offices are lucky in that good, conscientious outfits have prioritized hiring immigration experts (this does not dispense with the Padilla requirement, because presumably the ethical responsibility is still the public defender’s, but at least it offers the clients correct advice.) Those who work as private attorneys, or in smaller outfits such as alternate public defender offices in rural places, are left completely in the lurch. They rely on charts and lists such as this one, or they’ll refer the clients to immigration attorneys, but that means that people who are already in dire financial straits incur even more costs. At least one person admitted to me that they pass on cases with immigration consequences because they fear ethical violations and don’t want to do a bad job, and while this reluctance is understandable, one wonders where that leaves clients with immigration issues (who are already among the weakest, most disenfranchised folks in the system) collectively. More commonly (and also disturbing)–my former students admitted their immense discomfort when counseling people not to take good deals, or to go to trial with a very flimsy chance of success, or to take ridiculous deals that are immigration workarounds. They were (understandably) confused about whether advising their client about the least of all evils–taking a suboptimal criminal justice strategy to save them immigrationwise–was ethically clean, even when realistically sound. They also expressed frustration when dealing with ill-informed (at best) or callous (at worst) prosecutors who chide them for asking for something “special” or “preferable” for a client in risk of deportation.

In other words: This is not good.

I have a few thoughts about this. The first is that a solid empirical study of Padilla‘s impact on criminal practice is absolutely essential. This would require a survey of a large group of defense attorneys about how Padilla altered their criminal practice, as well as in-depth interviews with examples. This stuff will have to be triangulated with what we know about criminal representation, to check whether the additional burdens on defense attorneys have resulted in worse access to justice for noncitizen defendants.

The second is that all of us who teach criminal procedure in law schools–I’m going to start this and my chartacourse electronic casebook is available for you to use–have got to revise our curriculum to include a basic crimmigration unit. I’m thinking something between 6-8 hours covering the categorical approach, aggravated felonies, crimes of moral turpitude, some more specific removal categories, and basic situations in which one’s client might interface with the immigration system. In addition, of course, specialty crimmigraiton courses must be offered in every law school that purports to certify ethical defense attorneys for practice. The bar exam, for all its imperfections, can add immigration law to the list of covered subjects, and this would be relatively easy to do in the MBE because it’s federal law.

This is not a perfect solution, given that immigration law changes frequently and is subject to administrative whims (even when not dealing with someone as unhinged as the current occupant of the White House). Because of that, my third thought is that, in offering and taking CLEs, priority must be given to crimmigration updates. If and when we establish a defense bar, crimmigration proficiency has to be prioritized.

Same deal, by the way, for prosecutors: Larry Krasner’s initiative in forming an immigration unit at the D.A.’s office is an essential tool for any prosecutorial outfit that purports to give people what they deserve, rather than indirectly bring about grossly disproportionate punishment. Immigration is not an externality: it is part and parcel of the person’s fate, and has to be treated as such by the D.A.’s office.

If you are a defense attorney and have encountered immigration issues in your criminal practice, I would love to hear from you in the comments.

Facing Criminal Charges to Save Animals, Part IV: Planning Legal Strategy

Image result for animal activists in court
Australian animal rights activists protesting during a criminal
trial of an activist for trespassing an animal culling operation.

Part I
Part II
Part III

Trials of animal rights activists can be seen as the site of convergence for two very different legal events: a criminal process against an individual charged with a crime, in which the individual faces the prospect of conviction and punishment (and the dilemmas involved in going to trial vs. pleading guilty), and a landmark case for animal rights. By contrast to impact litigation on issues of animal cruelty, though, the latter meaning is a bit more indirect: the accused are pointing the finger at their own accusers as lawbreakers (of anti-cruelty laws), perpetuators of illegalities (through the pursuit of ag-gag laws that might be struck down as unconstitutional), and moral transgressors (through engaging in cruelty.) This duality in the function of the trial has complicated implications as to the legal strategy employed by the activists.

To begin, there is the choice of legal representation. Cases pursued as impact litigation might attract the attention and services of organizations such as the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) or animal law clinics at law schools (such as the program here at Harvard.) As Bruce Wagman explains here, there’s often a crossover between the litigation and the academic world in this field (Also see this great piece by Kathy Hessler). But most of what these organizations do is litigate with the animals as clients, as it were (now there’s an interesting issue of animal personhood), against factory farms, laboratories, zoos, amusement parks, etc., and they might find it difficult to litigate with a human lawbreaker as a client. This problem might reflect a more general rift in the animal rights community between the “moderates” and the “radicals”: Taimie Bryant writes about this rift, and the hesitation of the former to get behind the latter to provide legal representation, in this piece. There is also the more mundane issue of legal specialization: is it best to hire a criminal lawyer, or an animal rights advocate, for a criminal case involving animal rights advocacy? And how might the choice of representation inform the issues to highlight at the trial? This might also bring out interesting attorney-client conversations (and potentially disputes) as to the value of provocative strategies. 

The activists on trial seek support, financial and otherwise, and the emphasis on one aspect of the case over another might impact the sources of said support. Presenting oneself as an idealistic, otherwise normative person in risk of a considerable prison sentence might be a persuasive strategy in obtaining support on a personal basis from sympathetic people, but it also centers the person, rather than the suffering animals, in the debate. Presenting the criminal case as an effort to produce a landmark outcome is also fairly complicated. If the activists are seeking a jury trial, even in the happy event that they are acquitted, they will not obtain a reasoned, written decision supporting animal personhood and rights (or even animal welfare), and it might be anyone’s guess whether the acquitting verdict is the product of legal analysis or jury nullification due to sympathy for the defendants. So, is the desired outcome a conviction, followed by a reversal on appeal with a written judicial opinion? And if so, how might that affect the ways in which support is sought? 
Image may contain: 24 people, including Almira Tanner, Matt Johnson and Jon Frohnmayer, people smiling, people standing
Activists packing the court at Rachel Ziegler and Jon Frohnmayer’s
trial for open rescue activities, Sep. 9, 2019.
Photo credit: Paul Picklesimer on Facebook.
And what about behavior during the criminal trial? Is filling the courtroom with supporters wearing animal rights t-shirts a winning strategy, or might it prove a turnoff to a jury, especially in a rural farming area? Again, the answer might lie in the question what the activists are trying to achieve at trial.

And then there is the legal strategy itself. The endgame for some (albeit not all) animal liberationists is some recognition of animal personhood. There are fierce debates in the literature about how to conceptualize animal personhood, of course. The granddaddy of animal liberation theory, Peter Singer, seemed revolutionary when the book came out, but in light of later writings on the topic, his writing on food and medical experimentation does allow for some exceptions. Tom Regan’s take on animal personhood relies on the animals’ cognition. In their provocative comparison of the animal rights and pro-life movements, Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf rely on the concept of sentience. And  perhaps the most radical formulation of animal personhood is Gary Francione‘s abolitionist theory, which finds no exceptions to the prohibition against using animals for any purpose. And against these philosophical theorists, whose views are, perhaps best articulated as biocentric, we have the ecocentric views of environmental ethical thinkers, for whom the perpetuation of a species or an ecosystem might be more valuable than the protection of individual animals (see more about this debate in a post I wrote a while ago in my oft-neglected cooking blog, of all places.) The big question is – to what extent would prospective jurors need to “buy” any of these formulations of animal personhood, be they strong or weak, to find that the necessity defense applies and the activists were justified in saving the animals? Since the necessity defense requires a balance of harms, is it necessary that the harm be suffered by someone who has some sort of legal status, some sort of claim to rights? Or are rights and suffering fundamentally different? And to what extent will the activists’ lawyers expect jurors to parse out these different theories? Again, Helena Silverstein’s wonderful Unleashing Rights is relevant here: as she points out in other legal contexts, “lawyers in the movement rarely speak of animal rights in the courtroom.” But importantly, “rights talk itself is not out of bounds in the courtroom. When rights talk is used, however, it is not in the form of animal rights but in the form of human rights. . . lawyers and movement organizations advance human rights claims such as the First Amendment right to freedom of speech in order to promote animal rights.” Is this true in the criminal context as well?
Finally, given the jury’s power to nullify (big debates here about what jurors should do when confronted with unjust laws or their application), there is the question of whether the activists’ lawyers should invest in crafting their arguments within existing law (that is, arguing that the necessity defense, as currently framed, applies to open rescue) or changing the law (that is, arguing that the necessity defense should change because the current conceptualization of animal suffering/rights/personhood in law is insufficient or unjust.) What the lawyers choose to do is also a question of jurisdiction: there might be some states in which it is easier to work within the interpretation of the necessity defense, and those might, ironically, be places in which the defense is not codified, which might create a first-impression situation that gives the lawyers an interesting blank canvas to argue rights and personhood. 
But underlying these important considerations is an important feature of the criminal process: pursuing animal rights through the criminal process means that there is a human individual who might face conviction, and even incarceration, at the end of the day. My last blog post on the project discusses that.

Part V

CA Bar Hangs Red Scarlet Letters on Its Members

I just saw this absolutely horrible story on the Mercury news. It’s ridiculously headlined, “Is Your Lawyer a Crook?” And goes on to tell us:

What do you call up to 10 percent of lawyers in California? 

Convicted criminals. 

And that’s no rotten-lawyer joke. 

That’s the eye-popping new estimate by the agency that licenses them.
Of California’s 190,000 active attorneys, as many as 19,000 may have unreported criminal activity, from DUIs to more serious offenses, according to the State Bar of California. 

For the first time in California, all active lawyers will have to submit to having their fingerprints live-scanned or taken the old-fashioned way rby April 30 of next year under the plan the state Supreme Court is expected to approve in the coming weeks. The prints will be fed into the state Department of Justice’s database, and previous convictions will be reported to the Bar — as well as all future arrests. 

“If you have an attorney convicted, let’s say of fraud, you would want to know it,” said Leah T. Wilson, the Bar’s executive director, adding that the proposal evolved as Bar starts to “pay more attention to our public protection mission.”

Gosh, it’s almost as if Leah T. Wilson doesn’t really believe that the California criminal justice system is tasked with… what’s the word? Rehabilitation.

I speak from experience. As a law professor in California I teach hundreds of people every year. Given the high percentage of Californians that we incarcerate, inevitably some of my students have criminal records and have spent some time behind bar. As a consequence, they face an uphill battle with their moral character application, a component of their application to the bar. The application requires complete honesty, about expunged records as well as live ones, and undergoes an extreme degree of scrutiny, which people sometimes have to explain in letters and in hearings at the bar court. I’ve now testified in two bar trials and written four letters of recommendations on behalf of people with criminal records who want to be admitted or readmitted to the bar.

The bias, stigma, and ignorance–not just of the public, but of the bar itself–is breathtaking. At the bar trials in which I testified, I experienced what could only be described as a mediocre community theatre production of a morality tale. Grown people, who have matured and learned from their mistakes, have to recite their contrition. Parole and gubernatorial decisions to release people after decades of introspection and remorse are doubted and ridiculed. Skeletons are dragged out of closets to haunt people for mistakes they did as juveniles.

Honestly, after undergoing the tribulations of punishment in California, sometimes the wringer of repeated parole hearings (and gubernatorial reversals,) and on top of that, the moral character ordeal at the bar, anyone left standing is bound to be so much more thoughtful, reflective, and humble, than various so-called “moral characters” without a criminal record. Anyone with a substance abuse problem would have had time to sort it out and would be so much more mature about it than some so-called “moral character” who is still drinking or snorting, but whose record is squeaky clean. I would so much prefer to have someone from the former category as my lawyer than someone from the latter. But the general public, who is woefully misinformed by articles such as this one about who is a “crook” and who isn’t, would not necessarily make that choice, and that is a horrible injury to do to someone, not to mention a horrible privacy violation.

This also raises the issue of the elitism of the profession. We disproportionately incarcerate folks of fewer means and darker skins. As a consequence, our population of lawyers with criminal records is likely to include a disproportionate percentage of people who came to the profession from humble backgrounds. If we also put additional barriers on their gainful employment in the way of revealing their personal and private histories to potential clients, we are just deepening that elitism.

The problem, of course, is not only with this atrocious decision of the CA bar to injure its own members; it is with the kind of journalistic reporting that makes this into salacious gossip material. Who the hell uses the word “crook” as a euphemism for a criminal record, like something out of a Damon Runyon short story? And who the hell uses lawyer jokes to talk about people who have gone through so much to redeem themselves and find a professional future?

Does rehabilitation actually mean anything to the bar, when it decides to admit folks back to its ranks and then backstabs them by reducing their employment prospects? This is not a move that “protects the public.” This is elitism, bigotry, and ignorance.